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ABSTRACT
With the expansion of Western power in the Par East in 
the nineteenth century, relations between China and Japan 
entered a new phase. For the first time, Chinese and Japan­
ese attitudes towards each other were related to an image of 
Western power. China and Japan became aware that they were 
part of the same entity which was being threatened with 
foreign control and engulfment. With this realization came 
the belief that as both countries had much in common, racially 
and culturally, they should work together to combat Western 
incursions. However, in adjusting themselves to the outside 
world, China and Japan conceived resentment, resolutions as 
well as ambitions. The comparable and yet different ways 
in which each country responded to the Western challenge 
created circumstances which prevented the realization of a 
special relationship.
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the changes in 
the nature of the argument for Sino-Japanese cooperation be­
tween 1595 and 1911. Particular reference is made to the 
attitudes of different groups of people who were not necessarily 
responsible for policy-making but whose views were nevertheless 
influential among the Chinese and Japanese populace. Chapter
I gives an account of the political setting in which the idea 
arose in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Chapter
II describes the changes in Japan's political life which both 
strengthened and challenged her belief in a closer relationship 
with China. Chapters III and IV deal with China's response
to and latter, rejection of Japanese guidance and leadership. 
Chapters V and VH look at Japan's rising status and power in 
East Asia, her search for a definite role in world politics 
as well as a position of supremacy on the Asian continent. 
Chapter VI gives an account of Japan's role in the educational 
development of China in this period which made up a significant 
part of the Japanese ictea of leading her Asian neighbours to 
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BACKGROUND OF THE ARGUMENT FOR SINO-JAPANESE COOPERATION : WESTERN 
ENCROACHMENT IN THE FAR EAST IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
This study looks at the development of the idea of cooperation between 
Japan and China from the first major war between the two countries in 
189^-1895 to the end of the Manchu dynasty in China and the last year of 
the Meiji era in Japan. The idea arose in the latter half of the nine­
teenth century mainly as a response to the threat of Western domination 
in the Far East. Advocates in both Japan and China in the period under 
discussion often made reference to the historical and cultural relationship 
which had existed between the two countries. A survey of the earlier 
relations between Japan and China would help to throw light on this theme 
which made up an important part of the argument for cooperation between 
the two countries.
The earliest evidence of relations between China and Japan can be
found in Chinese historical records of the Han dynasty around 100 B.C.
In the following seven centuries, there was little direct contact between
the two countries. In 6071 the first official envoy to the Chinese
court representing the whole of Japan arrived at the then capital of
Chinaj Lo-yang, where he presented a letter from his sovereign. The
opening words were "The Emperor of the sunrise country writes to the
Emperor of the sunset country." In the following year? the Japanese
mission took the return journey accompanied by two Chinese envoys sent
by the Sui Emperor. The letter which they brought w&s* couched in the
language usually held by the Chinese towards foreign states. Japan
(1)was treated as a vassal. This first Japanese envoy marked the begin­
ning of official relations between the two countries.
(1) G.B. Sansom, Japan, a Short Cultural History? London, 1962, P.87.
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In 6 0 8, the Chinese envoys left Japan, accompanied by a number of 
scholars chosen by the Japanese Prince to study Chinese learning. Japanese 
interest in Chinese culture reached a peak in the seventh and eighth 
centuries when China was flourishing under the T'ang administration.
Japanese trade and cultural missions were sent to the T'ang court.
Students travelled to China to learn the Chinese methods of administration 
and engage in the pursuits of artistic and intellectual learning. All 
this cultural borrowing contributed to the phase of achievement for 
Japanese civilization known as the Nara culture in the early eighth century.
Following this phase of cultural relations with the T'ang, a more 
native form began to develop in the Japanese culture and a reaction against 
direct borrowing grew up towards the end of the nineth century. The 
disruption of power and the failure of the political institutions of 
the T'ang dynasty in the beginning of the tenth century played a part 
in this slowing down of interest in things Chinese. Students stopped 
coming to China and for sometime, official relations were curtailed.
However, the commercial relations between China and Japan which had 
begun in the form of private trade in earlier periods continued to grow.
By the fourteenth century, the Ashifeaga rulers then in power in Japan 
were giving patronage to the booming continental trade which had greatly 
contributed to the economic power of the Shogunate. The Ming rulers 
of China in this period adopted a Confucianist attitude
towards the tributary system. In 1^05? the ruling Japanese Shogun, 
Yoshimitsu,accepted the status of a vassal of the Chinese Emperor.
The Bakufu hence acquired the monopoly of the China trade and received 
lavish gifts from the Chinese Emperors. In return, it was asked to 
suppress the piratical raids on the China coasts.
After the death of Yoshimitsu in 1 0^8, his son and grandson did 
not carry on the nominal tributary relationship with China. In the
mid-fifteenth century, the outbreak of internal wars in Japan and 
increasing dynastic struggles in China disrupted all official relations. 
Trade between the two countries also faltered but it continued on a 
private level, sponsored mainly by the Western daimyos aid often backed 
financially by Zen monasteries. By the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, however, this unofficial trade had also declined largely owing 
to the increasing activities of the Japanese pirates, often aided by 
Chinese rebels in the southern maritime provinces of China. In 1^59* 
the Chinese government ordered that the China coasts be closed to Japanese 
traders but illicit trade and piratical activities continued. The 
closure put an end to the offical relations between the two governments.
In 1588, Hideyoshi introduced a law to tighten up control of the 
trade profits and suppress the piratical plundering along the China 
coasts. This measure marked the beginning of a more positive policy 
towards the Asian continent. In his position of power, Hideyoshi 
contemplated expansion on the continent. His plan was to establish 
an empire stretching between Japan and the Philippine Islands. The 
Korean campaign (1592 - 1598) ended in great losses for both the Chinese 
and Japanese armies and fleets. Neither side could claim a decisive 
victory. Hideyoshi had ordered the withdrawal of the Japanese troops 
from Korea before he died in August 1598. For Japan, it was a futile 
campaign, there was no territorial or financial spoils.
Official relations between China and Japan were again severed as 
a result of the Korean campaign. But a Chinese trading colony in Kyushu 
had grown up and it continued its pursuit of legitimate trade as well 
as smuggling. When in 1639 Japan adopted a policy of limited contact 
with the outside world, a restricted flow of trade was also carried 
out by way of the island of Tsushima to Korea and through the Ryukyus 
to China. The Ryukyu Islands and Korea thus constituted points of
contact between Japan and China up to the Meiji Restoration.
Throughout the centuries, Chinese cultural influences had continued 
to infiltrate into Japan through monks and traders. Confucianism was 
introduced to Japan by Zen Buddhist monks in the sixth century. But 
it was not until the Tokugawa period in the seventeenth century that a 
modified form of Confucianism played a decisive role in Japanese political 
life. The Tokugawa rulers found this neo - Confucianism compatible with 
their political philosophy. In teaching loyalty, piety and in general, 
the correctness of relations between the individual and the state, the 
Confucian philosophy found common ground with the political needs of the 
Tokugawa Bakufu. The military classes and retainers of the Bakufu were 
persuaded to study the philosophy. The Japanese government hoped that 
in this way their military zeal might be channelled into the right direction 
and they would become loyal and dutiful subjects of the Bakufu. In the early 
years of the Tokugawa rule, Confucianism contributed greatly to the 
maintenance of peace and order in the Japanese society.
What applied to relationships within society applied also to relations 
between states in the old world of East Asia. The civilization moulded 
by the dogmas of a Confucian hierarchical order was not one in which equality 
between states had made much headway. Up until the end of the nineteenth 
century, China's superiority was accepted by her tributary states in East 
Asia. Although Japan had only accepted the appearance of a vassal state 
for a brief period and was never quite brought to heel, she was for 
centuries overshadowed by China's greatness. Most Japanese acknowledged 
China's superiority in strength and culture and regarded her as the source 
of Asian civilization. The sense of kinship with China and Asia in general, 
however, remained in the background in Japanese thinking with regard to her 
neighbours. It was not until they were confronted with the threat of 
foreign incursions from outside Asia that the Japanese became aware of the 
need for cooperation with the other Asian countries and in particular China
in protest against the West.
X X X
Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, the Western powers 
began to expand their interests and influence into the Far East. The 
disparity in military power and technology between the Western and Eastern 
countries made it impossible for the latter to resist the Western advance.
As a result of the First Anglo - Chinese war of 1839 - l842, China was 
forced to enter into an unequal treaty relationship with the powers, 
characterized by the enforced opening of treaty ports, extraterritoriality, 
the most - favoured - nation clause and tariff fixed by treaty.
The decade following China's defeat saw the Western diplomats and 
naval officials who had been active in China busy putting into effect 
a similar treaty system in Japan. The Japanese who had for almost three centuries 
isolated themselves from the rest of the world now yielded to diplomatic 
pressure from the West and emerged to take part in international politics. 
Commodore Perry's treaty with Japan in 185^ and the second American treaty 
of 1858 were followed by Japanese treaties with England, Russia, the 
Netherlands and France. Each of these treaties imposed on Japan 
obligations which were not reciprocated by the Western powers. From 
this Western encroachment on the East (seiryoku tozen), a sense of 
national danger arose. Japan discovered that, compared to the powers 
of Europe and America, she was so weak that she invited interference, 
defeat and possible control.
This sense of insecurity surrounding Japan's national independence 
gave rise to the quest for equality with the West. The sonno - joi 
movement of the Bakumatsu was a reaction to this external pressure.
The West's forceful opening of Japan was seen as an affront to the
dignity of the Japanese Emperor and the integrity of the national polity 
As the people lost faith in the ruling classes who had been inadequate 
in dealing with the violation of the country by foreigners, they looked 
to the imperial institution which for almost three centuries had been 
obscured by the Bakufu. While "respect for the Emperor" (sonno) was a 
reaction to the danger threatening Japan's national polity, "expulsion 
of the foreigners" (joi) was an expression of the desire for diplomatic 
independence for Japan.
The movement carried with it the characteristics of a nationalist 
revolution and provided the ideological preparation for the Meiji 
Restoration. The goal of this nationalist revolution was reforms in 
the internal institutions with the view to achieving independence and 
expansion for the nation. In order to establish a concept based on the 
principle of national independence, the ruling classes of the early 
Meiji period tried to instil the idea of Japan, the "sacred country" 
(shinkoku) in the minds of the people. This image of Japan as the 
"chosen country" was intended to prepare the people to resist foreign 
incursions and preserve the national essence. From the beginning, the 
Meiji leaders sought to cultivate in the people a sense of patriotism 
and pride in the power of the nation. Hence the imperial government 
vowed in March, 1868, to "explore tens of thousands of miles of the seas 
and spread Japan's national prestige to the four corners of the earth ..
Many Japanese writers and ideological leaders of the Bakumatsu and 
Kaikoku period shared a desire to expand Japanese influence and 
prestige on the Asian continent. Prompted by an anxiety about Japan's
(2) Oka Yoshitake, "Kokuminteki dokuritsu to Kokkarisei" 
(National Independence and Raison d'etat) in 
Kindai Nihon Shisoshi Koza, Tokyo, 1961, VIII, p.12.
national existence vis-a-vi.i3 the Western, especially British and Russian 
expansions in the Far East, not a few believed that Japan had to gain 
a foothold on the continent and in particular, Korea. International 
politics was explained solely by power and the strength and power of a 
country were based almost entirely on the extent of a country's
(3)territories. They contended that if the Western powers used force,
Japan had to do the same. What Japan lost to the West by trade had to 
be recovered in territories on the Asian continent. For decades after 
the Restoration, the argument for the invasion of Korea (seikan ron) 
was a recurrent theme in Japanese politics.
The Klisshin \eikel ron
At the same time, the threat of Western engulfment of the East made
many Japanese conscious of the need to ally themselves with the other 
Asian countries against the Western enemy. Chinese defeats at the hands of 
the Western powers could only have sapped the confidence of many Japanese 
continental expansionists and made them hesitant about Japan's strength.
Up to the Sino-Japanese war of 189A - l893» the Japanese regarded
China as a strong power. If China, or Japan, for that matter, could 
not withstand Western aggression single-handedly, the two countries 
should join hands to fight for their national independence. Many 
began to talk of Sino-Japanese cooperation (rjisshin teikei) in the 
Bakumatsu period. Among the earliest advocates of this icLca Were Sate 
Kjobuhijfo, Hi nano kunicrvii and hatsu Kaistiu . Some like Oshima To mo in U'hc iv/ere 
in favour of the invasion of Korea were also supporters of the N/isshin teiKei ron
was
Although the Nisshin teikei ron had ho an motivated largely by fear 
and considerations of political necessity, it had also been inspired by
(3) ibid., p . 1 A.
(A) ibid., p.13 and 1?.
Also Watanabe Ikujiro, Nihon Kinsei Gaiko-shi, Tokyo, 1938, p.136.
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the fact that Japan had extensively inherited Chinese culture in the 
past centuries and that the two countries belonged to one race as distinct 
from the white Western nations. It was also because of this consideration 
for cultural and racial affinity between the countries of the Far East 
that some Japanese included Korea-despite her being a weak country - in 
their argument for Asian solidarity against the West. Moreover, many 
in Japan were aware that Asian countries needed to strengthen themselves 
and learn Western technology before they could hold out against Western 
aggression. The dream of Japan as an advanced and strong nation leading 
her neighbours had been an important element in the argument for 
cooperation between the Asian countries since the Bakumatsu period.
Thus in 1863? Katsu Kaishu of the Bakufu Navy told Kido Koin:
"What we ought to do is to send out ships from our 
country and impress strongly on the leaders of all 
Asian countries that their very existence depends 
on banding together and building a powerful navy, 
and that if they do not develop the necessary 
technology they will not be able to escape being 
trampled underfoot by the West. We should start with
Korea, our nearest neighbour, and then go on to 
include China." ^
Government leaders of the early Meiji period were particularly 
aware of the need for Japan to make technological progress such as 
had been attained by the Westerners. Iwakura, Okubo and Ito attached 
great importance to the consolidation of the internal administration 
of the country. They believed that this was the best way to attain
prosperity and strength for Japan. Like the advocates of the Seikan
ron, they were concerned with Japan’s national security. But they 
did not think that Japan's position could be strengthened by external 
expansion*. Instead, they argued that Japan should channel her energy
(5) Quoted in Marius B. Jansen, Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji 
Restoration, Princeton, 1961. p.165.
Katsu actually sailed to Korea but his plan ended unsuccessfully 
owing to the lack of positive support from the Bakufu.
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into internal reforms. As they were aware of British and Russian 
expansion* in the Far East? they were anxious that Japan should not 
allow her relations with China and Korea to deteriorate.^3'* Instead?
Japan should improve her relations with China and in particular? come 
to an agreement with the Chinese government on Korea.
It was largely because Japanese leaders of the early Meijiperiod regarded 
China as a power to be reckoned with and that some kind of cooperation 
should be fostered between the two countries that they took the initiative 
to come to an understanding with the Chinese government in 1870. In 
1 8 6 8? Councillor of state (sangi) Kido Koin had brought to the notice 
of Sanjo Sanetomi and Iwakura Tomomi his view that an invasion of Korea 
was necessary on the ground that the Korean government had to be repri­
manded for its stubborn attitude towards Japan. Kido's proposal was 
not taken seriously by the government because of the internal instability 
at the time. In l8?0j the issue was reopened when Kido appealed to 
Inoue Kaoru in the Home Ministry for support. This time Kido urged 
that Japan should negotiate with China on the Korean issue. His 
proposal received the support of many government officials especially 
Miyamoto Koichiro of the Gaimusho. The Gaimusho decided to send a 
mission to China headed by Yanagiwara to negotiate with the Chinese and 
drew up a plan comprising "Three clauses governing the policy towards 
Korea". The third clause stated:
"The mission to China will conclude an equal treaty 
with China* then go to Korea to open negotiations.
Should Korea show any signs of unwillingness to 
cooperate? Japan will correspond with China to arrive 
at a decision of how to deal with Korea? whether to 
settle the question in peace or with a war. This is 
what is called a policy of befriending the country 
further away and taking on a belligerent attitude 
towards the country nearer home..."67)
(6 ) See Watanabe Ikujiro? op.cit.? pp. I23ff.
(7) Quote d in P'eng Tse-chou? Meiji Shoki Nichi-Kan-Shin Kankei no Kenkyu. (Studies 
of relations between Japan? Korea and China in the early Meiji period)?
Tokyo? 1969i p.27.
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It would appear that the Gaimusho reckoned that it was necessary for 
Japan to arrive at an agreement with China before taking any actions 
regarding Korea.
The first Sino-Japanese treaty of friendship and commercial regulations 
was signed on 13th September, 1871. Tt provided for reciprocal extra­
territoriality and reciprocal treaty obligations. It was agreed that 
in both countries, trade was to be limited to the treaty ports. Both 
countries agreed to the mutual exchange of diplomatic and commercial 
agents. It was by and large, the first example of an 'equal - treaty1 
between Japan and China and marked the beginning of formal diplomatic 
relations between the two countries.
Article One provided for mutual non-aggression against each other's 
territorial possessions. Article Two provided for mutual good offices 
in case either of the contracting parties experienced injustice or 
wrong from a third country. This article appeared to open the way 
for a defensive alliance in the event of either country entering into 
military confrontation with one or more of the Western powers. It did 
in fact arouse the suspicion of some Western countries and the American 
charg'e d'affaires in Tokyo, De Long, expressed to the Japanese 
government his dissatisfaction with the inclusion of Article Two in
(ON
the treaty and urged the Gaimusho to remove it. 7 In May, 1872, the 
Gaimusho sent Yanagiwara back to China to negotiate certain changes 
in the treaty including the cancellation of Article Two. In the end, 
however, the article was not removed from the ratified treaty in l873i 
although it was never appealed to in the twenty years of its existence
(9)as a clause of alliance between the two countries.
(8 ) Dai Nihon Gaiko Bunsho (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Records) 
Tokyo, Vol. IV, pp. 236-237 .L a te r  volumes (from  V6L appear ur\d<sr t i t le ,  Nihon (ja tks&uruho
(9) T.F. Tsiang, "Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, 1870-189^M in 
Chinese Social and Political Science Review, Peking, Vol. XVII
(1933-193*0, p.12.
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Some historians think that Japan had intended to conclude a treaty 
with China based on the treaties concluded between China and the Western 
powers, thus giving Japan treaty rights equal to those given to the 
Western countries in China. It was only because Japan was not
strong enough to make China accede to such terms that she settled for 
an equal treaty with China.^ The fact that Japan had wanted to
include the most - favoured - nation clause in the treaty seemed to 
indicate that this had been the case. Also, Okuma's comment on Japan's 
proposals in the negotiations was also revealing. He thought that the 
rights and pivileges enjoyed by the European countries and America in 
China were results of victories in wars fought with China. As Japan 
did not yet have the strength to dictate to China, it was, in Okuma's 
opinion, absurd that she should demand the same rights and privileges 
from China.^1^
It would seem that the Japanese government was conscious of the
inequality in status between China and Japan with regard to Korea and
wanted to rectify the unequal relationship between the two countries.
Since Japan had been compelled to emerge from her isolation to enter
into diplomatic relations with the West, one of her most urgent policies
was to revise her unequal treaties with the Western countries. It was
conceivable that she had attempted in 1870 to apply the same principle in
reforming her relations with China. It was also possible that the Japanese
leaders were contemplating cooperation with China in defending Japan from
(12)
foreign aggression. An equal relationship was necessary before Japan
made any commitment towards this end.
( 1 0 ) See Ando Hikotaro, Nihon no Chugokukan, Tokyo, 1971, p.V?* 
and P'eng Tse-chou, op.cit., pp.27ff.
(1 1) Quoted in P'eng Tse-chou, op.cit., p.31.
( 1 2 ) Oka, op.cit.,pp.17-18.
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For almost three decades up to the Sino-Japanese war5 the Nisshin 
teikei ron carried considerable weight in the Japanese government's 
policy towards China. ’Iwakura Tomomi, minister of state to the 
Emperor from 1868 until his deaths was a staunch believer in the harmony 
of relations between Japan and China. Other government leaders 
including ItoJnoueand Okubo were also convinced that Japan's immediate 
concern was to strengthen her internal administration and a peaceful 
relationship with China was of prime importance. In 18?1^  Iwakura 
headed a mission to America and Europe and was aware of the difference 
between the technological progress of the Western countries and that of 
Japan. In 1873 he and Okubo maintained that Japan could not afford 
to commit herself in external ventures and objected strongly to the 
proposal to invade Korea.
Iwakura's conviction that Japan had to put emphasis on modernization 
was motivated by his fear of the West. He accepted that Japan's 
relations with the Western powers had to take first place in her foreign 
policies only because the latter had the upper hand. A memorandum on 
foreign affairs which he sent to Sanjo in 1869 pointed out that too 
many people had misunderstood the real meaning of Japan's policies 
of cordial relations with foreign powers. It said:
"Although we have no choice in having intercourse with 
the countries beyond the seas5 in the final analysis 
those countries are our enemies ... Day by day those 
countries develop their arts and their technology with 
a view to growing in wealth and power. Every country 
tries to become another country's superior. Country 
A directs its efforts at country B, Country B at Country C — 
they are all the same .. ."(13)
(15) Quoted in M.B. Jansen, "Modernization and Foreign Policy in 
Meiji Japan" in R.E. Ward, ed., Political development in 
Modern Japan, Princeton, 19 6 8, p.158.
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This reservation about Japan's relations with the early-developed
countries of the West was largely accountable for his advocacy of a
conservative policy towards China and Korea.
In l875i in a memorial to the throne, Iwakura emphasized the 
insecurity of Japan in a situation in which China was being threatened 
with possible annexation by Russia. He maintained that Japan had to 
befriend China so that the two countries could give each other help to 
ensure national integrity and co-existence. During the 1882 crisis in 
Korea, he pointed out to the foreign minister the bigger issue of Western
encroachment and the need for Japan to ally herself with China to
confront it. As he saw it, independence for Asia depended on Japan and 
China and no other country in Asia. He had faith in the potentialities 
of China to strengthen herself. It was unwise, in his opinion, for 
Japan and China to enter into a war over Korea. He cautioned the 
government not to commit itself too much in helping Korea to gain indepen­
dence as this, he maintained, would jeopardize the friendly relations
(1/f)
between Japan and China. A month later in the same year, Inoue
told Ito who was then in Europe his opinion on the policy towards China.
It was in the main similar to the proposal of Iwakura. He pin-pointed
the sweeping tide of Western encroachment in Asia and expressed his
desire to see not only China and Japan agreeing to overlook their existing
conflicts but the three countries, China, Japan and Korea cooperating
(15)with one another in the midst of this crisis.
Thus, when in 1 885, Ito concluded the Tientsin Convention with 
Li Hung-chang on the issue of Korea, the spirit of a peace-line policy 
existed towards China. This convention took place after an abortive 
coup within the Korean government when members of the pro-Japanese faction,
(14) Watanabe Ikujiro, op.cit., p.139
(15) ibid.
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calling themselves the Independent Party, attempted to topple the 
Chinese-dominated faction then in power. The Convention did not solve 
the question of Korean independence. It was concluded with Japan's tacit 
acknowledgment that China's historical relationship with Korea was 
superior to Japan's treaty relationship with Korea. Okuma's
Kaishinto, then in opposition, stood by the government in the Korean and 
Chinese problems. Okuma commended the peaceful policy of Ito and Incue 
as rightly the policy to pursue, from whichever angle one was to look at
(17)Japan's situation and destiny in the Far East.
This line of policy in which China was allowed a free hand to 
consolidate her influence in Korea was pursued at the risk of opposition
from radical Japanese supporters of the Korean Independent Party notably
_ _ _ __ some of
Oi Kentaro, Goto Shojir® and Itagaki Taisuke. In 1885, Oi and^his
followers clamoured to cross to Korea and deliver her from the corrupt
influence of the Chinese. They criticized the government at home for
having allowed Japan's national rights to be impaired and pressured the
Ito government into taking action to avenge the country's loss of prestige.
They wanted to introduce constitutional politics and reforms in the
internal administration of Korea. The government took a firm stand
throughout the crisis and in November, 18855 imprisoned Oi, Kobayashi
and several other dissidents.
For a decade after 18855 Japan's political influence in Korea was 
in decline. Russian influence began to appear in the Korean government 
after the Tientsin Convention* Anxiety over the infiltration of 
Russian influence moved foreign minister Inoue Kaoru, to propose that 
a special arrangement be made with China whereby the two governments
(16) ibid. p.1^ 0. This was maintained by Li Hung-chang throughout 
the negotiations. Li believed that China still had a stronger 
hand to play in the political affairs of Korea.
(17) ibid. p.1 2^ .
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could coordinate their polices towards Korea. The l880's also saw 
Japan very much occupied with attemps to carry out treaty reforms.
Inou..e was hoping that the Russian intervention in Korea might be warded 
off by encouraging China to enhance her leadership and control* that is, 
should a Sino-Japanese cooperative policy in Korea prove to be unreal­
izable .
jh e  S io inkan K a ip  ron
Throughout the l880's, Japan strove towards the goal of achieving
equality with the West and institutional, social and cultural modernization
was carried out. By contrast, China, and for that matter, Korea,
remained in their backward state of development. The 1884 war between
France and China ended again in defeat for China. The traditional belief
held by many Japanese in China's national strength began to be shaken.
After the mid - 1880's, Russia began to take a more ambitious attitude
towards international politics in the Far East. A feeling of unease
grew up concerning Korean and Chinese national independence which directly
affected that of Japan. 'Independence' for Korea gradually became
altered to 'dependence' as the Japanese politicians and writers became
convinced that Korea's backwardness and weakness made her too inviting
a prey for other powers. Similar considerations came into play to
transform hopes for cooperation with China to hopes for leadership of
reform in China and finally to 'protection' and coercion of a China
apparently incapable of playing her true role in international politics.
The Nisshin teikei ron gradually gave way to the argument for reforming
( 1 8 )China and Korea, or the Shinkan kaijo ron.
In the same period, activists in the popular rights movement (jiyu 
tninken undo) preached liberalism and democracy, adopting the radical
(18) Oka, op.cit., pp. 23ff.
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outlook of the idealistic move for Sino-Japanese cooperation. Up to 
the eve of the Sino-Japanese war, they challenged the domination of the 
Satcho oligarchs and their idealism stood in opposition to the conservatism 
represented by Iwakura and Ito. Their theory of internal democratisation 
and the identification of the destiny of the nation with that of the people, 
they maintained, was the only way to uphold the nation's independence from 
foreign domination. This liberal and reformist movement maintained a 
consistentlyAsian orientation. In addition to the question of Japan's
(19 )national independence, they talked of the revival of the Asian peoples.
Itagaki Taisuke, founder of the Jiyuto (the Liberal Party), claimed 
that the Party by no means restricted its aims to Japan but that it was 
dedicated to spreading the regenerating ideals of freedom and liberalism 
throughout China and Korea as well. He hoped for the reconstruction of 
China and Korea along the lines of European and American civilization 
and enlightenment (bummei-Kaika) and the introduction of democracy and 
liberalism into these countries as central to the question of achieving 
independence for Asia. The opening issue of the Toyo Jiyu Shimbun 
(Eastern Liberal News) appearing in 1881 with the founding of the 
Liberal Party contained an article written by Nakae Chomin. Nakae 
said that the objective of forming the party was to expand the natural 
liberty of the people of Japan and to extend the concept of the people's 
inherent liberty to the rest of the Asian countries. This constituted, 
he maintained, a part of the movement to achieve equal rights for the
peoples of the East, thus strengthening the solidarity among the nations
of Asia and erasing the injustice that had been done to them by the
w +- (2 0)Western powers.
(1 9) ibid. pp. 20-2 1.
(2 0) ibid. p. 2 1.
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Ueki Emori? another member of the Liberal Party and a founder of the
Koa Kai (Rise Asia Society)i applied the principle of
liberty and equality to Japan's relations with the other Asian countries
and maintained that all Asian countries had to be equal before sharing
joint responsibility in the East. Ueki's ultimate goal was the attainment
(21)of a utopian world government. That all Asian countries should
stand on an equal footing was also maintained by Oi Kentaro in 1885 when
he urged that Japan had to exert herself in the internal politics of
Korea in order to uphold the Korean Independent Party. He believed
that his Liberal Party 1 though already dissolved by 18855 and the Korean
Independent Party? then beginning to decline in influence? had the same
objective which was to give the Korean people their rights and happiness.
He was convinced that this could be achieved by introducing democracy into
Korea. Oi was seeking to rid the rest of Asia of "bureaucratic feudalism"
and in doing so? he believed that he was furthering greater Asian pros-
(22)perity as well as fighting the Tokyo government.
Sugita Teiichi took positive steps towards the realization of the 
revival of Asia. In his Koa Saku (Plan to revive Asia) which came out 
in 188 -^? he emphasized the importance of communication of knowledge among 
the Asian countries and the need for Japan to unite and cooperate with 
the people of other Asian countries. During the Franco-Chinese war of 
1884, he crossed to China and embarked on a project of reconstructing 
the country. With the support of other Jiyuto members like Nakae 
Chomin? Kurihara Ryoichi? Suehiro Shigeyasu? Ueki Emori and Kobayashi 
Kusuo? he set up the Toyo Gakukan (The Eastern School) in Shanghai with 
the aim of training the Chinese. He also felt that the people with
(21) Takeuchi Yoshimi? Ajia Shugi? GendaiNihon Shiso Taikei 9• 
Selected Works on Asianism? Tokyo? 1963? P- 9*
(2 2) ibid.? pp. 28-3 2.
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influence in China* either within or outside the government* needed to
be enlightened on the very question of China's territorial integrity.
He would have liked to see a diet system, modelled on that in Japan,
introduced into China. He had intended to implant the ideas of popular
rights and people's participation in government onto the continent,
believing that neither independence for Asia nor freedom for the East
(23)could become a reality without them.
The Shinkan kaijo v*on was also supported from another quarter repre­
sented by Arao Sei and Nezu Hajime. Their military background accounted 
for their awareness of the Western military might and the strategic 
importance k of Asia in a confrontation with R u s s ia .They believed that Chinavas in 
state of temporary degeneration but with help from Japan, she could still 
be saved from the West. This theory was very similar to the Jiyuto 
theory of Japanese guidance. Both Arao and Nezu regretted the fervour 
with which Japan was absorbing the Western civilization. In this respect, 
their outlook was very different from that of the Jiyuto members who 
tried to implant Western democratic ideas on Asian soil. Moreover,
Arao regretted that too little interest was shown by the Japanese govern­
ment in China. In 1 8 8 6, he went to China after he had been appointed 
to the General Staff. At Hankow, he set up an ostensibly mercantile 
establishment and assigned his men geographic sectors of investigation, 
thereby collecting extensive regional information. Supported by Nezu 
Hajime who was engaged in promoting educational activities in China 
through the Toa Dobun Shoin (East Asia Common Culture C o l l e g e A r a o  
set up a school in China to equip the students with the training to 
promote trading and commercial business between the two countries. Arao's 
declared mission was to establish peace in the Far East and save the world
from suffering. The first step towards this goal, he maintained, was
(2*f)the reconstruction of China. The Russian announcement of the
(23) Oka, op.cit., p. 2 2 . 
(2*0 ibid., p. 2 3.
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construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1887 strengthened his
conviction of the need for China to reform her internal affairs. In
1 8 9 0, he established the Sino-Japanese Trade Research Bureau (Nisshin
Boeki Kenkyusho) in Shanghai. But neither the school nor the bureau
received enough financial support from the government at home. Obsessed
with the idea of exploring and cultivating ties with China and rejecting
Westernization, Arao was one of the few individuals who dedicated their
lives to the cause of Asian revival. He firmly believed that the
potentialities of China - her expansive territories, rich resources,
her central position in Asia and in particular her naval strength - would
serve as great assets to both China and Japan if they would become allies
(25)in the battle against the West.
D u r in g the last decade of the nineteenth century, Japanese fear of
Western aggression and hope for cooperation between the Asian countries
persisted. An editorial entitled "A personal view of national defence”
which appeared in the Asahi Shimbun on 3 rd October, 189O, drew the public's
attention to the "Crisis in the Far East” caused by the "European invasion”.
It was time, the article said, for China and Japan to forget their
entanglements in the past and conclude a treaty of alliance so that their
(26)respective independence would be safeguarded in the future. There
was still faith in China's eventual awakening as was borne out by another 
editorial in the same paper, expressing optimism regarding the prospects
(25) From Arao's report on his mission to China 1886 -1 8 8 8 to the 
throne, written in 1889, in Nakashima Masao, compiler,
Taishi Kaiko-roku, Toa Dobunkai, Tokyo, 1936, Vol. II,
pp. 7^l£j-. In fact, Arao warned in 189*+ that if China became 
too wealthy and strong, she might be dangerous for Japan.
Japan would have to make her long-term plans with caution.
See Arao Sei's "Opinion on China” (Taishi Iken), l89*H cited
in Shimura Toshiko, "Bojutsu Henpo to Nihon” CVne. Gaftsrm tS[eVe.tv\aAfccuvi "Japan,
Tokyo Toritsu Daigaku Hogakukai Zasshi, Vol. VI, No. 2, p. 2 5 8.
(26) Quoted in Oka, op.cit., p. 18.
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of friendly relations between the two peoples of Japan and China, when 
China's potentialities in the way of territories, man-power and resources
(27)would be put to meaningful uses.
— t _ ,
In 1 893,. Tarui. Tokichi's Daito Goho Ron (Great Eastern Coalition) came out 
in the Chinese, urging China to join the proposed Japanese-Korean alliance.
In Tarui's opinion, China was one of the two great powers in Asia, beside 
Japan herself. These two great nations were responsible for upholding the 
dignity of the yellow race. The author deplored the rumour that China was 
soliciting England's support in strengthening her position vis-a-vis Japan.
He v/arned that this would only throw Japan into the arms of Russia, and then 
China, even with the help of England, could not hold out against Japan and 
Russia on the same side. Moreover, this move by China would be treacherous 
as she would be betraying a nation of her own race and culture* Besides,it 
would be to China's advantage to join forces with Japan and Korea to keep 
check on the ambitions of the Western powers especially Russia. Tarui pointed 
out that Russia was a common enemy to China and Japan. With the joint 
military effort of Korea, Japan and China, China could possibly recover 
the lost territories in Heilungkiang and the key areas in Manchuria already 
lost to Russia. Once the danger from the North was contained, China 
could look to the rest of Asia. It would be desirable, the author said, 
for China to coopen&te with Japan to introduce civilization to the 
Southern and South-eastern Asian countries, to free them from Western 
domination and eventually to bring about a great nation of the yellow
(2 8)people in confrontation with the European challenge.
(27) ibid*, pp. 28-29.
(28) Tarui Tokichi, "Daito Goho Ron", collected in Takeuchi Yoshimi, 
op.cit., pp. 106 ff.
Tarui was the leader of one of the left-wing derivatives of the Liberal 
movement of the early 1880's, the Sakaito (Eastern Social Party), which 
was first organized in 1882 in Hizen. It3 *  principles were the upkeep 
of ethical standards, equality for all and its goal was the greatest 
happiness of the masses. It was even intended that its activities 
would be extended to Korea and China. He was also determined to 
revive Asia and when the Manchu dynasty suffered defeat by the French 
in 188Q, he made for Hong Kong in the hopes of working out a programme 
withthe Ko-lao Hui.
Z k .
Nevertheless, the theory of Sino-Japanese cooperation we& r necessarily
affected by the diplomatic entanglements of the two countries. Korea's
sovereignty or lack of it had been a vexing problem especially for
Japan since the Sino-Japanese treaty of l87l. The 1876 treaty concluded
between Japan and Korea can be seen as an attempt on the part of Japan
to put Korea outside the Chinese suzerainty as it included a clause
(29)recognizing Korea's independence. Meanwhile, Japanese nationalism,
born of its encounter with the West during the Bakumatsu sonno-joi movement, 
was aggravated by the unsatisfactory settlement with China in 1882 and 1883.
The dissatisfied Japanese public had been critical of the government's 
conciliatory policy towards China over Korea. Within the government 
itself, military men had been clamouring for independent command and 
the expansion of military defence in the late 1 880's. It must be 
remembered that the myth of the strong Chinese fleet remained until 189*+.Soejims 
Taneomi, one of the first foreign ministers, believed that only by 
expanding into the Asian continent could Japan hope to safeguard her 
own national independence. Because of her insularity, he said in the
1880's, Japan was vulnerable to attack from all sides. Only by control­
ling Shantung and eventually the interior of China could Japan build 
a basis for national strength, a condition absolutely necessary for national 
independence.  ^^ ^
Others were concerned that as long as Korea remained under the
corrupt Chinese influence and therefore vulnerable to Western aggression,
Japan could not hope to safeguard her own independence. In 189O,
Yamagata Aritomo maintained that:
"Japan's line of interest was essential to her line 
of sovereignty if she was to become truly independent
(29) T.F. Tsiang, op.cit., p. 6 1.
(30) See Akira Iriye, "The Ideology of Japanese Imperialism: Imperial
Japan and China" in Grant K. Goodman, compiler, Imperial Japan and 
Asia, a Reassessment, East Asian Institute, Columbia University,
New York, 1967, p. 3^ +*
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of reliance on outside help. Korea was Japan’s line 
of advantage. Its independence was, therefore, 
essential to Japan and that independence was being 
endangered by the eastward progress of the Trans-
Siberian Railway. It followed that Korea could
be trusted neither to hostile Western hands nor to 
a power unable, as was China, to preserve it as 
Japan’s sphere of interest.”(31)
At the same time, advocates of the reconstruction of China were 
in their turn disappointed that their idea met with an apparent lack 
of response from the Chinese. In addition to that, there was disil­
lusionment regarding China's internal corruption and doubts about China's 
ability ever to effect reforms. Sugita Teiichi who had gone to China 
in 1889- could recall in 1886 the lack of insight of the Chinese to the 
world situation and their reactionary attitudes towards changes. While 
he was travelling in Europe in 1 8 8 6, he became even more aware of Western 
military prowess and the threat of Western imperialism. As long as 
China remained unawakened to the need for self-renovation, Japan was
alone in fighting Western advance and political security in the Far
(32)East was, as Sugita saw it, a hope of the past. ' ' As the nineteenth
century drew to its close, the talk of partitioning China among the
Western powers confirmed the fear of the loss of national independence 
for Japan. It appeared to many Japanese that the only way to preserve 
their country was to make military preparations with the view to taking 
part in the forthcoming partition. As Sugita put it, Japan must 
secure a place at the table as a guest instead of continuing to be
(33)the meat at the banquet.
In the decade before 189^1 members of the Jiyu Minken Undo were
(31) u^ofed in M.B. Jansen, "Modernization and Foreign Policy in 
Meiji Japan" in R.E. Ward, ed., Political development in Modern 
Japan, Princeton, 1988, p.182.
(32) Sugita’s "Plan of national policy" (Kokuze Saku) drafted while 
he was travelling in Europe,in Oka, op.cit., p. 26.
(33) iShLmura Toshiko, op. cit., pp. 25^—255*
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also influenced "by the clamour for the nation’s right (kokken). 
Oi Kentaro viewed with dismay the decline of Japanese influence 
in Korea. He thought that China's corrupt leadership could 
not safeguard Korea from the danger of Russian engulfment.
Eis frustrations were aggravated "by China’s arrogant and sus­
picious attitude in response to the Japanese offer of guidance. 
After a decade of abortive attempts to evolve a "Policy of 
the East" in conjunction with the other Eastern countries, Oi 
spoke in 1891 of "Japanese domination in the East" and became 
convinced of the need for Japan to take military action against 
China over the Korean question.(34)
According to E.H. Norman,
"The primary task in (japan1 s] foreign policy during 
the first thirty years of the Meiji period was 
to abolish that symbol of a nation destined for 
foreign domination, the unequal treaties. To 
turn back before they had reached the status of 
an independent power would spell humiliation, 
disaster, and possibly submission to foreign rule, 
while to continue along the course so brilliantly 
charted by the Meiji leaders meant expansion in 
the only direction permitted by history and geo­
graphy, namely, the Asiatic mainland v/here half- 
awakened peoples were stirring,uneasily under 
the menace of Western powers". '
The Sino-Japanese war was seen by many Japanese in terms of
a struggle between a country which was trying to develop
civilization and a country whose backwardness threatened to
jeopardize peace in the Par East. Japan's victory in the war
ended the tributary relationship between China and Korea and
removed China's political influence from the peninsula. The
Japanese could now look forward to a phase of enlightened and,
progressive development in the East Asian countries which many
maintained to be vital to the survival of Asia. At the same
time, the establishment of a Japanese foothold on the Chinese
mainland which Meiji expansionists and some government leaders
saw as a requirement of Japanese security was also expected to
follow as a result of the war. It would appear that with
Japan's national independence secured, the need for cooperation
with China to preserve East Asian integrity would lose much
of its urgency.
( 34V) Oka, op.cit., p. 26.
(35) E.H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State,
New York, 1940, p.198.
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And yet to the rest of the world, the war revealed 
China's weakness more than demonstrated Japan's strength.
The fact that Japan was not yet a determining factor in Par 
Eastern international politics was indicated by the success­
ful intervention of Russia, Prance and Germany in the peace 
settlement between Japan and China to have Japan restore 
to China, the Liaotung peninsula. Japan was thus prevented 
from acquiring a sphere of influence in China only to make 
way for a new phase of Western imperialistic activities in 
the Par East. The Japanese felt that they had more reasons 
to fear the loss of their independence than before the war
with China. Many believed that a struggle between the East 
ito«?
and West was inevitable in the near future and there remained
A
the need for China and Japan to make common cause with one 
another.
* * *
Meiji Japan's success at self-strengthening and moderniza­
tion highlighted China's contemporary failure. Por two decades 
after her defeat by England in the war of 1839-1842, China 
remained unaswakened to her weakness against the Western powers. 
It was not until Western encroachment reached a new height 
in i860 with the Anglo-Prench seizure of Peking that the Chinese 
became aware of the military superiority of the West and 
began to see modernization as a solution to both her domestic
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and foreign problems. In the l860's, attempts were made to carry out 
reform in self-defence. Yet these attemps at self-strengthening were 
halting and uncertain and progress towards modernization remained slow. 
Moreover, few Chinese leaders were ready to re-examine China's relationship 
with the rest of the Asian countries which they always regarded as inferior. 
Consequently, for decades after China's first confrontation with the 
West, few Chinese accepted that they needed to cooperate with their 
Asian neighbours in keeping the Western powers at bay.
It was not until the late l870's that some in the Chinese government 
began to advocate cooperation with Japan to fight Western aggression.
Most of these early advocates of Sino-Japanese cooperation were also 
reformers who saw that China, in attempting to strengthen herself, needed 
help from Japan which was by 188O a fast-modernizing country. Some were 
also influenced by the Japanese argument for cooperation between the 
two countries which by the l870's had much influence within and outside 
the Japanese government.
In 1877, six years after Japan's attempt to formalize diplomatic 
relations with China, the Chinese government sent its first minister,
Ho Ju-chang, to Japan. Ho was accompanied by Huang Tsun-hsien, 
secretary to the legation. Huang was one of the first Chinese who 
favoured the idea of China and Japan maintaining their traditional 
friendship and making joint efforts to attain an equal and harmonious 
relationship. Moreover, he advocated that China and Japan should unite 
their strength for their mutual benefit and resist the aggression from 
Russia and the other Western powers. In his poem, "Presented to 
Arisugawa Taruhite Shinno at the Official Opening of the Military Academy", 
he said,
"I came to present my credentials,
And you greeted me with jade and silk.
We stand together in Asia
And have from old had friendly relations,
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Like cheeks and jawbone  ^ relying 
[ on one another ]
Like the two wings of an army?
I trust that each will be prosperous and strong 
And then be able to assist the other.
Brethren? let us strive to rouse ourselves; 
Foreign insults will vanish on their own.
Let us throw away our armour and
Sing of the great peace
And preach it for a million years."
Huang represented the new scholars in late nineteenth century China 
and was an active member of the reform movement in the 1890's. He was 
convinced? soon after his arrival in Japan? that only by following 
Japan’s example of modernization could China hope to save herself. He 
was also one of the early advocates of China sending students to Japan.
He believed that as Japan once learned from China? China could now 
learn from Japan and benefit from the fact that the two countries had 
the same cultural background. While he was secretary to the Chinese 
legation from 1877-1882? he drafted numerous documents and despatches 
for Ho Ju-chang to the Tsungli Yamen and the Peiyang commissioner Li 
Hung-chang? analysing Japan's national affairs and explaining the policies 
China should take towards that country. But all his proposals and 
pleas were rejected by the Chinese government.
Because Huang was keenly interested in Japan's success at development?
(36) It was also common for Chinese and Japanese advocates of
Slno-Japanese cooperation to compare the relationship between
the two countries to that between the lips and the teeth? 
or the front wheels and the back wheels of the same carriage? 
hence the imagery of "shinshi hosa" (in Japanese).
(37) Ch' ien Ngo-sun? ed.? Jen-Ching-Lu Shih Ts'so 11 Chj-Lan? Shanghai 
Commercial Press? 1936? Vol. III? pp. 9a-i0b. Translated in 
Jocelyn Milner? "The Reform Ideas of Huang Tsun-hsien' s 'History 
of Japan' and its influence on the Hundred Days' Reform?" in 
Journal of the South Seas Society? Singapore? Vol. XVII (1961) 
Part 2? p.33.
(3 8) Cheng Tzu-yu? "Huang Tsun-hsien and Japan"? Journal of South 
Seas Society? Singapore? Vol. XVII (1961)? Part 1? p. 20.
he made a careful study of the social and political history of that 
country and of the reasons underlying the Japanese reforms and Western- 
iztion around 188O. In his study of Japanese affairs? he always kept his 
native country in mind. His two works? "Miscellaneous Poems on Japan" 
and "A History of Japan" were designed to reflect China in the mirror 
of contemporary Japan.
In 1882? Huang was appointed to San Francisco as consul general.
At the farewell banquet which was held in his honour by his Japanese 
friends? Huang composed his poem? "Farewell to my gentlemen friends 
in Japan"? reiterating his wish for an alliance between the Asian 
countries and urging Japan and China to retain their "brotherly ties" and 
unite their "strength and aspirations" to confront their common
(40)enemy.
Within the Chinese government? the question of making Japan 
anally arose , perhaps for the first time? over the H i  crisis in
188O. A little earlier in the l870's? relations with Japan had
become strained over the issue of the Liuchiu Islands and two factions 
haet sprung up in the Chinese government. One faction? which favoured 
a pro-Japanese foreign policy? included the governor-general of 
Nanking? Liu K'un-i? the governor-general of Chekiang? T'an Chung-Lin? 
the governor-general of Fukien? Wang K'ai-ta and Chang Chih-tung in Peking. 
The second faction? which opposed this policy and favoured making 
Russia China’s ally? was led by the governor-general of Tientsin?
Li Hung-chang. Because of Li's prevailing influence in Peking at this
(39) Jocelyn Milner? op.cit.? p. 6 6.
During the time when Huang was actively enaged in the reform 
movement in China from 1896-1898? he added to and revised his 
works on Japan. His "History of Japan?" in particular? had a 
great influence on K'ang Yu-wei? one of his close associates in 
the 1898 Reform period.
(40) Cheng Tzu-Yii? op.cit.? pp. 21-22.
time? the Chinese government gave priority to the settling of the Ili 
question over the Liuchiu issue. Li believed that differences with 
Russia had to be settled at once? or else Japan and the other powers 
would seize the opportunity of the Russo-Chinese estrangement to "hatch 
plots agaist China". To him? the argument of China making Japan an 
ally did not hold water. Japan was? in his opinion? too weak to give 
China any support against Russia. But if China could come to some sort 
of an agreement with Russia? even at the expense of making concessions 
to Russia? then? with Russia on her side? she would be in a position 
to bully Japan. The key point in Li's argument was that the disparity 
of strength of Russia and Japan was too great and China had to make sure
(4l)that she was backing the stronger of the two.
But towards the last decade of the nineteenth century? the argument
for making Russia an ally gradually lost ground. As Anglo-Russian rivalry
extended to the Far East in this period? China caiv\e under the? inf Hence
of the anti-Russian propaganda of the British and American missionaries
and diplomats in China. When the pro-Russian faction in China prevailed
in 1 8 8 0, some missionaries had warned? in the Review of the Times? that
if China entered into any agreement on mutual support with a foreign
(^+2 )power? she would alienate herself from the rest of the world. Meanwhile,
the Russian threat to the Far East was fully exploited in an attempt 
to persuade China to enter into an alliance with England. A.R. ColQuhoun? 
Correspondent of the London Times? wrote an article on England's policy 
in the Far East in which he stressed that with the help of England?
(41) Li Wen-chung Kung Ctiuan Chi (Complete works of Li Hung-chang? 
drafts of memorials). Nanking? 1903? Vol 39* P« 4. Quoted 
in Wang Shu-huai? Wai-jen yu wu-hsii pien-fa (The foreigners and 
the 1898 reform movement)? Taipeh? 19£>5> p-124.
(42) "China needs not conclude any agreement for mutual defence with
a foreign power"? Review of the Times? Vol. 14 (l878-l879)i 
p. 301. Quoted in Wang Shu-huai? ibid., p. 126.
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China could shield Korea and the Chinese north-west territories from 
Russian ambitions and even recover the maritime province of Amur which 
she had lost to Russia in i860. Colquhoun added that Japan would be
(43)included to make up a three-power pact against Russia.
As hostility between Japan and China grew before the war of 1894- l893» 
Western missionaries tried to influence the Chinese public to believe 
that it was unwise of China to seek war with Japan. Y.J. Allenj the 
American Methodist missionary and journalist* stressed the need for 
Japan and China to cooperate and give each other help against "a strong 
common enemy." A war* he said* would be to the disadvantage of both 
countries and if Japan and China became permanent enemies* then both
(44)would be destroyed in the end. Some believed that friendship
between the two countries would benefit China as Japan had much to
offer her. Timothy Richard, for example, thought that Japan was spreading
Western learning to the Koreans and the people living in Manchuria and
the Chinese could learn from Japan’s enlightened policy. He even
thought that if Japan were allowed to administer those territories and
apply her modernized methods, then better prospects and prosperity for
(9-5)the people living in those areas would follow.
The Western missionaries’ idea of China learning from Japan had 
great influence on Chinese reformers and scholars, mainly outside government
(93) Chang Chung-fu, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance* Baltimore, 1931i
pp. 9— h"1 -
(49) Y.J. Allen, "On dissolving enmity with foreigners", Y.J. Allen 
and Erh-k’ang Tsai, Chung-Tung Chan-chi pen-mo (History of the 
Sino-Japanese war over Korea, the political situations in the 
Far East, based on Chinese and foreign office publications and 
newspapers). Shanghai, 1897, Vol. 1, Part 6 , p. 21.
(4-3) Ting Tse-liang, "The discovery of Li Hung-chang's treacherous
conspiracy, encouraged by Timothy Richard before the Shimonoseki 
peace conference", in Chou I-liang et al. , compiler.;), Chung-jih Chia- 
wu Chan-cheng Lun-chi (Collection of discussions on the Sino- 
Japanese war), Peking, 1934, p. 34. Cited in Wang Shu-huai, 
op.cit., p.136.
circles. These scholars were anxious to see reforms carried out in 
China-reforms modelled on Japan and England. They were at the same 
time politically-motivated reformers and many saw in these two countries 
worthy allies as well as models for China. Wang T'ao, editor and 
contributor to the Shen Pao and one of the founders of modern journalism 
in China, advocated a cooperative policy towards Japan and England so 
that help could be obtained from those two countries and China could strengthen
(46)her military defence and fortify her frontiers.
Although up until the Sino-Japanese war, Japan was not regarded as 
a big power, some of the early reformers believed that Japan and China 
had common interests and the two countries should combine their efforts 
to keep Russia at bay. Ch'en Ch'ih said in his book "Yung Shu” (Problems 
of Political and Economic Reforms ) that China's misfortune at the 
moment was caused by Russia's penetration into eastern Asia. Once 
the Siberian Railway was completed, China would see the end of peace 
along her north-eastern and north-western frontiers. Japan was small 
and poor and could not stand up to Russia. But as she and China were in 
the same boat, the two countries could negotiate secretly to form an 
alliance. Ch'en believed that in fact, Japan feared Russia more than 
China did. And her desire to safeguard Korea as a bulwark was not
(47)unlike that of China.
While these Chinese did not believe without reservations that Japan 
was a friendly country desirous of cooperating with China, they were 
convinced that the two countries should, from necessities., make common 
cause with one another. Moreover, as the Chinese thought before the war
(46) Wang T'ao, T'ao-yuan Wen-lu Wai-pien (Works by Wang Taao on 
Reforms), collected in Wu-hsu- Pien-fa (Historical materials
on the Hundred Days Reform of 1898), Shanghai, 1953’ Part 4, p. 22.
(47) Ch'en Ch'ih, Yung-Shu Nei-wai ]±Len (Problems of Political and 
Economic reforms), Shan.ghai,1 898, Inner Volume, Part 1 , p. 5*
Quoted in Wang Shu-huai, op. cit., p. 144.
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that Japan was a weak country, any ambitious designs that Japan might 
have had regarding China were not taken very seriously. In fact, many 
Chinese scholars in this period regarded Japan, when compared to Russia, 
as the lesser of two ’evils'.
On the other hand, there were mounting suspicions regarding Russian
intentions in East Asia. Immediately before the Sino-Japanese war,
Russia wanted to cooperate with China in keeping Korea from Japanese
intervention. Some Chinese reformers strongly advised the government
against entering into any agreement with the Russians on the issue.
#
Ch'en Chill, reformist Writer , thought that Russia's intentions were no 
less ambitious than those of Japan with regard to Korea. Once she 
had suceeded in keeping Korea from Japan, Ch'en warned, Russia would 
lay claim* to the right of protecting Korea and come into conflict with 
China over the question of suzerainty over Korea. It was unwise of 
China, he maintained, to invite Russian intervention while fighting 
Japan over the Korean issue.
Ir> the last two decades the nineteenth century, China was drawn towards Japan by the
_ |
Russian threat. Aroused fey a sense of urgency by Russian harassment
of Chinese territories in the 1 8 8 0's, Chinese government leaders
began to see Japan in the light of a possible ally. But many of them
still believed that the ancient strategy of "using the barbarian to 
the
control^barbarian " was applicable in the late nineteenth century.
Japan was looked upon as just one of the foreign countries that could 
be manipulated in the intricate procedures of diplomacy* Nevertheless, 
it is significant that the question of making Japan an ally occupied an 
important place in the political thinking of the Chinese government.
(48) Ch'en Cliiu, "On Russian support for China" in Ch'en Chung-i 
ed., Huang-Ch'ao Ching-shih-wen San-]±Len (Supplementary 
collection of articles on social themes), Shanghai, 1898, 
Vol. 78, p. 13.
33.
And when Western encroachment in the Far East reached a new height in the 
post-Sino-Japanese-war era, some government leaders became the 
principal group which urged cooperation with Japan.
Early Chinese reformers were motivated by idealistic as well as 
political considerations. Some of them genuinely believed in friendship 
between the two countries and that China could learn from Japan. In 
part, their enthusiasm came as a response to the Japanese argument for 
Asian solidarity. But a greater admiration for Japan and a deeper 
concern for the friendly relations between the two countries were to be found 
Lh their successors, the Chinese reformers of the 1898 period.
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CHAPTER TWO
JAPAN'S AWARENESS OF HER CHANGING STATUS IN ASIA, 1893-190^
Japan's weakness and inferiority in international politics in the 
post - 1893 period
The retrocession of Liaotung forced on Japan by the Triple Intervention 
came as a blow. Contrary to the belief that Japan had emerged as a 
strong power from the war with China, her position in the post-war world 
seemed as insignificant as before. Many Japanese became aware of the 
true nature of international politics and came to advocate that Japan put 
an emphasis on power-politics in her future relations with the strong 
countries.
Furthermore, the surrender of Liaotung shattered Japan's hopes for 
national independence. The Japanese believed that they had fought the 
war with China to ensure independence for Korea with the ultimate goal 
of establishing peace in the Far East. This in turn had been motivated 
by the desire to safeguard Japan's own national independence in face 
of Western advances in the East. The post-war intervention, especially 
that of Russia, threatened to substitute pre-war Chinese control in 
Korea. A new phase of Western imperialistic activities in the Far 
East seemed to have begun with the Triple Intervention. For the 
Japanese, their government's failure in its use of diplomacy had resulted 
from Japan's weakness compared with the powers. Tokutomi Rchiro (Soho), 
a journalist, had this to say of the retrocession of Liaotung in his 
autobiography,
"After hearing about it I became almost a different 
man psychologically.... It had happened because 
we weren't strong enough. What it came down to
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was that sincerity or justice didn’t amount to 
a thing if you weren’t strong enough. " ( ^
And Kuga Minoru commented,
’’International politics cannot be argued with 
reasons alone, they have to be determined by 
force (2 )
Nevertheless, the victory over China had given the Japanese 
confidence in their country. Intoxicated by their victory and 
anxious to enhance their national prestige, the Japanese clamoured for 
concessions from China immediately after the war. Some, however, believed 
that Japan should be cautious lest her demands should alienate China 
completely. Okuma, leader of the Progressive Party in opposition to 
the Ito government, felt that Japan should not allow the war to damage 
the friendship between the two countries. Even before the powers inter­
vened in the Sino-Japanese settlement after the war, Okuma had commented 
that Japan would be wise to return Liaotung to China in the hope of 
retaining friendly relations between the two countries. On the occasion 
of Li Hung-chang's arrival in Japan in March, 1893 to negotiate the 
peace treaty, Okuma talked to a newspaper reporter about his views on 
the post-war situation*
"... It is the right of the country which has won 
the war to take over [Liaotung] but it would also 
be a gesture of magnanimity on the part of the 
Emperor of Japan to return it to China.Needless 
to say, considerable conditions should be attached 
to the returni [of Liaotung] so that our rights 
and interests in Korea will not be threatened from 
that area .... The Emperor of Japan has entered 
upon war with China to defend a weak Korea out of 
a sense of justice. Now that China has lost the 
war and realized the mistakes she has made, the 
Chinese ruler should be made the permanent friend 
of the Japanese Emperor. It is not likely to be
(1) Quoted in Oka Yoshitake, op.cit., p. 3^+.
(2) Kuga Minoru, "A personal view on the political issue of the 
retrocession of Liaotung," Nihon, 27th May, l895«
Cited in Oka, ibid.
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the wish of the Emperor of Japan himself to seize 
the land of origin of a close friend."(3)
Arao Sei who had gone to China a decade earlier with the hope of 
improving Sino-Japanese understanding spoke strongly in favour of Japan 
and China joining hands against Western aggression. In his "Refutation 
of erroneous opinions regarding China'S written in l893* he opposed the 
idea of Japan demanding territorial concessions from China as it would 
set an example to the other countries and lead to the partition of 
China. He also feared that excessive Japanese demands might arouse
the hostility of the Chinese people against Japan thus giving the Western
countries an opportunity to exploit the disharmony between Japan and 
China to their own advantage . He maintained that only by "cooperating 
and taking concerted actions" would Japan and China save the Far East 
from Western encroachment. If the two countries forsook this course
wof action, then there would be no hope of an Asian revival.
There was also a wariness of China's potential strength despite
her defeat. Tokutomi Soho wrote in 1895 in an article entitled
"China must not be bullied" that if patriotic feelings, loyalty,
bravery, a sense of honour and readiness to act in the name of justice
were the natural qualities of mankind, then the saying that these
were lacking in the Chinese'was not likely to be true. Once education
was given to the Chinese people, they would no longer submit to be
bullied. Now that China had suffered a serious blow, it was not likely
that she could strike back at Japan with much strength. Japan should
(5)seize this opportunity to make peace with her. This concern about
(3) Okuma-ko hachijugonen-shi (Biography of Okuma Shigenobu, 1838-1922),
Tokyo, 1926, Vol. II, p.203.
(9-) Arao Sei, "Refutation of erroneous opinions regarding China",
l893i PP- 23-29. Cited in Shimura Toshiko, op.cit., pp. 263-269-.Also,
(3) Tokutomi Soho, "China must not be bullied" in Kokumin Shimbun,
18th February, l893» Paraphrased in Oka, op.cit. p. 31*
China’s potential strength remained an important factor in Japan’s 
consideration of China as an ally against the West in the post-1895 
era.
The Argument for the Preservation of China
The war of 1899—1895 exposed China's vulnerability. The powers,
rivalling as well as cooperating with one another, advanced their 
interests in China by creating spheres of influence. In 1896, Russia 
asked Chinese permission to build a railway across Manchuria to Vladi- 
vostock. The Peking government at first refused but Li Hung-chang who 
negotiated with the Russians in St. Petersburg got Peking's agreement 
to his signing in June a secret Russo-Chinese treaty of alliance. (A 
bribe of three million rubles had been promised to Li by the Russian 
government). By this agreement, China and Russia would fight together 
against any future Japanese expansion on the continent, and the newly- 
established Russo-Chinese Bank was given the right to finance the 
construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria.
In December, 189?, Russia sent a naval squadron into Port Arthur 
and got from China in March, 1898, a twenty-five-year lease of the 
southern tip of the Kwantung peninsula including Port Dairen and Port 
Arthur. She also acquired the right to connect these ports with the 
Chinese Eastern Railway by a north-south line, the South Manchuria 
Railway. The Russian occupation of Port Arthur was in fact encouraged 
by Kaiser William II ^f Germany who in November, 189?> had set an 
example by sending a German squadron into Kiaochow in Shantung. By 
March, 1898, Germany had formally secured the lease of Kiaochow for 
ninety-nine years. Following the Russian and German successes, England 
leased Wfeihaiwei in 1899 and France in the same year, obtained a lease 
of Canton Bay for ninety-nine years.
When Japan saw how China was threatened with partition, she began 
to feel more keenly the threat to her national independence and peace 
in the Far East. It was in the midst of this scramble for concessions 
that the argument for the preservation of China, Shina hozen r.on, came 
into being. The Japanese believed that they could no longer adopt a 
passive role in Far Eastern politics in the face of Western aggrandizement. 
Independence for China was crucial to peace in the Far East and hence 
of great importance to Japan. Should China be partitioned by the 
powers, Japan would find Western menace on her doorsteps. Preservation 
of China would not only be in China's best interests but also to the 
advantage of Japan and the Japanese were not championing this cause 
merely out of a sense of justice. It was an awareness of Japanese 
strength and superiority among the Asian countries and at the same time, 
a realization of Japan's precarious, position in international relations 
that led the Japanese toput forward the argument. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi 
Shimbun wrote that careful considerations and prompt actions on the part 
of Japan were needed to redress the political situation in East Asia.
Japan might not be strong enough to compete satisfactorily with the 
other powers in peace time and the resources that she could draw on 
might be inadequate at times of crises, but the Japanese were a capable 
nation and instead of viewing the situation with folded arms, she should 
do what she could to improve it.^^
a. Expressions of dissatisfaction with the official policy
The Japanese government's policy at this juncture was marked by a 
lack of action regarding the powers' violation of peace in the Far East.
The Ito government had been aware that Japan was not strong enough to
(6 ) "The recent Western advances in China", 21st July, 1898, p.1. in
Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun microfilm reproduction by Mainichi
Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1 966. This newspaper will hereafter be cited
as T.NNS.
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protest against the enforced retrocession of Liaotung.
After the Triple Intervention, it was prepared to come to 
terms with the Western countries with a view to consolidat­
ing Japan's political and economic positions in the Far East. 
Moreover, it was unwilling to forgo its share of concess­
ions in China which lay in the province of Fukien.
Over the critical period of 1897-1898, therefore, the
Japanese government adopted a wait-and-see policy. It
cautiously refrained from taking any action regarding the
Russian demand made on China for the lease of the southern
tip of Liaotung. Ito feared that if Japan antagonized
Russia, she would have to deal with France and Germany as
well. Thus when Kato, minister to England, recommended
that Japan coordinate her actions with England to oppose
the Russian move and urged that it would he desirable and
wise for Japan and England to form an alliance which would
give the two powers undisputed naval power in the Far East,
he secured no support from Tokyo. Ito much preferred an
understanding with Russia on Korea and was anxious to stay
(7)out of the crisis. 1
Nevertheless, the idea of an Anglo-Japanese alliance 
and the government's failure to protest against the powers' 
scramble for concessions in China became topics of much 
discussion* in Japan. Many Japanese were dissatisfied 
with the government's tendency to align its policies with 
one or the other of the Western powers.
The Nihon, a nationalist nev/spaper, wa,s highly critical of the
(7) William, L. Langer, The .Diplomacy of Imperialism, second 
edition, Harvard University, Mass.’, 1556, pp.472-473.
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Japanese government’s policy during the 1897-1 8 9 8 crisis. It said
that in order not to arouse the suspicion of the Western powers, the
Ito government was watching the latters' partition of China with folded
(8)arms. In doing so, the government was making a serious mistake.'
Did not the Westerners include Japan in what they called the Far East 
and would they look upon Japan as different from China and Korea and 
hence refrain from making ambitious moves against Japan? Once the
(9 )
Western powers had partitioned China, they would set to work on Japan.
In particular, the Nihon maintained, it would be unwise of Japan to form 
an alliance with England. The English were a different race from the 
Japanese, they were very keen on advancing their own interests and were 
not a dependable nation. The Japanese government should consider care­
fully the consequences of such an alliance before it made any commit -
. (10) ments.
Kotoku Shusui, editor of the Yorozu Choho, also objected to the idea
of an alliance with England. He said the English had always sought to
advance their own interests without expending any efforts Before the 
Sino-Japanese war, England had declared herself a friend of China. Yet 
after the war, she turned her back on China and sided herself with Japan, 
the victor. During the Triple Intervention, however, she did not lift 
a finger to help Japan. Although she was now opposing the Russian action 
in China, once Russia succeeded in acquiring rights and interests from 
the Chinese government, she would make similar demands on China to further
her own interests. Japan should not look for an ally in such an
(11)unreliable country. He maintained that the government’s current policy
(8) "The Ito government’s policy towards China", Nihon. 7th March 1 898- 
Quoted in Shimura Toshiko, op.cit., p. 271.
(9) "The new development in the eastern advances of the Europeans", 
editorial. Nihon, 7th February,1898, ibid.
(10) "On the Anglo-Japanese alliance", Nihon, 8th August, 1898 ibid.
(11) Kotoku Shusui, "England’s foreign policy", in Yorozu Choho,
15th March, 1898, ibid.
only benefited the European powers. Instead, Japan should open her heart 
to the Chinese people and profess to the latter her willingness to take 
up the responsibility of preserving the integrity of China. If she 
would do so, China would certainly make an effort to rid herself of
I -i , (12)the oppression by the powers.
According to Kotoku, Japan's interests did not run parallel to those 
of England. The main concern of England was to protect and expand her 
unrivalled commercial interests in China. To do so, she maintained that
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the open door in China must be observed by all the powers. But this 
did not prevent her from claiming a sphere of influence in the Yangtze 
valley from which all powers were excluded. Hence her policy in China 
was far from being unselfish. She had approached Japan - and America 
and Germany - in 1898 to join her in preserving the integrity of China.
But her main objective was to contain the Russian expansion in the Liaotung 
Peninsula. The logic of forming this anti-Russian block, according 
to Kotoku, was founded on the idea of balanpe of military power so that 
England would be ready to go to war with Russia when necessary. However, 
Kotoku maintained, this was not the way to bring about the preservation 
of China. What China needed most at the moment was reform . The 
reform of China was like the removal of a malignant tumour from a 
patient. Even when the operation was gently carried out, one still 
could not guarantee the recovery of the patient. If drastic actions 
were taken, then there would be no question of the patient's surviving 
the ordeal. China, a gravely ill nation, would certainly not survive 
the confrontation of forces between the powers on her territories. In
(12) Kotoku Shusui, "How to deal with today's situation in the East?", 
Yorozu Choho» 19th March, 1898, ibid.
entering into a political alliance, a country must first be aware of
the possibility of her entering into wars, an obligation which most
alliancesentailed. If Japan formed an alliance with England without
paying due considerations to such a possibility, then she would be
taking an irresponsible action. She should refrain from making any
such commitment with England, America and Germany on moral grounds.
Moreover, Japan's military defence was not sufficiently strong and her
commercial stake in China was inadequately developed. An Anglo-Japanese
(13)alliance would only benefit England and not Japan.
b. Japanese leadership in stemming the tide of Western expansion
Many Japanese believed that instead of timidly adjusting herself to the 
policies of the Western powers, Japan should act independently to safeguard 
her own independence. They asserted that there were special ties binding Japar 
to Asia and she should take the initiative in preserving East Asian integrity. 
That Japan, having modernized first, should lead China towards development 
and help her gain her independence was the theme of many newspaper 
editorials which appeared in 1898. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun 
said,
"... This important undertaking [of leading the 
Chinese people towards enlightenment] for Japan 
has arisen out of the natural relationship between 
the two peoples and will have to be carried out 
on the basis of this natural relationship.... The 
mutual feelings between the Chinese and Japanese 
peoples are enough to bring out the successes in 
such an undertaking and it is not necessary to 
rely on diplomatic means.... China's land is in 
Japan's neighbourhood; the two countries have the 
longest peaceful relations. They are tied by race 
and language and share the same interests and 
concern in international politics. Can it be 
said that Japan's leadership of the Chinese people 
towards development is merely a question of bestowing 
a favour...?"(1Z0
(1 3) Kotoku Shusui, "Beresford's argument for a quadruple alliance", 
written on 2 k t h - 2 7 t h  January, l899» in Kono Hiromichi, compiler,
Kotoku Shusui, Hyoron to Zuiso (Kotoku Shusui, Reviews and Reflections), 
Tokyo, 19^95 pp. 20^-205.
(lh) "The enlightenment of the Chinese people," TNNS, 31st August,
1898, p.2 . ---
Okuma who formed the cabinet in cooperation with Itagaki in June,
18 9 8, strongly supported the argument for the preservation of China.
In a speech entitled Shina Hozen Ron given at a general meeting of the Toho 
Kyokai (Association of Eastern Nations) 011 19th October, 1898, he put 
forward the "Okuma Doctrine", Okuma said that although the Western 
powers were threatening to colonize the whole of China and by so doing 
destroy the Chinese system, they would not succeed. He claimed that 
China would no longer remain dormant; once a hero should arise, a sense 
of patriotism in the people would be aroused and the Chinese would unite 
to defend their country against the Western advances. The Chinese had 
always had a unified language and learning, a sense of loyalty, filial 
piety and justice which had taken root since Confucius. By organizing 
themselves and drawing upon those assets, they could rid themselves of 
their backwardness. The task of arousing their consciousness and giving 
them support, leadership and enlightenment fell on no other country but 
Japan. This was the "duty" and mission of the Japanese people. Japan 
was, after all, China's neighbour, bound to her in race, culture and 
language and equipped with the strength to support that country against 
foreign invaders. In so doing, Japan would be only repaying China for 
the historical and cultural heritage which she had received from that 
country. Unlike the Western powers, Japan had no intention of annexing 
China's territories. It was, Okuma said, not consistent with the 
benevolence of the Japanese Emperor and the sense of chivalry and 
justice of the Japanese people that they should covet the territories 
of another country.^^)
Embodied in Okuma's idea of Japan's role in preserving China was the theory
(13) Okuma-ko hachijugonen-shi, op.cit., pp. 308-309* Also,Watanabe 
Ikujiro, Nihon Kinsei Gaiko-shi, op.cit., pp. 302-303*
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that Asia should belong to the Asiatics. This was why he emphasized the 
suitability of Japanese guidance for China. Because of the geographical 
proximity and cultural closeness of the two countries, Japan, rather 
than the Western countries themselves, was better equipped to impart 
Western knowledge to China. Okuma envisaged that by becoming strong, 
the Asian countries would one day take the place of the European powers 
in the Far East.
Confrontation of the yellow and white races
The Far Eastern situation in 1898 was seen by many Japanese in terms 
of confrontation between the yellow and white races. Japan and China 
should therefore join hands in fighting the Western powers for the 
survival of the yellow nations. The Nihon wrote that European statesmen, 
in conducting their foreign policies, were guided by the notion that the 
countries of the world were divided into two groups; those belonging 
to the same race as themselves and had a similar political system as 
their own and those differing, from them racially and politically.
It was the ambition of these European nations, when the opportunity 
arose, to subject the countries of the latter group under their rule.
Such a policy had in fact been carried out towards China which be longed 
to a different racial group and had a different political structure 
from that of the Europeans. Japan had reformed her political system 
on the European models and she was not protesting against the European 
powers’ policies towards China. But such actions on her part would 
not make the European countries accept her as one of them because she was 
still a country of a different race. Because of this, the Nihon 
concluded, Japan would eventually have to act alongside the countries
-f in (1 6)of her own race.
(1 6) "The Europeans' ideas about the foreign countries", editorial, 
Nihon, 17th April, 1898, in Shimura Toshiko, op.cit., p. 271.
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In early 18981 an article entitled "Alliance of the peoples of 
the same race" appeared in the Taiyo and was translated into Chinese 
and several European languages. It made an impact both inside and 
outside Japan. Konoe Atsumaro who wrote the article was at that time 
president of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet? a position which 
he held from 1896 to 1903* Konoe spoke of the necessity for an 
alliance between Japan and China to resist the aggression of Western 
nations and their aggrandizement in the Far Easti
"... The future of the Far East is one in which 
the struggle between the human races will take 
place inevitably .... Temporary diplomatic consid­
erations may lead to combinations which may for 
the moment obscure the main issue; but these 
are mere incidents detached from the great struggle? 
which is one between the yellow and white peoples 
in which the Chinese and Japanese must inevitably 
find themselves on the same side ...."(l?)
Konoe also observed that the European nations did not regard the yellow
race in quite the same way that they did those of Africa and other parts
of the world; their contempt? he said? was mingled with fear?
"... The so-called administration of Africa? colon­
ization of Australia and South-east Asia and 
exploration of South America [by the Europeans] 
indicate nothing but their conspiracy of conquering 
other races. As the differences in progress 
between these races on the one hand and the Europeans 
on the other are too great? the latter have had no 
difficulty in conquering these undeveloped lands .... 
However? as regards the yellow races? the European, 
nations are contenptious on the one hand and uncertain 
on the other. This is due? especially to the 
military skills which Japan has exhibited in the 
war with China. Although it is true that the 
level of civilization in terms of material progress 
of the yellow race is undeniably inferior to that 
achieved by the European powers? their national 
strength and potentialities are still hard to 
determine ...."(^S)
Konoe Atsumaro? "Alliance of the peoples of the same race (Do Jinshu 
Domei) and the necessity for researches on the problems of China?" 
Tai.yo, 1st January? 1898? collected in Konoe Atsumaro Nikki? Tokyo? 
1968? Fuzoku Bunsho (Supplementary Documents)? pp. 62-63. This 




As regards the "partition of China", Konoe said,
"... Although the danger of a partition of China 
is not imminent at the moment, it is imperative
that the countries of the yellow race jointly evolve
a method to protect themselves. It may not be 
necessary for the Western powers to ally with one 
another in a racial struggle in the undeveloped 
lands [of Africa, Australia and South America], it 
is not so easy for them if they want to conquer 
China. Hence, when the partition of China becomes 
a reality# it will also be a time when an alliance 
among the powers will be formed, resulting in a 
confrontation of the white and yellow races. In
a situation like this, the destiny of the Japanese
people can hardly be detached from the struggle .
As he regardedan alliance between the Japanese and Chinese as indispensable 
and inevitable, he was much concerned at the tendency among his country­
men, especially those resident in China, to imitate the "evil example"
of the Europeans and to affect to despise the Chinese. He deplored
the foolish jubilation of the Japanese at the fall of China in l895»
The destiny of the Chinese nation, Konoe maintained, was bound up with 
that of Japan. The Japanese should cultivate a feeling of friendliness 
towards their neighbouring country, aid and encourage the Chinese in 
the advancement of their power and civilization. They should strive 
even more vigorously to remove from the minds of the Chinese people 
jealousy- and suspicions against the Japanese.(20)
Concerning the situation in China itself, Konoe observed that the 
Peking government was as unenlightened and arrogant as in the old days.
Not only was it reluctant to carry out reforms in China’s civil and military 
institutions, despite the loss China had suffered in the war with 
Japan, but it was still dreaming of the "Great Chinese Empire," oblivious 
to the danger threatening the country. He urged the leaders of Japanese 
thought to go to China in order to become acquainted with the state of 





Konoe believed that there were influential people outside Peking 
who were concerned about the deteriorating situation in China. Chang 
Chib-tung? for example? was enthusiastic about reforms in the country 
and the people in Shanghai were aware of the ambitions of the Western 
powers and there was among them a gradual deepening of friendliness 
towards the Japanese. Because of this? cooperation between the Japanese 
and Chinese people would best be promoted on the unofficial level. But 
first of all? Japan had to research into China’s problems? investigate 
the Chinese institutions? explore the customs of the local people and 
acquire more knowledge of the Chinese nation. He regretted that while 
many Japanese travelled extensively in Europe and learned a lot about 
the Western countries? very few knew enough about the affairs of China.
And if Japan was to evolve a plan in conjunction with China to save 
the Far East from Western domination? she would have to overcome her 
ignorance regarding China.
Such were the ideas and ambitions which inspired him to establish
- (22) the Toa Dobun Kai (East-Asia Common Culture Society) in Novemebr? 1898.
At the opening ceremony? Konoe who became the first president of the
Society said?
’’Japan and China have had a long relationship with 
one another. Their cultures and values are 
similar. In sympathies and circumstances? they 
are as close as brothers? as close as the lips are 
to the teeth .... A few years ago? the great 1 
Heaven did not have pity on us and the two brother 
countries were engaged in hostilities against one 
another. The powers took this opportunity [to 
strengthen their influences in the Far East] and 
the situation has since become more and more dan­
gerous. Is it not time the two countries forgot 
their past mistakes? discarded their hatred for one 
another and jointly defended themselves against
(2 1) ibid.
(22) See following Chapter and Chapter Six.
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the outside foe? At this moment, both govern­
ments must in the name of justice and courtesy 
strive to strengthen the relations between the 
two countries and the two peoples must work 
together in good faith to attain mutual interests. 
The [intellectual and political! leaders of Japan 
and China,..must treat one another with sin­
cerity, bring forth the truth to everyone, 
support their governments and discipline 
the ordinary people in an attempt to resist 
the demands (of the strong powers] upon their 
territories...."(23)
Japan's role in the Chinese reform movement of 1898
The argument for giving support to the Chinese in 
reforming their institutions was reinforced in 1898 when 
K'ang Yu-wei, inspired by Japan's successful modernization, 
launched a reform programme with the support of his followers 
in the Hunan province, many of whom were scholars and minor 
officials in the government.
The Japanese government, however, was not openly 
disposed to the idea of fostering a special relationship 
with China which it feared would arouse the suspicion of 
the Western powers. Baron Albert d'Anethan, Belgian minister 
to Japan, reported that Ito had favoured a rapprochement 
between Japan and China just before the powers' scramble 
for concessions in China in early 1 8 9 7 . ^ ^  But no 
positive step was taken by Tokyo towards this end over 
and after the 1898 crisis. But some Japanese diplomatic
(23) Quoted by Watanabe Ikujiro, op.cit., p.304.
(24) D'Anethan to de Pavereau, Belgian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, No.249/104, 23rd December, 1897, in George 
Alexander Lensen, ed., The D'Anethan Dispatches from 
Japan, 1894-1910, S o phi a University', Tokyo]" l/e’7, p775 .
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officials and military agents were convinced that China could and 
should be saved from Western domination through the help of Japan.
They quietly implemented a policy that would give assistance to a
movement in China that had the promise of strengthening the country
against the Western powers especially Russia.
Inside China, the tendency of the Manchu court to favour
Russia in its foreign policy and the suspicion and resentment which 
many Chinese officials in Peking continued to harbour against Japan 
after the war did little to further the cause of a Sino-Japanese rappro­
chement. But outside the immediate supervision of Peking, there were 
other areas of activity and other centres of power in China which offered 
wider scope for the implementation of the policy of Sino-Japanese cooper­
ation. Entrusted with the build-up of Chinese military forces, many 
of the provincial viceroys were desirous of strengthening China through 
progressive military reform. And it was to these provincial viceroys 
that the Japanese proposed that they would assist China in expanding and 
improving her military establishment.
In December, 189?, a military mission led by Kamio Mitsuomi was 
sent to Hankow by General Kawakami Soroku of the Japanese Army General 
Staff. The mission was to deliver to the govern®r-general of Hu-kuang, 
Chang Chih-tung, Kawakami's message that the previous war between China 
and Japan had been a mistake, that the increasing power of the white 
race in the Orient presented grave dangers to both China and Japan, 
and that closer relations should exist between these two Asian countries 
which we re basically of the same race and culture. Japan would provide 
training in military science to Chinese students sent to Japan as a 
first step towards strengthening China militarily. She and England 
already had an understanding by which they were willing to align them­
selves with and give assistance to China. But should China continue
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to ally herself with Russia, Japan would be obliged to support British
(25)policies of encroachment in the Yangtze Valley.
Kawakami's ideas were presented to Chang Chih-tung in January, 1898 and
met with favourable response from the latter who, though reserved about
China's alignment with foreign powers, was enthusiastic about the training
of Chinese students in Japan. As news of Japan's desire to align
herself with England and China and to help strengthen China against the
Western powers spread to other parts of the country, it was received
with favour by many of the Chinese reformers, especially those in Peking
and in the province of Hunan. In particular, it was greeted with
active enthusiasm by K'ang Yu-wei who had for a long time advocated
that China should renovate herself by following the Japanese example
of modernization and using Japan's programme of reform as a model.
Soon after he learned of the Japanese wishes for closer relations with
China, K'ang acted with energy and promptness. In mid-April, he
presented his "Study of Reforms in Japan" to the Emperor Kuang Hs.u , in
the hope of providing him with a guide to reform adopted from the
innovations that had already been put into effect in Meiji Japan. In
June, he submitted a memorandum to the Emperor appealing to the latter
to inaugumte a reforrrri programme of China's institutions by following
the example of the Meiji Emperor. A few days later, on 11th June,
1898, the Chinese Emperor issued the edict fixing the policies of the
Empire. This was to herald a ®ries of reform measures which lasted for
(26)just over three months. K'ang's active advocacy of reforms
modelling on the Japanese can largely be explained by his long-time
(25) Chang wen-hsiang kung ch'uan-chi (Collected memorials, works and papers 
by Chang Chih-tung), Peking, 1957, Vol.79» pp.l9B-20b.
(26) For K'ang's efforts in preparing the reform programme of 1898, 
see Richard C. Howard, "Japan's role in the Reform Programme
for K'ang Yu-wei" in Lo Jung-pang, ed. (with translations), K'ang 
Yu-wei, a Biography andaSymposium, University of Arizona Press, 1967,
pp. 287 ff.
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interest in the history of Meiji Japan. But it would appear that 
the knowledge of the willingness of the Japanese to assist China greatly 
encouraged him in his efforts to bring forth the reform programme of
1898.
Japanese newspapers' reviews of the reform movement
The Japanese responded favourably towards K'ang's efforts to reform 
the Chinese institutions. Some newspapers believed that the hope of 
the revival of Asia would eventually materialize now that the Chinese had 
awakened to the need for renovation. The Yorozu Choho urged the 
Japanese people to sympathize with and support the Chinese in the same 
way that they would protect someone who had unfortunately fallen ill
(27)and was now making efforts to recuperate. The Nihon observed that
the Chinese reform movement, though still in its early stages, should 
not be dismissed lightly. The Japanese should not overlook K'ang's 
potentialities in saving China. Japan must take this opportunity to
(2 8)guide the Chinese people in reforming their institutions.
In April, Fukumoto Nichinan, super-intendant of the Nihon, went to 
China to report on the progress of the movement. Fukumoto believed 
that Japan had secured the independence of Korea by going to
war with China. Now Japan should awaken China from her obstinacy 
and help her to get back on her feet so that the three countries would 
co-exist in East Asia and safeguard peace in this part of the world.
He reported that the recent development in China indicated that Chinese 
inside and outside the government had awakened to such a need and they
(27) "Japanese measures in the Shashih riot", Yorozu Choho, 18th May,
1898- Quoted in Shimura Toshiko, op.cit., p. 275.
(28) "Argument for promoting reforms in China's internal administration", 
Nihon,13th May, 1 8 9 8, ibid., p. 276.
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were beginning to see that China must learn from Japan in order to
strengthen herself. Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i who had advocated
war in 1894 were now enthusiastic supporters of the Misshin domei ron
(the argument for a Sino-Japanese alliance). People like K'ang Yu-wei
were convinced that it would be to China's advantage to acquire Western
knowledge from Japan and not from the Western countries themselves.
Translated books, newspapers and journals were coming out in large numbers
advocating reform ideas and organizations were being set up to put these
ideas into practice. At this moment, it was urgent for Japan to give
guidance to these people, promote harmony among themselves and encourage
their movement so that they would attain the same achievement as the
(29)Japanese had in the era of Keio.
The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun pointed out that there would be 
mutual benefits for both countries if Japan took the position of a 
leader in the Chinese reform movement. It said that if China looked to 
any one European country for support in her reforms, she would arouse 
suspicions and obstruction from the other powers. But if she turned to 
Japan whichstood outside the rivalries of the Western powers, such 
complications would not arise. Between Japan and China, agreements and 
understanding concerning matters of reform could be attained without 
the use of diplomatic strategies. Since the Sino-Japanese war, the 
Chinese people had not only recognized the progress Japan had made in 
civilization but also felt the need to look to Japan for support.
Moreover, the advances of the Eurppean powers in the East had drawn 
the Chinese people closer to Japan. An opportunity had now arisen 
for Japan to enlighten and guide the Chinese. in another editorial
(29) Fukumoto Nichinan, "The Japanese and Chinese situations", Nihon, 
15th April, 1898, ibid., p. 277
(30) "The enlightenment of the Chinese people", TNNS, 31st August,
1 898, p. 2 .
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article, the same paper said that now that the Chinese had eventually
awakened to the need for revitalizing their internal administration,
adjusting their finances and making the most use of their talented
people, Japan's long cherished hope was gradually becoming a reality.
Should the Japanese not be pleased about it? Apart from striving for
the best in reforming their institutions, the Chinese government and
people must cultivate a sense of nationhood. Without this sense of
nationalism, all the edicts for reform, no matter how benevolent they
(31)might be, would be to no purpose.
The coup d'etat in China in September 1898 and Japanese government policy
K'ang Yu-wei's reform programme, however, lasted only a hundred 
days. In initiating major renovations in the Chinese civil and military 
systems, K'ang was supported by a group of scholars with little political 
influence and a handful of minor officials in Peking. The progressive 
provincial viceroys were not prepared to fully endorse his reform 
programme which was then regarded as radical. Although K'ang, who 
had little political power in the Peking government, had the moral 
support of the Emperor, real power was in the hands of the conservative 
faction in Peking led by the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi and Li Hung-chang.
Tzfa Hsi had for long intended to depose Kuang Hsu and she viewed the 
liaison between the Emperor and the reformist party as a threat to her 
predominant position. K'ang Yu-wei's 'subversive' reform programme 
only hastened her decision to dethrone Kuang Hsii.On 21st September, 1898, 
she ordered the execution of six young reformist officials and the
(3 1) "Encouraging the best in the governing of the country", TNNS, 
8th March, 1898, p. 2.
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enforced seclusion of Kuang HsU .
On the day of the coup? K'ang Yu-wei's closest supporter Liang
Chfi-ch’ao went to the Japanese legation to appeal to Hayashi Gonsuke,
then minister to China, for his aid in rescuing the Emperor and protecting
the lives of K'ang (who had departed for Shanghai) and the other reformers.
Ito who was then visiting Peking suggested that Hayashi telegraph
instructions to the Consul-general in Shanghai to give what help he
could to K'ang and also made arrangements for Liang's escape from Peking
to Japan. Efforts were also made by the Japanese legation staff to
save Huang Tsun-hsien, T'an Ssu-tung, Chang Yin-huan, Wang Chao and
others associated with the reform movement, but only Liang and Wang
Chao arrived safely in Japan. When K'ang arrived in HongKong a few
days after the coup, he immediately requested the Japanese consul to
assist him to go to Japan. With the consent of Okuma, then prime minister,
K'ang was able to find refuge in Japan. On 27th September, 1898,
Okuma sent a telegramme to Hayashi, authorizing him to advise the
Tsungli Yamen not to take any drastic actions against the reformers and
(32)to adopt moderate measures in all respects.
Although Okuma was sympathetic towards K'ang and Liang and offered 
them private support and encouragement, his government took no active 
part in furthering the cause of the Chinese reformers which was to 
launch a campaign in Japan to save the Emperor. Moreover, the Japanese 
government was not prepared to jeopardize its relations with the Tzu 
Hsi faction in Peking.
(32) Okuma to Hayashi, 27th September 1898, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, 
Tokyo Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31? Part Tj (195^) 
No. 5 6 0, P.6 6 3. This sounds will hereafter be cited as NGB.
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This unwillingness to give active support to the reformers aroused
criticism at home. The Nihon said that this was not the time for
the Japanese government to have recourse to precedents in international
in a way
law. The Japanese government had Acowardly^'ref rained from taking actions 
to rescue the Emperor of China. If it had acted in this way because 
it did not wish to incur the displeasure of the Peking government or 
upset Chang Chih-tung and Li Hung-Chang, then it had acted disgracefully, 
jeopardizing Japan's prestige and dignity as an advanced nation in
(33)East Asia. In another article, the Nihon said that by propping
up the regency in China, the Japanese government had dealt a severe 
blow to the Chinese reform movement which had been a result of much 
labour and efforts. In order to promote self-renovation in China,
Japan must refuse to recognize the Tzu Hsi regency, urge Peking to restore 
the Emperor to power and advise the Chinese to adopt civilized methods
,  , (3*+)of government.
The Yorozu Choho also regretted that the Chinese reform movement 
had ended abruptly and was equally critical of the Japanese government's 
inaction after the coup. It said that the reckless actions of K'ang 
Yu-wei and his supporters were merely mistakes of a transitional phase 
in the reform programme. Once this period of trials and errors had 
passed, their methods would change and cautious and capable people 
would emerge to carry them out. It was premature to predict failure 
for the Chinese reform movement and pass judgment on the rash attempt 
of K'ang and his supporters at this early stage. It was even more 
foolish of the Japanese foreign affairs authorities to say that there was
(33) "The plight of the Chinese Emperor", editorial, Nihon, 13th 
October, 1898* Quoted in Shimura, op. cit., p. 2§0.
(3 4) "The Japanese government's measures before and after the coup," 
Nihon 27th October, 1 8 9 8, op.cit., p. 280.
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no hope of success for the movement. If the Japanese government attempted
to discourage the Chinese reformers or tried to prevent the Japanese
people from giving them moral support, then it would be committing the
(35)biggest crime against justice.
The la c k  of o f f ic ia l  sympathy for the Chinese reformers was even
more pronounced during the second Yamagata government which replaced
the Okuma cabinet on 8th November, 1898. The new Japanese government
was more concerned with remaining 011 good terms with the Peking government
than promoting reforms in China. Hence when Yano Fumio, minister to
China, advised Prince Ch’ing and other top officials in Peking to discard
their conservative policy and make use of the services of the progressive
( ^6 )
officials in reforming the government, he was criticized by the
Gaimusho for having gone too far. The deputy foreign 7'n.inister, Tsuzuki
Keiroku, told Yano that such an advice on the internal policy of China
would only arouse the resentment of the Chinese leaders and serve no
purpose. It was not the concern of Japan whether the internal policy
of China was progressive or conservative. Japanese officials should
be concerned solely with the advancement of Japan-’ s interests and make
(37)the most of every opportunity to achieve this end.
It would seem that the Yamagata government reckoned that it was 
in Japan's interests to secure the friendship of Peking 
instead of the reformers. Thus from late 18 9 8, there began
a short phase of rapprochement between the Japanese and the Manchu 
government . The Japanese leaders began to look upon the presence
(35) Naito Konan, "The two phases in the argument for reforms in 
China", part 3» Yorozu Choho, 30th October, 1898, ibid.,
pp. 281-2 8 2.
(36) Yano to Aoki, 26th November, 1 898, NGB, Vol.31» part 1 , (195^)» 
No. 61O, p.7l9.
(37) ibid., p. 720.
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of K ’ang Yu-wei and other Chinese refugees in Japan as a source of 
embarrassment. When Chang Chih-tung requested Segawa, Japanese consul 
in Hankow, to expel K'ang and his party from Japan, Aoki, foreign Minister, 
advised Se gawa to assure Chang that the Japanese governemnt was far 
from willing to give asylum to K'ang and his party, nevertheless it 
was impossible owing to international usage to send them out of the 
country against their will. But every effort would be made to secure
/ ~7 Q \
that end. During this time, a split had developed between the
Chinese refugees themselves. Wang Chao was in favour of bringing a 
compromise between Tz’u Hsi and Kuang Hsu while K'ang and Liang,on 
the other hand, stuck to their belief that no reforms could be implemented
(39)in China unless total power was restored to the Emperor. This
convinced the Yamagata government that the engagement by the Chinese 
refugees in Japan in "subversive activities" would cause harm to its
(9o)relations with Peking and it offered K'ang assistance to leave Japan.
After K'ang had left Japan in March, 1899? Aoki again ordered Yano to
(9-1)step up measures to expel Liang. In December the same year,
Liang left Japan. After the departures of K 'ang and Liang, repressive 
measures were taken by the Japanese government against the activities 
of their supporters. At the request of Chang Chih-tung, reformist 
publications were banned in Japan.
In 1 8 9 9, a secret move to foster a closer Sino-Japanese relation­
ship was made between Fukushima Yasumasa and Odagiri on the one hand 
and Chang Chih-tung on the other. A Chinese secret mission was sent 
to Japan in July to discuss "secret matters" relating to the two countries.
(3 8 ) Aoki to Segawa, 6th December, 1898, ibid., No. 613? p» 729-.
(39) Wang Shu-huai, Wai-jen yu wu-hsii pien-fa, op. cit., p. 239-
(9-0) Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih (Material on the pre-1911 revolutionary
history), Shanghai, 1953? Vol.1 , p. 5»
(9-1) Aoki to Yano, NGB, Vol.32 (1955)> No .4-13i pp.545-546.
(9-2) See following Chapter.
(9-3) See following Chapter.
(43)
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As news of the coming of the Chinese mission reached Japan, the 
Japanese press speculated on the possibility of a Sino-Japanese 
alliance. It was conjectured that there would be closer cooperation 
in military and economic affairs between Japan and China if such 
an alliance materialized.(^
Yamagata, however, was opposed to the idea of a Sino-Japanese 
alliance. In anticipation of the arrival of the Chinese mission, he 
discussed the matter with foreign minister Aoki and minister of finance 
Matsukata and put forward his opinion in a memorial to the Japanese 
Emperor. He said that it was very likely that the Chinese government, 
encountering much hardship in its internal and external affairs, had 
decided to send a special mission to seek the help of Japan in keeping 
the Western powers at bay. He also said that when the Japanese government 
received the Chinese emissaries, it must take care not to injure their 
feelings in order to maintain the good relations with China. This was 
most important because China was Japan's "line of interests" and the 
Japanese government must seize every opportunity to extend it. However, 
if the relations between the two countries became too intimate, then 
the European powers would suspect that an alliance between Japan and 
China was being formed against them. This would incur difficulties 
and disadvantages for Japan at the peace conference which was being 
held in Hague. It was most ill-advised of Japan to ally herself with 
China in the hope of attaining independence for East Asia. The Japanese 
government should altogether avoid discussing this question with the
• • (45)Chinese emissaries.
(44) Teshirogi Kinsuke, "Bojutsu yori koshi ni itaru kakumeipa to 
henpopa no kosho" (The negotiations between the revolutionary
and reformist factions from 1898 to 1900) in Kindai Chugoku kenkyu, 
Chugoku kenkyu I-inkai, ed., Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha, 1966,
Vol 7., p. 248.
(45) Yamagata Aritomo, "Opinions regarding the Chinese special mission", 
27th May, 1899? in Oyama Azusa, (compiler), Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho 
(Reprints of 77 memorials and other writings by General Yamagata 
Aritomo, 1898-1922), Meiji - Hyakune.n-shi Sosho* Vol.16. Tokyo,
1966, pp. 251-255.
Thus the slender possibility of a Sino-Japanese alliance ended 
with the newly-founded consciousness on the part of the Japanese leaders 
of Japan's changing power status in the Far East. Although the 
Yamagata government was drawn closer to Peking and Chang Chih-tung 
as a result of the 1898 coup , it was not prepared to enter into 
further understanding with the Chinese government. By agreeing to 
play down the influence and suppressing the activities of the Chinese 
reformers in Japan, the Japanese government had helped to prevent the 
risk of the Manchu dynasty's downfall. It had come to accept the need 
to coordinate its policies with the Western powers in maintaining the 
status quoin the Far East.
Japanese government policies in the Far East in the early twentieth 
century
In 1900, Japan joined forces with the Western countries in putting down 
the Boxers in northern China. Foreign minister Aoki said at the time 
that under no circumstances would Japan act independently of the powers. 
Throughout the crisis, Japan was anxious to impress upon the Western 
powers that she did not seek any exclusive or particular advantages and 
that her interests in China were identical with those of the powers.
An imperial message from China to the Emperor of Japan asking for help
(47)in defending China against the insurgents and the foreigners failed
to call up an enthusiastic response from the Japanese government. In 
reply, the Emperor of Japan made no allusion to the Chinese proposal 
that Japan "make common cause" with China. He merely replied to make
(46) "The gist of foreign minister Aoki's replies [to questions] 
regarding the China incident." TNNS, 16th June, 1900, p.1.
(47) See following Chapter.
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it clear that Japan did not want to pursue towards China a line of 
conduct different from that of the other powers:
”... Now that all the powers have sent their troops 
to Tientsin? Japan is merely sending her own troops 
to relieve and protect her ministers from the 
hara-ssment caused by the rebels and not for any 
other purposes .... The Japanese and Chinese have 
always been friendly with one another and in the 
event of an emergency? Japan will not refuse to 
fulfil her obligations. We hope that the Chinese 
government will apply itself more energetically to 
suppressing the rebels so that this will be used 
as evidence of its efforts and the stand that it 
has taken over the present crisis. In any negoti­
ations that may be carried out among the powers? 
Japan will do her part to support China .
The Yamagata government saw that a more promising future for Japan 
could be attained by acting in concert with the Western powers SO that if 
a division of China were to ensue ? Japan could and should have her
f
share. Thus in 1900? the year of Japan’s cooperation in the Allied 
Expedition in Northern China was also very nearly the beginning of her 
active expansions in southern China and southern Korea.
Since the acquisition of Taiwan in /l895? Japanese governor-generals 
of that island had been suggesting practical implementation for plans 
of extending Japanese influence and interests into Fukien? the Chinese 
province opposite Taiwan. They believed that Taiwan and Fukien shared 
contiguous interests commercially and politically and because they were 
interdependent? they should be put under the same control. In 18 9 8?
Japan had secured from China a promise not to alienate the Fukien province 
to any other power. But when the Japanese government asked for 
railway rights in the province in 1900? it was refused. In August?
19 0 0? Katsura Taro? minister of war in the Yamagata cabinet? sent
(98) ’’The imperial message of the Japanese Emperor concerning the 
Boxer incident*” Extract in TNNS? 20th July? 1900? p.1.
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instructions to Kodama Gentaro, governor-general of Taiwan, to make
preparations for an occupation of Amoy, capital of Fukien, to counteract
the Russian presence in Newchang and the British presence in Shanghai.
On 28th August, two Japanese vessels set sail for Amoy from Taiwan.
On the same day, however, an unexpected order from Tokyo instructed the
Sh impel
Amoy consul and Goto^to postpone their landing operation. During this 
period of delay, British, Russian, French and American warships arrived
09)in Amoy making the Japanese invasion impossible.
The decision to forsake the Amoy expedition was partly a result 
of Ito's caution. Protests against the Japanese expedition had been made 
by American, British and German representatives to the Japanese consul 
in Amoy as well as to Tokyo. Ito was sensitive to the possibility of 
a coalition of foreign powers being formed against Japan as had taken 
place soon after the Sino-Japanese war/^^ But a more important cause 
of the sudden decision to end the expedition was Russia’s unexpected 
announcement on 26th August that she would withdraw her troops from 
Peking. It was feared in Tokyo that the Russian forces would be withdrawn 
to and concentrated in Manchuria The Tokyo government thus decided 
to stop the venture in southern China in order to concentrate its
resources in dealing with the problem in the North.
During the Boxer disturbances, Japan had approached Russia in July, 
1900 with the proposal that Japan should take Korea while Russia took
Manchuria as their respective spheres of influence. But the Russians
( 9^) For an account of Japan’s abortive attempt to consolidate her 
influence in Fukien and South Korea, see Ian H. Nish, "Japan's 
indecision during the Boxer disturbances", Journal of Asian 
Studies, Vol. XX (1 961), pp. 9^9-961.
See also Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, 
Cambridge, Mass., 195^1 PP* 99-102.
(30) Ian H. Nish.ibid., p. k'pk.
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were not prepared to forgo their interests in Korea and rejected the
proposal. Many Japanese at the time including the prime minister,
Yamagata,felt that Japan should take advantage of the North China
incident to consolidate her position in Korea, thus creating a substantial
buffer state separating Japan's sphere of influence and Russia's frontier
(51)on the Yalu. " In August, the Japanese government secured the
German government's promise not to raise any objections to any action
on Japan’s part in placing Korea under her sphere of influence and to
observe neutrality in the event of any power opposing the Japanese
action. The Japanese government had also promised the German government
that it was prepared to "reciprocate in the good will in case of a
similar event which Germany may have to encounter in the path of her
(52)rapid progress and development."
The Yamagata government resigned in October, 1900 and no further 
action was taken towards this end. But these two incidents demons­
trated that some Japanese leaders had tried to use the opportunity afforded 
by the Boxer crisis to consolidate Japanese interests on the Asian 
Continent. In so doing, they were acting in line with the Western 
powers' policy of aggrandizement in East Asia. The Yamagata government 
had since 1899 dismissed the idea of forming an alliance with China 
against the West. In 1900 when the dismemberment of China seemed 
to be most imminent, it acted promptly to secure Japan's interests in 
preparation for such an eventuality.
However, still unsure of her own power among the Western countries, 
Japan dreaded a possible division of China. Some Japanese leaders
(5 1) ibid., p. 957.
(52) Quoted in Nish, ibid., p. 958.
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were aware that the integrity of China could not be preserved 
merely by the powers promising not to occupy Chinese territories. 
China needed a progressive government which was capable of 
upholding the country's independence. Ito who succeeded 
Yamagata as prime minister in October, 1900, told Baron Albert 
d'Anethan that "Without foreign support, China will never 
succeed in making the financial, moral and political reforms 
in her Government, without which she is bound to perish. The 
Governments of Europe, Japan and America, therefore, must agree 
on a general plan of reform for China" .(53) ^ M s  emphasis on 
cooperation between Japan and the West in giving help to China 
marked the beginning of a new official attitude towards 
reform in China. Although some Japanese leaders still main­
tained that Japan should lead China towards development, the 
Ghina hozen ron hau come to mean something rather different 
from what Okuma had advocated in 1896.
In 1902, Japan entered into an alliance with England 
with the objective of containing the Russian threat in Manchuria 
which had been growing since the Boxer Rebellion. The alliance 
pledged each power in support of the status quo and general 
peace in the Far East and territorial integrity of China and 
Korea. These were to be achieved by the affirmation of both 
powers' special interests in China and, in particular, Japan's 
predominant interests in Korea. It was the first time that 
Japan successfully concluded an alliance with a Western nation. 
With this diplomatic success, a change came about in Japan's 
political life which in the following years was to be dominated 
by power politics on the grand scale.
(53) D'Anethan to de Favereau, No. 14/11, 8th February, 
1901. Lensen, op.cit., pp.146-147.
Russia's refusal to withdraw her troops from Manchuria 
after the Boxer disturbances continued to threaten Japanese 
security. Ito who had been succeeded by Katsura Taro in 
June, 1901 but remained influential in the government still 
believed in the need for an entente with Russia. Under his 
influence, Japan proposed in 1903 a settlement with Russia 
based on the mutual recognition of Russian railway rights 
in Manchuria and Japanese political and economic interests 
in Korea. Russia countered with a guarantee of territorial 
integrity for Korea only, excluding China and demanded Japanese 
recognition of Manchuria as an exclusively Russian sphere of 
influence. Katsura1s government, under pressure from a 
public opinion increasingly eager to fight, refused the Russian 
demands and war broke out in February. 1904. The outbreak 
of Russo-Japanese hostilities led to a revival of the rumour
the
ofA"yellow peril" in the West. Japanese government leauers
were anxious to reassure the Western powers that the war was
not a racial conflict. prime minister Katsura, in particular,
(54)stressed that it was "no war of race, no war of religion".
The racial factor in Japanese political thinking in the early 
twentieth century
The changing power status of Japan in Asia was appreciat­
ed by most Japanese in the twentieth century. This awareness 
had two different implications for Japanese attitudes towards 
China. On the one hand, many Japanese shared the government's
(54) D'Anethan to de Favereau, No.101/58, 28th May, 1904, 
ibid., p.190.
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view that Japan needed to join in the game of power politics 
alongside the Western countries. They accepted that this 
would entail Japan's gradual abandonment of her role as the 
champion of the Asian nations in confronting Western power.
On the other hand, the realization of Japan's growing prestige 
in Asia strengthened the belief that Japan should take a 
leading role in preserving China. Many Japanese claimed 
that they had taken an active part in the various attempts 
at change in China since the reform movement of the 1898 
period and that Japan had a special role to play in China's 
regeneration. In educating Chinese students and helping to 
train the Chinese army, Japan could cultivate sympathy and 
understanding in the Chinese for the state of affairs in the 
Japanese nation, thus paving the way for a closer relation­
ship between the two countries.
Those who took the second view tended to reject the 
government's policy of propping up the Manchu regime. They 
maintained that the Manchu rulers and not the Chinese people 
were responsible for the backward state in China. No doubt 
China had not exerted herself enough but given help, the Chinese 
would overcome their weakness and become a strong nation 
again. When this happened, the Eastern world would no longer 
have to suffer harassment and aggression from the West.
The Japanese government's concern with China should be with 
the people and not the rulers.
In an article entitled "Two hundred years of Chinese and 
Japanese relations", Okuma again stressed his faith in the 
potentialities of the Chinese nation. He said that a people
6 8 .
with four thousand years of history could not perish. It 
was unfortunate that the Manchu rulers had failed in their 
duties towards their Chinese subjects and allowed the terri­
tories of the Chinese people to be placed under the sovereign­
ty of foreign powers. But the Chinese people would not 
subject themselves to this humiliation for long. A time 
would come when wise and courageous men would emerge to
(55)organize the people in fighting for their independence.' ’
Okuma also predicted that a confrontation between the- 
human races in the twentieth century would take place in 
China. As the present government of China could not save 
the country from being partitioned by the white powers, 
the duty of leading China away from this disaster fell on 
Japan. He reiterated that what China needed most was 
renovation in her educational system. The Japanese must 
first widen the Chinese people's horizon and encourage them 
in their pursuit of knowledge and justice. Such were the
the 'the
duties of a Japanese to wards A Chinese with whom they shared a racial 
and cultural relationship.
Some writers also shared Okuma's view that a racial 
struggle was still going on in the twentieth century. An 
article in the Nihon entitled "Competition in the pacific Ocean" 
stressed that the world was created for all mankind and
(55) Okuma Shigenobu, "Two hundred years of Chinese and 
Japanese relations", translated in Ch'ing I pao (China 
niscussion), reform journal, Yokohama,(16 9o-l901)»




not for the white race alone. If the other races had been conquered 
by the white nations? it was because they did not realize that only 
the fittest survived and that they had not exerted themselves in fighting 
for their independence. Japan's position in the world was equal to 
those of the European powers. The Japanese were a nationalistic and 
aspiring people who had no lack of the qualities of the superior Asian 
race. Once she became the leader of the yellow race and? together with
the Chinese? led the eight hundred million Asian people in confronting
the white invaders? then the outcome of the conflict in the Pacific 
Ocean [sic] was still to be decided. The article said that the Japanese 
people wished to see China become another power beside Japan in the East? 
they hoped patriotic men in China would make sacrifices for their 
country and venture into bitter hardship for the attainment of civiliz­
ation. The expansion of Asian power? the recovery of Asian sovereignty
(57)
and the well-being of the yellow race depended on Japan and China.
Some were disconcerted by the hostility and malice embodied in 
the yellow peril idea which was revived immediately before the Russo- 
Japanese war. They regarded it as a weapon which the Western powers 
employed against the Asian nations. Takahashi Sakue said it was evident 
that the confrontation between the races of the world was taking place 
as the world powers rallied to the "racial concept". The "countries
of the same culture" in the East should therefore unite to form a front
against the other races/5^
(5?) "The Competition in the Pacific Ocean"? Nihon? translated in
Yu-hsueh i-pien (Foreign works translated by Chinese scholars 
studying abroad)? Tokyo? No. 1? 14th November? 1902? pp. 88-90. 
(Facsimile? Taipeh? 1 968).
(5 8) Takahashi Sakue? "A look at the world especially the Far Eastern 
situation before removing the teaching of Chinese from the 
secondary school curriculum"? in Nihon? 1st January? 1903• 
Paraphrased by Oka? op.cit.? pp. -^2-^ 3•
The Nihonjin? a nationalist journal? warned that instead of 
coordinating her actions with the Western countries? Japan should join 
in the efforts of the Asian nations to counter Western encroachment.
It said that although the competition between the races was a fact? 
the diplomats of Japan had avoided talking about it and newspapers 
and journals had refrained from discussing it. This was because they 
did not want to rouse the Westerners. They hoped that in the internat­
ional competition, Japan would form a union with the Western countries 
to oppose China and Korea. That was why the Japanese government 
endeavoured to align its foreign policies with those of Europe. Troops 
were sent to China during the Boxer Rebellion with a view to supporting 
the Western powers as they attemped to punish China. Increasingly? 
Japan's foreign policies and national arguments had become directed 
towards unity with countries not of her own race and confronting those 
of the same race as herself. But? the Nihonjin stressed? the situation 
in international politics was one in which the peoples of the West opposed 
the peoples of the East. Because of this? cooperation between Japan 
and China was a necessity. If the Japanese? who were a dynamic people, 
would help and join hands with the Chinese? then the two countries would 
be able to preserve their national independence. But if Japan were
to stand alone in this world of racial confrontation ? then her
(59)future would be doomed. ■
But as the article in the Nihonjin pointed out? not only government 
leaders? but many Japanese writers and newspapers had doubts about 
Japan's role in championing the Asian nations against the advances 
of the Western countries. They were beginning to think
(59) "The future of the Japanese nation"? in Nihonjin? 20th February 
1903* paraphrased by Oka? ibid.? p. kj>.
71.
that Japan would have to cooperate with the Western powers if she wanted 
to preserve her national independence. The Japanese who had a historical 
relationship with China should help the latter to achieve stability.
But they must also have the cooperation of the Western powers to attain 
this goal. A situation in which the powers selfishly scrambled for 
concessions in China and competed with one another in establishing their 
repective spheres of interests was no solution to the China problem*. 
Instead of following every action of the powers? Japan, equipped with better
4
knowledge of the state of affairs in China,should try to enlighten 
the West on the necessity of cooperation with a view to maintaining 
peace in the Far East.
During the Boxer Rebellion? the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun which 
stauiohly supported this line of argument advocated that the powers 
cooperate in preserving China. It very much regretted that the military 
activities of the Western countries had been motivated by "greed" and 
"opportunism". These Western powers had tried to further their own 
interests at a time when the Chinese government and rebels were engaged 
in hostilities. The paper urged that Japan refrain from doing the same 
and send troops to China only to protect Japanese lives and interests.
Japan should fulfil her duty as China's neighbour by asking the powers 
to act with one mind in preserving China's sovereign rights.
According to the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun? the agreement between 
the Western powers to maintain the status cruo in China was not enough 
guarantee for the restoration of China's independence. It merely 
perpetuated the situation in which China had no power to safeguard 
the lives and properties of her own people as well as those of the 
foreigners. The principle of preservation of China would
(60) "The China Incident"? TNNS? 1 +^th June? 1900? p. 2.
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become a dead letter if the pledges made by the powers were not backed 
up by the restoration of sovereign rights and territories to the Chinese 
government. As long as this was not achieved, such declarations of 
'preservation' would only produce negative results for peace in the Far 
East, Questioning the validity of the "preservation of China" as 
agreed upon by the powers, the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said,
"... First we must be sure about the exact meaning 
of the 'preservation of China' as agreed upon 
by the powers. Does it mean the maintenance 
of China's political and social stability?
Does it refer to the preservation of China's 
territories? Or does it mean the preservation 
of China's sovereign rights? If it is the 
first, then is the partial stability in the 
political and social order in China with an 
absent Emperor and Imperial Court to be preserved? 
If it is China's territories that is in question, 
are then the perpetual leases of her territories 
and the unlimited military occupations of vast 
areas part of the 'preservation'? Not only are 
China's administrative and judicial rights dis­
regarded when she is made to recognize the validity 
of leases and the occupations of her territories, 
but she also has to tolerate a system in which 
the foreign consular jurisdictional rights are 
allowed to remain in the settlements of the 
respective powers...."(6l)
But such wariness of the Western powers' intentions in the Far 
East all but vanished with the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
in 1902. The Russian threat looked like being contained with the 
promise from England to cooperate in maintaining general peace in the 
Far East. This new understanding with England brought about a feeling 
of comparative security. Moreover, the Japanese public was intoxicated 
with its consciousness of the country's new status as the ally and 
valued friend of a world power. S.L. Gulick observed that
"... With the advance of Russian aggression in
(6 1) "The meaning of the preservation of China", TNNS, 25th September,
1900, p. 2.
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Manchuria, there was danger that Japan 
would again he thrown into anti-foreign 
agitation, hut announcement of the Anglo- 
Japanese Agreement in 1902 dispelled that 
danger and evoked the enthusiasm of the 
p e o p l e 62)
If Japan's new relationship with England did not hreak 
down in Japan all antipathy to the white race, it greatly 
reduced the Japanese fear of Western domination of Asia and 
hence her concern for the plight of China. The Tokyo Nichi- 
Nichi Shimbun changed its tone with rega.rd to the preservation 
of China. In an editorial article in March, 1902, it said 
that the Chinese government leaders had only themselves to 
blame for the critical period after 1895 when the powers competed 
with one another to establish their respective sbheres of in­
fluence in China. Fortunately for the Chinese government, 
these powers had now jointly agreed to discard their nolicies 
of invasion. It said that in 1901, an understanding had been 
reached between England, Germany and France whereby England 
agreed to open the Yangtze region to the powers. Also, the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance had been concluded with a view to 
guaranteeing the "open door" in China and giving all the powers 
equal rights in that country. Nevertheless, the problems 
which China had brought about in international relations must 
be removed by herself. If the. Chinese leaders remained un­
awakened and persisted in their unenlightened policies, then 
the respite in the Far East which the powers had helped to 
bring about would not last long and China would still find her­
self in deep waters. The Chinese government and people must 
exert themselves so as to prevent any calamities which might 
affect countries which had friendly relations with them.^-^
(62) Sydney L.Gulick, The White Feril in the Far East,
New York, 1905, pV65.
(63) "On the self-awakening of the Chinese government leaders", 
TNN3, 4th March, 1902, p.2.
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This relaxed attitude towards the Western nations can also be 
detected in the "Objectives of the China Association"! a document 
relating to the establishment of the Shina Kyokai in 1902. The
professed goal of this Association of which Konoe Atsumaro was a
founding member, was to spread education which would "renovate civili­
zation in China" and promote trade between Japan and China with a view to
strengthening the friendship of the two countries. The document said it was 
to the credit of the Western countries that they had endeavoured to
assist in the development of China. The least that Japan could do
was to catch up with them,
"Universal brotherhood is the great moral obligation 
of the human race .... If nations cannot share 
their benefits and learn from one another to 
compensate for their own shortcomings so that 
civilization is attained to procure happiness for 
mankind, thga tmiversa 1 brotherhood1 has no real
meaning. We have heard that the European and
American nations are taking upon themselves the 
task of guiding and enlightening oths? countries 
and venturing into great difficulties to engage 
in the educational and exploratory activities in 
China. We must think highly of their chivalrous 
disposition. As there has been a historical 
and special relationship between Japan and China, 
the existing friendship of the two countries has 
to remain on such a basis. Would it not be 
improper of the Japanese if they treated [the 
development of China] with negligence, procrast­
ination and hesitation? Should we not feel 
ashamed in front of those adventurous European 
and American peoples?"(6*f)
Some were beginning to have doubts about the case for the alignment 
of Japan and China based on the proximity of race and culture. The 
revival of the rumour of the yellow peril in the early twentieth 
century threatened Japanese political life in a new way. The Japanese 
who were emerging from Asian backwardness felt that they were being excluded 
from participation in international politics. Supporters of the
argument for cooperation with the Western countries began to question
( 6 k ) "The purpose of establishing the China Association", collected 
in Nikki, op.cit., Fuzoku Bunsho, p. k l 5 .
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the theory of cultural and racial affinity between Japan and China.
An editorial in the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun in late 1900 said the 
Japanese and Chinese peoples were no more affiliated to one anotheri 
racially and linguistically? than the Teutonic race was to the Latin 
race. The Chinese influence in Japan's education the article pointed 
out? had diminished considerably over the past decade. The study of 
the Chinese language in Japan had declined in popularity and importance 
owing to the fact that it had contributed little to Japan's technological 
advancement which was vital to her in this competitive world. Even 
the validity of the belief that the two peoples had shared the same 
language was becoming more and more questionable and it was doubtful 
whether the traditional concept of cultural and racial affinity had 
any real importance in deciding the future relationship of the two 
countries:
"... We attach importance to the mutual benefits 
of a peaceful trading relationship with our 
neighbour; we value among the Chinese people 
talented businessmen who are trustworthy?
hard-working? economical and skilful? those 
who excel in governing themselves in provincial 
politics and those who are brave? persevering 
and ready to embrace hardship in military affairs.
As there has been thousands of years of friendship 
between Japan and China? there are natural 
sympathies between the two countries and we 
are deeply concerned about the future and destiny 
of China. Hence it is our long cherished hope 
that our friendship will grow so that Japan's 
rights and interests will not be opposed and 
advancement and progress will not be hindered.
But we not only have to refute the narrow context 
of the outdated argument of China and Japan 
having a relationship comparable to that between 
the lips and the teetlh* we must also expel the unnec­
essary fears which have been aroused by the idea 
of the 'yellow peril'? an unenlightened concept 
entertained by the Europeans at the moment..."^5)
(65) "On cultural and racial affinity"? TNNS? 29th September? 1900?
p. 2 .
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In face of the suspicion and fear which had been en-
ihe
gendered in the West by the idea of/’yellow peril", many 
Japanese believed that they hau to try still harder to make 
themselves accepted by the powers into their ranks. The de­
emphasis on Japan's racial and cultural links with China was. 
indicative of a widespread anxiety regarding Japan's future 
relationship with the West. The Ji ji Shimbun which had des­
cribed the decision of England to form an alliance with an 
Asian nation as "history-making" and expressed great satisfact­
ion with Japan's achievement in the 1902 alliance said that 
Japan was more concerned at the possible continuation of 
the rumour after the Russo-Japanese war than with the outcome 
of the war itself. The Nihonjin said in 1903 that the
speculation of a Japanese victory had aroused a fear of Japan 
among the white nations. This was because the defeat of 
Russia would mean a loss of face and prestige for the "Aryan 
race". The Russians, out of self-interest, were spread­
ing the rumour to prejudice the white people against Japan, 
how that Japan had acquired a higher standing in international 
■politics, she must try to remove this racial prejudice of 
the white nations.
* * *
(66) "The Manchurian question and the racial question", 
11th October, 1903 and "Comments on Current Affairs 
Column", 29th November, 1903, Jiji Shimbun, quoted 
in Oka, op.cit., p.41.
(67) Susagawa Kiyoshi, "The need for paying attention to 
the development of hostility of the alien race", 
Nihonjin, 5th October, 1903, Oka. ibid., p.41.
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The defeat which Japan suffered at the hands of the 
Western powers after the Sino-Japanese war led her to believe 
even more strongly in the need for cooperation with China 
to preserve Asian integrity. At the same time, she was 
aware of her superior strength and advancement in modernizat­
ion among the countries in the East. Many Japanese believed 
that they were entitled to a. leading role in the Asian 
struggle against Western domination.
As changes came over Japan's political life in the 
early twentieth century, however, Japan also became conscious 
of her changing status in Asia. Many Japanese began to 
see a better future for Japan in cooperating with the West.
In aspiring to become an equal of the Western powers, they 
took a new view of China and Asia in general. The sense 
of community with Asia came to be challenged by a sense of 
detachment. These two seemingly conflicting views —  
identification with Asia and alignment with the West —  were 
to be foiind in coexistence in the developing notion of 
Japan being a bridge between the Eastern and Western world.
CHAPTER THREE
CHINA'S IMAGE OF JAPAN AS AN ALLY, 1895-1904
European expansion in the Far East increased with the Russian 
penetration into Manchuria after the Sino-Japanese war. China's 
traditional attitude of condescension towards Japan had not been swept 
away by Japan's victory in 1895? Put diplomatic necessity forced her 
to see that Japan would be a useful ally in her struggle against the 
West. The Chinese realized that Japan's victory had been made possible 
by modernization. And in face of growing pressure from the Western 
powers for concessions and spheres of influence, they began to turn 
towards Japan for support with their reforms and military defence.
Despite the enmity which the war of l894-l895 had engendered, 
many Chinese realized soon after the war that they had to make 
up with Japan to counter the Russian threat. When Li Hung-chang 
negotiated a defensive alliance with Russia in 1896 against future 
Japanese aggression, many in China viewed the forthcoming Sino-Russian 
understanding with grave misgivings. Wang Chih-ch'un, another leading 
official in Peking, likened the Russians to the Mongols in the late 
thirteenth century who, after having suppressed the tribe of Chin with 
Chinese help, proceeded to conquer China. He feared that Russia, 
emboldened by her treaty with China, would first direct her blows 
against Japan, and then devour China. He believed that China had 
made a big mistake in making an alliance with Russia and advocated 
that an offer of alliance be made instead to Japan on China's initiative.
(1) Ch'en chi, "On Russian support for China", in Ch'en Chung-i, 
ed., Huang-Ch'ao Ching-Shih-wen San-pTen (Supplementary 
collection of articles on social themes), Shanghai, 18981 
Vol. 4, p. 18.
In fact, it was generally reckoned by the Chinese that it had
been a mistake for China and Japan to go to war against each other.
Cheng Kuan-ying, the scholar comprador, in one of his essays on frontie
defence, said that as the two countries were both situated in Asia, .
fighting one another would only benefit a third power. He proposed
that China profess her good will to Japan, forget the past enmity and
(2)cooperate with Japan to bring about the revival of Asia.
Kung Hsin-ming suggested that in order to persuade Japan to accept 
the offer of alliance, China needed to emphasize Russia's ambition of 
engulfing East Asia and the urgency for Japan and China to end their
(3)disputes. ' Japanese attention would also have to be drawn to 
the imminent completion of the Siberian Railway. Kung also reckoned 
that this would strengthen the argument for a triple alliance between 
Japan, China and Korea to forestall any moves that Russia might make 
once her railway was completed.W
Chinese respose to the Japanese overtures of 1897-1898
The Japanese mission headed by Kamio Mitsuomi to Hupeh in late 
i897 evoked enthusiastic response from the group of Hunanese reformers 
led by K'ang Yu-wei. K'ang believed that the Japanese were sincere 
in their offer of friendship and assistance. He drew up a statement 
of his reasons for an alignment with Japan and England against Germany 
and Russia and went about among the high officials in the government 
urging them to accept such a policy. He also submitted a memorial
(2) Chang Kuan-ying, "On frontier defence, part six", in Ch'en Chung- 
ed., ibid., Vol. 491 p. 7.
(3) "Preface by Ts'ai Erh-k'ang", in Y.J. Allan and Tsai Erh-k'ang, 
Chung Tung Chan-chi pen-mo, op cit., Vol. 1. Part 1 , p. 8.
(4) "Preface by Kung Hsin-ming," ibid., Vol. 1» Part 1 p. 10.
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putting forward his argument:
"... We and Japan are interdependent, whereas Russia 
and Germany have ambitions in the Orient that 
are not to [Japan's] advantage. Because she 
was a small nation, long before the Sino-Japanese 
war, she had reformed her institutions and 
strengthened herself; and she sought to maintain 
her independence by increasing her prestige. 
Although by her victory [over us] she acquired 
Liaotung, she was unable to hold on to it. Under 
such circumstances she cannot but detest Russia 
and Germany, and is therefore sincere in asking 
to Join with us and to give us assistance.. ."wJ
Central to all Chinese reformers' themes of defence against foreign 
aggression was the need for reforms and reconstruction to be carried 
out in the country. Aside from the Russian image of a strong Western 
power threatening to invade China, the hope and belief that China could 
learn from Japan in the way of modernization were equally important 
factors which increased the weight of the argument for cooperation with 
Japan. As T'ang Tsai-ch'ang, a follower of K'ang Yu-wei, pointed out 
in an essay, "On China should form an alliance with Eng-land and Japan":
"... Cooperation with England and Japan is the way
to cure the symptoms, if not the cause of China's
illness .... The way to make England an ally is 
through Japan and the way to make Japan an ally 
of China is through learning .... And the only 
way for China to acquire practical knowledge is 
through learning from Japan."(6 )
It was widely accepted among the reformers that "organizations which 
sought to revive Asia" had their origins in Japan and those organizations 
had the objective of making China strong so that Japan could look to
China for support in keeping the Western powers out of East Asia.
Some maintained that Japan had fought the war with China out of self- 
defence. And if China would exert herself and carry out reforms to
(5) K'ang Yu-wei, K'ang Nan-hai Tzu-pTen Nien-p'u (Chronological 
autobiography of K'ang Yu-wei), collected in Wu-hsu Pien-fa 
op.cit., Part f^, pp. 138-139* iVf.
(6 ) T'ang Tsai-ch’ang, "On China should form an alliance with England 
and Japan," Wu-hsii Pien-fa, ibid., Part 3* PP« 103-105.
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strengthen the country, then there was little doubt that Japan would
be willing to become her ally. Failing this, China would sooner or
(7)
later be engulfed by Russia. Again, the Sino-Japanese war was
viewed by many as a lesson for China because it had the effect of
making the government and people aware of the need to exert themselves
(8)and make a strong nation out of China.
The Chinese reformers’ favourable response to the Japanese overtures 
can be explained by their anxiety about the threat of Russian and German 
aggressions in early 1898. At the sametirr^ their interests in and admiration for 
Japanese success in modernization led them to view Japan as more than 
a powerful country that might be of passing assistance to China in the 
current crisis. For them, Japan was an example of an awakened Asian 
nation. China should learn and draw strength from Japan's experience 
in reforming her institutions.
The need to cooperate with Japan was also appreciated by Chinese 
officials, especially those in the provincial governments. Chang 
Chih-tung responded favourably to the Japanese approach but he had
(9)reservations about including England in the understanding. He
reckoned that all foreign powers were taking advantage of the fact that 
Germany had occupied Kiaochow Bay to further their aggressive policies 
against China. Entering into an understanding with some of these 
powers was, in his opinion, only to temporize and avoid making more
(7) "On the necessity for Asian countries to retain a close relationship 
as that between the lips and the teeth", in Yu Pao-hsien et al.
(ed.), Huang Ch'ao Hsii-ai Wen-pien (A collection of essays by writers 
of the reform movement), Shanghai, 1902/3* Vol. 5 8, p. 28.
(8) Huang Ching-lan, "On the benefit which has been done to China by 
the war with Japan", in Ch'en Chung - i, ed., Huang Ch'ao Ching- 
shih-wen San- £ie n, op.cit., Vol.5* pp. 23-25.
(9) Despatch from gcvernor-general of Wuhan ChangChih-tung to Tsungli 
Yamen, I, 17th January, 1898, Ch'ing Kuang-hsii-ch'ao Chung-Jih 
chiao-she shih-liao (Documents on Sino-Japanese relations in the 
Kuang-hsii period), Peking, 1932-3* Vol.51* p.1 2. This source will 
hereafter be cited as Documents: Kuang-hsii.
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enemies than necessary.(10  ^ He stressed that if, however, China was to
include England in the entente, she would have to do so through Japan.
He hoped that Japan would mediate between England and China and act as 
a restraining influence on the former, "cutting down her greed and
(1 1)aggressive designs in any demands that she might make on China."
Liu K'un-i, governor-general of Nanking, on the other hand, saw
England as a more suitable ally than Japan. He was of the opinion that
while Russia, Germany and France all harboured covetous designs on
Chinese territories, England was a "commercial power" which was only
interested in expanding her trade with China. Nevertheless, he accepted
Chang's view that China needed Japan's cooperation and advocated that
an agreement of cooperative actions be made between China, Japan and
England, thus enabling England, on the one hand, to protect her commerce
in China,and Japan and China, on the other hand, to safeguard their 
(*12)territories.  ^ In January, 18981 Liu sent a despatch to the Ministry of
Defence supporting Chang Chih-tung in the latter's proposal to accept the
(13)Japanese offer of cooperation. Ch'en Pao-chen, governor of Hunan,
thought the matter could not be delayed. Like Chang, he thought that 
the inclusion of England was more a matter of necessity than desirability 
as he was afraid that England would soon join in the scramble for 
territories if China did not enter into any agreement with her. He 
also believed that Japan could counteract England's influence and he 
was hoping that Kiaochow Bay would be saved by Anglo-Japanese intervention.
(1 0) Despatch from Chang Chih-tung to Tsungli Yamen, 16th January,
1 8 9 8, Chang Wen-hsiang Kung Ch'uan-chi (collected memorials, works 
and papers by Chang Chih-tung). Peking,1937* Vol.?9i p. 25.
(11) ibid.
(12) Despatch from Liu K'un-i to Ministry of Defence, 17th December,189?. 
Wang Liang (ed.), Ch'ing-chi Wai-chiao Shih-liao (Documents on the 
foreign relations of the last two reigns of the Crfing dynasty), 
Peking, 1932, Vol. 127, pp. 33-3^.
(13) Despatch from southern commissioner Liu K'un-i to Ministry of 
Defence, 25th January,1898, Documents:Kuang-hsu, Vol.511 P* 1 .^
(lA) Despatch from the governor of Hunan Ch'en Pao-chen to the Tsungli 
Yamen, 18th January, 1898, Documents: Kuang-hsii, Vol.51 1 p. 13.
(1*0
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But the idea held by the provincial governors of forming an alliance
with England was soon discarded. England’s offer of a loan to
construct the Canton-Hankow Railway aroused suspicions and was seen as
an attempt to consolidate her stronghold in the Yangtze region. Chang
Chih-tung felt that if China accepted the English loan? then the partition
(15 )of the country would become a fact rather than just a threat.
Even Liu was convinced that such a move on the part of England was 
indicative of her intention to occupy the Yangtze area and that she was 
acting beyond the limits of a "commercial power". He went as far 
as to fortify the region for the purpose of defending the Yangtze 
region against England's "penetration".^^ The minister of trade?
Sheng Hsiian-huai? however? felt that China should accept the loan for 
the construction of railways. He insisted that Chang and Liu reconsider 
cooperating with England. His argument was that China should cooperate
(17)with the powers - America? England and Japan - to expand trade.
The Chinese government decided to accept the loan but the talk of making 
England an ally lost its popularity.
Moreover? the Chinese government had reservations about entering
into a formal alliance with any one country in particular. It had to
take care not to offend Russia. In reply to Chang Chih- tungfs proposal
that China enter into a cooperative relationship with Japan? the
Ministry of Defence warned?
"The government advises against your making any 
ill-considered promises to the Japanese for fear
(1 3) Chang Wen-hsiang Kung Ch'uan-chi? op.cit.? Vol.79> P* 20.
(1 6) Liu K’un-i I-chi (Collection of works by Liu K'un-i)?
Peking? 1959 > Vol.5> P« 2211.
(17) Wang Wen-chih (ed.)? Yu-chai Ts'un-kao Ch'u-kan? (A collection 
of memorials? telegrammes and letters by the Chinese industrialist 
Sheng Hsiian-huai)? Shanghai? 1939» Vol 32? p. 2.
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of invoking Russian invasion. Although a 
cooperative relationship with Japan, in its own 
rightSi is not a disadvantage to China, it is 
feared that a catastrophe will inevitably result 
on China's northern frontiers ... once the Sino- 
Japanese entente is made..."(
And the Tsungli Yamen said,
"Russia's ferocity is getting more intense every­
day and all countries fear her .... England and 
Japan are soliciting China's cooperation merely 
because they want to use her as a bulwark against
Russia; they have no intention of helping us..."^9)
When appealed to by Liu K'un-i to consider the policy of cooperating
with England, the Chinese government had this to say,
"The English offer of friendship cannot be accepted 
at face value .... The government is aware of 
England's intention [to first enter into some 
sort of agreement with China and then proceed to 
occupy Chinese territories].... For the time 
being, we can only temporize affairs with the powers.
If China enters into cooperative agreements with 
only one or two countries and neglects the rest, 
she will be creating a situation in which the 
powers will be roused to disputing with one another.
The government does not think this is a wise m o v e . . . " ^ 0 ;
It is appropriate to reflect here that the Tokyo government was
not disposed towards the idea of a rapprochement with China over the 1897 -
1898 period. Ito who was prime minister from January to June 1898 
hoped to see a progressive government in China but his government was 
cautious in its use of diplomacy over the period of the powers' "scramble 
for concessions" in China. The hope for an alliance between the two 
countries was entertained by Japanese military agents and diplomats 
on the one hand and Chinese provincial governors and reformers on the 
other. The fact that neither group was in the centre of power largely 
accounted for the failure in implementing the plan for closer Sino- 
Japanese cooperation in the face of increasing Western encroachment.
(1 8) Despatch from Ministry of Defence to Chang Chih-tung, 4th January, 
1898, Documents: Kuang-hsii, Vol.51 > p* 9b.
(1 9) Chang Wen-hsiang Kung Ch'uan-chi, op.cit., Vol.79 pp. 26-27.
(20) Ch'ing-chi Wai-chiao Shih-liao, op.cit., Vol.127, p. 34.
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Nevertheless, one can still say that during the period from the 
German occupation of Shantung to the eve of the coup d'etat in September, 
1 8 9 8, the sense of urgency surrounding the need for cooperation with 
Japan reached a peak in China. This was also indicated by the state 
of euphoria caused by the visit of Ito to China in Septemebr, 1898, 
just over two months after he had ceased to head the government at home.
Before Ito set off from Japan, he had been granted an audience by 
(21)the Meiji Emperor. His visit to China, though unofficial, was
one of observation. In July, 1898, the Japanese Chinsai Jiho wrote
about the forthcoming visit,
Prince Ito is one of the top figures in 
East Asia at the present time. Being mindful 
of the past and looking with great insight to 
the future, he works towards the maintenance of 
peace in the East. He has expressed regrets that 
the political leaders in China are still living 
in a dream and now he is travelling to China to 
discuss a plan of safeguarding East Asia with 
the Chinese government ...."(2 2)
Certainly, it was viewed by the Chinese as more than an unofficial
tour. It was seen as a gesture on the part of Ito to foster anew
relationship which had been lost between the two countries. Ito
himself said, in a poem which he had composed on his way from Korea
to China, that he was going to Peking with the "humble and loyal intention
of re-establishing the old tie which had existed between Japan and 
(23)China". And as Mori Taijiro, one of the men who travelled to
China with Ito, put it:
"... Part of Asia is occupied by Europe. What 
but conscientious cooperation between Japan 
and China can prevent the catastrophe which will 
soon befall Asia...."(2*0
(2 1) ibid, Vol.13^1 p.
(22) Chinsai Jiho, 21st July, 1 898, reprinted in the Tientsin Kuo-Wen-Pao, 
30th August, 1898, collected in Wu-hsii Pien-fa, op.cit., Part 3i P* 395*
(23) Ito's poem, translated and printed in the Tientsin Kqo-Wen-Pao, 15th 
September, 1898. Collected in Wu-hsii Pien-fa, ibid Part 3> P* ^04
(29-) Poem by Mori Taijiro in a banquet given in honour of Ito in Tientsin
on 1 ' 15 ' ' 5 reprinted by Kuo-Wen-Pao, iMth September, 1898,
Collected in Wu-hsii Pien-fa, ibid., Part 3i P* ^03*
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On reaching Tientsin) Ito was rather overwhelmed by his reception
from Chinese of all positions who greeted him with requests that he
(25)give assistance to China. ' A few days later> on his arrival in 
Peking) he was welcomed by a memorial to the Emperor) praising his 
capabilities and requesting the Emperor to grant Ito an audience in 
which an alliance between the two countries might be discussed.
One enthusiastic memorial suggested that the Emperor employ Ito as 
adviser to the Chinese government) since with his precious experience
he was easily the man best qualified to assist China in carrying out
(27) .
reforms. During the audience) Kuang Hsu asked Ito to enlighten
him on the methods of carrying out reforms in China. Ito , however, declined
the request saying that he felt he was not in a position to oblige and
(2 8)insisted that his visit was a personal and unofficial trip."" Never­
theless > in various conversations with the Chinese government officials)
Ito talked about China's land-use5 industries) commerce and the need
(29)to introduce a new military system.
But no official negotiations were undertaken for a Sino-Japanese 
alliance. Ito's"mission" of "re-establishing the old tie" between the 
two countries probably consisted of no more than a wish to see reforms 
carried out in China as the necessary step towards restoring stability 
in the Far East.
(25) Ito's letter to an unidentified friend) dated -13th September) 
appears in Komatsu Midori) ed. ) Ito Ko Zenshii) Tokyo) '1928) Vol. I) 
p. 178. See Richard C. Howard) "Japan's Role in the Reform Movement 
of K'ang Yu-wei" in Lo Jung-pang) ed.) K'ang Yu-wei) a Biography
and a Symposium) op.cit.) p. 301.
(26) The memorial was submitted by Ch'en Mou-ting on ihth September) 1898. 
Ch'ing-chi Wai-Chiao Shih-liaO) op.cit.) Vol.'l3^ +j PP* 19-20.
(27) The proposal was made by Fu K'uei) a chu-jen of Kuei-chow province) 
Wang Yun-sheng) Liu-shih nien lai Chung-kuo yii Jih-pen (Relations 
between China and Japan in the past sixty years). Tientsin)
1932-3^1 Vol.3* pp. 267-272.
(28) Ito was probably not prepared for the honour of an audience with the 
Chinese Emperor and felt that he could not 'advise' Kuang-hsii on the 
matter. "Conversation between Prince Ito and the Emperor") report
in Ch'ang-Yen-Pao) 30th October) 18 9 8) Wu-hsii Pien-fa) op.cit.) Part3» 
p. W7.
(29) Reports in Kuo-Wen-Pao) 21st and 2 9th September) 1898) Collected 
in Wu-hsii Pien-fa) ibid.) Part 3i PP* ^25-^26
However, the arrival of Ito in Peking and the Emperor's readiness 
to grant him an audience may well have been a decisive factor in 
persuading the Empress Dowager to carry out the coup d'etat that 
brought the reform movement of 1898 to a sudden end. Throughout 189? 
and 1898 when Chinese reformers responded readily to the Japanese offer 
of official friendship, the Tzu Hsi faction had viewed the situation 
with disfavour. Tzu Hsi and Li Hung-chang were particularly uneasy 
about the possibility of Kuang Hsu becoming an object of Japanese sympathy 
under the influence of K'ang and his party. Rumour to the effect that 
Ito had come to China at K'ang's request and was in Peking for the 
purpose of plotting against her could only have convinced Tzu Hsi that 
prompt action was necessary to protect her position of power. Thus
the day of the Emperor's audience with Ito was followed almost immediately 
by the enforced seclusion of the Emperor and in a few days, by the 
decapitation and imprisonment of those reformers who had not fled the 
country.
Chinese efforts to foster an alliance with Japan after the coup d'etat
After having fled to Japan, K'ang and Liang began to make reckless 
and desperate appeals to Japanese leaders to intervene in restoring 
the Emperor to power. They hoped to solicit help from Japan to save 
China from the unenlightened rule of the conservative faction in Peking.
As Liang Ch'i-ch'ao saw it, Manchu-Chinese rivalry in the government 
was the main factor which had caused the coup. According to him, the 
basic difference between Kuang Hsii and Tzu Hsi was that the Emperor
(30) On 17th September, the Manchu princes Ch'ing and Tuan warned the
Empress Dowager that Ito's audience with Kuang Hsii on 20th September 
would endanger her position. The Empress Dowager was also supposed 
to have discovered a secret edict from the Emperor to K'ang Yu-wei 
urging K'ang to secure the help of England and Japan in rescuing 
him from the Empress Dowager's faction. See Su Chi-tzu, Ch'ing-t'ing 
Wu-hsii Ch'ao-pien chi in Wu-hsii Pien-fa, ibid., Part 1 , p. J>kk.
wanted to appoint Chinese with progressive ideas to the government
while Tzu Hsi insisted on using reactionary Manchu officials. The
progressive Chinese faction aimed at reforming the country and tended
to look to England and Japan which it believed would support China’-s
struggle for national independence, whereas the Manchus depended on
Russia for protection and support to remain in power. In this way,
the rivalry was extended to China's policies. He intimated to Okuma
that if the Tzu Hsi government remained contented to be Russia's puppet,
then the 'balance of power' in the Far East would soon be upset and
the partition of China would follow. When this happened, the most
that Japan could get out of the partition was Fukien and it would even
be doubtful whether she would be able to keep the province.
Should the European powers take concerted action to invade the East,
the entire Asia would be engulfed and Japan would not be able to
preserve her own national independence. China could only be saved
by reforms and as long as the Emperor remained in confinement, this
could not materialize. Hence the safety of Japan was closely linked
with the return to power of Kuang Hsii. As China was at the moment
threatened by grave danger from the West, she had to "look to Japan,
(3 1)
a friend, for support to combat her foreign foes".' Wang Chao
who had also fled to Japan as a result of the coup told Konoe Atsumaro
that it was largely owing to the Manchu government's fear of Japan
that it had turned to Russia for support. He also warned that while
the Emperor was in captivity, and hence no longer in a position to
counteract the influence of Tzu Hsi's faction, it was to be expected
(32)
that more agreements would be sought by Peking with Russia.
(3 1) Letter from Liang Ch'i-ch'ao to Okuma, 26th October, 18 9 8, NGB, 
Vol. 311 Part 1 (195^)» No. 6 0 1. pp. 696-6 9 8.
(32) Conversation between Wang Chao and Konoe Atsumaro, 13th February, 
l899i collected in Nikki, op.cit., Vol. 2* p.2?3.
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The Chinese reformers argued that the question.of China's national 
independence, and hence the safety of the Far East was inseparable 
from her reconstruction. That Japan had a special role to play in 
guiding China towards reform was given further emphasis by K'ang Yu-wei 
and Wang Chao in their separate conversations with Konoe# who maintained 
that Japan had a duty to lead Asian countries towards enlightenment.
Wang requested Konoe, who was shortly to visit China, to advise the 
Empress Dowager and Yung Lu to refrain from taking extreme measures 
against Kuang Hsu. He and K'ang thought that Konoe's visit to China 
would enhance Japan's influence against Russian dominance in China's 
foreign relations.
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao confided to Shiga Shigetakft, writer and official 
at the GaimushS, that he had reckoned, immediately after the coup, that 
Japan alone was enough to "put things right" in China, that is, see to 
it that Kuang Hsii was restored to the throne. But by the end of 
October, however, he realized that this was impractical and that it had 
to be done with the cooperation of Japan, England and America. He 
also expressed his hopes that this cooperative effort would eventually 
lead to a quadruple alliance between Japan, China, England and America. 
Liang told Shiga that once he secured Japan's agreement, he would travel 
to England and America to solicit help. He hoped that Japan, England 
and America would apply diplomatic pressure on Tzu Hsi to restore 
Kuang Hsii to power and impose an order on the Chinese government that 
5,000,000 taels of gold be given annually to the Empress Dowager to
(3*0keep her from meddling with government affairs.
(33) ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 273-27A. For discussions between K'ang and 
Konoe in November, 1 8 9 8, see Vol 2. pp. '195-197.
(3*+) Interpreted negotiation between Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Shiga Shigetake,
supplement to letter from Liang to Okuma, NGB, Vol. 31, Part 1,pp.703-705. 
Liang also told Shiga that there was a revolutionary force brewing in 
southern China which aimed at overthrowing the dynasty. This revolutionary 
party also wanted a reconstruction of China. But Liang thought a revolution 
in China would inevitably invite foreign intervention and eventually part­
ition. He would, as he told Shiga, rather resort to the diplomatic inter­
vention of Japan which, in his opinion,_would save the dynasty on the 
one hand and enable China to follow a line of reform on the other.p./OH.
There was little evidence to show the coup d'etat of 21st September, 
1898 had been effected with any support from a foreign power* Although 
K'ang Yu-wei suspected that Tzu Hsi had made an agreement with Russia 
whereby she promised Russia preferential rights in Manchuria in return 
for Russia's support to keep the Manchus in power, he did not think that
(35)any foreign power, including Russia, had played any part in the coup.
The motive was to eliminate from the government all 'radical elements' 
which were driving at a reformedand new policy. The killing of six 
radical members of the reform party and the expulsion of several progressive 
officials from the government seem to indicate this. The coup was 
hence a purely domestic affair in Chinese politics. The reformers' 
intimation to the Japanese leaders of the government's pro-Russian leanings 
embarrassed the Peking government in its relations with the Japanese 
authorities. Requests were repeatedly made by Peking to the Japanese 
government to expel K'ang and his party.
This delicate situation which had arisen immediately after the coup
was also viewed with concern by Chang Chih-tung. Although Chang saw merit
in and was sympathetic to some of the reform ideas advanced by K'ang,
Liang and other reformers, he also disagreed with elements of their
philosophy and method. During the Hundred Days Reform, he had remained
relatively aloof from the activities of the reform party and had not
(37)been considered by the latter as one of their affiliates.
(35) Henry Cockburn "Memorandum of Conversation with K'ang yu-wei on 
voyage from Shanghai to Hongkong, 27th-29th September, 1898*" in 
Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence respecting the affairs of China, 
presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty
the Queen, March, 1899,ChinaNo. 1, Inclosure 2 in No. 901,VoL C  I X  ,pp.3o8-3IO.
(36) In fact the Chinese government had sent a tele gramme to Li She.ng-to, 
minister to Japan, to have K'ang and Liang assassinated in Japan.
Wang Shu-huai, op.cit., p. 231.
(37) For Chang Chih-tung's relations with the reformers in the pre­
coup period, see William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational 
Reform in China,Harvard East Asian studies, series 5^+, 19?1,
pp. 138-1 -^5 *
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When Kamio Mitsuomi was sent by the Japanese Army General Staff 
to China, he specifically went to Hupeh with a view to discussing Sino- 
Japanese cooperation with Chang Chih-tung. As Chang believed that China 
needed to strengthen herself, he welcomed the Japanese proposal to train 
Chinese students in Japanese military, agricultural and technical 
schools. By the time the coup d’etat took place, Chang had made 
arrangements with Kamio and the Japanese charge d'affaires in Shanghai, 
Odagiri Masunosuke, that the Japanese would supervise the training of 
Chinese troops in Hupeh. He therefore viewed the activities of the 
reformers in Japan with misgivings as he feared that the Japanese might 
be led to suspect him of being pro-Pussian and this would adversely 
affect his plans. In November, 1 898, he requested Segawa, the Japanese 
consul in Hankow, to inform the Japanese government that the stay of 
K'ang and his party would not only "injure the good feeling of friendship
which existed already between both countries" but also prevent him
from carrying out his plan to employ Japanese military instructors to
train Chinese troops in Hupeh.
At the same time, Chang feared that the delicate situation in the 
relations between the two governments which had resulted from the 
reformers' desperate appeals to Japanese leaders might make the Empress 
Dowager suspicious of any dealings between himself and the Japanese.
He thus told Segawa that he wished the Japanese government would request 
the Tsungli Yamen to authorize the southern trade commissioner, the 
northern trade commissioner and the governor-general of Wuhan (who was
(3 8) Chang's message was passed in Segawa's letter to Aoki, 2nd December, 
1 898, NGB, Vol. 31> Part 1 , No.6l2, p. 723. In a letter written 
to a friend, Ch'ien Hsiin, in Shanghai on 23rd January, 189 ,^
Chang also expressed his anxiety and regrets over the activities 
of K'ang and his party in Japan - activities which, in his words, 
were responsible for "jeopardizing the liaison between Japan and 
China", Chang Wen-hsiang Kung Ch'uan-chi, op.cit., Vol.157,
PP. 31-32.
then Chang himself) to send out students to Japan as soon as possible.
He had acted with caution, as he told Segawa, because he had hesitated
n
to "act on his own authority" for fear of incurring the suspicion of 
(3 9)
those in power." " Chang's hesitation in implementing his plan
was also related by Odagiri in a letter to the deputy foreign minister 
in Tokyo. Odagiri described Chang as a "leading figure of the group 
advocating moderate reforms" whose actions had become "more and more 
cautious since the coup."^^
Chang's attitude towards Sino-Japanese cooperation had not changed 
since the Japanese military mission approached him with an offer of 
assistance in late 1897 - one that was in favour of overcoming China's 
backwardness with the help of Japan without emphasizing the role of 
Japan as the guardian of Asian enlightenment. After the coup, Chang 
persistently urged the Japanese authorities to expel K'ang and the other 
reformers. This could have been due to his anxiety to act in accordance 
with the wishes of Tzu Hsi so as not to jeopardize his relations with 
the conservative faction in Peking. But a more important reason was 
that he genuinely believed that in doing so, he was acting in the 
interest of friendship between the two governments. Moreover, Chang 
was convinced that better and closer relations between Japan and China 
could be fostered on the governmental level. In securing his position 
in the government, Chang was not acting purely out of self-interest.
He also hoped to use his influence with the Tzu Hsi faction to further 
his plan for a Sino-Japanese alliance.
Chang believed that there were those among the 'reactionary' 
officials in Peking who could be persuaded to accept his views regarding
(39) NGB> Vol. 31* Part 1 , No. 612, p. 723.
(^ 0) Odagiri'sletter to deputy foreign minister in Tokyo, 21 st 
December, 1898, NGB, Vol. 311 Part 1, No. 6 1 6, p. 725.
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the rapprochement between China and Japan. He once told Odagiri,
"... The -minister of defence, Yung Lu,is a wise 
man who is capable of seeing reasons in important 
matters. If he should secure friendship with 
the Japanese ministers, then the r e l a t i o n s e e n  
China and Japan will be greatly benefited."
Having secured the expulsion of K'ang from Japan in March, 1899*
Chang proceeded to bring about a closer Sino-Japanese understanding.
In early 1899? the chief of staff of the Japanese army Kawakami Soroku 
had sent his military officers to talk to provincial governors in 
southern China about the need for preparing the Chinese army for an 
eventual war with Russia. Kawakami's diary recordea that an under­
standing had been reached between his military emissaries and Chang 
Piao, a subordinate of Chang Chih-tung, on the "urgent measures" to be 
taken by the governor-general of Hukuang (Chang Chih-tung) and Liang- 
kiang (Liu K'un-i). It was agreed that in the interest of the country, 
the two governor-generals would exhort the Peking government to
support their schemes of training 10 0 ,00 0 troops in their provinces and
(92)building torpedo-boats to fortify the Yangtze. In April, the
Japanese army colonel Fukushima Yasumasa visited Liu K'un-i at Nanking 
and Chang Chih-tung at Wuchang. During their meeting, Chang arranged 
with Fukushima that the latter would meet with Yung Lu to discuss 
matters relating to both countries. It was at Yung Lu's invitation
(93)that Fukushima, accompanied by Odagiri, arrived in Shanghai on May. 
Fukushima's decision to make the trip had also been made on the strength
(99)of foreign minister Aoki's approval.
(91) ibid., p. 728.
(92) Toa Dobun Kai, Taishi Kaiko-Roku, (Collection of materials about
Japanese involved in China) Tokyo, 193§> 1991, part 2, p. 276.
(93) Gaimusho Gaiko Bunshoka Shozo Bunsho, Oden, (Japanese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Documents kept in the Bureau of Foreign Affairs 
Papers, outgoing despatches) 13th April, l899i Cited in_Teshirogi 
Kinsuke, "Bojutsu Yori koshi ni itaru Kakumeipa to Henpopa no 
Kosho", op.cit., pp. 296-297.
(99) Taishi Kaiko Roku, op.cit# , Part 2, p. 278.
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That Odagiri had accompanied Fukushima on his visit to China was no 
coincidence. Odagid had in fact left for Japan a short while ago
(45)to discuss his own mission to China with Aoki. It was possible
that he had taken Chang Chih-tung's hint that closer relations between 
the two governments could be cultivated through Yung Lu and made the
trip to Tokyo to consult Aoki about the matter.
Soon after the arrival of the Japanese in China? Yung Lu arranged
that Odagid be given an audience with Tzu Hsi during which Odagid
would make an attempt to "obtain the Empress Dowager's consent to a plan
(i+6)
which would bring about a secret liaison between Japan and China."
After this audience? Tzu Hsi appointed Liu Hsiin and Ch'ing K'uan as 
emissaries to go to Japan on 8th July. News of the coming of the 
Chinese secret mission led to the rumour in Japan of closer military 
and economic cooperation and an alliance between the two countries.
There is no evidence to show that the question of a liaison between
Japan and China was discussed between the Chinese emissaries and
the Japanese government. It is even doubtful whether the Chinese
mission was received by Japanese governmental leaders. Yamagata's
(i+7)
reservations regarding the idea of a Sino-Japanese alliance ' leads 
one to conclude that in 1899 the hopes for closer relations between
the two countries vis-a-vis the Western powers were no more than wishful
thinking on the part of some Chinese - and Japanese - officials.
On the other hand? the hitherto pro-Russian attitude of Tzu Hsi and 
her supporters including Yung Lu raises doubts as to the sincerity of 
the Chinese mission in offering the Japanese government an alliance.
(45) Gaimusho Gaiko Bunshoka Shozo Bunsho? Oden? 13th April? 1899- 
Cited in Teshirogi Kinsuke ? op.cit.? pp. 246-247.
(46) Taishi Kaiko Roku? op.cit.? Part 2? p. 4l6.
(47) See previous Chapter.
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Perhaps with the expulsion of K'ang Yu-wei from Japan and the safe 
confinement of the Emperor, Tzu Hsi's suspicion of a plot against her 
hatched by the Chinese reformist party with the help of the Japanese 
had subsided by the latter half of l899» And it was just possible 
that she was beginning to come round to Chang Chih-tung's view that China 
needed Japanese help to reform her economic and military institutions.
What was important about this episode in Sino-Japanese relations 
was that some Chinese leaders saw in Japan an ally for China. They 
urged cooperation with Japan because they wanted Japanese help to 
strengthen Chinese defence. Chang Chih-tung's hopes for an alliance 
had little to do with the fact that the two countries shared a cultural 
and racial relationship. He was more concerned with China needing 
an ally against the Western powers especially Russia.
Chinese provincial leaders and the Toa Dobun Kai
The activities of OdagirL and Fukushima on the one hand and Chang 
Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i on the other to bring about an alliance 
between the two countries had ended in failure. Yet the policy of 
friendship and assistance to China that had been inaugurated by 
Kawakami in late 189? was not entirely without result. In early l899«
Chang Chih-tung sent to Japan his first contingent of Chinese students
including his grandson Chang Ho-k'un. While the students were sent to
military schools, Chang's grandson was sent to the School of Learning
for Peers (Kizoku Gakushuin). This arrangement had been made between
Chang and Odagiri who persuaded Chang that not only would Chinese
officials have to send their subordinates abroad to study but they
would also have to send their own relatives to Japan. In this way,
they could be given the opportunity of receiving education alongside
the ordinary students. This would enable them, when they finished, to inspire.,
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encourage and lead their subordinates. This, according to Odagiri, 
was the short-cut to making the nation strong. This was, in
fact, the first time that a Chinese student was admitted to the Kizoku 
Gakushuin. Konoe, who was at that time principal of the School, 
expressed his willingness to "undertake the responsibility of educating
(49)three to four students from the Chinese upper classes in the Gakushuin."
It was at about the same time that Konoe founded the Toa Dobun 
Kai with the objective of promoting cultural understanding between 
Japan and China. Toa Dobun Kai schools were set up in both countries.
Konoe and his supporters were aiming at the cultivation of Sino-Japanese 
friendship on the unofficial level.^G) Society's activities
were mainly supported by Chinese provincial government officials espec­
ially in Kiangsu and Hunan.
In fact, it had been the policy of the Toa Dobun Kai, since its
foundation,to promote cooperation with Chinese officials. The
Society was formed by the combination of Inukai Ki's Toa Kai and
Munakata Kotaro's Dobun Kai. Inukai, the 'brain' of China policy in
Okuma's cabinet from June to November, 1898, had always sympathized
with Chinese reformers and revolutionaries. After the coup of September,
1898, he wanted to give support to K'ang and his party in restoring Kuang Hsi
to power. Inukai had hoped that by cooperating with the "progressive
elements" in China, he could bring about a new Sino-Japanese relationship
(51)in the interest of both countries. Munakata,on the other hand,
(48) "Correspondence between Odagiri and Konoe relating to the 
application of Chang Ho-k'un, grandson of Chang Chih-tung, 
to enter the Japanese Gakushuin", 7th January, l899» Nikki, 
op.cit., Vol. 2, pp. 256-257.
(49) ibid.
(50) For activities of the Toa Dobun.Kai, see Chapter Six.
(51) Gee M.B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, Harvard University 
Press, 1954, pp. 5-4, 75-77.
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did not think that the K'ang-Liang group could save China and he
favoured gaining the friendship of the Peking government through
Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i. He was of the opinion that in
affording K'ang and Liang asylum, the Japanese government was not
(52)handling the China question to the advantage of Japan. Munakata
and his supporters in the Dobun Kai believed that the activities of 
K'ang and his party were hazardous for the stability of the Manchu 
dynasty. The Japanese government, however, should try to preserve 
the Manchus and prevent the partition of China by the powers.
At a conference held in preparation for the amalgamation of the
Toa Kai and the Dobun Kai on 24th October, 1898, the two divergent
views were put forward. Konoe, founder of the future Toa Dobun Kai,
proposed that the two parties compromise their differences and put
(53)an emphasis on the need to preserve China. As a result, the
Conference resolved that the Toa Dobun Kai be established with the
objective of upholding the "preservation of Chinese integrity". With
this vague declaration, the China policy of the Toa Dobun Kai was directed
towards supporting the Tzu Hsi government with a view to maintaining
(54)the status quo in China. " The promotion of cooperation with Chang
Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i in the training of Chinese students became
(52) Taishi Kaiko Roku, op.cit., Part 2, p. 3 8 0.
(53) Toa Senkaku Shishi Kiden (Meiji hyakunen-shi Sfcosho, Nos. 22-24),
Tokyo, 1966, Part 2, p. 601.
(54) In fact, when immediately after the coup K'ang and the other
reformers appealed to Konoe for protection and help, Konoe
had said that Japan should refrain from taking any course of 
action so long as Tzu Hsi's policy towards the reformer refugees 
in Japan remained undecided. See Nikki, Vol 2, p. 156. 
Moreover, when K'ang was sent away from Japan under the order
of the Japanese government, Konoe raised no objection. He 
even intervened to have K'ang given financial assistance in 
order to facilitate his departure. Nikki, Vol* 2, pp. 2 3 8,
239> 2931 294.
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the Society's main concern. And during the first decade of its 
existence, the Society's educational programme benefited primarily 
the scholars and gentry classes in China.
Liu K'un-i wrote in response to Konoe's "Principal objectives of 
the Toa Dobun Kai" which was published in late 1898:
"The Toa Dobun Kai works towards the reconciliation 
and cultivation of friendship of the three countries 
[of Japan, China and Korea] for the purpose of 
confronting the powerful West. Guided by Heaven, 
it upholds and expresses t.ruth and righteousness.
Is this not the opportunity for the East Asian 
countries to change from a state of disunity to 
one of alliance and from a state of adversity to 
one of peace...? Prince Konoe's declaration 
speaks the truth by appealing [to us] to cooperate 
in one spirit and with one objective, to give one 
another encouragement and advice. If we can 
always give air word in honesty and act in the name 
of justice, then no discord will arise among 
ourselves and we shall be able to fight the external 
foe and cooperate to safeguard peace in the East.... 
And dare I not pledge my support for and uphold
this cause?"
The establishment of the Nanking Dobun Shoin evoked encouraging 
response. Liu thought that it was a timely move which served to 
remind the Chinese of the conflict between the yellow and white races.
He especially applauded the "loyal and sincere" intentions of the 
Toa Dobun Kai for "remembering what Japan had owed China in the way of 
cultural guardianship." He reckoned that the school was established 
with a view to try to "save China from her present p l i g h t " M u c h  
optimism was expressed regarding the future of the School. Wang 
Chia-t’ang, another Chinese o ffic ia l, s a id ,
"One can foresee the day when the governments and 
peoples of Japan and China see eye to eye and 
work hand in hand towards the goal of enlighten­
ment. ..."(57)
(59) Letter from Liu K'un-i, written in reply to Konoe's announcement
of the objectives of the Toa Dobun Kai, Nikki, op.cit., Vol.3»
pp. 29-30.
(3 6) Letter from Liu to Konoe, ibid., Vol.3« p. 221.
(37) Letter from Wang Chia-t’ang to Konoe, ibid.
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Renewed hopes for a closer relationship with Japan in the early 
twentieth century
Japanese influence in Chinese political thinking greatly increased
towards the end of the nineteenth century. By contrast? the Chinese
had become more and more hostile against Russia since the latter's
seizure of Port Arthur. Even at Peking? the Russian i.nfluence was
on the decline. Hayashi Gonsuke? deputising for Yano Fumio as Japanese
minister to China in 1898? observed with complacency that "apart from
Li Hung-chang? no other official in the Chinese government has pro- 
( sR')
Russian views." As a result of Russia's penetration into Manchuria
soon after the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion? hopes were once again 
raised in China for a strengthening of relations with Japan.
Throughout the Boxer crisis? Japan acted alongside the powers in 
sending troops to China. Japanese activities,however? were seen 
by the Chinese as efforts undertaken to restore peace in the Far East.
It was hoped that Japanese mediation in the settlement between China 
and the powers would bring about a situation in which China's territorial 
integrity would be respected. In fact? in the early stage of hostilities 
between the allied powers and China? the Chinese had sought to separate 
Japan from the Western powers and the Chinese Emperor made an appeal 
for help to the Japanese Emperor on 3rd July? 1900:
"... China and Japan have always been interdependent 
and friendly with one another .... The killing 
and rioting which have been taking place recently 
are due to religious differences among the people 
and yet the Western powers suspect the government
(58) Hayashi Gonsuke? Talking of the seventy years of my life? excerpt 
translated and collected in Wu-hsii Pien-fa? op.cit.? Part 3> 
p. 378.
In September 1898 immediately before the coup? Li was expelled from 
the Tsungli Yamen. It was not until 1899 that he was appointed to 
the governor-generalship of Canton. From 1900-1901? he was re-appointed 
as governor-general of Tientsin^According to Hayashi? Li had fallen 
from power because he could not get enough support from his subordinates 
in his anti-Japanese manoeuvres, p. 369*
of being responsible for inciting the people to 
engage in anti-foreign activities. This had 
led to the seizure of the Taku Forts and the 
outbreak of conflicts? resulting in a confusion 
which is worsening every minute. If one looks 
at the situation of the world to-day? the East 
and the West are in confrontation with each other.
In the East? there are only two countries - China 
and Japan - to keep up the front. Are the strong 
and powerful countries in the West casting hungry 
looks on China alone? Once China is no longer 
able to hold her own? it is feared that Japan too? 
may not be able to stand by herself. Our well­
being or plight is contiguous with one another; 
we should put aside our small differences and 
cooperate to maintain peace on all sides. At 
the moment? China can hardly manage to muster 
military forces against the rebels within the 
country. As for the task of sorting out the 
differences and appeasing all parties among the 
powers? she has to rely on the support of Japan.
We hope that Japan? whictabelongs to the same continent 
as ourselves? will act in earnest to the benefit 
of all. It is our sincere hope that Japan will 
assume the leadership in bringing back a peaceful 
situation in the Far East."(59)
While the Empress Dowager and some of her Manchu supporters were 
alleged to have encouraged the Boxers in their anti-foreign activities? 
the Yangtze regional officials had resorted to diplomacy to mitigate 
the catastrophe. Liu K'un-i in Nanking? Chang Chih-tung in Wuhan and 
Yuan Shih-k'ai in Shantung had ignored the dynasty's declaration of 
war in June and on their own initiative? negotiated with the powers 
for a rapid restoration of peace. The war was? by this agreement? confined 
to northern China. Nevertheless? Liu K'un-i was inclined to think 
that the fault lay with the Western missionaries and that the Boxers 
had been driven to violence by the infringement of the missionary activities 
on the culture? traditions and lives of the Chinese people. In a 
letter which he wrote to Konoe? Liu said:
"The catastrophe in northern China is a result of
(59) Documents: Kuang-hsu Vol. 53* p. 39-b. Imperial message to Emperor 
of Japan? 3rd July? 1900.
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the conflicts between the Boxers and the Christ­
ians .... Missionaries especially the Catholics 
from the West have disturbed the lives of the 
local people. Their activities constituted a 
threat to the peace in the localities. These 
Western missionaries testify to their false 
beliefs and exasperate the Chinese people to 
the point of breaking out in violence....”
What China hoped, according to Liu, was that Japan, whichhad not engaged 
in missionary activities,would assume the leading role in restoring 
peace/ 61 ^ He said,
"If Japan would act on behalf of China, keeping 
in mind the close relationship between the two
countries, thaiChina would see the day when she
would abundantly repay Japan's magnanimity(62)
In a despatch which he sent to the Tsungli Yamen in April, 1901,
Liu said that Japan had sent the largest number of troops to China 
but had demanded an indemnity smaller than those demanded by Russia, 
Germany and France. He believed that those were Japan's gestures of 
friendliness and encouragement to the Chinese government and people.
He also believed that Japan had expressly sent the largest army to 
intervene on behalf of China in her negotiations with the Western powers. 
He urged the Tsungli Yamen to enlist Japan's support in requesting
the powers to reduce their demands.
That Japanese popularity was greatly increased during the Boxer 
crisis was reflected in a letter written to the leaders of the Kokumin 
Domei Kai (Peoples' League) in 1902 by a Chinese whose identity remained
(60) Letter from Liu K'un-i to Konoe, August, 1900, Nikki, op.cit.,
Vol.3i pp. 268-269.
(6 1) ibid. It was not strictly true that Japan had not engaged 
in any missionary activities in China. The Toa Dobun Kai itself, 
especially in the early days of its existence, was connected with 
the missionary activities of the Hongwanji in China and Korea.
See Nikki, Vol. 2. pp. 237, 29-1, Vol.3? p. Vf. It would seem that
in 1900, the Chinese did not regard the activities of Japanese Buddhist
monks as an imposition of an alien culture on Chinese life. Certainly,
most Chinese would have liked to think that Japan had received the
Buddhist cult as part of the cultural heritage from China.
(62) ibid. See also reply from Liu to Konoe, January,1901, Vol.^ f, p. 23.
(63) Despatch from southern commissioner Liu K'un-i to the Tsungli Yamen,
30th April, 1901, Documents: Kuang-hsii, Vol.62, pp. 32b-33a.
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obscure. The writer said he was convinced that Japan did not wish 
to see a war being waged in China and that she had moved her troops 
into China solely for the purpose of defending the lives and properties 
of Japanese nationals. He commended the "disciplined behaviour" of 
the Japanese troops which was "unrivalled by those of any other country". 
"The Chinese local people in Peking and Tientsin" were able, in fact, 
to "see justice done only in the Japanese government offices in China".
He proposed that the leaders of the Kokumin Domei Kai use their influence 
with the Japanese government and urge it to mediate on behalf of China 
in the treaty that was being negotiated in Peking. Only a treaty by 
which China was spared "excessive compensations" to the powers could 
ensure the rapid recovery of stability and the introduction of a new 
reform policy in China. He summed up his letter saying, "Benevolence 
on the part of Japan is China's great fortune; it is nevertheless, to 
Japan's own advantage ." ^
The negotiations for the International Protocol were complicated 
by Russia's activities in Manchuria. By October, 1900, Russian troops 
had occupied Mukden and a separate agreement between Russia and China 
was being negotiated by Li Hung-chang. Early in November, the Russian 
commanders on the spot made an agreement with the Tartar general at 
Mukden, Tseng Chi. The so-called Alexiev-Tseng Agreement, signed on 
9th November, 1900, provided that the civil administration of Manchuria 
should be restored to the Chinese, but that Russian troops should 
remain stationed at Mukden and other point along the railways. Soon 
after the agreement was made known to the world in early 1901, the
(6 )^ Letter from unidentified writer to leaders of the Kokumin Domei
Kai, 1902? Nikki, Supplementary Volume, (Fuzoku Bunsho), pp. 695-696.
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Japanese government "confidentially advised" the Chinese minister 
in Japan against cessation of any territories to any power. It also 
warned the Chinese government not to permit any power to station her 
officials or troops in any Chinese territories as this would "set a 
precedent which would inevitably be used by the other powers to justify 
similar actions on their parts". And in the event of China being 
coerced into yielding any of her rights or territories, she could reply 
that any demands made on her would have to be referred to the Inter­
national Protocol, thus saving China from incurring any loss or 
disadvantage to herself/^)
Within the Chinese government, Li Hung-chang, with the almost single-
handed support of Prince Ch'ing, proposed that China yield to the Russian
pressure. He also urged the Chinese government to give priority to the
settlement with Russia so that Sino-Russian relations could be saved
from jeopardy as a result of the representations from the powers espec- 
(66)ially Japan. " The Ministry of Defence was concerned at the 
admonition from the Japanese government but could not decide on any 
course of action. It reckoned that the Chinese government had to 
follow a cautious line of policy as it could "afford neither to incur 
the wrath of Russia nor arouse the anger of the powers". As Li Hung- 
chang was "familiar with China's stand as regards Russia", the Ministry 
of Defence saw fit to depend on Li to "make the best of the situation
(67)by exercising his influence with the Russians". Meanwhile, the
Chinese ministers in Germany, England, America and Japan were ordered 
to appeal to the respective governments for "mediation"
(6 5) Despatch from Chinese minister in Japan Li Sheng-to to Ministry of 
Defence, 15th February, 1901. Documents: Kuang-hsii, Vol.60, p. 15.
(6 6) Despatches from Prince Ch'ing and Li Hung-chang to Ministry of Defence 
27th February, 1st March, 1901, ibid., Vol.60, pp. 27b-28a, 29b,
respectively.
(67) Imperial order forwarded by Ministry of Defence to Prince Ch'ing and 
Li Hung-chang, 25th February, I9 0 1,ibid., Vol. 60« p.26.
(6 8) Imperial orders forwarded by Ministry of Defence to Chinese ministers
in Germany, Japan, England and America, 28th February, I901,ibid., 
\bl.6 0, p. 2 9.
However, the regional governments especially the Yangtze provincial 
governor-generals vigorously opposed Li's dealings with the Russians.
They regarded the Japanese admonition as urgent and sincere. Liu K'un-i 
argued that the fact that Japan and the other powers had so far refrained 
from using military means to stop Russian ambitions showed that they 
still hoped China would stand firm in resisting the Russian pressure 
and that Russia would eventually step down. It would, therefore, be 
wise of China to accept the Japanese admonition so that the partition 
of Chinese territories would be prevented. ^ ^) jje urge(j the Ministry 
of Defence to appeal to the Japanese government for further support in 
resisting the Russian demands. Chang Chih-tung acknowledged that
Japan's effort to stop the negotiations between China and Russia showed ag^nuine
(7i)desire to preserve China's territorial sovereignty. The same view
was shared by the Chinese minister in Japan* Li Sheng-to, who stressed 
that Japan's admonition had been motivated by her desire to "maintain 
good relations with China" and was not to be construed as having other
(72)motives.
By April, when the Russians had begun to back down as a result of 
the protests from the other powers especially Japan, the Chinese Ministry 
of Defence had taken a clearer stand. It thanked the Japanese govern­
ment for its support which was "responsible for the slowing down of the 
Russo-Chinese negotiations" and appealed to Japan to stand firm on this 
line of policy in cooperation with England so that China's sovereignty
as regards Manchuria would be safeguarded in the actual agreement to
(73)be concluded between China and the powers.
(6 9) Despatch from Liu K'un-i to Ministry of Defence, 28th February, I90l,ibld. 
Vol. 6 0, pp. 28b - 29a.
(70) Despatch from Li.n, 6th March, 1901, ibid., Vol.6 1 , p.1.
(71) Despatch from Chang Chih-tung, 25th February, 1901, ibid., Vol. 60,
pp. 25b-26a.
(72) Depatch from Li Sheng-to through Sheng Hsuan-huai to Ministry of 
Defence, 26th March, 1901, ibid., Vol.6 1 , p. 3^+.
(73) Draft despatch from Ministry of Defence to Chinese minister in
Japan, 22nd April, 19 0 1, ibid., Vol.62, p. 2*fa.
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Japanese intervention seemed to have convinced China that she could 
rely on Japan's influence in saving Manchuria from Russian ambitions.
Liu K'un-i believed that China could rely on Japan's promise to pressure
(71)Russia to withdraw her troops from Manchuria. He also discredited
the rumour that Japan was contemplating recognition of Russia's prefer­
ential rights in Manchuria in return for Russia's recognition of Japan's 
freedom of action in Korea - the Manchuria-Korea exchange. Liu also 
maintained that Japan could not have harboured any designs on Manchuria 
itself, or she would not have urged China to entrust the issue of 
Russo-Chinese disputes over Manchuria to the joint arbitration of the
(75)powers.
By November, 1901, the death of Li Hung-chang removed the most 
influential opponent of the pro-Japanese arguments in the Chinese govern­
ment. Chang Chih-tung thought that there remained no reason for 
China to enter into further bilateral negotiations with Russia. He 
urged the Tsungli Yamen that any moves on the part of the Chinese govern­
ment to enter into any agreement with Russia be referred to the 
Japanese government in advance. Japan's support, he said, had to be 
appreciated and China could not afford to act rashly, or Japan might 
take a similar course of action as that of Russia and this would lead
(76)to the partition of China.
The pro-Japanese attitude of the provincial government leaders 
was significant as it threw light on the policy of "liaison with the 
southern governor-generaIs "of the Toa Dobun Kai during the Boxer 
crisis. As has been mentioned, the Toa Dobun Kai since its establishment
(79) De^atch from Liu K'un-i to Ministry of Defence, 22nd October, 1901, 
ibid., Vol. 6 5, pp. 12-13.
(75) Despatch from Liu K'un-i to Tsungli Yamen, 9th April, 1901, ibid., 
Vol. 62, p. 12.
(76) Despatch from Chang Chih-tung to Tsungli Yamen. 11th November,
1901, ibid., Vol.65* p. 15.
had had considerable influence with the Southern Chinese provincial 
leaders and it had been the policy of the Society to consolidate 
Japanese influence in China by cooperating with Chang Chih-tung and Liu 
K'un-i. Soon after the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion, a conference 
of the executives of the Society was held on 20th June, 1900 in 
which a "Plan of Policy" was drafted recommending six steps of action 
for Japan in dealing with the current crisis in China. Firstly,
Japan should try to enlist the support and sympathy of the people in 
Southern China for the principle of preservation of China. Secondly, 
if anti-foreign activities broke out in the South, the Toa Dobun Kai 
should try to enlighten the people, either through the press or by other 
means, on the danger of such activities, but no military action should 
be taken. Thirdly, should the Peking government collapse or lose its 
power to administer its orders to the country, Japan should act before 
the powers in helping to establish a new government in the South.
Fourthly, Japanese troops outnumbering those of the powers should be sent 
to put down any resistance offered by the Chinese government armies.
But the Japanese troops must not wage a war against the Boxers. Fifthly, 
once any power or powers began taking actions with a view to devouring 
China* Japan would immediately launch an operation to occupy Korea. 
Finally, if the Chinese government left Peking in exile and the powers 
then proceeded to divide the territories into their respective spheres 
of influence* Japan should not hesitate to occupy a large area for 
her own sphere of interests.(?7)
As a result of much debate, it was agreed by the members of the 
conference that only step one and two be incorporated into the "Policy
(77) Nikki,,Vol. 3> p. 190.
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of the Society", with the added resolution to "help to reform the Chinese 
(n o\
government". Konoe recorded in his diary later that his associates and him­
self concumd on the need to implement the plan of approaching and secur­
ing the cooperation of the Southern governor-generals but they believed 
it was as yet premature to deliberate on the plan for the establishment 
of an independent government in opposition to the "reactionary faction" 
at Peking.
The "Plan" threw light on the Toa Dobun Kai’s anxiety for the 
‘^preservation of China" Leaders of the Society feared that in the event 
of a partition of China? Japan would be disadvantaged owing to her 
inferior military strength compared to those of the powers. They 
therefore proposed that Japan take independent action to secure her 
influence in southern China before the powers began to carve up China.
For the Japanese - the leaders of the Toa Dobun Kai notwithstanding - 
the "preservation of China" was more a necessity than an act of altruism.
In the years immediately before the Russo-Japanese war, the Chinese 
were also drawn closer to Japan by Japanese anti-Russian activities.
The Kokumin Domei.Kai, a pre-dominantly Dobun Kai organization, won 
high acclaim in China. Founded in 1900 by a group of politically 
active people who were particularly interested in China, the Kokumin 
Domei Kai aimed at unifying Japanese public opinion without distinction 
fo-£ political party and official or civil standing in support of a 
solution to the Far Eastern question on the basis of "maintaining the 
integrity of China" (Shina Hbzen) and "upholding Korea" (Chosen Yogo).
Its immediate objective was to urge the government to send troops to
(78) ibid., Vol.3i p» 19J•
(79) ibid., Vol.3? p. 202.
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Korea to check Russian ambitions in Manchuria. Konoe who headed the 
organization was hailed by the Chinese as the saviour of their country.
Chu Hsi-lin, an official in the government, reckoned that Konoe was 
"the only person in both the East and the West who has a genuine desire 
to see the preservation of China become a reality". Once again,
emphasis was put on racial and cultural affinity and expectations were 
raised of the establishment of a special and permanent relationship 
between the two countries.
Liu K'un-i said he hoped Konoe's Kokumin Domei Kai would influence 
the Japanese government to follow "a policy of chivalry" and act in the 
name of justice so that peaceful order in the Far East would be 
maintained.^^ He reckoned that the Kokumin Domei Kai, being 
founded at the height of Russian penetration into the Far East, had the 
objective of cultivating a special relationship between Japan, China 
and Korea to resist this pressure. Konoe's effort in rallying Sino- 
Japanese cooperation at this juncture showed him to be "a man of great 
wisdom and well-versed in the affairs of the world". Equally
enthusiastic response came from the Ministry of Defence. In their 
replies to Konoe's letter appealing for China's support in thwarting 
Russian penetration, Yung Lu and Wang Wen-shao hailed Konoe's aspirations 
as those of "a gentleman of great sincerity and benevolence" and his 
actions those of "a man of high purpose."
These Chinese officials, however, were also realistic about the 
Far Eastern situation. Liu was aware that China's claims to Manchuria, 
if not backed up by Japan, were as good as lost. But he also feared
(80) Letter from Chu Hsi-lin to Konoe, July, 1901, ibid., Vol.61 
pp. 232-233.
(8 1) Letter from LiuK'un-i to Konoe, 1902, ibid., Fuzoku Bunsho, p. 6 8 9.
(8 2) ibid., p. 6 9 0.
(8 3) Draft despatch from Ministry of Defence to Chinese minister in 
Japan Li Sheng-to, 10th June, ^901, Documents: Kuang-hsu, Vol.6 3,
p. 25a.
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that Japan alone would not be enough to withstand Russia. She would 
have to cooperate with England and America in pressuring Russia to 
evacuate Manchuria. Liu had especially appealed to Japan for help 
because he was unsure of the support of England and America whereas 
he felt that a Sino-Japanese liaison was justified by "both countries' 
reverence for the Confucian ethics? geographical proximity? contiguous
interests and aspirations and the need to defend themselves from foreign
(8i+) also
aggression." Chang Chih-tung^saw the need for Japan to cooperate
with England and America in preserving the East Asian order. Moreover?
he was enthusiastic about Konoe's proposal to open Manchuria. He
felt that China should lose no time in introducing new methods of
administration to the area as an experiment of reform policy for the 
( )
whole country.' In a letter to Konoe? Wang Wen-shao and Ch'ii Hung-
chi? too? said that China needed the joint efforts of Japan? England
and America to enforce the evacuation of Russian troops from Manchuria 
and refer the Manchurian issue for international settlement.^86^
Such was in fact the objective behind the Kokumin Domei Kai's "Shina Hozen? 
Chosen Yogo". Konoe and his supporters relized that Japan alone could not 
withstand Russia and t^ iat only by rallying the other countries to the cause of 
presErving China could Japan hope to secure peace in the Far East and 
independence for herself. In the face of Russian aggression? Japan
and China needed to stand together but the Kokumin Domei Kai did not
pursue a policy of bilateral alliance between the two countries. In 
fact? Konoe was anxious that the Western powers should not be misled 
into thinking that Japan and China were conspiring against them by
(8^ ) Letter from Liu to Konoe? 1902? Nikki? Fuzoku Bunsho? pp. 688-689.
(85) Letter from Chang Chih-tung to Konoe? 1901? ibid., Fuzoku 
Bunsho? pp. 636-637.
(86) Letter from Wang Wen-shao and Ch'U Hung-chi to Konoe? 1902? 
ibid.? Fuzoku Bunsho? pp. 921-522.
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forming a racial alliance. His speech given at the first 
meeting of the Kokumin Domei Kai was revealing:
"... As for [the talk of the Domeikai being] an 
alliance of the yellow peoples against the white 
peoples ... not only has such an idea not been 
put forward in the Society's 'Declaration' but 
it has never entered into the conversations 
between myself and my colleagues at our various 
meetings .... Although we recognize the necessity 
for friendly relations [between Japan? Korea and 
China]? it is not true? however? that the interests 
of these three countries alone are being affected 
in the Far East today. Russia? England? France 
and Germany too [have their stakes in this part 
of the world]. Even America and Italy ... 
are. involved in one way or the other. Not only 
is the exclusion of and discrimination against these 
countries an impossibility? but it is also unnece­
ssary. At the moment when all the European countries 
are advocating 'preservation1 [of China]; Japan 
must depend on and cooperate with them to attain 
this goal. If one will insist on putting forward 
the idea of discrimination against the white 
peoples? then one would arouse the suspicion of 
the white nations and the important plan of [the 
Domei Kai] would be jeopardized."(^7j
A lack of diplomatic realism? however? was apparent in the attitude
of those Chinese further from power. Many in China? especially those
who felt strongly that China needed vigorous reforms and a new political
system saw the Kokumin Domei Kai as more than an anti-Russian? or
indeed? anti-government organization. They saw the establishment of
the Kokumin Domei Kai as a message to both the Japanese and Chinese
peoples that there had always been a special relationship between them
and that they would have to develop it further to safeguard their
(88)independence and sovereignty in the Far East. The racial factor
was conveniently used to emphasize the need for China and Japan to
(87) Konoe's inauguration speech at Kokumin Domei Kai? ibid.? Vol.3> 
pp. 339-3^0.
(8 8) Letter from Wang I-cheng to Konoe? July? 1901? ibid.? Vol.^ -? 
pp. 231-232. Wang I-cheng who described himself as a Chinese 
official whose political views were not recognized owing to his 
low position in the government thought the Kokumin Domei Kai 
shared the same objective as the "Society for the promotion of 
mutual benefits for China and Japan" which he had tried unsuccess­
fully to organize in China five years earlier.
cooperate. No distinction was made between Russia and the other Western 
powers. Chao Erh-sun, governor of Hunan wrote to Konoe in 1903*
"Japan and China are situated in the same part of 
the world, they belong to the same race and share 
the same culture and philosophy and they are as 
close to one another as the teeth are to the lips. 
Even if they cooperate and mutually support one 
another, it is still feared that they are not 
strong enough to confront the expansions of the 
Teutonic and Slav races. If they still persist 
in engaging in hostilities against one another, 
thus weakening their strength and finances* then 
it is only to be expected that the other races 
will seize the opportunity to further their 
aggression .... " (89)
■ D istrust o f R u s s ia  , in  p a r t i c u la r  , was shown in a letter written in 
the name of three hundred and eighty-five "men of high purpose " in 
Shanghai who had "formed themselves into a society" under Wang K'ang-nien 
and other reformers who had been active in the 1898 period. The 
'society' had been formed to "awaken the entire nation to the fate of 
the F a r East". The letter said that the powers in Europe were all 
persuaded by the sweet word of Russia, just as children were tempted 
by sweets; but soon they would discover that Russia would come out 
on top of all the powers in a partition of China. ^  ^
Anti-Western feelings were amply expressed in the words of Wang Yii- 
jun, an official in the Kwangtung government who was about to take up 
office in Manchuria. Wang was a severe critic of Western missionary 
activities and the Chinese government's policy of assimilation which 
enabled the Catholic hierarchy, in particular, to gain official status. 
According to Wang, many Chinese were attracted to the Catholic Church 
as the converts always managed to get the missionaries to intervene
(89) Letter from governor of Hunan Chao Erh-sun to Konoe, 3rd October, 
19035 ibid., Fuzoku Bunsho, pp. 638-639*
(90) Letter from Wang K'ang-nien etc. to Konoe, 1901 ibid., Fuzoku 
Bunsho, pp. 522-523*
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and help them win their disputes. The Chinese community became 
divided and the people "caused to suffer" during the Boxer riots.
He also attacked the agreement made by the government and the powers 
allowing Westerners to live in mixed-residence among the Chinese as 
"much harm would be done to the lives of the Chinese people". Under 
those circumstances, Wang maintained, the Chinese people needed guidance 
and protection. While the Western countries such as England, Russia,
France and Germany were only concerned with territorial and financial 
gains, Japan wanted to befriend China to fight the foreign foe.
Besides, countries in Asia sharing the same culture and belonging to 
the same race should sweep away their differences and build on their 
past friendship.^^^
Emphasis was put on the Confucian tradition shared by both Japan
and China as opposed to the Christian religion of the West. Wang's
proposal of the method to implement Sino-Japanese cooperation was that
Konoe would solicit the support of the Japanese government in sending
Japanese personnel to China to establish a "Common-cultural Society for
the Protection of Confucianism". The "Society" would in fact carry
out anti-Russian activities under the facade of preaching the Confucian
philosophy. He even suggested that in the event of an outbreak of
hostility between Japan and Russia, Chinese members of the society
could be sent to the battlefields disguised as Japanese soldiers.
This, Wang believed, was "the first step towards the right direction
(92)of linking China and Japan together."
As a war between Russia and Japan became imminent, the Chinese 
applauded Japan's action in holding out against Russia on the diplomatic 
front. Many believed that Japan could deliver the Far East from the 
catastrophe of Russian engulfment. The Hsin Min Tdung Pao (New People’s
(9 1) Letter from Wang Yii-jun to Konoe, December, 1901 ibid., Vol.4,pp.35^-355
(92) ibid., p. 355*
113.
Miscellany) 5 a reform journal founded by Iiang Ch'i-ch'ao in 1902, 
pointed out that as the safety of Manchuria and Korea directly affected 
Japan's national safety and progress and as neither China nor Korea 
was in a position to defend herself, Japan had taken upon herself the 
task of confronting Russia. She was in fact "protecting herself as 
well as safeguarding the well-being of all in keeping with the spirit 
of altruism." China could not but be sympathetic towards Japan and
(93)welcome her actions.
X X X
The Chinese were awakened by their defeat in 1893 to their own 
weakness and the superior military power of Japan. Their sense of 
urgency surrounding the nations independence was heightened by the 
Western powers' "scramble for concessions" in the post-war period.
Many Chinese came to look upon Japan as more than just a possible 
ally. Chinese reformers who had advocated reform measures to be carried 
out on the Japanese model we re e^en moreconvince d that China had to obtain 
help from Japan in order to strengthen herself. They saw that the 
war with Japan had been a mistake and that the two countries needed to 
strengthen their ties to form an Asian front against Western aggression.
In late 1897, Hunanese reformers re^ oonded with vigorous enthusiasm to 
the Japanese offer of friendship. Chinese reformers saw a Sino-Japanese 
alliance as more than a political union. They looked upon Japan as 
the leader of the "Asian awakening" which would soon be followed by a 
general Asian revival.
(93) "Review of the political situation: documents relating to the
Russo-Japanese negotiation^', 2nd December, 19035 Hsin Min Ts’ung Pao, 
reprinted in Taipei, 1 966, Vol.7, No. ^2-^3, p« 153*
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Many progressive Chinese provincial governors shared the reformers' 
belief that Japan had something to offer China. Chang Chih-tung readily 
accepted the Japanese offer of assistance. If Chang did not share 
K'ang Yu-wei's enthusiasm about a union between Japan and China based 
on idealistic and sentimental grounds, he still saw that the lingual 
and cultural similarities between the two countries would be assets for 
Chinese students in acquiring methods of modernization from Japan.
Moreover, Chinese provincial governors were convinced that forming an 
alliance with Japan was a political necessity. Changfs efforts in bringing the 
Tzu Hsi government closer to the Japanese indicated his belief in 
the vital importance to China of Japarfs friendship. Tzu Hsi's appoint­
ment of a Chinese mission to Japan with an offer of an alliance also 
reflected Chang's success in overcoming contrary influences within the 
government.
Apart from the Japanese military mission of late 189?, events in 
1898 also appeared to augur well for closer cooperation between the two 
countries. Japanese government leaders appeared to take an interest in 
fostering closer relations with China. Ito's visit to Peking and 
Konoe's establishment of the Toa Dobun Kai inspired hopes in the Chinese 
for an alliance with Japan. One must not forget that in the same year Okuma 
had promised in his "doctrine" to offer China help and guidance. These 
events helped to build up the Chinese image of Japan as a friend and 
ally which had remained outside the imperialist camp of the Western powers.
During the Boxer Rebellion, the Chinese faced the greatest danger 
of a partition and many believed that their only hope for survival lay 
in a racial alliance with Japan. The emphasis on the racial and cultural 
affinity between Japan and China was never stronger in the Chinese 
argument for closer cooperation between the two countries. In the 
years immediately before the Russo-Japanese war, China was drawn still
113.
closer to Japan by the Russian threat. Some even believed that Japan 
was to fight China's war and regarded Japan as the saviour of Asia 
from Western engulfment. The Chinese appeals to Japan to cooperate on 
racial grounds were never more urgent. It was at the same time charact­
erized by impractical considerations. By 1902, Japan had already 
established herself as an ally of one of the strongest Western powers 
of the time. Some opinions in Japan - those of Konoe notwithstanding - 
were gradually changing towards a deremphasis of the racial and cultural 
factor in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Yet many in China at that 
time would have found it hard to accept the Japanese prime fninister5 




EMERGING CHINESE NATIONALISM IN FACE OF GROWING JAPANESE POWER,
1909-1911
Japan defeated Russia in the war of 1909-1903. Elated by Japan's 
victory, the Chinese gradually acquired a sense of nationhood and talked, 
about the recovery of their national rights. At the same time, 
the war made Japan a world power and this entailed changes in her 
role in world politics. These two phenomena — emerging Chinese 
nationalist aspirations and expanding, political opportunities for Uapan — had 
important implications for the idea of Sino-Japanese cooperation in 
the post-war period.
Continuation of the pro-Japanese policy of Chinese provincial leaders
In December, 1903* rumour had it that China was making moves to
form an alliance with Japan and that Yuan Shih-k'ai, governor-general
(1)of Chihli and Peiyang commissioner, was its chief advocate. The
rumour was not only widespread in China but was also noted by the
Russian and Japanese press. One Russian newspaper warned that the
impending Sino-Japanese alliance was unlike ordinary alliances made
between countries for specific purposes. It was an alliance of the
(2)yellow race against the Western world. Around July and August, 1909,
(1 ) 0 Shih Ching Wen (Russian Alarm), (facsimile,Taipeh, 1968),No.19,
28th December, 1903* This was one of the first revolutionary news­
papers published in Shanghai. It ran for just over one year from 
15th December, 1903 to 23th February, 1909. I+- was founded at the
height of Russian penetration into the Far East , designed to protest 
against Russia's occupation of Manchuria and belabour the Manchu govern­
ment for permitting Chinese territories to be violated. This paper 
will hereafter be cited as OSCW.
(2) "The instigatory argument of the Russian press", article in Jiji 
Shimpo > translated in OSCW, ibid., No.96, 29th January, 1909.
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a proposal was made by some government officials to send an emissary,
Chang Po-hsi of the Board of Census, to Japan to express the Chinese 
government's gratitude for the chivalrous part played by Japan in the 
war. But the proposal was not taken up owing to the opposition of 
some officials who advised against such an overtly friendly gesture 
towards Japan. Such a gesture, they said, was premature at a time
when the outcome of the war was not yet predictable.^^
Since the nineteenth century, this kind of split among Chinese 
officials both in Peking ?nd in the provinces into two factions, one 
pro-Japanese and the other pro-Russian, had been a recurrent phenomenon. 
Although Russian influence in the Chinese government had declined 
considerably by 1903i the pro-Russian sentiment of the Empress Dowager 
was still to be reckoned with. Furthermore, some officials, notably 
the minister of defence Wang Wen-shao, were suspicious of Japanese
motives in going to war with Russia. In November, 1909, an alliance
with Russia was contemplated by the pro-Russian faction led by Li
(9)Lien-ying. But Yuan Shih-k'ai, who had succeeded Li Hung-chang as
governor-general of Chihli since the latter's death in 1901, had 
amassed great influence and was keen on winning the friendship of 
Japan. He had the support of Chang Chih-tung, governor-general of 
Hunan-Hupeh, Shen Cliun-hsuan, governor-general of Canton and Ma Yu-k'un, 
general of Chihli. During the course of the Russo-Japanese war,
Yuan and his supporters managed to exert great influence on the govern­
ment's decisions regarding China's relations with the belligerent
(3) "The disposition of the Chinese government and people towards Japan after 
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war''. Toa Dobun Kai Kankei Zassen 
(Miscellaneous documents relating to the T5a Dobun Kai), Sectionl. 
1899-1910, Tokyo, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M.T. Series
(1868-1993), Reel No. 773i pp. 196-197.
(9) Ching Chung Jih Pao (Warning Bell Daily),(facsimile.Taipeh, 1968)."The 
confirmed news of the government's move to ally itself with Russia", 
Vol.9, 5th November, 1909*and "Review of Current Events", Vol.9, 10th 
November, i909,f?(.After the Russo-Japanese war, there seemed to be 
little reason to write any more on the subject of Russian occupation. 
The 0 Shih Ching Wen changed its name to Ching Chung Jih Pao and ran 
for one year from 26th February 1909 to 28th January, 1905* The paper 
concentrated on the threat posed to China's independence by foreign 
powers including Japan. This paper will heisafter be wited as CCJP.
powers.
Although there was general acknowledgment of Japan's bravery in
declaring war on Russia, thus blocking Russia's attempt to engulf
Manchuria, some Chinese officials were concerned about the effects of
a Japanese victory on China's relations with the Western countries.
Yang Chao-yiin, Chinese minister to Belgium, for example, thought that
the European countries and America viewed the Russo-Japanese war as
a racial conflict the outcome of which would directly affect the
relations between Europe and Asia. These Western countries would
become wary of the "yellow nations" if Japan won the war. A Japanese
victory therefore, according to Yang, would make the West suspicious
of China as well. To prevent such a misunderstanding, he proposed
that China strengthen her relations with the powers in the midst of
the Russo-Japanese conflict by sending missions abroad to improve
(5)Sino-Western understanding.
Others were concerned that a Japanese victory, no less than a 
Russian victory, would affect Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. 
Shortly after the outbreak of the war and China's declaration of 
neutrality, Chang Jen-fu of the Censorate (Tu Ch'a Yuan) proposed 
that China mediate to stop the Russo-Japanese conflict before it 
became a major war. He believed that this gesture on the part of 
China would serve to secure for her the rightful claims to Manchuria 
and forestall severe reprimand from either side in the eventual
+-+-1 -i- (6 )settlement.
(5) Despatch from Chinese minister to Belgium Yang Chao-yiin suggesting that
China send special missions to the Western countries which had a treaty
relation with China. Received by Waiwupu on 9th June, 1909, Documents:
Kuang-hsu, Vol.68, pp. I2b-l3a.
(6) Despatch from Chang Jen-fu of the Tu Ch'a Yuan to Waiwupu, 29th
February, 1909, ibid., Vol.68, pp. 3^-9.
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The same outlook was adopted by the Waiwupu which shortly before 
Port Arthur fell into the hands of Japan in Jaunary, 1905 > advocated 
that China assume a peace-making role to stop the war before either 
power came out with decisive victory. The Waiwupu was also in favour 
of asking other powers to intervene in the war. It was suggested that an 
emissary Wu T'ing-fang, one time minister to America, be sent to America and the 
European countries with this mission. Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, opposed 
the suggestion. He stressed the importance of cooperation with 
Japan to settle the Manchurian question and maintained that Japan had 
not acted in any way contrary to the spirit of the declaration of 
war which would justify intervention on China's part. The decision
(7)to send Wu to the West was thus reversed.
Conflict between the Waiwupu on the one hand and Yuan and his 
supporters on the other again arose as the end of the war drew near.
The Waiwupu decided that in order to safeguard her own rights, China 
had to participate in the peace conference and insisted on sending 
envoys. Hopes were also entertained for an international conference 
to he held should Japan make excessive demands in Manchuria. The 
British and American ministers in China were approached. Yuan 
Shih-k'ai and his supporters from the provincial governments, however, 
believed that only by cooperating with Japan could the Manchurian 
problem be solved and that it would be to neither China's nor Japan's 
advantage to invite the intervention of the Western powers in the 
settlement. Yuan, however, was not strong enough on this occasion 
to influence the Waiwupu into changing its plan. The proposal to
(7) Toa Dobun Kai Kankei Zassen, op.cit., pp. 211-215. The report
mentioned that this move to send Wu abroad proposed by the "less 
enlightened Chinese officials" had been prompted by the rumour 
started by the Russian minister in China and the minister in China 
of "one other country" that Japan despised China. The rumour was 
apparently circulated with a view to causing discord between Japan 
and China, p. 199*
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send envoys was rejected by the British and American ministers. And
the Waiwupu withdrew its proposal only on the protest of the Japanese
. . . . PVi. (8) minister m  China.
Neither of the two incidents was strictly a confrontation between 
the pro-Russian and pro-Japanese factions. There were officials in 
the Waiwupu including Ch'u Hung-chi, minister of foreign affairs, who 
were friendly towards Japan. Nor was either decision of the Waiwupu 
anti-Japanese in nature. They, however, brought to light the signif­
icant fact that some provincial governors were willing to cooperate 
with Japan over the Manchurian question. The influence of this group 
of people was being felt increasingly in Peking and this foreshadowed 
some kind of cooperation between Japan and China on the governmental 
level. This was particularly noticeable in China's reform programme 
which the Ch'ing government had taken into its own hands since the 
turn of the century. However, as at the end of the nineteenth century, 
this kind of relationship was not destined to evolve into a formal 
alliance between the two countries. One must also bear in mind that 
reforms especially those effected in Manchuria had been introduced with 
a view to counteracting the influence of Japan.
There were signs that the Chinese government was more resolved than 
at any time before to recover possession of the Manchurian provinces 
after the Russo-Japanese war. To this end, it pursued a policy of 
appeasement towards Japan. Attempts were made to adjust matters 
amicably with Japanese authorities. The appointment of the Chinese 
bannerman Chao Erh-sun to the goveror-generalship of Manchuria in 
late 1905 marked the beginning of some efficient administration in that
(8 ) "The opinion of political circles at Peking regarding the Manchurian
question", report from the Peking correspondent of the Toa Dobun Kai. 
Received 9th August, 1905* ibid.,pp. 258-281.
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area. Chao was also anxious to obtain Japan's cooperation in settling 
affairs in Manchuria. A meeting was held between Chao and Saionji, 
then prime minister and foreign minister, in May, 1906 during which 
discussions were undertaken relating to the withdrawal of Japan's 
military office from Hsin-min-tun, the return by Japan of Yingkow 
to China, the cooperative project of afforestation in eastern Manchuria 
between Japan and China and other m a t t e r s . I n  August, 1906, 
the Waiwupu recommended that members of the Japanese delegation to the 
post-war conference between Ja.p?,nand China be given the imperial award by 
the Chinese Emperor for their "services rendered in concluding the 
agreements concerning Manchuria and their efforts made towards the 
preservation of friendship between Japan and China as well a s peace
.1 -r-i >» ( 1 0 )m  the Far East.
The Chinese government's attempt to carry out reforms on the Japanese 
model
The post-war years saw the Chinese government making concrete 
attempts to effect reforms in the country's administration, education 
and army. Strides were also made towards the establishment of a 
constitution. When Japan's constitutional monarchy defeated Russia's 
Tsarist autocracy in 19051 constitutionalism seemed to have proved its 
efficacy as a basis for unity between rulers and ruled in a national 
effort. Sentiments within China were for a more liberalized and 
more independent regime. The Japanese victory had given the Chinese an
(9) According to Chao, Saionji had stressed that this episode of 
Sino-Japanese cooperation was not to be made known to the powers 
and that the negotiations were to be kept confidential. Despatch 
from governor-general of Sheng Ching Chao Erh-sun to Ministry of 
Defence and Waiwupu, 2nd May, 1 906, Documents: Kuang-hsu, Vol.6 9, 
pp. 27b-28a.
(10) Waiwupu's recommendation of the Imperial Star Award to be given 
to the Japanese delegation to the treaty conference, 12th August,
1906, ibid, Vol. 691 pp. 32b - 33b.
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elated feeling and many felt that China could achieve as much. There 
was an urge to catch up with Japan. The central government had to 
satisfy the demand from the radical-minded for a strong China which 
could withstand the onslaught of Western aggression. Within the 
country, there was a growing provincial interest in having a share in 
the government. Two official missions in the first half of 1906 were 
sent to study constitutionalism abroad. One, led by Tuan Fang, visited 
mainly Germany and the United States and • the other, led by Tsai Tse, 
visited Japan, England and France. The commissioners returned in 
August, 1906 and recommended that the Japanese constitution serve as 
model, conditions in that country being far more comparable to those 
in China.Tsai Tse's report on the investigation in Japan was one of 
praise for Japanese institutions. Tsai expressed admiration for 
Japan's achievement in her legal and educational systems, her navy and 
army, her agriculture, industries and commerce and recommended that 
China use them as models.
Tsai Tse was not the first Chinese official to recommend that 
China could benefit from modelling her reforms on the Japanese version.
Shen Chia-pen and Wu T'ing-fang of the Board of Punishments, for example,
had commented in October, 1905* that it was an advantage for China to
be able to learn from Japan's experience in developing her judicial 
institution and that China should send specialists to investigate 
Japan's legal and prison system.*'1^
The result of these recommendations was that in the few years 
immediately after the Russo-Japanese war, Chinese missions were sent
(11) Report from Tsai Tse on the investigation in Japan, 13th February,
1906, ibid, Vol.69* pp. 25b-26a.
(12) Memorial from ministers of law Wu T'ing-fang and Shen Chia-pen
to send missions to Japan to investigate Japan's legal system
and criminal law, 15th October, 1905, ibid., Vol.6 9 , pp. l8-l9a.
to Japan. In turn, memorials were submitted by the Board of Punish­
ments, the Board of Education, the Board of Trade, the Waiwupu and 
individual Chinese officials recommending that the imperial awards 
be given to Japanese officials of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry 
of Education (Mombiisho) , the Imperial Household Department (Kunaisho) 
and the Toa Dobun Kai for their services and help given to Chinese
(13)
missions during the latters' courses of investigation.
It is hard to determine to what extent these exchanges helped to 
improve relations between the two countries. They probably amounted 
to little more than a mutual expression of good-will on either side.
But concrete reforms were carried out especially in education and the 
army under the leadership of Chang Chih-tung and Yuan Shih-k'ai. 
Japanese instructors were hired in increasing numbers to train Chinese 
troops and Chinese officers were sent to military academies in Japan. 
Chang Chih-tung was now able, with the central government's backing, 
to send missions to study the Japanese school system, import Japanese 
teachers and send larger numbers of students from his provinces to 
study in Japan.
Cooperation between the Japanese and Chinese governments in controlling 
Chinese students in Japan
Japanese influence in the late Ch'ing reform movement was perhaps 
greatest in the field of education. Cooperation between the Japanese 
and Chinese governments in this area was two-fold. The first was in 
providing the Chinese students who had gone to Japan in rapidly growing 
numbers between 1903 and 1906 with education. The other, perhaps
(1 3) See Documents: Kuang-hsii, Vol.69? and 70 for scattered references.
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unforeseen by ‘both, governments at first, was in controlling 
and later, suppressing the political agitation of Chinese 
students in Japan.
After the turn of the century, the Chinese diplomatic
>n Ja p&y\
representativesAwere invested with the added duty —  not 
required of Chinese missions in other countries —  of coping 
with the presence of a rapidly growing Chinese student 
population and their increasing interest in political activity. 
The Russo-Japanese war had aroused a sense of political 
consciousness in the Chinese students. The weakness of 
China contrasted sharply with the power of Japan. Chinese 
students became discontented with the state of affairs at 
home. They agitated for changes in the home government 
and rallied to the support of reformist and revolutionary 
leaders in Japan such as L'iang Ch’i-ch'ao and dun Yat-sen. 
Privately supported students, in particular, viewed the re­
strictions imposed on their activities as an extension of 
the unenlightened rule of the Manchu government.
In July, 1902, Chinese students demonstrated and 
protested against the refusal of the Chinese minister in 
Tokyo to recommend nine students for the Seij5 military 
school. ' Realizing that the student affairs in Japan 
needed more direct and stringent control, the Chinese 
government authorized that the office of controller-general 
of students be set up in Japan on 1st January, 1903.
This office carried the same rank as the minister and all 
students affairs were placed under its control.
In the same year, the impress Dowager ordered Chang 
Chih-tung to draft a set of regulations to reduce "corrupt 
practices" among the Chinese students in Japan. Chang 
negotiated with the Japanese minister, Uchida Yasuya, 
on those regulations that would require commitment by
(15) Despatch from Chinese minister in Japan, Ts’ai Chun, 
to Waiwupu, 31st July, 1902 and 8th August, 1902, 
Documents: Kuang-hsii, Vol.66, p.15, 16.
the Japanese government or Japanese school authorities. After 
receiving a promise of cooperation from the Japanese? Chang formally 
presented the regulations to the throne on 6th October? 1903 •
In accordance with these regulations? only a limited number of 
Chinese students would be admitted to Japanese schools each year for 
the study of government law or military matters and no privately 
supported students would be permitted to receive military training 
in Japan. All Chinese students? government or privately supported? 
would be required to register with the Chinese minister to Japan and 
the newly established Chinese office of controller - general of students 
in Japan. Students could enter only those private schools recognized 
by the Japanese Mombusho as maintaining standards equal to those of 
government schools. They could? however? enter special preparatory 
schools established for Chinese students? providing these? too? were 
regulated by the Mombusho. Japanese school authorities would be 
responsible for grading the conduct of Chinese students within the 
schools. In cases of proven serious offence (both within and outside 
the schools) which included writing and printing inflammatory essays? 
issuing newspapers and meddling in politics? or engaging in'hctive 
disruption of peace and order"? the Japanese educational authorities 
would honour requests from the Chinese minister or controller-general 
to expel and deport guilty students from Japan. Reports on the cases 
of all deported students would be submitted to the Waiwupu and the 
authorities of their home provinces.^°^
Chang's regulations were accepted by the throne and late in 1903v 
at the request of the Japanese authorities? a set of rules for the 
discipline far and encouragement of Chinese students were added. The
(16) For details of the regulations? see Chang Wen-hsiang Kung Ch'uan-chi 
op.cit.? Vol.6 1 : pp.1-10. See also W. Ayers? Chang Chih-tung and 
Educational Reform in China? op.cit.? pp.193-195*
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method of encouragement specified was the conferral of Chinese civil
(17)service degrees on graduates returning from Japan.
The Chinese government’s regulations of 1903 was a step forward 
in the direction of closer cooperation between the Chinese and Japanese 
governments in tightening control of Chinese students. It was? 
therefore? not surprising that in November? 1903? the Japanese Mombusho 
promulgated a series of regulations of its own restricting the 
students' choice of schools and lodgings and requiring a letter of 
recommendation from every Chinese student.^1^^  There was evidence 
to show that the Chinese minister in Japan,Yaig Shu,had conferred with 
the Mombusho about the regulations before they were put forward.
Yang had apparently heard that the Japanese authority intended to 
issue the regulations and asked to see a draft of the proposed contents.
He found it entirely satisfactory and told the Waiwupu later in a 
despatch that he could find nothing prejudicial to the intrests of the 
students? and that he was satisfied with the regulations "since they 
concerned the control of schools and indirectly the control of students."^9) 
In view of the fact that it had attempted to tighten its control over 
student affairs in Japan two years earlier? the Chinese government 
too? would have welcomed the Mombusho's regulations.
In 1907 ? both governments felt the need to expel Sun Yat-sen from 
Japan and stringent measures were passed by both governments to 
control revolutionary activities. The Chinese government set up 
stricter rules regarding student travel* to Japan? and the Japanese 
government took repressive measures against Chinese students' publishing 
activity and meetings. The post-war era saw the rapid growth of
(17) Ayers? ibid.^ p. 193-
(1 8) Saneto Keishu? Chugokujin Nhpn Ryugakushi (A history of Chinese 
students in Japan)? Tokyo? 1960? pp. 963-^67.
(19) Yang Shu to Waiwupu on Chinese students' boycott of classes? 17th 
January? 1 906? Documents: Kuang-hsu? Vol. 6 9? pp. 23b-2Vb.
unrest in Chinese society. Chinese dissidents? be they reformists or 
revolutionaries? launched their campaigns to "save China" from abroad 
and Japan became a centre of their activities. They were? however? 
seldom able to obtain the sympathy of the Japanese government. 
Increasingly? the Chinese government relied on the Japanese authorities 
to put down these subversive activities. The T^kyo government? 
unwilling to involve itself in any movement in China which threatened 
to topple the Manchu dynasty? responded readily to the requests from 
Peking to clamp down on the student unrests. But perhaps this coop­
erative attitude towards the Manchus indicated a concern for the need 
to maintain the status quo rather than a desire to foster closer 
relations with Peking.
Comments of the Chinese press on Japan's role in the "revival of Asia" 
after the Russo-Japanese war
Chinese opinions were unanimous in praising Japan's bravery in 
entering into military confrontation with Russia. A more enthusiastic 
response to Japanese chivalry came from the literary and press circles 
which openly acknowledged that Japan was motivated by altruism no 
less than the need to defend herself against Russian aggression. The 
Hong Kong Hua-Tzu Jih-Pao condemned the "aloofness" and "acquiescence" 
on the part of the strong Western powers towards the Russian penetration 
into Manchuria. On the other hand? it expressed admiration for 
Japan which had acted "in the name of justice" despite the disparity 
between herself and Russia in terms of size and strength.
(2 0) "The difference in the orientation of Japanese and Russian policies" 
in Hong Kong Hua Tzu Jih Pao (The Chinese Language Daily News)?
20th March? 1903* Established in Hong Kong in 186^/5? this was 
one of the earliest and longest running Chinese newspapers. It 
began as the Chinese edition of the British Daily News but later 
came under Chinese proprietorship. Being published in Hong Kong? 
it reflected the relatively progressive attitudes of the Southern 
Chinese and was critical of the corrupt and ineffective Manchu 
government. But it did not openly express sympathy for the rev­
olutionary cause. This paper will hereafter be cited as H.K.Hua 
Tzu Jih Pao.
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The Ching Chung Jih Pao commented that Japan was acting in accordance 
with international law. Firstly, Japan was fighting out of self- 
defence as the common interests which she shared with China were being 
threatened by Russia. Secondly, Japan was fighting for justice because 
she could not condone Russia's violation of China's sovereignty.
Thirdly, Japan was fighting to preserve China and Korea and to maintain
peace in the Far East in keeping with her friendship with those two
, . (21) countries.
The Chinese government's declaration of neutrality on 12th February,
1909- was criticized throughout the country. Emotional letters from
readers were written to the 0 Shih Ching Wen expressing willingness to
fight on the side of Japan. The "Women's Society of Resistance
against Russian Aggression" volunteered to help the Japanese Red Cross
(22)Association in giving aid to wounded Japanese soldiers. Petitions
were sent to the Waiwupu from Chinese residents in America, Australia,
Africa and other parts of Asia urging the government to fight alongside
Japan. Chinese merchants in America offered to contribute to the
military expenses of the Chinese army. Japan3 they said, was fighting
for justice and China could not step aside and watch Japan fight the
, , (23)war for her.
The friendship of Japan was given a high value. The rumour 
of a government move to form an alliance with Russia roused much 
disquiet in the Ching rhung Jih Pao. Such a step, it commented, would 
make Japan see China as her enemy and this was particularly ill-advised 
as Japan had declared war On Russia in the name of preserving Chinese
(21) "On the right of intervention in international law", editorial
in CCJP, op.cit., Vol.1 , 3th April, 1909-* p.2.
(22) "A tribute to the Women's Society of Resistance against Russian
Aggression", OSCW, op.cit., No.9-3, 26th January, 1909-.
(23) Petition from Chinese residents in America, Australia, Asia and
Africa to the Waiwupu, 16th February, 1909-, Documents: Kuang-hsii,
Vol.73, pp. 3-6. Also CCJP, op.cit., Vol.1 , 27th February, 1909-* p.3»
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territories. " According to the Ching Chung Jih Pao, China should
reform her internal affairs and cooperate with Japan. It said it was 
important that China take the initiative, or Japan would have to align
(25)her policies with those of the white powers for her own national saiety.
The Tung Fang Tsa Chih, however, did not accept that Japan was at the 
cross-road of either cooperating with China or joining the Western 
imperialist camp. It believed that China could either be strengthened 
with Japanese help or partitioned by the Western powers. Should the 
latter happen, Japan, not yet a world power, would find herself
isolated. Hence the Tung Fang Tsa Chih believed that not only China, 
but Japan too could benefit from closer cooperation with one another.
In view of this, it was unwise of China to declare herself neutral
(26)instead of joining forces with Japan against Russia.
During the war* there was an overwhelming wish in China for a 
Japanese victory. T^ere were three elements central to this sentiment. 
The most important was related to the post-war repercussions which 
would directly affect China. It was believed that a Russian victory 
would arouse the envy of the other bhg powers. Russian monopoly in 
the Far East would hence be challenged and a war of partition of China 
would be fought among the powers. The prospect of saorvival for China 
would hence be one of pessimism whereas with a Japanese victory, some 
hope for China’s future independence were entertained.
Secondly, it was believed that the outcome of the war would have
(29) "The repercussions of forming an alliance with Russia", editorial,
CCJP, Vol.9, 19th November, 1909.:. p.1 .
(25) "The unpredictability of present day diplomacy", Review of Current
Events, ibid., Vol.5, 11th December, 1909* p.9.
(26) "The relationship of estrangement and rapprochement between Japan
and China", editorial, Tung Fang Tsa Chih (Eastern Miscellany),
No.1 , 11th March, 1909, p.1. The journal was founded in 1903 
in Shanghai. It set out to discuss international politics in 
the Far East and constantly harped on the theme of the confrontation 
between the East and West. It attributed the inefficacy of the 
Manchu government to the monarchical system and was in favour 
of the establishment of a constitution andareform programme for China. 
But its emphasis was put on the diplomatic relations between the 
powers in the Far East. This work will heieafter be cited as TFTC.
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a great psychological impact on China. China's defeat by Japan in 
1893 had made her acutely aware of her weakness. The Chung Wai Jih Pao, 
(Universal Gazette), pointed out that China could not confront Russia 
militarily owing to the inefficiency of her forces. It regretted that
this was .the reason why Japan demanded the declaration of neutrality of
(27)China so that Japan would not be impeded by an ineffective ally.
While the progress made by Japan in technological and political areas 
was admired by most Chinese, it was still believed that Japan was a weak 
nation especially when compared with Russia. Since the encroachment of 
the Western powers in East Asia had begun, the independence and national 
safety of Asian countries had been threatened as a result of this 
weakness. The Russo-Japanese war was seen as a war between the strong 
and the weak.
From the time when the idea of "yellow peril" had been revived
among the Western powers towards the turn of the century, the Chinese
press had reacted against it. It was seen as a vi®cious attempt on
the part of the West to justify their imperialistic activities in the
Far East. The Russian threat to Manchuria, in particular, was conceived
of as the apex of the "white peril", a term which had come to be used
to describe Western expansion in East Asia. Many Chinese saw the Russo-
Japanese war as a racial conflict between the white race and the yellow
race. The Tung Fang Tsa Chih thought that a Russian victory over
Japan would make the Chinese people believe that it was the wish of
Heaven that the yellow race be doomed, and that not even a conscientious
and patriotic people like the Japanese could fight against it, to say 
(28)nothing of China. On the other hand, the Chung Wai Jih Pao thought
(27) "The present political situation in China", Chung Wai Jih Pao (Universal
Gazette), April, 1909, reprinted in TFTC, ibid., No.3, 10th May,
1909, pp. 97-50.
(28) "On the Russian influence in China", editorial TFTC , No.2, 10th
April, 1909, pp. 36-38.
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that a new phase in world politics would emerge with a Japanese victory- 
over Russia and no one need believe any longer in the superiority of
+ (29)the white race.
The third implication of a Japanese victory for the Chinese especially 
the more informed and politically - minded was that it would give weight 
to their argument that China needed a constitution. Attention was 
drawn to Japan’s achievement since the Meiji Restoration and the fact 
that China had accomplished almost nothing during the preceding decades.
They argued that the establishment of a constitution was the heart 
of the matter. This was the only way to save China from her journey 
towards gradual destruction. a Japanese victory would reveal the
inferiority of the Russian autocracy compared to the Japanese constitut­
ional monarchy.
The hopes that were attached to a Japanese victory were extended 
to a new phase of Sino-Japanese cooperation after the war. As the 
Hsin Min T^ung Pao put it,
"... The Russo-Japanese war marks the beginning 
of the expression of nationalism by the peoples 
of East Asia. It strengthens the mutual understanding 
and united effort of the Japanese and Chinese peoples.
As most of our students going abroard receive their 
education in Japan and as many Japanese scholars pay 
their visits to China, there is boundless scope for  ^ ^  
the unity of thought and ideas of the two peoples..."
(29) "On the hopes that lie ahead of China," Chung Wai Jih Pao, reprinted
in TFTC, No.3, 10th May, 1909, pp. 53-55.
(30) "The need for the government to reform its national policy as a
prerequisite for survival," in Shih Pao, 7th August, 1909, reprinted
in TFTC, No.7, 9th Sqtember, 1909, pp 199-198.
(31) "The future of the Russo-Japanese war" in Hsin Min TsVmg Pao (New
People's Miscellany) 1902-1907, facsimile, Taipeh, 1 966, Vol.8 ,
No. 99-95, 1st January, 1909, pp.19-15. Founded in Yokohama, a 
twentieth century version of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's reform journal 
of the post-1895 period. While in the latter half of the l890's, 
Liang's advocacy of reforms was considered in many ways revolutionary, 
his argument for a constitutional monarchy and opposition to a 
republic made him a target of attack by the revolutionaries. Although 
Liang himself had become somewhat disillusioned after the 1898 coup, 
up to 1907, he still believed in saving the nation by modernization 
and had little animosity against the Manchu dynasty. This work 
will heisafter be cited as HMTP.
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Chinese writers outside the government regarded the Russo-Japanese 
war with sanguine expectations. They believed that the war was about 
to determine the questions of the glory or decline of Asia and Europe, 
the rise or destruction of the yellow and white nations and the victory 
or defeat of despotism and constitutionalism. They observed with 
optimism that if Japan won, obstacles in the way of the yellow race 
would have been removed and the situation in Asia would gradually improve.
The Chinese should do what they could, in the meanwhile , to reform their 
institutions, extend their knowledge, recover national power and seek 
independence and strengthening of the country. To them, the Russo- 
Japanese war was a turning point in the history of Asia and China. At 
last, the tide seemed to be turning against the Western domination of 
Asia, and in favour of political reformat home, Japan's role in 
China's reform was well recognised and now that China was undergoing 
reform so as to become like Japan, the two countries should foster a 
closer relationship by building on their common interests.
It was on the strength of this argument that some emphasized the need
for China to 're-cultivate' a post-war friendly relationship with Japan.
The Tung Fang Tsa Chih criticized the government for rejecting Japan's
"good-will" and her offer of a coalition after the Sino-Japanese war.
It also attacked Li Hung-chang's pro-Russian policy after the war and held
him responsible for inducing Russian penetration into Manchuria which
in turn caused the scramble for concessions by the Western powers in the
1898 period. This, it maintained, was a result of the government's mistake in
(32)rejecting Japan's offer of friendship.
It was also believed that Japan herself stood to benefit from a
(32) "The harmful effects of China's dependence on a third party", 
editorial, TFTC, No. 8 , 9th October, 1909, pp. 158-161.
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closer relationship with China after the Russo-Japanese war. Much 
emphasis was laid on the insecurity of Japan's position in international 
politics in the Far East. It would seem that those who believed in 
Sino-Japanese cooperation in the post - 1905 period did not reckon that 
Japan had attained the goal of national independence with her victory 
in the war. The Hong Kong Hua Tzu Jih Pao said that as Russia's defeat 
was unexpected and it was a blow to her pride, Japan would be wise to 
prepare for a war of revenge as Russia would not accept defeat at the 
hands of a small country such as Japan. An alliance with China, 
according to the Hua Tzu .Jih Pao, was the answer to the threat of a second 
military confrontation with Russia. It would also provide a permanent
(33)
basis on which Japan and China could cultivate their future friendship.
The Tung Fang Tsa Chih believed that though the victory of Japan might 
give her the status of a great power, she would not be accepted by the Western 
powers. Hence Japan still would not have secured her national independence. 
China should make use of this psychological moment to form a cooperative 
relationship with Japan. She should seize this opportunity to carry 
out reforms and strengthen herself as Japan would then be willing to 
offer her help and support. If, however, China perpetuated her 
backward state of affairs and remained unaware of the Western expansion, 
then she would become isolated as Japan would have her own national
(39)independence to think of.
Others were more cynical about the post- war situation. The Wai 
Chiao Pao thought that it was only because the Russo-Japanese settlement 
was a diplomatic failure for Japan that China would be affected 
beneficially for she could then look forward to peaceful coexistence with 
Japan in future. It commented that Japan's attitude towards China
(33) "On the relations between Japan and China", H.K. Hua Tzu Jih Pao, 
30th June, 1905.
(39) "International diplomacy of the present day", TFTC, No.1, 28th 
February, 1905, pp.9-5.
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had seen several changes during the preceding decade. Such changes 
had been the results of Japan's successes and failures in her dealings 
with the Western powers: After the Sino-Japanese wari for example?
Japan reacted against the joint intervention by Russia? France and 
Germany and offered China her friendship? arguing for a liaison based 
on racial and cultural affinity. In 1902? she concluded an alliance 
with England and was jubilant over her association with a white nation.
She rejected the theory that Japan and China belonged to the same race 
and argued that Japan should alienate herself from the yellow race.
During the early part of the Russo-Japanese war? Japan was very cautious 
and adopted a friendly and peaceful disposition towards China. Soon 
after the fall of Port Arthur? however? she offended China's feeling 
when she proposed plans for settling the Manchurian question. The 
Wai Chiao Pao premised that had Japan reaped a diplomatic victory from 
the Portsmouth Treaty? her future policies towards China would be one 
of furthering her ambitions in that country. This diplomatic setback 
therefore? might make her realize that rapprochement with the white race 
was not feasible and that it would be more realistic to cooperate with 
China/35 ^
Some genuinely believed that the racial implication of the Russo- 
Japanese conflict would be carried over into post-war international politics 
and that the future would see an endless confrontation between the 
yellow and white races. This was held as sufficient reason by 
the Fukien Jih Jih Hsin Wen to believe that Japan had a genuine desire
(35) "Further discussion on the Russo-Japanese peace treaty"? Wai Chiao 
Pao (Diplomatic Review)? No. 122? 23rd September? 1903. pp. 2-3»
This is a privately owned publication which was founded in late 
1901 in Shanghai. Its objective was to overcome China's inefficiency 
in dealing with foreign countries by keeping Chinese diplomatic 
circles informed of foreign news and ideas. It proposed to 
rectify the situation in which China was gradually losing her 
sovereignty through a lack of any policies towards the foreign 
powers. It also aimed at enlightening the Chinese public on 
foreign affairs and especially the futility and danger of anti- 
foreignism. It was? by and large, a scholarly and learned journal 
widely read in government circles and was? in fact? taken over by 
the Waiwupu in 19 0 6.
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to support China
Emergence of Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialist feeling after 
the Russo-Japanese war
Optimism and euphoria were not the only sentiments surrounding 
the future of Sino-Japanese relations. Few were so naive as to 
overlook what Japan? if victorious? might do after the war. Throughout 
the same period? doubts and suspicions of Japanese intentions were 
not discarded. The revolutionary newspapers in Shanghai such as the 0 Shih 
Ching Wen and later? the Ching Chung Jih Pao? saw little difference 
between Japan and the Western powers in their policies towards China.
Even Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's constitutional journal? the Hsin Min TsVmg Pao? 
was none too reserved in its criticism of Japan's intentions towards 
Manchuria. It is important to note here that the coincidence of the 
Russo-Japanese war with the increasing tempo of political reform at 
home had aroused the interest of the Chinese in external affairs.
The newspapers and political publications had been trying to awaken 
the people to the danger that was threatening the country and for the 
first time? public attention had been drawn to the foreign menace since 
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war giving impetus to the movement 
for constitutionalism? reform and nationalism. The "recovery of 
national independence and right" became widely-accepted slogans among 
the public. Increasingly virulent attack was directed at the Manchu 
government for its being too weak to resist foreign aggression and 
too ineffective in recovering China's national rights from the foreign 
powers. These two issues: the need to preserve Chinese independence and
(3 6) "On the question of Japan having a monopoly of control in East 
Asia"? 8th July? 1905* Fukien Jih Jih Hsin Wen? reprinted in 
TFTC?No.9? 23rd October? 1905? pp. 1?9-l8l. The view expressed 
by the Fukien Jih Jih Hsin Wen might have reflected the influence 
of the Toa Dobun Kai in the province.
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the unsuitability of the Manchu rule for the Chinese nation became 
inseparable. And in the early half of the first decade of the 
twentieth century? anti-Manchu hostility remained largely within the 
confines of anti-imperialism.
As has been noted? the 0 Shih Ching Wen (Russian Alarm) changed
its name to Ching Chung Jih Pao (Warning Bell Daily) soon after the
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war? the purpose being to make the
(37)Chinese people aware of the new source of threat —  Japan. To
the editors of these newspapers? Japan's successive victories in Manchuria 
seemed to pose an added cause for alarm. The Ching Chung Jih Pao comm­
ented that the Russo-Japanese conflict in Manchuria was a case of "driving
the tiger out through the front door and letting the wolf in through 
( -zQ)
the back door." As early as at the outbreak of the war? the Hsin
Min T^ung Pao gave one of the reasons for Japan insisting on Chinese
neutrality as the unwillingness on her part to commit herself in an
alliance with China which would give the war a racial connotation.
According to the Hsin Min T^ung Pao? Japan was anxious not to arouse
(39)the disapproval of America and the European countries. " Suspicion 
of Japanese intention to align her policies with the West accounted 
for the wariness regarding Japan's intentions towards Manchuria.
Many suspected that the Russo-Japanese war was one fought by both 
powers for imperialistic ends.
One of the reasons for the criticismof the government's declaration 
of neutrality was that by so doing China had tacitly relinquished her
(37) "The epilogue of the 0 Shih Ching Wen" in concluding issue of
the newspaper? OSCW? 25th February? 190^.
(38) "The question which has arisen with the fall of Port Arthur"?
editorial? CCJP? Vol.3* -^th September? 1909-? p.1. tlne
(39) "Why did Japan want China to become neutral?"? Review ofACurrent
Political Situation in HMTP? Vol.7? No. 90-9-1? 2nd November?
1903? pp.122-123.
(40)claims to Manchuria. Japan's negotiations with Russia for the
latter's recognition of her political, commercial and industrial 
interests in Korea in exchange for her recognition of Russian influence 
in Manchuria in July, 1903 Had provoked criticism from the 0 Shih Ching




those negotiations. The Ching Chung Jih Pao said tha oth China
and Korea were the real losers in the Russo-Japanese war.
The Ching Chung Jih Pao was particularly critical of Japanese
activities in Manchuria during the war: Japan had deprived China of
her "financial sovereignty " when she appropriated the customs and
(9-3)revenues in Yingkow. Her intention of introducting constitutional
government in Manchuria, far from being a genuine wish to improve the 
political system of Manchuria, was merely a desire to alienate the
(49-)people _iving in Manchuria from the Peking government. When
Nakamura Shingo's "Proposed plan of remedial policy towards Manchuria"
appeared in the Gaiko Jiho, advocating nominal return of Manchuria
to China but de facto Japanese control in the area, Chinese fears of
Japanese ambitions in Manchuria were confirmed. The plan provoked
widespread criticism from the Chinese press. Anti-Japanese hostility
was aroused particularly among the northern Chinese public when the
issue was debated in the Tientsin Ta Kung Pao, the officalized Shih
(4b)Pao and the Chung Wai Jih Pao (Universal Gazette).
(40) "The extraordinary reasons given for China's declaration of
neutrality": Review of Current Events in OSCW,No.6 8, 20th
February, 1904.
(41) Editorial article written on the occasion of the expansion of 
the 0 Shih Ching Wen, ibid, No.6 8, 20th February, 1904.
(42) "Both Japan and Russia are to gain from the war", editorial, CCJP
Vol.1, 3rd April, 1904* p.2 .
(43) "The great misfortune which has befallen China": Commentary of
Current Affairs, ibid., Vol.3? 31 st August, 1904.
(44) "The vanguard movement of establishing a constitution in Manchuria
editorial, ibid., Vol.3? 8th September, 19044 p.1.
(45) See Toa Do'oun Kai Kankei Zassen, op.cit., pp. 210-211.
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Attention was also drawn to the infiltration of Japanese influence 
in China. Again, the Ching Chung Jih Pao said that this was as much 
a cause for concern as that of the Western powers in other spheres of 
Chinese affairs as it facilitated Japanese annexation of China in the 
near future. The paper warned that the Japanese had succeeded in 
intercepting Chinese control over the education of Chinese students.
She had encountered little difficulty in this enterprise because many 
radical-minded Chinese had come to regard Japan as an advanced country 
in Asia and therefore had warmed towards Japanese help. This, however, 
was a real danger to China, the editorial said, as it would lead to 
total acceptance of the Japanese culture and the undermining of the 
Chinese heritage
As a warning to the Chinese leaders, the Ching Chung Jih Pao said 
that there were three arguments in Japan regarding her policies towards 
China. The first was for the expansion of imperialistic activities 
in China to catch up with the Western powers by annexing Manchuria and 
increasing her influence in Fukien in order to prey on other areas in 
China* This, according to the Ching Chung Jih Pao, was in fact 
currently being carried out by the Japanese government. The second 
policy was to support and cooperate with China so that together they 
might confront the West which had been much alarmed by Russia's 
propaganda of the "yellow peril". The paper argued that this was 
only a face which the Japanese turned to China and there was little 
sincerity behind it. The third policy was to deal a fatal blow to 
the "sleeping tiger" to forestall all future misfortune which she might 
cause Japan through her weakness. This policy, the Ching Chung Jih Pao 
warned, presented the greatest threat to China and it should be brought 
to the notice of those Chinese government leaders who were at the
(46) "On the Japanese control over Chinese education", editorial CCJP 
Vol.4, 14th September, 1904* p.1.
139.
moment disposed to a pro-Japanese policy.
Attitudes of Chinese reformers and revolutionaries in Japan towards 
Sino-Japanese cooperation after the Russo-Japanese war
The few years immediately after the Russo-Japanese war also saw 
the propaganda struggle between the Chinese reformers and the Chinese 
revolutionaries. An editorial battle was waged between LVang ChT- 
ch'ao of the Hsin Min Tsung Pao on the one hand and Hu Han-min, supported 
by Wang Ching-wei and Chang Ping-lin of the Min Pao on the other.
The 'battle' took place in Japan as the Hsin Min Ts'ung Pao was published 
in Yokohama and the Min Pao in Tokyo. As both publications were 
smuggled into and circulated in China.it is thought that their ideas and 
theories reached a fairly large section of the reading public. The 
main substance of the dispute was the pros and cons ofa republic and 
a constitutional monarchy for China. The issue of Sino-Japanese 
relations also made up an important part of their discussiora.
Their attitudes towards cooperation between the two countries were 
influenced by their political views on the Chinese government and 
their own relations with the Japanese authorities and individuals.
One of the major issues debated by the reformers and the revolution­
aries was whether a revolution in China would invite the intervention 
of foreign powers. In its anxiety to convince the Chinese public 
that a revolution would not induce the dismemberment of China, the 
Min Pao emphasized that the nature of the revolutionary movement, 
unlike the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, was anti-Manchu and not anti-foreign.
(47) "Is there any sense in relying on a foreign power?",
Commentary on Current Events, ibid., Vol.2, 4th June, 1904j p.1.
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While the revolutionaries' attack on the Manchu government before
\
1905 tended to focus its weakness vis-a-vis the foreign powers?
this kind of argument was rarely heard after the establishment of the
Tung Meng Hui in Tokyo in 1905» Compared with the decade of 1895-1905»
the threat to China's independence after 1905 probably seemed less
immediate and the revolutionaries tended to minimize the current
danger from the foreign powers. Wang Ching-wei insisted that the
situation in the Far East had changed since Japan had won the war.
Russia and her 'allies' —  France and Germany —  were beginning,
to  fe e l  u n c e r ta in  a b o u t a d is m e m b e rm e n t o f C h ina a f t e r
Russia's defeat at the hands of Japan. Japan? supported by England
and America? he maintained? only wanted to preserve China's integrity
and maintain the "open door" in Chinese territories. Wang emphasized
did
that Japan had shown her pacific intentions when she^not try to take 
advantage of China at the time of the Boxer Rebellion.v
But the Chinese revolutionaries in Japan had little support of 
Japanese government circles which much preferred the conservatism of 
the reformers. Okuma? in particular? had since 1898 cast his lot with 
the reform party and he distrusted the Chinese revolutionaries. In 
a speech which he gave at the Toho Kyokai soon after the Sino-Japanese 
settlement was negotiated? he criticized the Manchu government for 
losing its control over the Chinese people who were agitating to recover
08) Wang Ching-wei? "Refutation of the theory that a revolution will 
induce the dismemberment of China"? Min Pao (People's News)? 
photographic reprint? Peking? 195?? Vol.1? No.6 ? January? 1907? 
pp. 18-26. Founded in 1905 in Tokyo? the journal was the organ 
of the Chinese revolutionary party? theT'ung Meng Hui. Its 
editors and contributors were mostly students studying in Japan 
who had rallied to the revolutionary cause. It was antagonistic 
to the Manchu government for its "inadequacy of diplomacy"? "corrup­
tion" and "misgovernment"j and propagated the idea that nothing 
short of the downfall of the ruling dynasty could save China 
from destruction.
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Chinese rights which had been lost as a result of the weakness of the
Manchu government. Echoing Liang Ch'i-oh'ao's note of caution?
Okuma warned that subversive elements in society were undesirable as
thqy would lead to unrests which in turn would encourage the aggressive
intentions of foreign powers. He advocated that Japan adopt a strong
attitude in her future policies towards the Manchu government as well
09)as the Chinese revolutionaries.
The lack of sympathy on the part of Japanese government leaders 
was a source of frustration for the Chinese revolutionary leaders.
They were convinced that the Japanese government did not know what 
was good for China and hence did not understand the importance of a 
revolution for China. Commenting on Okuma's speech? Hu Han-min 
regretted that Okuma had not made any distinction between the Manchu 
authorities and the Chinese people in his criticism. He argued that 
the ManChu government had been responsible for upsetting the 
balance of power among the foreign countries but he maintained that 
revolution and independence for China would soon change all that.^0^
Many Chinese revolutionaries who found in Japan a haven for their 
political activities were also hopeful for help and cooperation from Japan. 
They believed that China needed Japan for her national survival but 
not until she had achieved as much as Japan in the way of self-strength­
ening and renovations could she hope to cooperate with Japan cn an 
equal basis. As long as China remained under Manchu rule? such hopes 
would never become a reality. Ch'en T’ien-hua? the revolutionary 
student who killed himself in protest against the Mombusho regulations
(9-9) Hu Han-min? "Commenting on the most recent Sino-Japanese negotiations"?
ibid.? Vol.1? 26th November? 1905? pp. 102-108.
(5 0) ibid.
1^ 2.
of 1905 said in his "Last Message"?
"... It is only because of Japan's war [with Russia] 
that China has been able to survive. Although 
it is a shame for China that she has been saved 
by Japan? [the Chinese] must acknowledge Japan's 
efforts towards the preservation of East Asia.
If [the Chinese] feel ashamed of themselves [for 
having had to turn to Japan for protection]* they 
can do no better than make themselves strong? improve 
their foreign relations? change their national 
polity and strengthen their military defence in the 
coming decade. Then the Japanese will certainly 
welcome China as an ally. One must not? however? 
confuse 'alliance' with 'protection'. If a country 
needs'protection' from another? it means that she 
is powerless and entirely at the mercy [of her 
protector]. One can find such an example in Korea. 
Countries which are allies with one another are 
equal in strength. They offer one another help 
and assistance. England and Japan [have such a 
relationship with each other].... The basis for an 
alliance is common interests and not racial and 
cultural affinity .... China and Japan have common 
interests but are not equal in strength .... Hence 
if China formed an alliance with Japan at the 
present moment? she would only become [a second] 
Korea. And yet if she detached herself from 
Japan now? East Asia would be destroyed... ."w'l)
One of Min Pao's six objective.s called for cooperation between the 
Japanese and the Chinese people. It is perhaps worth noting that the 
statement did not call for an alliance. Hu Han-min explained this 
point in an editorial?
"There are two schools of thought about China in 
Japan. One advocates conquest by force,the other 
favours close guidance and ultimate assimilation.
Not many people hold the first view. The policy 
it advocates is military-centred and is unpopular 
with diplomatic circles and hence it is unimportant. 
The second school has more influence. However? 
the idea of assimilation implies an unequal relation­
ship between the two peoples. There are those 
among the four hundred million Chinese who can 
discern the lack of sincerity in this argument and 
are therefore cautious and suspicious about it.
In this way? the peoples of Japan and China cannot
(5 1) Hsin-hai Ko-ming Lieh-shi Shi-wen Hs.iian (Selection of revolutionary 
literature of the 1900' s)_, Peking? 19&2? p. 103.
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cooperate with one another. There are also two views 
held by the Chinese —  the anti-Japanese and the 
pro-Japanese. The anti-Japanese attitude is 
unwise ... but the pro-Japanese attitude is dependent 
on Japan's support and is one of resignation to 
the present situation in which China is unable to 
defend herself against foreign invasion. What 
we want is a strengthening of friendship between 
the two peoples. China should reform and streng­
then herself in order to secure a stalus which will 
enable her to negotiate with Japan on an equal 
footing and not to subject herself to any more 
humiliation. Japan on her part should give up 
her ambitions. She owes her culture to China and 
she must not try to take advantage of her now ....
The Manchu government cannot represent the Chinese 
people. Japan will benefit if she forsakes the 
Manchus to ally herself with the Chinese people...."
In the post-Russo-Japanese-war years? such views as were expressed 
by the Min Pao editors could be expected to cause grave reservations 
among many Chinese? not least of all their counterparts in China? the 
editors of the 0 Shih Ching Wen and the Ching Chung Jih Pao? for example. 
But as Jansen puts it? "The Min Pao performed a valuable service for 
the cause of Sino-Japanese relations. Its services were needed for 
there was much to arouse suspicion and dislike among the Chinese students
(53)in Japan" A month after its publication? the Japanese Mombusho put
out rules regulating activities of Chinese students. The students 
bcycotted classes and demonstrated. Some advocated that the entire 
student population leave Japan and go back to China? others wanted to 
stay. The split extended to the editorial board of Min Pao. Wang 
Ching-wei and Hu Han-min insisted on staying and the journal resumed 
publication until October? 1908. Had Min Pao and its leaders been 
removed from the Japanese setting in 1905? its revolutionary movement 
might have become thoroughly anti-Japanese.
(52) Hu Han -min? "The six points of the Min Pao"? Min Pao ? op.cit.? 
Vol.1 ? No.3? April? 1906? p.18.
(53) Marius B. Jansen? The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen? op.cit.? p. 121.
1 Vf
It would be appropriate to mention here that Chinese revolutionary 
leaders found sympathisers in Japanese liberal politicians? activists 
and nationalists who shared Sun Yat-sen's ideology of pan-Asianism —  
all Asian countries to unite together in fighting Western domination.
Inukai Ki was a genuine supporter of the 'progressive' Chinese who 
agitated for reforms and changes in China. As a liberal parliamentarian? 
he was opposed to the oligarchic government at home and devoted to the 
struggle for representative government in Japan. He was also conscious 
of the necessity for Asian unity and often attacked the government if 
its policies seemed too pro-Western. Japanese nationalist societies 
notably the Kokuryukai had a keen interest in Asian expansion and shared 
the hopes? plans and activities of the Asian revolutionaries. These 
nationalist adventurers drew a parallel between Japan at the end of 
the Tokugawa period and Asian countries during the Meiji period and would 
like the same —  overthrow of the government in Tokugawa Japan —  to 
happen in contemporary China and Korea. Miyazaki Torazo? more of 
a radical liberal than patriot? was motivated by a genuine fear of 
Western imperialism and wanted to bring about the regeneration of 
Asian countries as the first steps towards attaining independence for 
Asia.
The Meiji adventurers believed in Japan's superiority and seniority 
in reforms over the rest of Asia. They felt it their duty to guide 
Asia towards prosperity. This attracted the Chinese revolutionaries 
especially Sun Yat-sen« Sun told Miyazaki that the deliverance of 
the four hundred million Chinese people? the venge.ance of the yellow 
race of East Asia and the recovery of the human rights of the universe
(5*0 For a detailed study of the history of cooperation between the 
Chinese revolutionaries and their Japanese sympathisers? see 
Marius B. Jansen? The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen? op. cit.
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depended on the outbreak of the revolution and Miyazaki should back him 
and his supporters to their success which realization would solve all 
other problems.^''"
Sun's hatred of Western imperialism steered him towards Japan as 
a logical ally. In 1905? he and his revolutionary supporters many 
of whom were students in Japan organized themselves into the T'ung Meng 
Hui in Tokyo with funds and help from their Japanese friends. The 
formation of the T'ung Meng Hui? however? marked the beginning of 
a declining friendship between the Chinese revolutionaries and the 
Japanese. As the revolutionary movement became more organized and 
gained in momentum? it swung more to Chinese goals and Chinese nation­
alism. Anything short of cooperation on terms of equality was 
likely to be rejected. On the other hand? by 1905? growing Japanese 
power and complications in Japan's foreign relations had ruled out 
the possibility of an equal partnership between the two countries. 
Moreover? the Japanese government had misgivings about the revolutionary 
movement which threatened to overthrow the Manchu government. Sun Yat- 
sen? however? was for Sino-Japanese cooperation at all costs. In 
January? 1907? he intimated in a speech given at a meeting of 
Chinese students in Tokyo that since the revolution was aimed at 
the Manchus and the revival of China? he would have no complaint 
if Japan felt she deserved territory north of Changchun for her 
help.  ^ This? ironically? convinced the Tokyo government
that Sun's presence in Japan was embarrassing and undesirable for its 
policy of propping up the Manchu government in China. When Peking
(55) Ch'en Ku-t'ing? Kuo-fu yu Jih-pen yu-jen (Dr. Sun Yat-sen and 
his Japanese friends). Taipeh? 1965? P-5«
(56) This was recorded in Toa Senkaku Shishi Kiden? op.cit.? Vol.II? 
pp. ^55-^36. See Marius B. Jansen? The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen 
p. 122.
146
requested the Japanese expulsion of Sun later that year? the Tokyo 
government promptly obliged.
It may be true that the danger from Japan made China's situation
after 1905 hardly less precarious? but the revolutionaries? with their
headquarters in Tokyo and anxious for Japanese help? were in no position
to make an issue of Japanese imperialism. It was. the reformers who
tended to emphasize the international situation after 1905* Liang
Ch'i-ch'ao? for one? had doubts about Min Pao's point on Sino-Japanese
friendship. According to him? cooperation on an equal basis was a
political unreality. Japan? he said? would not be willing to assume
any other role except the dominant one in the relationship? while to
subject the Chinese people to the minor role in the partnership would
(57)
entail the loss of Chinese sovereignty. '
Liang's reservation on this point indicated that a change had
occurred in his attitude towards Sino-Japanese cooperation since the
1898 reform era. In 1 898? he founded the Ch'ing I Pao (China Discussion)
in Yokohama? a leading reform journal of the time? and one of its
professed goals was the "exchange of aspirations and voices of China
( )
and Japan and the unity of the two in friendship.” ' At that time,
Liang was convinced that what China needed was a government reform 
programme along the lines of the Japanese constitutional monarchy.
He regarded Japan as the ideal. His hopes for Japanese guidance in 
leading China towards reforms? his emphasis on relationship between the 
two countries being as "the lips to the teeth" and his enthusiasm about 
cooperation between Japan and China were repeatedly expressed throughout
(57) Liang Ch'i-ch' ao? "An elaborate discussion on the advantages and 
disadvantages of a racial revolution and a political revolution"? 
HMTP? Vol.l9? No.76? 9th March? 1906? p.3 8.
(5 8) "Preface to the Yokohama Ch'ing I Pao"? Ch'ing I Pao (1898-1901)? 
facsimile Taipeh? 1967? Vol.1 ? No.1 ? 23rd December? 1 898? pp.3-»5«
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i . ... (59)his writings.
However, Liang's writings after the turn of the century carried 
a rather different flavour. His expulsion from Japan in late 1899 was 
in part responsible for his disenchantment with the idea of a special 
relationship between Japan and China. During the Russo-Japanese 
peace talks, he spoke in favour of China calling an international 
conference to settle the Manchurian question. He criticized Yuan Shih- 
k'ai and Yang Shu, Chinese minister to Japan, for their insistence on 
China settling the Manchurian problem with Japan alone. A bilateral 
settlement, in Liang's opinion, would only result in the secession of 
Manchuria to Japan.
In October, 1909-, Okuma, at a meeting of the Shinkan Kyokai 
iation of China and Korea), gave a speech in which he reiterated 
"Doctrine" and stressed that Japan was best suited to lead China 
enlightenment on racial and cultural grounds.^"1' An article which 
Liang wrote for the Hsin Min Tsung Pao conmmenting on Okuma's speech 
revealed his doubts about the practicability of the "Okuma Doctrine".
While he acknowledged Okuma's “sincere concern” for China's territorial 
integrity, he maintained that there were those in Japan who had 
ambitions towards China. Liang said that power politics had little 
regard for ethics. Okuma's sincerity and eloquence could not cover 
up the facts. No country could hope to achieve independence by relying
(59) See, for example, various articles by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in the 
Ch'ing I Pao: "On the advantages of learning Japanese", Vol.2,
No.10, 1st April, 1899? P-589f ’’China's strength to become independent 
and Japan's policy in the Far East", Vol.9-, No. 26, 5th September,
1899, pp. 168^-1685, "The best policies of the powers towards China
in the present time," Vol.7, No.53? 5th August, 1 9 0 0, p.39-29 and
Vol.7, No.55’ 29-th September, 1900, p. 3555*
(60) Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,,"Criticism of the steps taken by the government
in the Russo-Japanese peace settlement", HMTP, op.cit., Vol.13?
No.68, 9-th May, 1905? PP« 81-8 5.





on the support of other powers and China would be well-advised not
(62)to depend on Japan for her independence. " It is not surprising
that in 1906 he attacked the Min Pao for being too naive in believing 
that there was hope for • Sino-Japanese cooperation on an equal basis.
Fear of Japanese ’encirclement of China') 1907-1908
Any hopes for an alliance with Japan all but disappeared when 
Japan reinforced her diplomatic position in the Far East by concluding 
a series of agreements with the Western powers —  France and Russia in 
1907 and America in 1908. Each of these agreements pledged the signa­
tories to respect the independence and integrity of China) the principle 
of equal opportunity for commerce and industry as well as the rights 
and interests of the other party in that country. The Franco-Japanese 
agreement asserted that the two countries possessed a special interest 
in preserving peace and order especially in the regions of the Chinese 
Empire adjoining the territories where they had rights of sovereignty) 
protection or occupation. In the nnnvwtt i rw nf-t.ho Russo-
Japanese agreements) both parties agreed on the line of demarcation in 
Manchuria by which they were to sustain their mutual interests in each 
sphere of influence. By the exchange of the Root - Takahira notes) 
America acquiesced in Japan's claim to a special position in Korea and 
Manchuria in return for Japanese recognition of America's interests in 
the region of the Pacific Ocean.
The reaction of the Chinese minister to France) Liu Shih-hsuni to
(62) Liang Ch'i-ch'aO) "The so-called Okuma Doctrine") HMTP) Vol.115 
No.57) 21st November) 190A-) pp. 59-75*
(6 5 ) For details of the agreements, see Morinosuke Kajima) The
emergence of Japan as a world power) 1895-1925» Tokyo5 196 8,
pp. 171-189.
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the news of the conclusion of the Franco-Japanese agreement was perhaps 
not uncharacteristic of Chinese diplomacy of the period. In a despatch 
to the Waiwupu on 19th June, 1907, Liu reported that, by implication, the 
agreement infringed on China's territorial integrity. He asked the 
Waiwupu whether he should obtain an explanation from the French and 
the Japanese governments of their positions or just pretend to be 
unaware of the implication so that China could refuse to acknowledge both 
powers' strengthened positions in China.
The matter was soon taken up with more urgency, however, by the 
imperial inspector-general of Kiangsu, Shih Li-chin, who urged the 
Waiwupu in a memorial to take preparatory measures in face of the 
new threat to China's national security which had arisen with the 
conclusion of the Franco-Japanese agreement. Shih reported that 
knowledge of a secret agreement had been withheld from the Chinese 
government by France and Japan designating Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, 
Kwantung and Fukien as spheres of influence of the two countries. He 
warned that the rest of the powers had all acquiesced in Japan's 
activities, recognized Japan's special position in China and placed 
their trust in Japan to respect their own spheres of influence in 
China. If China still pinned her hope on Japan to preserve her 
territorial integrity, she would only degenerate to the same position 
as Korea. Shih also reported that an agreement would soon be made 
between Russia and Japan whereby the two countries would recognize each 
others exclusive influence in Mongolia and Manchuria respectively. He said 
that the foreign powers were using different parts of the Chinese 
territories as gifts to gratify one another's greed. China could no
(6*f) Despatch from Chinese minister to France Liu Shih-hsun to Waiwupu,
19th June, 1907, Documents: Kuang-hsu, op.cit., Vol. 70, pp. 52b-33a»
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longer sit back and watch without making any protest.
The Chinese public was even more alarmed by Japan’s new 
diplomatic successes* It believed that Japan had come to terms with 
the Western powers to control China's destiny. Japan's rapprochement 
with France and Russia was seen as part of a general trend towards 
the combination of forces among the big powers. England and France 
had already formed an entente in 190^4- and in August? 19071 England 
and Russia entered into an understanding. Through these alignments? 
the Anglo-Japanese and Franco-Russian alliances become interconnected 
in East Asia. An article in the Hsin Min T^ung Pao entitled "The 
Franco-Japanese agreement and its relations with China "saidj
"... the earth is being explored everyday and 
[the big powers of] the world are daily expanding 
[their influences]? leaving no room for colonization 
for the late-comers. Japan has washed the fields 
of Manchuria and Korea with her blood and expended 
her entire energy on operations in these areas 
because there is no other land im which she can 
treat as her colonial territory. Is Japan? 
however? entirely to blame for defending herself 
at the expense of others in this world of 'survival 
of the fittest'? One can only blame [the people 
of] Manchuria and Korea for having failed to 
explore and develop their own wealthy resources 
and educating their own people? thus allowing those 
tasks to fall into the hands of Japan which is 
becoming more ambitious everyday .... At the moment? 
both France and Japan are anxious to expand their 
influences in China .... The so-called 'preservation 
of China' is none other than a jargon in inter­
national politics with which they hope to fool 
the world while they plunder and enrich themselves 
[at the expense of China] ...."(6 6)
The Chung Wai Jih Pao and Shanghai Shen Chow Jih Pao warned that 
"preservation" had come to mean "peaceful partition". By declaring 
to the world that they wanted to uphold the principles of open door
(65) Appeal from imperial inspector in Kiangsu Shih Li-chin to 
Waiwupu to make plans for defending China from the imminent 
danger to the country's security? 28th July? 1907? ibid.? Vol.7l? 
pp. 2b-3a.
(6 6) "On the Franco-Japanese agreement and its relations with China" in
HMTP? op.cit.? Vol.17? No.9^ +1 15th August? 1907 ? p.7.
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and equal opportunity , the powers were aiming to expand their
(67)interests in China and eventually carve up that country. The
Wai Chiao Pao had similar misgivings regarding the agreement between 
Japan and America concluded in late 1908. It said that the so-called 
equal opportunities and protection of common interests of the two 
countries were none other than "means of peaceful invasion" of China. 
Japan and America would use their mutual agreement to expand their 
respective rights in commerce which would lead to the gradual depletion 
of China's financial resources.
In explaining the new devlopment in Japan's foreign relations, 
the same journal said,
the
"Since the idea of„'yellow peril' has been created 
by the German Emperor ... the Japanese have 
b e e n  resentful of the stigma and worked 
hard to disassociate themselves from it. By 
overcoming China and defeating the Russians,
Japan has become a world power .... Since last 
year (1907), she,has abandoned the old argument 
of racial and cultural affinity with China and 
refuted the idea that China and Japan shared a 
relationship as that between the lips and the 
teeth .... Is it true that she holds a grudge 
against China? One is inclined to think that 
she [does not but] wishes to catch up with the 
Western powers. The rumour of the 'yellow peril' 
has awakened the Japanese to the overwhelming 
pressure of the West in the East and she is afraid 
that the Western powers will outstrip her on the 
Asian continent ...." ^
The Min Pao became bitterly disappointed with Japan. An article 
called for an alliance between the countries in Asia without Japan:
"... the brother countries in Asia are suffering from 
the same fate. India is under British domination, 
Annam is colonized by France and China's Manchuria 
has been conquered .... At the present moment, the
(67) "The stage has been set for the partition of China by the powers",
editorial, Chang Wai Jih Pao, 28th July, 1907, reprinted in the 
TFTC, op.cit., No.8 , 2nd October, 1907, pp. 199-19-5. And "On the 
conclusion of agreement between Japan, England, Russia and France 
and their relations with China", Shen Chow Jih Pao, 17th August, 1907, 
reprinted in TFTC, No.1 1, 29th December, 1907, pp.81-8 6.
(6 8) "On the American-Japanese agreement and its relations with China's
future", Wai Chiao Pao, No.228, 28th November, 1908, pp. 2-5.
(6 9) "Impressions on the Western theory of the Yellow Peril", ibid.,
No.209, 5th August, 1908, pp. 2-3.
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Asian continent is being preyed on by the ambitious 
powers. Japan alone is arrogant and conceited 
enough to see herelf in the light of a Western 
power. She considers China as beyond salvation 
and wishes to share the spoils of a partition.
Can we still contemplate allying ourselves with 
Japan? The peoples of India and Annam, however, 
are full of integrity and a sense of purpose ....
We have faith in [their support for] the creation 
of a unified and harmonious Asia.M(70)
Japanese rapprochement with the Western powers in 1907-1908 was a 
turning point in Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations as well as Chinese 
attitudes towards Japan. The Chinese government and public both 
saw it as a new threat to their country's security in the midst of 
Western encroachment in the East. To them, Japan had turned her back 
on her Asian neighbours and joined the Western powers in their imperial­
istic activities. The reaction of the Chinese was one of despair 
with regard to the future of their country. Although little had 
materialized from the idea of a special relationship between the two 
countries in the past, Japan's new friendship with the imperialist 
powers was, to the Chinese mind, nothing less than the abandonment of 
the cause of Sino-Japanese cooperation against the Western threat to 
Asian independence.
The Tatsu Maru incident and anti-Japanese boycott of 1908
Pessimism over the future of China further aroused national 
aspirations in the Chinese who since 1905 had resorted to political 
agitations with a view to enhancing the status of their country in the 
world. In 1 908, for the first time, the Chinese boycotted Japanese
(70) "Hopes for harmony in Asia", Min Pao, op.cit., No.25, August, 1908,
pp. 56-57.
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goods in face of high-handed Japanese policy in the Tatsu Maru incident.
In February, some Chinese officials had seized a Japanese freighter, the 
Tatsu Maru*loaded with a consignment of arms obviously intended for 
smuggling into China via Macao. While on board the Tatsu Maru, the 
Chinese officials lowered the flag of the Japanese vessel and hoisted 
the Yellow Dragon flag in its place when a Portuguese officers' boat 
was seen approaching the spot of trouble. The official explanation 
of the Chinese government was that the Chinese officials did not want 
a third, party to intervene in the dispute. The Yellow Dragon flag 
had been hoisted in the hope that the Portuguese would not suspect anything 
unusual. The Japanese government and in particular, the Japanese puplic, 
hcWtv/er, would not accept the Chinese explanation and insisted that 
their national honour had been insulted.
The subsequent negotiations between the two governments were
prolonged and Japan's main contention was that the freighter had been
seized illegally by the Chinese on the sea near Macao which, the Japanese
maintained, was Portuguese territorial waters and therefore outside
Chinese jurisdiction. As compensations for the seizure, the Japanese
governemnt imposed harsh terms on China. It demanded that the Chinese
government formally apologize to the owner of the Tatsu Maru by firing
twenty-one times, release the freighter, purchase the consignment,
punish the Chinese officials responsible for the seizure and pay compen-
(71)
sations to the owner of the Tatsu Maru.
Japan's demands aroused hostile reactions from the Chinese. The 
"Self-Government Association" in Canton resolved to boycott Japanese
(71) For Japanese documents relating to the incident, see NGB, vol.^ -1*
Part 2, (1961), pp. 1-62. Fullest coverage of the incident is 
found in Wang Yiin-sheng, Liu-shih-nien-lai Chung-kuo yii Jih-pen, 
op.cit., Vol. 5> pp« 1?5 - 198*
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goods and services. The boycott was organized by some Cantonese who 
had strong political views. Hsii Ch'in? Ch'en Hui-fu and Lo Hsiao-ang 
were followers of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and K'ang Yu-wei. They intended 
the boycott to be a political action against Japan's high-handed policy 
and not a demonstration of anti-Japanese hostility. They stressed 
that the boycott was to be a civilized method of protests and enjoined 
the people, not to resort to uncivilized tactics. As the movement 
spread to other parts of southern China? however? it gradually got out 
of control. In November? 1908? a riot broke out in Hong Kong organized 
from Canton by the "National Disgrace Society" which had sent more than 
twenty people to Hong Kong with the objective of destroying the shops 
and goods of Chinese vendors of Japanese merchandise. Anti-Japanese 
hostility was evident among the Chinese in southern China and the 
movement did enough harm to Japan's trade with that part of China to
(72)cause much concern on the part of the Japanese government.
The movement also had the sympathy of individual officials.
Admiral Li Chun of the Kwangtung fleet indirectly encouraged the boycott
by advising Chinese officials at the "Office responsible for the remedial
settlement of the Tatsu Maru incident" in Canton against purchasing
coal from the Mitsui company in the midst of the boycott. Governor-
general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi Chang Jen-chun did not act on the
order from Peking to take severe measures in suppressing the boycott
(73)
movement. When Chang did not carry out immediately the order
from the Waiwupu to release the Tatsu Maruj the Chinese gentry and 
merchants in Hong Kong had rallied to his support. Chang was convinced
(72) For details of the anti-Japanese boycott? see NGB, Vol.9-1? Part 2? 
pp. 62ff. For organization of the boycott? see documents (nos.) 1099*
1119- and 1115. For riot in Hong Kong? see nos. 1117? 1196? 119-7 and 1166.
(73) Japanese consul in Kwangtung Ueno to foreign minister Hayashi,
30th April? 1908? NGB? Vol.9-1? Part 2? No.1113> p.79- and foreign 
minister Hayashi to Japanese minister in China Hayashi? 1st May?
1908, NGB, Vol.9-1 ? Part 2, No. 1115, p.75.
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of the justice of the Chinese cause and insisted Japan be asked to 
express regrets as part of the settlement of the Tatsu Maru incident.
He suggested that the Chinese officials directly involved in the seizure 
of the Japanese freighter be summoned to Peking to explain what had 
happened. But his suggestion was turned down by the Waiwupu which 
told Chang that China had been partially at fault and that at any rate 
it did not want trouble with Japan. Under this instruction, Chang 
reluctantly ordered his officials to prohibit the anti-Japanese agitation.
He admonished the Cantonese merchants and gentry to forbear, since 
China had no choice but to sucuumb to Japanese pressure, given the
(74)
fact that "our diplomatic effort is limited by our lack of power".
The boycott, however, did not have the support of revolutionary
students. Chinese students in Japan were split into two groups on
this matter. By and large, the split was between the constitutionalists
and the revolutionaries. The latter blamed the Peking government for
handling the Tatsu Maru incident badly and attacked the boycott movement
as uncivilized and ill-conceived. At a gathering of Chinese students
in May, some constitutionalists gave speeches declaring support for the
boycott and tried to win over those who did not hold any particular
view on the matter. A scuffling socaa followed between the two opposing
groups and as a result, the constitutionalist students left the place
of gathering. The revolutionaries then passed a resolution to oppose
the boycott by sending telegrammes and letters to the Kwangtung govern-
(75)
ment and leaders of the boycott movement.
(74) Chang Jen-chun to Waiwupu, 7th, 13th, 19th March, 1908; Waiwupu to 
Chang Jen-chun, 4th,7th March, 1908, Waiwupu archives at the Institute 
of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. Cited in Iriye Akira, 
"Public opinion and foreign policy: the case of late Ch'ing China"
in Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphey and Mary C. Wright, eds., 
Approaches to Modern Chinese History, University of California 
Press, 1967, p. 2 5 6.
(75) "The anti-Japanese boycott and Chinese students (the agitation of 
Chinese students in Japan/* TNNS, 19th May, 1908, p.2.
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One of the letters criticized the boycott as a mistake on the part 
of the members of the "Cantonese Self-Government Association" who had 
erroneously believed the boycott to be a demonstration of patriotic 
feeling. It said that the way the Chinese government had handled the 
Tatsu Maru negotiations revealed its lack of knowledge of international 
law —  yet another example of its feeble diplomacy. It was now absurd . 
to stage an anti-Japanese boycott to make up for the loss China had 
suffered on the diplomatic front as it would make both countries suffer 
losses as well as arouse criticisms from the rest of the world. It 
was only lately that China had become aware of the importance of 
sovereign rights and such foolish actions on the part of the Cantonese 
merchants would only arouse resentment and suspicions from the other
(76)countries and jeopardize China's chances of becoming a strong power.
It would appear that the revolutionary students' opposition to the 
boycott was another episode in the wrangle between the Chinese revolut­
ionaries and constitutionalists. The organizers of the boycott move­
ment were followers of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the 
Cantonese Self-Government Association was formed by those who wanted 
provincial participation in a constitutional government. But the 
basic objection of the revolutionaries to the boycott, however, arose 
from the fact that they were not attracted to the cause of opposition 
to arms smuggling as they were the ones who were most anxious to obtain 
arms.
The boycott was confined to a very narrow scope, hardly extending 
beyond Kwangtung and Kwangsi. The Wai Chiao Pao which was 
published in Shanghai cautioned the Cantonese against their reckless 
protests,
".... As we are lacking in all kinds of defence, 
indulging ourselves in reckless arrogance will 
only incur the wrath of our strong neighbour.
(76) The letter was translated in the TNNS in an article entitled "The
anti-Japane se boycott and Cantonese students in Japan", 3^J May, "1908, p.2.
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Should our neighbouring country send an ultimatum? 
then our government will be in deep waters? and 
should she send a gunboat? then our territorial 
waters will 'shake' with fear? the entire Chinese 
nation will dissolve and great harm will be 
done to our national entity .... Diplomacy of 
to-day must be backed by a powerful navy and new 
weapons. If we still believe that victory or 
defeat can be decided by talks alone or that we 
can hold on to our aspirations and pride to defend 
ourselves? then we will only be ridiculed for ages 
to come ... ."(77)
The Waiwupu? from the beginning? was opposed to the boycott. Yuan 
Shih-k'ai? its president? fearing that the boycott would complicate Peking's
negotiations with Japan? instructed the provincial governors to suppress
the anti-Japanese movement. As it became clear that Canton was the
only centre of the boycott and that the movement was strongly influenced
by followers of K'ang and Liang? the Waiwupu was all the more determined
(78)to crush it. The Tatsu Maru incident coincided with an aggressive
Japanese policy in Manchuria. In 1908? disputes between Japan and 
China which had been left unresolved in the 1905 treaty came to the 
fore? together with new problems such as the Chientao question. Japan's 
hardened attitude towards the negotiations presented a new threat to 
the security of Manchuria. The Waiwupu had to be extremely cautious 
lest an untoward incident occur during the anti-Japanese agitations be 
used by Japan as a protest to use force in Manchuria in retaliation.
On the other hand? Japanese aggressive policy in Manchuria height­
ened Chinese hostility. The riot in Hong Kong towards the end of 
1908 was underlined by a good deal of anti-Japanese sentiment. It was 
not only a case of an orderly protest which had got out of control.
As the Chung Wai Jih Pao put it?
(77) "On the Cantonese peoples' anti-Japanese boycott"? Wai Chiao Pao?
No. 203? 27th March? 1908« pp. 2-3.
(78) Waiwupu to Chang Jen-chun? 12th March? iJth April? 1908? Academia
Sinica Archives? Taiwan? cited in Iriye Akira? "Public opinion
and foreign policy"? in Albert Feuerwerker et al?(eds)? op.cit. p.235«
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"Japan which belongs to the same continent and the 
same race as China and with which we have always 
had a special relationship like that between the 
lips and the teeth ... has since last year 
Of fended, the p r i d e  o f the Chinese people. In 
questions such as Chientao, the Hsinmintun --Fakumen. 
Railway and the smuggling of arms in a commercial 
vessel into China, the Japanese have used threat 
and force to back their demands. The Chinese 
government may be cautious and reluctant to resort 
to force in the negotiations, the Chinese people 
are not as generous and long ■—  suffering. The 
recent riot of the southern Chinese in Hong Kong 
is indicative of such feelings on the part of 
the Chinese people".
The boycott of 1908 might not have had nationwide support owing 
to various reasons and it might have been the intention of the 
organizers merely to draw the world's attention to the fact that the 
Chinese expected their country to be taken more seriously as a political 
entity, it nevertheless demonstrated a considerably hostile and 
resentful attitude on the part of the Chinese who saw that Japan had 
emerged as an imperialist power threatening Chinese integrity alongside 
the Western countries.
The consolidation of Japanese power in East Asia, 1908-1911
Much of the negotiations between Japan and China in the 1908-1909 
period centred on both countries' claims to railway, mining and lumbering 
rights in Manchuria. But it was the boundary dispute over Chientao 
which sparked off the beginning of a new era in Sino-Japanese relations 
in Manchuria.
Since the late nineteenth century, a community of Koreans had grown 
up across the Tumen River in the Yenchi region of southeastern Manchuria
(79) "On the incident of the Chinese riot in Hong Kong*Chung Wai Jih Pao, 
27th November, 1908, p.1.
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near the Korean - Russian border. In late 1907, the Japanese government 
disputed China's sovereignty in the area, insisting that the region 
was Korean territory and that Japan had the right to protect the 
Koreans from the harassment of Chinese officials and residents in 
the area/^^ The Japanese challenge seemed to be closely linked 
with their claim to the right of mining silver in the T*ien Pao Shan 
area which was situated in Chientao. A contract for a joint enterprise 
in the silver mine had existed between a Chinese merchant Ch'ing Kuang-ti 
and a Japanese called Nakano Jiro. The Chinese government took a firm 
stand in maintaining its claim to sovereign rights over the ^hientao 
region and in November, 1907, ordered the closure of T'ien Pao Shan to 
all mining activities. The Japanese consul in Manchuria protested, 
maintaining that as the sovereignty over the region had still to be 
decided, the Chinese government had no right to close the mine to the 
Japanese.^^^ The dispute lasted over two years during which time 
both parties sent troops t< the region and firing incidents occurred.
The Chinese were greatly alarmed by the situation. The "Head-
office of the Organization of Chinese Students in Japan" sent a
telegramme to the Waiwupu appealing to the latter to tighten up Chinese
naval defence in the face of Japanese aggression. Japan's recent
action in Chientao, the telegramme said, showed that the Franco - Japanese
and Russo-Japanese agreements had emboldened Japan and that she was
(8 2)leading the powers in partitioning China. The Manchurian Daily
News warned that the Chientao question was only the beginning of Japanese 
aggression. If Japan's ambition was not checked immediately, she
C ^
would one day make claims to the rest of the Chinese territories.
(80) According to Chinese sources, the name Chientao was invented by the 
Japanese referring to the Yenchi region in Manchuria* See despatch from 
governor-general of Manchuria Hsii Shih-ch'ang and governor of Fengtien 
(Mukden) T'ang Shao-i to Waiwupu, 2Ath August, ^907, Documents:
Kuang-hsu, Vol.7l, p. 10b.
(8 1) Despatch from governor-general of Manchuria Hsii Shih-ch'ang to Waiwupu, 
3rd December, 1907, ibid., Vol.72., pp. 7a-8a.
(82) Telegramme from the Head-office of Chinese students'organization in
Japan to Waiwupu, 13th September, 1907, ibid., Vol7l, p.l5h.
(8 3) "On the indisputable fact that Chientao is Chinese territory" in
Manchurian Daily News, 1908, reprinted in TFTC,No.5?23rd June,l908, p.7.
While it held its ground firmly with regard to the Chientao question 
throughout the negotiations, the Chinese government made considerable 
concessions to the Japanese government in the other areas of disputes 
in Manchuria. Early in 1909? the Japanese minister to China Ijuin was 
instructed to tell the Waiwupu that if the Chinese government would 
make compromise and concessions in the other unresolved questions in 
Manchuria, Japan would be prepared to recognize Chinese sovereignty 
in Chientao. In the Sino-Japanese agreement signed in September,
1909? the Chinese government agreed not to construct the railway running 
between Hsin-Min-Tun and Fa-Ku-Men which Japan held to be prejudicial to 
the interests of the South Manchuria Railway. China also agreed that 
the route between Ta Shih Ch'ao and Yingkow —  originally a route used 
for transporting coal to the Chinese Eastern Railway —  be extended 
to join the South Manchuria Railway. Japan acquired the right to mine 
in the collieries in Fushun and Yentai, paying revenues to the Chinese govern­
ment. All mining areas along the Antung-Mukden Railway and
branches of the South Manchuria Railway were to be jointly operated 
by Chinese and Japanese concerns.
The agreement was a major setback for China in Manchuria. It is 
hard to specify what particular concessions China had made in return 
for Japanese recognition of her territorial claim to Chientao. Suffice 
it to say that the Chientao question was an important factor influencing 
the Chinese government's decision to come to terms with Japan in 1909. 
Throughout 1908 and 1909? the Chinese government was anxious to settle 
the Manchurian disputes peacefully with Japan, despite growing anti-Japanese 
hostility at home.
(8 f^) Despatch from Waiwupu to governor-general of Manchuria Hsii Shih-ch'ang, 
15th February, 1909? Ch'ing Hsiian-t'ung ch'ao Chung-Jih Chiao-she 
Shih-liao, (Documents on Sino-Japanese relations in tie Hsiian-t'ung 
period), Peking, 1933? Vol.1 , pp. 7a-7b. Hereafter cited as 
Documents : Hsiian-t'ung.
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From about 1908, Russian and Japanese "special inteifsts" in 
Manchuria became seriously challenged by American capitalists who 
intended to use the "open-door" as leverage especially on Japan to force 
her to let go her sphere of influence in that area. Willard Straight 
who was appointed American consul - general in Mukden in 1906 had 
found an influential friend in T'ang Shao-i, the Chinese governor of 
Fengtien. T ’ang had granted Japan the monopoly of railway rights in 
southern Manchuria, but he was ready to use the power of American 
capital as a buffer against Japan.
In 1909i Straight proposed to England and the powers to cooperate 
in building a long railway from Chinchow to Aigun. This was to 
supplant his previous scheme to make a loan jointly with England,
France and Germany to the Chinese government for the purpose of building 
two railways out of Hankow: one to Canton and the other into the Szechuan 
province. This was known as the Hukuang loan, covering the provinces 
of Hunan and Hupeh. It never materialized, however, because England 
did not want intruders in her sphere of interest in the Yangtze valley 
and refused to cooperate.
The Chinchow-Aigun project was only one of the two proposals made 
by America in 1909. The other one was to 'neutralize' the railways 
of Manchuria: Russia and Japan to transfer ownership of their respective
lines to an international banking group. The scheme was rejected by 
Japan and Russia which jointly warned China that she must consult them 
before foreign capital was employed in Manchurian railway enterprises 
in the future. Partly owing to the remonstrance from Japan and 
Russia, France and England gave notice that they would not support 
America in the Chinchow-Aigun line. The neutralization proposal also 
drove Japan and Russia closer together. A second Russo-Japanese 
agreement was signed in July, 1910, secretly reaffirming the line of
demarcation between their spheres in 1907 and strengthening the right 
of each, within her own sphere, to take all measures necessary for 
the safeguarding and the defence of those interests.
To the Chinese, the second Russo-Japanese agreement meant that 
Japan and Russia no longer paid lip-service to the principle of 
"preservation of China". By this agreement, they had closed the door 
and upset the balance of power in Manchuria. The Chinese minister to 
Russia, Sa Yin-t*u, told the Waiwupu that Russia and Japan were resolved 
to cooperate in advancing their interests in Manchuria with a view to 
excluding the other powers. China could no longer hope to regain her 
rights and interests with the help of the other countries. It would 
be difficult, for example, for China to recover her railways from Russia 
and Japan when the leaseholds expired. She therefore must reorganize 
her internal affairs in Manchuria, strengthen her defence and prepare 
for a confrontation with Russia and Japan when she reclaimed her railways
■ e  +■ (85)m  the future.
The governor-general of Manchuria, Hsii Shih-ch'ang, also urged 
the Waiwupu to take immediate measures to fortify the area. The 
Manchurian region, he said, was the origin of the Manchus and the basis 
of the Ch'ing court. Once it fell into the hands of the enemies, the 
national independence of China as a whole would be lost. China could 
not sit back and await her own destruction. Manchuria was rich in 
natural resources and the Chinese government must develop them. Russia 
and Japan had both established their machineries to implement their 
colonial policies in that area. The Chinese must counteract their
(8 5) Despatch from Chinese minister to Russia Sa Yin-t'u to Waiwupu, 
13th July, 19010, ibid., Vol.5? p. 8 .
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influence. He suggested that the Chinese government set up a bureau 
for exploration purposes in Manchuria, encourage more people to settle 
in the area and promote development enterprises. He even suggested that 
the Chinese government resort to loans from the powers for those 
purposes. He also maintained that the government would be wise to 
go ahead with the construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway in 
collaboration with America.
The Chinese press took a more alarmist view of the development
in Russo-Japanese relations. An editorial in the Shanghai Hsin Wen
Pao (Shanghai News) summed up the views of the Chinese newspapers on 
the latest Russo-Japanese agreement:
”... China has not been included as a party to 
the agreement despite the fact that she is the 
sovereign of Manchuria and possesses the largest 
stake in that area .... A new situation has 
arisen with the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese 
agreement. China's administration in Manchuria 
in future will come into conflict with those two 
countries. There is no hiding from the truth
that she has lost her prestige and honour.
Henceforth, China will no longer be able to 
look upon Manchuria in the same light as her 
other provinces. The fate of Manchuria is 
running parallel to that of Korea... '
The annexation of Korea by Japan in August, 1910 came as another 
blow to China. The Chinese press expressed pessimistic views on the 
future of China and warned of the imminent destruction of the country: 
Japan had forsaken her declaration to respect the independence of Korea 
and the powers seemed to be unperturbed by her action. Would not the 
powers follow Japan's footstep and abandon their own promise to 
preserve China's integrity? It was time the Chinese people united their
(8 6) Governor-general of Manchuria* Hsu Shih-ch'ang*s proposed plan of 
development in face of increasing danger threatening the safety 
of Manchuria, 16th August, ">910. ibid., Vol.5> pp. l8a-l9a.
(87) Telegramme from the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun Correspondent in Shanghai 
15th July, 191O: "Comments on the Russo-Japanese agreement in 
China", Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, l7th July, 1910, p. 2i Asahi Shimbunsha, 
Tokyo, (reproduced in microfilm form). Hereafter cited as TAS.
efforts and strengthened their determination to save their country.
They must urge their government to carry out more vigorous internal
(88)reforms and press for an early opening of the parliament.
The Japanese annexation of Korea also gave rise to a sense of 
urgency on the official level surrounding the need for reform in the
administrative system in Manchuria. In November, I9l0,the new governor-
general of Manchuria, Shih Liang, presented a series of proposals 
to the Waiwupu. The primary objective of these proposals was to 
invite foreign investment and trade with a view to counteracting Japanese
influence in the area. Shih Liang suggested that the government abolish
the tariffs in all the ports in Manchuria* introduce rm*ed-residence in 
the interior of Manchuria to counter-balance the large number of 
Japanese who, by passing off as Chinese, had been residing in territories 
outside the prescribed areas for foreigners, open the mining and 
lumbering enterprises to foreign investments, appeal to the powers 
for loans to launch development projects and begin work on the construction 
of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway. His aim was to restore the "open door" 
and balance of power in Manchuria.
The Waiwupu, after some deliberation, approved the opening of 
mining and lumbering industries to foreign investments but decided 
against the plans for free-ports and mixed-residence in the interior as 
it believed that both measures would benefit Japan more than America 
and the European powers. It also rejected the idea of borrowing 
money from the powers and maintainedthat China had to finance her own 
development of the area in order to forestall foreign incursions. The
(8 8) See various reports from Asahi Shimbun correspondents in Peking, 
Mukden and Shanghai on the reaction of the Chinese newspapers to 
the Japanese annexation of Korea, TAS, 30th August, 1st, 3rd,9-th 
and 18th September, 1910, all on p. 2.
(8 9) Repurt from governor-general of Manchuria Shih Liang to Waiwupu,
17th November, 191O, Documents: Hsiian-t'ung, Vol.6 , pp. 9-b-3a.
construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway was believed to be too 
expensive and therefore unfeasible. ^ 0 )
The Manchu government's hope for maintaining friendly relations with 
Japan, 1908-1911
According to the Waiwupu, the proposed plan to counter-balance
Japanese influence in Manchuria was hard to implement because of the
complications in the administrative structure in Manchuria. A more
plausible reason, however, was that the Chinese government wished to
maintain an amicable relationship with Japan. Throughout the Tatsu
Maru incident and the anti-Japanese boycott in 1908, the Chinese
government adopted a cautious and compromising policy. While he was
visiting Japan in October, 1908, T'ang Shao-i, governor of Mukden,
was anxious to impress upon the Japanese that China did not bear
a grudge against Japan on account of the Manchurian question. He
also said that any misunderstanding between the two countries had
arisen from the lack of law and order in Manchuria. But as these
were gradually being restored, he was hopeful that China and Japan were
(91)on the road to harmonizing their relations.
During the prolonged negotiations with Japan over the various 
disputes in rianchuria, the then governor-general of ^anchuria Hsii 
Shih-ch'ang, despite his alarm over the Japanese challenge to Chinese 
sovereignty in Chientao, had expressed his wish that Japan and China 
would come to an early settlement of the unresolved issues and resume
(90) Waiwupu's reply to Shih Liang, 15th January, 1911, ibid., Vol.6 , 
pp. 9 a - 1 1 a .
(9 1) "T'ang Shao-i on the relations between Japan and China", TNNS, 
op. cit., 29th October, 1908, p. 2.
their friendly relations so that Russia should not take advantage of
the estrangement between Japan and China to further her ambitions in
(92)
northern Manchuria. In March? 1909? he submitted a memorial
suggesting that Japanese civil and military officials who were connected
with the South Manchuria Railway Company be decorated with Chinese
imperial honours as a gesture on the part of the Chinese government to
promote friendly relations between the two countries. These Japanese
officials included the former president of the South Manchuria Railway
Company? Goto Shimpei and his successor? Nakamura who? according to
Hsii? had endeavoured to maintain peaceful and cordial relations between 
(93)Japan and China. As has been mentioned? the Chinese government
took a compromising attitude in the Sino-Japanese settlement in 1909*
The fact that Japan had become a world power since the Russo-Japanese 
war played an important part in the Chinese government's decision-making 
in dealing with that country. There is little doubt that Peking did 
not want to antagonize Japan.
During all this time? Japan remained as the model for Chinese 
constitutional reforms. Official cooperation between the two countries 
continued in the field of education though by 1908? the number of 
Chinese students going to Japan had become considerably smaller.
Japanese teachers in agricultural and police schools? Japanese doctors 
in hospitals and Japanese military officers were recommended for imperial 
awards for their services in Manchuria. As late as January? 1 9 1 1? Li 
Chia-chii of the Board of Education and one time minister to Japan? was 
sent to Japan to investigate Japanese finances in preparation for
(92) Despatch from Hsii Shih-ch'ang to Waiwupu? 23th December? 1908? 
Documents: Kuang-hsii? Vol.7^ +? p. 30*
(93) Memorial from Hsii Shih-ch'ang requesting the Chinese Emperor to 
give awards to Japanese officials? 6th March? 1909? Documents: 
Hsiian-t'ung? Vol.1 ? pp. l9-a-l6b.
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(qZf)
constitutional reforms in China. Japanese guidance which was part
Ifand parcel of the special relationship between the two countries was 
still given a high value by the Chinese government.
Moreover? as the revolutionary movement gathered momentum towards 
the end of the first decade of the twentieth century? the Manchu govern­
ment was able to find a sympathetic friend in the Japanese authorities. 
When Sun Yat-sen was expelled by the Japanese government in 1907 at the 
request of Peking? Ito and Yamaza Enjiro of the Gaimusho had decided 
that he be allowed to return in three or four years. But Sun was
(95)not officially readmitted before 1911. " With Sun out of Japan?
the T'ung Meng Hui was left without a powerful leader and the Manchu 
government hoped that the revolutionary cause would lose much of its 
attractions for the Chinese students. But student unrest continued 
to challenge the Chinese authorities. In March? 1907? Chinese students 
in Japan demonstrated outside the Chinese legation in Tokyo. They 
alleged that the Chinese minister responsible for student affairs?
Wang Ke-ming? had used spies to investigate their political activity.
The incident ended with Wang's resignation.^^ Soon after this? the 
Chinese government stepped up its repressive measures against the 
revolutionary students. The Japanese authorities too? increased their 
surveillance and control.
The Manchu dynasty faced the most serious crisis in November? 1908 
when the Empress Dowager Tz'u Hsi and Emperor Kuang Hsii died leaving
(9^ -) Report of "Investigation officer of Constitutionalism" Li Chia-chu
on Japanese finances? 19th January? 1911? ibid.? Vol.6 ? pp. I2a-l9b. 
Li also edited and translated several papers on the Japanese 
tax and account systems supplied by the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance (Okurasho).
(95) Marius B. Jansen? The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen? op.cit.? p.125.
(9 6) Chung-kup Jih-pao (China Daily News)? Facsimile of a part-run of 
the Hsing Chung Hui newspaper issued in Hong Kong? (Taipeh? 1969)? 
No.2098? 5th March? 1907? p. 5* This newspaper was distributed
to Chinese communities in the Philippine Islands? Singapore? Tokyo? 
Honolulu and San Francisco.
a vacuum at the top of the government. Within and outside China?
there were speculations on a power struggle among the high-ranking
officials in Peking and a major reshuffle in the organization of the
government. The critical situation gave rise to the danger that
internal unrest in China would break out leading to the downfall of
the Manchu regime. The Japanese government was particularly concerned
and tightened its control over the activities of Chinese revolutionaries
in Japan. In a conversation with Hsu Shih-ch'ang? the Japanese consul
in M^churia? Okabe said that Japan deeply grieved for China for her
misfortune and was worried that the revolutionaries in China might
seize the opportunity to create trouble. He told Hsii that the Japanese
government had authorized its officials in various districts to prohibit
all Chinese students suspected of engaging in revolutionary activities
from leaving Japan with the intention of returning to China during the
crisis and to prevent arms and ammunition from leaving Japanese ports
for China. It had also ordered the governor-general of Taiwan and
the resident-general of Korea to take similar actions. Okabe said
that it was the intention of the Japanese government to do all in its
power to help China and those measures were evidence of its good-will
(97)towards the Chinese government.
Chinese revolutionary publications also suffered as a result of the 
cooperation between the Chinese and Japanese governments. In October? 
1908? at the request of T'ang Shao-i? the Japanese authorities ordered 
that the Min Pao? Szechuan and Yunnan? three leading revolutionary 
journals of Chinese students in Japan? be banned from publication.^^
(97) Despatch from governor-general of Manchuria Hsu Shih-ch'ang to
the Ministry of Defence? Z k t h November? 1908? Documents: Kuang-hsu? 
Vol.7^ ? p. 27.
(9 8) "The closure of Chinese student journals by the Japanese 
government"? Chung Wai Jih Pao (Universal Gazette), Shanghai?
1st November 1908.
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And as if to return the courtesy of the Japanese government? the 
Chinese government ordered the closure of the Min Hsii Jih Pao (Peoples' 
Plight)i a sequel to the Min Hu Jih Pao (Peoples' Cry) - both Shanghai 
sequels to the suppressed Min Pao - in November "1909* The order had 
been made as a result of a protest lodged by the Japanese consul and 
vice-consul in Shanghai against the Min Hsii Jih Pao's remark on the 
assassination of Ito in late 1909. The paper had commented that
the death of Ito was a triumph for the Chinese and Korean peoples whose 
aspirations for national independence had long been suppressed by the 
policies of "ambitious Japanese expansionists" like Ito. It was 
time for Korea and China to take joint action in redressing the situation
(99)
in the Far East. " ' The Min Hsu Jih Pao's comment also aroused much 
concern on the part of the Japanese press. The Hankow correspondent 
of the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun expressed his wish that the Chinese 
authorities would take prompt action in suppressing the "subversive
elements" attempting to jeopardize the friendship between Japan and
p,. (100)China.
In the post-Russo-Japanese-war era? the Manchu government? not 
sharing the aspirations of the Chinese nationalists? did not find 
Japan's imperialistic policy in East Asia particularly menacing or 
incompatible with friendship between the two countries. Its existence 
increasingly being threatened at home? the Manchu government could 
not afford to make external enemies. A friendly relationship with 
Japan which entailed the acceptance of harsh terms was necessary. It 
would not? so the Manchu government hoped? aggravate its precarious position.
(99) "The conspiracy of Ito's visit to Manchuria"? editorial? 26th 
October? 1 908? p.1? "On the assassination of resident-general 
Ito" editorial? 2nd November? 1909? p.1* Min Hsii Jih Pao. 
(Peoples' Plight)? Facsimile? Taipeh? 1969. Also? "Closure of 
the Shanghai Min Hsii Jih Pao? continued"? TFTC? No.13> -^th 
February? 191O? pp. 463-^ -68.
(100) "Special report from China by correspondent in Hankow"? TNNS? 
27th November? 19095 p. 3*
Growing Chinese hostility against Japanese imperialism h9'lQ—J9hh
The gap left by the Min Hsii Jih Pao? an anti-Manchu and anti-imper­
ialist newspaper? was soon filled by the Min Li Pao (the Democrat) 
which ran from October 1910 to September? 1913 as the most influential 
revolutionary paper in China of its time. Like its predecessors? 
the newspaper was published in the concession area at Shanghai. Its 
contributors included people like Sung Chiao-jen? a close associate of 
Huang Hsing and one of the founders of the T'ung Meng Hui. But the 
main body of the managerial and editorial staff had little connection 
with the revolutionary movement centred in Japan.
In the early days of its publication? the Min Li Pao was not a
clear-cut revolutionary newspaper. Its main concern was that China 
was being threatened by imperialistic activities of the powers and the 
Manchu government was incapable of safeguarding the country's national 
independence. It was particularly hostile against increasing Japanese 
influence in Manchuria and Korea? denouncing Japan's ''hypocrisy" in 
assuming the role of the champion of Far Eastern independence. It 
believed that Japan's aggressive activities in Manchuria were increasing 
rapidly in preparation for an eventual occupation of the area and Japan 
had forsaken all her promises to uphold peace and stand by China in 
face of foreign domination. It also stated that China and Japan were 
in a state of undeclared war. Japan would strike within five years'
time and China must fight for her sovereignty over Manchuria. It
would be wise of her to strengthen her military defence in preparation
, ... , .... (1 0 1 ) for this eventuality.
(101) See "On the Far Eastern situation in the last twenty years"? in
instalments? 8th? 9th February? 1911i p.1? 25th? 27th March? 1911 
p.1. "On saving China"? editorial? 29th? 30th October? 1910? p.1., 
"A state of undeclared war between the two countries"? 1st Novembe 
1910. p.1? all in Min Li Pao? (Democrat). Facsimile? Taipeh? 1969*
The Min Li Pao also tried to play down Japan's growing influence
with the powers. It wrote at length about Japan's ''isolation'' in the
Far East and her "precarious position" among the Western poweis It
said England had begun to see that her alliance with Japan did not
benefit her position in India while Japan had used the alliance to
annex Korea. Russia had always been an enemy of Japan. The Russo-
Japanese agreement of 1910 had enabled Japan to expand her influence
in Korea but did not help Russia to realize her ambitions towards Mongolia
Above all? the American proposals to neutralize the railways in
Manchuria and construct the Chinchow-Aigun Railway had conflicted with
Japanese interests. It was unlikely that Japan and America would come
(102)to friendly terms with one another.
In particular? the Min Li Pao made much of the increasing incompat­
ibility in the policies of America and Japan in Asia. It maintained 
that America seemed more and more interested in championing China's 
cause against Japan. There was hope that America? with her capital 
and power? would counter-balance Japanese influence in Manchuria.
When Liang Ch'i-ch'ao expressed his disapproval of China borrowing 
loans from America and the construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway? 
arguing that such moves would alienate China from England? France? Russia 
and Japan? he was bitterly attacked by the Min Li Pao as a traitor 
intending to sell Manchuria to Japan.
The fierce attack on Liang Ch'i-ch'ao by the Min Li Pao was part 
of the quarrel between the Chinese constitutionalists and revolutionaries. 
The accusation was, moreov/er, not well founded as Liang himself was
(102) "A new and indisputable assessment of China's situation"? ibid.? 
23rd December? 191O? p.1.
(103) "New evidence against the traitor Liang [Ch'i-ch'ao]"? in 
instalments, ibid. ? 8th? 10th? 12th January? 1911. p.1. "Has Liang 
degenerated to this state? ibid.? 10th January?19115 p.2.
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highly critica l of "Japanese imperialist" a c t iv ity  after the Russo-Japanese
war. The Kuo Feng Pao ( National Custom)? organ of Liang's
constitutional party in the post-190? period? was not slov; to condemn
Japanese policy in Manchuria. In January? 1 9 1 1? it wrote?
"The new term imperialism is a policy in which a
country seeks to expand her national power and
livelihood outside her own territories .... Japan's 
recent activities indicate that she is gradually 
becoming an imperialist power ... Nowadays? those 
countries which carry out imperialistic activities 
are the same which preach peace. Perhaps it is 
more accurate to say that when a country expands 
her livelihood into another, she is practising 
'peaceful imperialism' and when she expands her 
power [into the territories of another]? she is 
practising 'aggressive imperialism'. But the 
two are inseparable and one leads to the other.
From the establishment of the South Manchuria
Railway Company to her recent activities in
Manchuria? Japanese policy has undergone a change 
from peaceful imperialism to aggressive imperialism...." 
(lO*f)
Further suspicion of Japanese ambitions in China was aroused in 
1911 by the rumour of a new agreement between Japan and Russia. In 
1911i America made a proposal for an international banking loan 
consisting of American? British? French and German capital to be made 
to the Manchu government? designed ostensibly to reform and stabilize 
Chinese currency. To this end? China should be made to accept an
American financial adviser. The plan alarmed both Russia and Japan
which interpreted it as another cloak for American economic penetration 
of Manchuria. In June? the Japanese government approached Russia with 
the suggestion that the two countries take joint action in protesting 
against the preferential rights which the four powers had secured in 
Manchuria in their agreement made with China. The Min Li Pao?
(lO^ f) "Japan's foreign policy"? Kuo Feng Pao ? Shanghai? (191O-1 911)?
No. 3^ H 11th January? 9^J1 ^ pp. 21-22.
(105) Foreign minister Komura to Japanese minister in Russia Motono?
1*fth June? 1911? NGB, Vol.Vf, Part 2 (1962), No.682, pp. 336-357.
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alarmed by the possibility of a new Russo-Japanese agreement, made a 
surprising appeal to Russia for an alliance:
"... An alliance between Russia and Japan will 
benefit Japan and not Russia. The Russian govern­
ment will not be coaxed into such an unwise commit­
ment. Instead, Russia should try to reach an
understanding with Cnina vis-a-vis Japan’s contin­
ental imperialism. The day when Japanese aggrand­
izement on the continent materizes will see the 
destruction of the two old empires of China and 
Russia.... If China still [contemplated] cooperation 
with Japan against Russia and if Russia sat back 
and allowed Japan to invade China, then they 
would be exhibiting a negligence for the great 
moral principle of mutual dependence. The relation­
ship between Russia and China are like that between
the lips and the teeth. Once the lips are gone,
the teeth will suffer from the cold...."(106)
X X X
Only half a decade earlier, the same image of the lips-teeth 
relationship had been freely used by the Chinese to describe their 
relations with the Japanese when they talked about the need for China 
and Japan to unite their efforts against Russian aggression. This 
was when both the Chinese and Japanese thought they had something to 
offer each other in a cooperative relationship. But when China stood 
powerless watching Japan fight her war over Manchuria in 1909-, she 
had tacitly given up hope for an equal relationship. This could not 
have been more obvious than when, soon after the outbreak of the war, 
she declared herself a neutral power on the insistence of Japan. The 
kind of relationship that China would, in future, have with Japan was 
to be decided by the outcome of the war; and by Japan, when she eventually 
won it.
(106) "On the Russo-Japanese alliance", Min Li Pao, 5th, 6th, August, 
1911? p. 1 and 1 1. "Sincere admonition to Russia - revision of 
the commercial agreement between Russia and China", ibid., 29th 
August• 1911, p.1.
This is not to say that the Chinese government had resigned itself 
to the dictates of Japan's wishes. Even while the Russo-Japanese 
conflict was going on, it still vacillated between a pro-Japanese and 
a pro-Russian policy. But the situation was very different from that 
of the late 1 8 9 0's when Japan actually offered to cooperate with her and 
was then in a position to choose her 'ally'. In fact , in 1909-, an 
alliance with either power seemed to be out of the question. Russia 
had shown her ambitions in seizing Chinese territories and Japan 
preferred to fight the war on her own.
Meanwhile, growing unrest at home threatened to overthrow the 
existing order. As the Japanese government seemed to look with a 
suspicious eye on the 'subversive elements' which were using Japan as 
a base to build up their strength, the Manchu government had its 
reasons for maintaining the good-will of the Japanese government. But 
the post-war cooperation between the two governments was not of a kind 
that had any long-lasting effect on the friendship of the two countries. 
After the Russo-Japanese war, few Chinese leaders pursued a consistently 
pro-Japanese policy. The new generation of provincial and central 
government leaders led by Yuan Shih-k'ai took care to avoid trouble with 
Japan. But the active promotion of Sino-Japanese cooperation by Chinese 
officials had ended with the deaths of Liu K'un-i in 1902 and Chang 
Chih-tung in 1909- Moreover, the relationship of the 1 8 9 0's in which 
both countries shared the fear of Western encroachment haci also ended 
with Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war. Instead, China now 
had to accomodate another foreign influence in her territories, that 
of Japan in Manchuria.
Outside the government, attitudes towards Japan were not complicated 
by long-term political considerations. Sentiments were much more 
affected by events such as the war and Japan's activities in Manchuria.
1?5.
For the Chinese, Japan1s victory had done much to create a sense of 
emancipation from the enthralment of Western domination of over half a 
century. The more restrained section of the public spoke of the 
need for future cooperaticn between Japan and China* the regenerat­
ion of the yellow race and the return of peace to the Far East.
But Japan's victory also filled the Chinese people with false 
hopes for their country. Suspicions of all foreign powers, not least 
Japan, went hand in hand with a growing sense of patriotism. A 
revolutionary press in China had existed soon after the outbreak of 
the Russo-Japanese war advocating the recovery of China's lost sovereign 
rights over her railways, China's education of her own students and Chj_na«s 
own right to 'preserve' herself. They criticized the foreign powers 
for abusing the term "preservation of Chinese territories" which in 
their opinion, amounted to nothing less than the partition of China.
In 1905-1906, the Chinese boycotted American merchandise in Shanghai.
This was to spearhead further anti-foreign boycotts in the early 
twentieth century.
In the extremely anti-imperialist publications, there were severe 
criticisms of Japanese activities in Manchuria. Talks of China 
carrying out reforms with the help of Japan rarely heard. It
would seem that the Chinese public was determined that China was not 
to place herself under Japanese leadership.
In Japan, nationalism in Chinese students was further aroused by 
the example of Japanese nationalism. More overtly than their counterparts 
at home, these students expressed their aspirations and hopes for 
China in anti-Manchu activities. They became increasingly hostile 
against Japanese power when their activities conflicted with Japanese 
authorities whose attitudes and policies towards Chinese students coincided
with those of the Manchu government. But outside the government, 
Japanese adventurers and idealists gave invaluable support to the Chinese 
revolutionary leaders. This accounted for the fact that Japan became 
a centre of Chinese revolutionary movement in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. Some of the Chinese revolutionary leaders thought 
they could extend the friendship existing between themselves and their 
Japanese friends to the Chinese and Japanese people at large. But 
after the Russo-Japanese war* the Tokyo government conducted an even more 
conservative policy towards the movements in China. Secure in the 
knowledge of a friendly Manchu government in China, Japanese government 
leaders were anxious that the Manchu dynasty should not be overthrown 
so that they could continue to maintain the upper hand in dealing with 
Peking. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao seemed to be aware of this when he criticized 
the revolutionaries for being too naive in believing that there were 
hopes for cooperation between Japan and China on an equal basis.
The year 1907 was viewed by many Chinese as a point of departure 
in Japanese policy and attitudes towards China. Chinese leaders and 
the public both alleged that Japan, by coming into a series of diplomatic 
agreements with the Western countries, had abandoned her role as the 
champion of Asian independence against Western encroachment. Many 
believed that Japan had turned her back on China and severed the 
historical and cultural ties between the two countries. It would 
appear that the Chinese had been slow in realizing that the Japanese 
government had since the turn of the century coordinated its policies 
and actions with those of the Western powers. Warnings of Japanese 
expansionist ambitions had in fact been made by nationalist writers 
soon after the Russo-Japanese war. But Japan’s diplomatic measures in 
1907 convinced the Chinese that henceforth there would no longer be 
any question of a special relationship between the two countries.
Aroused by Japanese high-handed policies in Manchuria and the Tatsu 
Maru incident, Chinese nationalism became more defined, finding its 
enemies in Japanese imperialism and the weak Manchu government. A 
few years earlier, some revolutionaries with their anti-Manchu organiz­
ations in Japan had had reservations about making an issue of Japanese 
imperialism. In 1907, however, their revolutionary cause suffered 
further from the cooperative measures of the Japanese and Manchu govern­
ments in suppressing their publications and expelling their leader.
Many became totally disillusioned with the Japanese authorities. By 
the end of the decade, Manchu weakness and increasing Japanese power in 
the Far East aroused a fear that Chinese independence was being threatened 
in an. unprecedented way.
CHAPTER FIVE
JAPAN’S NEW ROLE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, 1909-190?
After her victory over Russia in 1905? Japan's worries about the 
problem of national survival subsided. The Japanese came to look 
upon themselves as a member of the civilized community of nations. They 
began to talk of the necessity to secure their rights in China - rights 
which were due the status of Japan as a world power.
At the same time, the gradual awakening of the Chinese after 
the war evoked enthusiasm from the Japanese. Many were optimistic 
about the prospects of closer relations with a strong China. The 
readiness to recognize and sympathize with incipient
Chinese nationalist aspirations can be explained by the fact that most 
Japanese, despite their consciousness of Japan's new power status, had 
not ceased to regard themselves as the leader of the "awakening of 
Asia". Increasingly, Japan, a Westernized Asian nation, saw herself 
as a link between the Eastern and Western world. The argument for 
Japan introducing China to Western civilization became more influential 
after the Russo-Japanese war.
Japanese determination to safeguard her post-war interests in China
For ten years since l895> Japan had not recovered psychologically 
from the impact of Western imperialism. Having defeated Russia in 
1905? she was determined to forestall all future harassment to her 
safety and peace in the Far East. The immediate step was to make 
Russia accept her demands.
Russia's refusal to pay a war indemnity and yield up the whole of 
the Sakhalin Island were accepted by Japan at the Portsmouth conference*
But the Japanese people at home were infuriated by the concessions 
which they thought did not do justice to their war efforts. They 
were also particularly sensitive about the ensuing negotiations between 
Japan and China. When China was slow to consent to the Russo-Japanese 
arrangements that Japan be given the construction right for the Kirin- 
Changchun . Railway, when indeed, China actually refused Japan's request 
for several other rights in southern Manchuria, Japanese newspapers 
were very dissatisfied with China and severely critical of the Japanese 
government.
The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun attacked the Japanese plenipotentiaries 
in Peking for their neglect of the nation's honour, prestige and safety, 
reminding, them not only that Japan had expended much money and man­
power to uphold peace in the Far East and China's integrity but also 
that Japan had to establish her interests in Manchuria in order to 
safeguard that region from future Russian incursions. It urged the
Japanese diplomats in China to put pressure on the Chinese government
(1)to recognize Japan's interests in Manchuria. According to the
Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, the Chinese government had no right to insist,
at that moment, on upholding China's prestige and honour as these had
been lost before the Russo-Japanese war when she subjected herself to
Russia's violation of her territorial integrity. It was Japan which
had restored China's honour the maintenance of which, no less than
Japan's own national independence, depended on the establishment of
(2)
Japan's position in Manchuria.
The Japanese press urged the government to forc<£
(1) "Losing faith in the Peking Conference", editorial, TNNS, op.cit., 
17th December, 1905? P»2 and Mochizuki Uguisukei, "The second 
Portsmouth - failure of the Peking negotiations", TNNS, 30th 
December, 1903, p* 2 and 31st December, 1903, p.^.
(2) "The delay in the Sino-Japanese negotiations" editorial, TNNS,
19th December, 1905, p.2.
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China to adopt an enlightened foreign policy and in particular? a cooperative 
attitude towards Japan. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said that 
Japan had fought to preserve Chinese territories? had encouraged self­
strengthening reforms and had educated China's eight thousand students? she
c
naturally expected gratitude from China. One charateristic of China's
A
foreign policies? the newspaper said? was the willingness to submit to 
the strong and be contemptuous of the weak. Up to the Spno-Japanese 
war? China had looked down on Japan and been subservient to Russia. Li 
Hung-chang and his pro-Russian clique had repeatedly urged the government 
to take control of J a p a n . B u t  after she had been defeated by Japan 
in 1895? relations between the two countries underwent a remarkable 
change. Japan's prestige greatly increased and the pro-Russian 
faction began to lose its influence. Now that Japan had won the war 
against Russia? influential Chinese officials like Yuan Shih-k'ai?
Chang Chih-tung? Prince Ch'ing? Ch'u Hung-chi and Natung were urging 
their government to enter into closer cooperation with Japan. However? 
said the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun? despite this seemingly optimistic 
sign? it appeared that there was-'always a barrier between the two 
countries. Japan and China had never totally understood one another.
Mutual doubts and suspicions existed under the superficial friendliness.
And when it came to dealing with foreign countries? the Chinese 
government always came up with contradictory ideas and theories. It 
had no responsible party or parties to make decisions and it was unable 
to keep secrets. Compared with other powers in China? Japan's 
position was very poor. She had little influence on and little knowledge 
of Chinese affairs. The post-war situation urgently called for
(3) Chang Pei-lin was said to have advocated the invasion of Japan as 
the national policy at one time and according to the Tokyo Nichi- 
Nichi Shumbun? Li Hung-chang's Chihli Army,the North Sea Navy and 
the military defence installed at Port Arthur and Weihaiwei were 
for the purpose of the invasion. See "History of China's foreign 
relations - report from Peking by Peking correspondent"? episode 4?
TNNS? 3th November? 1903» p.1.
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(4)
reorientations in the Japanese government's policies towards China.
It was believed that pragmatism and not sentimental promises
would have to govern Japan's future policies towards China. The
Tokyo Asahi Shimbun commented after the Peking Conference that the
relationship between Japan and China since the war of 189^-1895 had
been founded on empty words like "lips - teeth relationship" and
"cultural and racial affinity" while all the time strong powers like
Russia were reaping advantages through having a "proper" diplomatic
(5)relationship with China. Japan's prestige in China had suffered
at the Peking negotiations and the Japanese government must not hesitate
to apply necessary pressure on Peking in matters concerning Japan's
interests as this would also benefit China and build up the foundation
(6)of permanent peace in East Asia. 7
Japan's stake in Manchuria
When Japan acquired Russian rights in southern Manchuria, she also 
inherited the time limits placed upon the possession of the area .
The twenty-five - year lease of the Kwantung territories including 
Port Arthur and Dairen was due to expire in 1923* IP was an objective 
of Japan to lift this condition and extend the leasehold to ninety - 
nine years.
Some Japanese were convinced of Japan's claim to perpetual rights 
in southern Manchuria. In his "Theory of mandatory rule over Manchuria", 
written in 1905? Ariga Nagao, professor of international law at Tokyo
( k ) ibid., episodes 1-12, 2nd November - 12th November 1905? all on page 1.
(5) "Japan's policies towards China", Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Asahi Shimbunsha,
Tokyo, 3"lst December, 1905? p.2. Hereafter cited as TAS.
(6) "Impressions in Shanghai on the peace-talk, continued" TAS,27th
September, 1905? P*3*
Imperial University, said that like the relationship which had existed 
between Japan and Korea, a definite relationship had grown up between 
Japan and Manchuria as a result of the Russo-Japanese war. Japan 
was prevented from annexing Manchuria only by the rules governing 
international relations. Nevertheless, as China had no power to stop 
Russia’s violation of international law and as it was a matter of 
urgency for Japan to safeguard her national safety, she should at least 
obtain a mandate over part of Manchuria. Japan should exercise 
sovereignty for China over the Liaotung Peninsula so that any future 
Russian advances in the southern direction could be checked effectively. 
For this purpose, Japan's model should be England's rule of Cyprus for 
Turkey, Sudan for Egypt and Austro-Hungary's rule of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for Turkey. However, as Japan had always upheld the policy 
of "open door" in China, she should adhere to the same principle in 
implementing her economic policy in Manchuria. She would be ill-advised 
to monopolize any interests as this would be following the Russian example
• ■ a  (7)in the pre-war period.
Kokubu Tanenori's argument which was put forward in an article 
entitled "Non-recognition of the existence of Chinese sovereignty in 
Manchuria" was even more flagrant in its disregard for Chinese sovereignty. 
He said that China's declaration of neutrality at the beginning of the 
war meant that she had given over Manchuria to be used as the war zone.
By so doing, China had voluntarily given up her right to rule that 
area. Thus, whilst it had been necessary to respect China's territorial
(7) Ariga Nagao, "Manchu Inin Tochi Ron", translated in HMTP, op.cit.,
Vol.12, No.6 5, 20th March, 1905? pp. 1-21. See also Somura Yasunobu, 
"Tairiku seisaku ni okeru imeeji no tenkai" (Changing images in 
continental policy) in Shinohara Hajime and Mitani Taichiro, eds. , 
Kindai Nihon no Seiji Shido : Seijika Kenkyu II (Political leadership 
in modern Japan : studies of politicians, part II)« Tokyo, 1 965?
pp. 268-269.
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integrity before the wari after the wari there was no point in Japan's
taking pains to recognize the so-called Chinese sovereignty in
(8)Manchuria as it no longer existed.
The Taiyo, however, maintained that Japan must respect China's
sovereignty and keep peace in the Far East or the world would never
(9)believe that she had fought the war with those intentions. The
Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun too, thought Japan would not have fought 
the war in vain even if she returned southern Manchuria to China:
"... The prompt return of southern Manchuria
is a gesture of fairness by which Japan would 
gratify China, forestall suspicion on the part 
of Russia and win the confidence of the powers.... 
Apart from the rights and interests which Japan 
has acquired from the treaties, Manchuria 
remains outside Japan's territories and has not 
been drawn within Japan's sphere of interests in 
any agreement [made with China] .... But if 
another war should break out ... Japan, in order 
to safeguard her own safety, has every right 
to take the matter into her own hands.. . 1 0)
This meant that Japan would also have to honour her promise 
to keep the 'bpen door" in Manchuria. This, however, need not be to 
Japan's advantage as her commerce and industries in Manchuria might 
suffer as a result of her inferiority in technology and lack of resources.
But despite anxiety caused by the disadvantages Japan faced in
competing with the other powers, there was optimism regarding Japan's
economic future in Manchuria. The Nihon Jitsugyo Sekai Taiheiyo,
for example, said it could foresee Japanese economic ascendancy in the
(11)area. Shiga Shigetake, geographer and journalist, urged the
(8 ) Kokubu Tanenori, "Manshu ni okeru Shinkoku shuken no sonzai c hininsu"* 
quoted in Somura Yasunobu, ibid., pp. 269-270.
(9) "On Japan's operations in Manchuria and Korea", Taiyo, translated 
in Wai Chiao Pao, No. 101, 28th February, 1905* PP* 7-11.
(10) "It is only a matter of course that Japan should return Manchuria 
to China", TNNS, ^ t h June, 1906, p.2.
(1 1) "The war and the economy", Nihon Jitsugyo Sekai Taiheiyo, translated 
in CCJP, op.cit., Vol. IV, 18th November, 1904, p.1.
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government to lead the nation in exploring the resources in southern
(12)
Manchuria. The Taiyo believed that the Japanese people should
be encouraged to settle in Manchuria? engage in agriculture and
industries and develop the resources. According to the Taiyo? this
was the only way in which Japan could secure her share of interests
(13)and stand up to the competition of the Western powers. And the
Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said?
"The exploration of mines and forests is the basis 
of Japanese enterprises in Manchuria .... The 
benefits [which will come as a result of developing 
these resources] are not only materialistic but 
also spiritual. The success or failure of the 
Japanese enterprises in Manchuria and Korea will 
determine whether or not the Japanese will become a 
great nation in the world...."(1 )^
Different theories on Japanese expansion in Manchuria at the end 
of the Russo-Japanese war ranged from respect for Chinese sovereignty 
over Manchuria to outright annexation. Most Japanese? however? 
believed that now that Japan had become a member of the community of 
Western nations? she had to abide by the rules of international politics.
The principle of "preservation of China" still had to be observed? but 
it had a less emotional impact on Japan after the war. The Japanese 
now stressed the need for keeping the "open door" and improving 
trading relations in China. However? this brought Japanese economic 
ventures in Manchuria face to face with competitive Western enterprises. Thus 
in coordinating her policies with those of the Western powers? Japan's 
special position in Manchuria was challenged by Western activities in 
that area. This was to remain a central theme in Japan's relations 
with the West throughout the first decade of the twentieth century.
(12) Shiga Shigetake? "On developing Manchuria and the Kwantung Peninsula"? 
in Kokumin Shimbun? 7th? 8th and 9th December? 190^ -? translated
in Wai Chiao Pao? No. 1 0 1? 28th February? 1903? pp. 11 — 1 +^.
(13) "On Japan's operations in Manchuria and Korea"? Taiyo? December?
190^? translatedinWai Chiao Pao? No. 101? 28th February? 1903? PP* 7-11.
(1 4) "The Japanese people and the Liaotung Peninsula"? TAS? 16th 
January? 1903? p.8 .
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Chinese and Western suspicions of Japan in Manchuria
The post - Russo-Japanese-war era also saw the beginning of a 
movement in China to recover the rights she had lost to the powers.
Manchuria became a focal point of Sino-Japanese disputes. The Chinese
public was highly critical of Japanese policy in Manchuria. Protests
also came from the Western powers against Japan's disregard for the
"open door" and her discriminatory activities against European and American
merchants in Manchuria. In March? 1906? the British minister to
China and the United States ambassador to Japan made their complaints
to prime minister Saionji that Japan was unfairly exercising her
authority in exempting her own merchandise from duties by importing
them directly into Dairen whilst European and American goods had
to go through customs in Shanghai? Chefoo and other ports before they
reached Dairen.
Ito? then resident-general in Korea? also received from the British 
charge d'affaires in Seoul a note which warned that if Japan did not 
reverse her "closeddoor^ policy with regard to trade in Manchuria? she 
would lose the sympathy of the European countries and America and would 
find herself isolated in the event of a future outbreak of military 
hostility between herself and Russia.
As a result? on the initiative of Ito? a Conference of the genro 
and cabinet members was called on 22nd May? 1906. It was decided at 
the Conference that Japan would respect China's sovereign rights and 
adhere to the principle of equal opportunity for all countries.
(1 5) "The question of the 'closeddoor' in Manchuria raised by England 
and America"? 19th March? 1906? Nihon Gaiko Nempyo narabi ni Shuyo 
Bunsho (Chronological record of Japanese foreign relations and 
select documents)? Tokyo? 1965-1966? Vol.1 ? pp. 258-259*
(16) "Manshu mondai ni kansuru kyogikai"? 22nd May? 1906? ibid.? p.26l.
And in order both to forestall the possibility of military ascendancy
in Manchuria and make Japan's intentions understood by the local
people? it was decided that the machinery of the Kwantung governor-
general be re-organized along the lines of peace-time establishments
(i7)and the military authorities in Manchuria be abolished gradually.
Ito who presided at the Conference argued that Japanese policies 
in Manchuria had unwisely provoked hostilities throughout China. He 
saw the movement to recover rights as a dangerous force which could 
erupt into another Boxer Rebellion. He said it was Japan's duty as 
a friend to lead China away from such extremities. H.er goal should 
be to win the good-will and confidence of the Chinese people. Japanese 
military authorities in Manchuria? therefore? would have to be abolished, 
The responsibilities of administering and protecting the people in 
the area belonged to China . Japan could not take them into her own 
hands. Should China fail to carry out those duties? Japan would then 
have an obligation to help her insofar as such help and support were 
concomitant with her rights in Manchuria. An outbreak like the Boxer 
Rebellion would invite military intervention on the part of the powers 
and provide Russia with legitimate excuse to reoccupy southern 
Manchuria. Hence it was unwise of Japan to incur the suspicions of 
the Chinese government and per pie and allow their dissatisfaction to 
grow into dangerous proportions. Furthermore? it was important that 
Japan regain the sympathies of the British and American peoples as 
Japan would need their support in the event of a war in the future.^^^
China's hostility and the Western powers' criticism caused much
(T?) ibid.? p. 263.
(18) ibid.? pp. 262-26 -^.
disquiet in the Japanese press. Many Japanese newspapers were of
the opinion that Japan's intentions had been misconstrued. In
refuting an allegation of the London Daily Mail in late 1906 that Japan
had been taking advantage of China's state of unrest to consolidate
and expand her own influence? the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said?
"... The rising tide of the rights recovery 
movement is accompanied by a sense of awakening 
in the Chinese people ... which gives rise to 
a resentment of the launching of Japanese enter­
prises in Manchuria.... For those Chinese who 
are ignorant we must excuse them for having 
suspicions. But for those who are intelligent 
we expect them to be cooperative towards Japan 
in developing Manchuria .... Far from having taken 
advantage of China's weakness to further her 
'ambitious designs'? Japan finds herself in the 
present position only as a result of China's short­
sighted and corrupt policies over the years ....
Japan has taken up enterprises in Manchuria so
that by adhering to the principles of open door 
and equal opportunity? she will induce economic 
cooperation among the powers and open the way 
to further development of Manchuria....(^9)
Disputes in Manchuria between the Japanese and Chinese came to 
a head in the latter half of 1907 when the negotiations between Hagihara? 
Japanese consul-general in F«ngtien and Chao Erh- sun? Chinese governor- 
general of the area ground to a halt over the lumbering enterprise in 
the Yalu forests? mining in Fushun and other matters. Relations 
between the two governments seemed to be deteriorating rapidly. The 
Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun was critical of China's dilatory and unyielding 
attitudes? attributing them to her ingratitude for what Japan had 
done. But it was still hopeful of an amicable settlement with China.
It advised the Japanese government against the use of force. Instead? 
it urged the two countries to reconcile their differences. In order 
that friendly relations might be maintained between the two countries*
(1 9) "The biased view of the foreigners"? editorial,TNNS? 22nd November?
1906 ? p. 2.
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Japan should express her trust in China and China should discard her
.. . . . (20) reservations and suspicions.
The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said Japan had not entered the war against 
Russia solely for the sake of preserving China. She was neither 
strong nor rich enough to do so. The Russo-Japanese war had been 
fought because Japan’s own safety was also at stake. Having defeated 
Russia? she had to secure the rights which had been held by Russia in 
China in order to safeguard her own interests and safety. It was 
unfortunate that the Japanese government had not been able to arrive 
at an all-out agreement with the Chinese government immediately after 
the war, Nevertheless? the Chinese government and people could hardly 
expect Japan to give up her rights that were due her as a result of the 
war. It was regrettable that some Japanese living in Manchuria were 
inclined to behave in an overbearing manner because they thought their 
country had done China a big favour. This only deepened the resentment 
of the Chinese people and did nothing to improve the relations between 
the two countries.^"1'
Moreover? the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun warned that Japan's prime concern 
should not be with Manchuria but with the entire China. It was 
ill-advised of the Japanese government to be obsessed with the 
consolidation of her influence and trivial gains in Manchuria. Instead,
it should try to improve the overall relations between the two
, . (22) countries.
Most Japanese newspapers believed that the Chinese public's bitter 
reaction to the negotiations over Manchuria in 1907 was a force with
(20) "Japan's relations with China"? editorial? TNNS? 3^d October? 1907? p.2,
(21) "The improvement of Sino-Japanese relations"? editorial,TAS? 21st 
September? 1907? p.3*
(22) "Policies towards Manchuria and China"? editorial? TAS? 15th 
October? 1907.? p.3*
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which Japan had to come to terms. This was also recognized by the 
genro and cabinet members at the meeting in May? 1906. Japan could 
not afford to alienabe the Chinese officials and people by ignoring 
their sense of awareness. She could? however? guide their nationalist 
aspirations in the right direction which for Japan in 1907, meant 
guiding China towards 'civilization' and making her realize the 
necessity of renewing friendly ties with Japan.
Japan's role in educating Chinese students
Soon after the Russo-Japanese war? Japan attempted to live up 
to the image of a Westernized Asian nation introducing civilization to 
the backward countries in Asia. Her role of a friendly neighbour 
giving guidance and direction became most obvious in educating Chinese 
students in the post-war years. Inspired by the Japanese example of 
an Asian country newly risen to the rank of a worS power? Chinese 
students thronged to Japan soon after 190^ -. The question of these 
students soon became an important topic of discussion in Japan. It 
is worthwhile here to take a look at unofficial as well as official 
attitudes towards the question.
Aoyagi Atsutsure? educationist and China expert? had this to
say,
"The knowledge which Chinese students acquire in 
Japan is to be used in politics? education and 
other fields of Chinese society. These students 
would hold the key to friendly relations between 
Japan and China and peace in the Far East if they 
made good use of the knowledge; but they would 
sow seeds of hostility and misunderstanding between 
the two countries if they abused it. This in 
turn depends on whether they receive a good or bad 
education when they are in Japan. The question 
of Chinese students in Japan is therefore? not 
only a problem for China? it is also a matter of 
concern for Japan. Furthermore? it is not simply 
an educational question, it is a matter of the greatest 
importance which affects the world...."(2 3)
(23) Aoyagi Atsutsure, "The question of Chinese students", TAS? l7th 
July, 1905> p.5 and 13th November? 1905? P* 5*
Aoyagi commented that it was regrettable that most of the Chinese students
came to Japan only for short-term courses which lasted for less than a
year as he did not think that the students benefited much from them;
and when they? in turn? should educate the young in China? they would
find the task beyond them. This would mean that education in China
would still be dependent on teachers coming from abroad and "national
independence in learning" and the spread of education in China would
not materialize for some time to come. According to Aoyagi? this
would be most unfortunate for China's younger generation? China's
(24)
future and the friendship between Japan and China.
Commenting on Aoyagi's view? the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said that the Japanese
educational authority was largely responsible for the fact that
most Chinese students did not receive a perfect education. It was?
however? the wish of the Japanese people to educate Chinese students
well. They believed that this was a gesture through which they could
(25)
offer their utmost friendship to China.
As was implied by Aoyagi and the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun? the type of education 
that the majority of Chinese students were receiving in Japan left 
much to be desired. Moreover? the relations between these students 
and the authorities of their host country were far from cordial. The 
major outbreak of hostility came with the regulations set down by the 
Japanese Mombusho in late 1905* Chinese students objected especially 
to two rules one of which required every Chinese student who was 
admitted to either a government or private school to submit not only 
a letter explaining why he/she wanted to enter that particular school
(24) ibid.?
(25) "Question of Chinese students? comments on Aoyagi's article"? 
TAS? 18th July? 1905? p.3*
but also a letter of endorsement from the Chinese legation in Japan.
The second rule required Chinese students to enter schools which had 
been recommended by the Mombusho to the Chinese government. Much 
has been said of the confrontation between the Japanese and Chinese 
authorities on the one hand and the Chinese students on the other.
In view of the fact that the Japanese and Chinese governments found 
it necessary to adopt the same line of policy towards the students? 
one can say that the Chinese students’ resentment and anger were not 
directed so much against the "discriminating policies of the Japanese 
government" —  though they made this their cry —  as against inter­
ference of the Japanese authorities. The students were extremely 
sensitive of this as they became increasingly involved in revolutionary 
activities against the Manchu government at home.
The Mombusho adopted a firm line throughout the incident. It 
maintained that the students had misinterpreted . the meaning and 
intentions of the regulations. According to the Mombusho officials? 
only a handful of the thousands of Chinese students coming to Japan 
managed to enter schools which came under the direct supervision of 
the Mombusho. The rest had to attend private schools and institutions 
many of which had been newly set up to accomodate them. These 
private institutions offered substandard academic training and 
facilities and unsatisfactory conditions of accommodation for the 
students. It was with a view to keeping these schools under control 
that the Mombusho had introduced the regulations. According to the 
Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun? the aim was none other than to protect 
and direct the students so that they could fulfil their ambition of 
learning. As these students had been sent to Japan with the purpose 
of receiving good education? the achievement of such an objective would 
go a long way towards cultivating friendship between the two countries.
(26) "Control of Chinese students"? TNNS? 5th November? 1905? P*3?
"Mombusho's explanation"? TNNS? l4th Decern ber? 1905? p.4.
The incident also drew the attention of the Diet. Although the 
spokesman of the government maintained that no diplomatic importance 
was to be attached to the matter as it had nothing to do with the 
agreement made between Chang Chih-tung and Uchida? minister to China 
in 1903i to allow Chinese students to come to Japan? the opposition 
parties were not prepared to let the matter pass without looking into. 
On 18th December? anl Investigation Committee of State Affairs 
(Naiseibu Chosakai) of the Kenseihonto called a meeting to discuss 
the incident. Representatives from the Mombusho? Gaimusho and the 
president of the Chinese students were present. At the meeting? it 
was decided that as the incident would affect Sino-Japanese relations? 
the officials of the Mombusho were to be persuaded to withdraw the 
departmental ordinance. If the Mombusho refused to be persuaded? then 
the Investigation Committee would bring the matter up in the Diet and 
put pressure on the Mombusho to do so. The Committee pointed out 
to the students that it sympathized with their point of view but 
would be appreciative if they would adopt "proper methods" to make 
their point and that it could not approve of their radical and un­
reasonable actions. It also reminded them that they should put their 
studies above everything else/27'*
Criticism of the students' behaviour also came from the Japanese 
press. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said that the regulations 
had been set up with the aim of protecting Chinese students from 
profiteering private schools because responsible sectors of the Japanese 
society felt it to be within their duty to put a stop to the evil 
practice. The Chinese students' protests were therefore entirely
(27) "The government and the question of Chinese students"? TNNS? 15th 
December? 1905? p.2? "The Kenseihonto and the question of Chinese 
students"? TNNS? 19th December? 1905? p«2. The regulations? however? 
were not withdrawn. The students' boycott of classes was ended partly 
by a wane of enthusiasm after weeks of almost total strike and 
partly because Chang Chih-tung sent officials to Shanghai to reason 
with those who had left Japan to go back.
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meaningless. Although they might have regarded the rules as a 
political weapon to restrict their freedom, this could not be used 
as pretext for their irresponsible behaviour. They had come to Japan 
to study but now they were squandering their time on other activities.
The event had taken a course disadvantageous to both China and Japan 
and was to add a stigma to the year 1903 in the history of Japanese
* + ■ (28) education.
But criticism apart, it is evident that the spirit of guidance 
was not abandoned. As another article in the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun 
put it,
”... These students are an elite group of four 
hundred millions Chinese. They are expected to 
take up the burden of administering their country 
and educating the masses in future. If they want 
to succeed in carrying out these tasks, they must 
enrich themselves further with knowledge. The 
recent incident shows that they have forsaken their 
long-term objective in favour of clamouring for 
conveniences [which they call freedom] of the 
present moment. Such behaviour is a stumbling 
block to their far-sighted aspirations. Since 
China is an expansive and populous country, the 
task of reforming her conditions to become a strong 
and progressive nation is not something that can 
be achieved in a short time. If they hope to 
see China progress gradually in the same orderly 
manner as Japan has in arriving at her present 
state of advancement, and if they wish to conduct 
China's affairs in the capacity of 'men of high 
purpose', they should make it their primary objective 
to develop their abilities and knowledge in order 
to face the challenge. We do not approve of their 
indulgence in frivolous and empty talks. We feel 
that it is our duty to advise them to devote 
themselves to their studies so that they will be 
able to enrich China's future with brilliant successes. 
The present moment is a time of. ret inspection and 
self-examination for them."
(28) "Disturbance by Chinese students", TNNS 11th December, 1903? p.5? 
"The educational and religious sectors in the year 1903”, episodes 
1 and 2, TNNS, k t h January, 1906, p .1 and 6th January, 1906, p.^ f.
(29) "The settlement of the Chinese students' incident", TNNS, 8th 
January, 1906, p.2.
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There is no doubt that the importance attached to the question of 
educating Chinese students was linked to the belief that it would result 
in better relations between China and Japan. For some Japanese, 
the threat of Western encroachment in the Far East had not 
diminished after the Russo-Japanese war. In an address at Waseda 
University in March, 1906, Okuma drew the attention of a gathering of 
Chinese students to the Far Eastern situation. He said that the 
European powers had first threatened, then bullied and lately, by 
spreading the rumour of the "yellow peril", slandered China. The 
post-war era was a time when the European people were being led astray 
and the Eastern nations were undergoing a transitional period with much 
confusion and turmoil. The state of Chinese society, Chinese politics 
and the Chinese way of thinking were not enough to enable China to 
stand on her feet in the competitive world. Chinese students themselves 
would have to look inward in order to eradicate the faults that were 
keeping their country backward. It was regrettable that China was 
no longer respected by the world. She had succumbed at the first 
encounter with foreign oppression and had to concede to humiliating 
treaties in order to attain peace which was only short-lived. Was 
it not time, therefore, for the Chinese students to exert themselves 
and fight for the future of their own country?
In short, Chinese students were urged to put their trust in 
Japanese guidance and place their confidence in Japanese help. The 
emphasis was on mutual understanding and cooperation. As Uchida 
said, "Not only is it important that Japan accept China’s students
(30) Okuma's address to Chinese students at Waseda University,
Okuma-ko Hachi.jugonen-shi, op.cit., Vol.2, pp. 561-5 6 2.
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and inspire them well, it is necessary for the Chinese government and
(31)officials to place their confidence in Japan.”
It was felt that in several ways the education of Chinese students
could be improved in order that Japanese guidance could be given more
effectively. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun urged the authorities to concentrate
on improving quality and not coping with the numbers of students# Short
term courses, for example, could be abolished. It also believed that
the Japanese authorities could encourage more communication and
cooperation between Chinese and Japanese students, the former often
being more mature in age. That many Chinese students suffered from
physical weakness and indulged in opium-smoking was, according to the
Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, attributable to negligence on the part of the
Japanese educational authorities. It maintained that Chinese students
needed encouragement from their teachers to take up sports as the
first step towards inducing them to mix with Japanese students in
(32)cultural and intellectual pursuits.
Okuma also stressed the importance of improving relations between 
Chinese and Japanese students. In a speech given at the opening ceremony
ii n ,
of the Sino-Japanese Students Association in January, 1906, he likened 
the Chinese students in Japan to Japanese students in Western countries 
in the late Tokugawa era. The present generation of Chinese students, 
Okuma said, were the inheritors and preservers of Japan's modernization.
The relationship between Japan and China was that of brothers and with 
mutual cooperation and encouragement, the two countries could become 
pillars of peace in the Far East. As Japan and China belonged to the 
same race, shared the same culture, moral standards and the heritage of
(31) "Regular meeting of the Toho Kyokai", TNNS, 8th June, 1 906, p.4.
(32) "The present state of Chinese education", TAS, 26th November, 1907, 
p.3? "The way to bring about the development of Chinese student",
TAS, 15th June, 1907, p.3.
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Confucian philosophy, Chinese students coming to Japan should benefit 
from the fact that they were learning from a totally alien culture 
which had already been assimilated into Japanese surroundings with 
which they were familiar owing to the common background between the 
two countries. This was a convenience which China could not miss.
Japanese students should bear this in mind and try to understand
(33)their Chinese fellow-students. ' At the same ceremony, Viscount 
Aoki Shuzo stressed that a friendly relationship between the peoples 
of China and Japan was as important as that between the two governments. 
There should be more integration between students of the two countries. 
Japanese students should be sincere and helpful and Chinese students 
should be humble in their search for knowledge and not be suspicious 
of the foreigners. Such a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship 
would go a long way towards the materialization of long-lasting friendship 
between the two countries.
In the years immediately after the Russo-Japanese war, Chinese 
students in Japan were exposed to new theories such as national rights, 
individual freedom, parliamentary politics and international relations.
Often carried away by their enthusiasm, they identified nationalism with 
anti-foreignism and anti-Japanese hostility was one of their expressions 
of patriotism. One reason for their anti-Japanese sentiment was that 
they seemed to receive little sympathy and much lack of da=srespect from, 
the Japanese. Inevitably they themselves contributed to such attitudes 
through their poverty, disorganization and general confusion. But 
as the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said, Chinese students had been 
exploited by the Japanese commercial sector as well as profit-making
(33) "Opening ceremony of the Association for Sino-Japanese students", 
TNNS, 29th January, 1906, p.^ f.
(3*0 ibid.
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'educationalists'. It was natural? it pointed out? that these 
students who had come to Japan with hopes and admiration should react 
against this kind of treatment and the Japanese people had only them­
selves to blame for the anti-Japanese hodility that those students 
took with them back to China. It was regrettable? said the paper? 
that the promising young people of China? Japan's neighbour and natural 
ally? should nurture enmity against her. The Japanese people would
(39)
have to be retrospective and abandon their contemptuous attitudes.
It would seem that the episode of Chinese students in Japan did 
not augur well for any other attempt on the part of Japan to pursue 
her goal of guiding China. Yet many Japanese did not fail to 
sympathize with the nationalistaspi rat ions of the Chinese students. They 
believed that only by giving them still more encouragement could Japan 
hope to bring about closer relations between the two countries.
Chinese rights recovery movement and Japan's recognition of growing 
Chinese nationalism
Beginning in 1904? despatches from Japanese ministers in China 
to the government at home were full of references to the rising tide 
of nationalism in that country. In a long report on railway construction 
in Fukien? the Japanese consul Nakamura wrote in December? 1904:
"Everyone recognizes the most radical changes 
which have taken place in the Chinese people's 
ideas. The change has been especially noticeable 
in connection with the rights recovery question.
The Chinese have become nationalistic and every­
where they are talking about rights recovery? 
railway redemption and mining development without
(35) "Anti-Japanese hostility in China"? TNNS? 30th June? 1 906? p.1.
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foreign intervention....Nationalistic thought 
in connection with foreign rights has permeated 
the entire land of China? and all classes of 
people have been affected by the currents of 
the new thought. 11
By 1905> this new sense of nationalism had manifested itself in
an anti-American boycott protesting against America's discriminatory
treatment of Chinese? in particular? the total exclusion of Chinese
labourers from the United States. Boycotts were organized in most
of the treaty ports? especially Shanghai and Canton where students
joined merchants in mass meetings and press agitation. American
trade was damaged for several months. But the basic motives of
the organizers and leaders? at any rate? were political. As the
Wai Chiao Pao said? specific grievances against the United States
were not the fundamental issues. What was basic was the elevating of
"peoples'' wisdom" through political action so as to enhance the
standing of China in the world. "All the world is watching us? and
our success will determine our fate. If we succeed? foreigners will
(37)
say we cannot be slighted."
It could also be true? as Iriye suggested? that it was the implied 
objective of the organizers and leaders to conduct the movement in
a restrained and disciplined manner in order that the Chinese would obtain
( ^  Pi)
the sympathy of enlightened foreigners. To this end? however?
the movement had only partial success. The anti-American boycott was 
soon followed by outbreaks of hostility? notably in connection with 
the imprisonment of a Chinese woman in a British prison? ordered by
(36) Japanese consul-general in Fukien Nakamura to foreign minister 
Komura? 2Ath Decerwber? 190^ f? NGB? Vol.37? part 2 (1958) 1 pp.117-123.
(37) Quoted in Iriye Akira? "Public opinion and foreign policy? the 
case of late Ch'ing China"? in A. Feuerwerker et al. ? (eds.)? 
Approaches to Modern Chinese History? op.cit.? p.22A.
(3 8) ibid.
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the British consular magistrate in Shanghai. Foreign lives and 
settlements were endangered and relations between China and foreign 
countries suffered in the course of the unrest. The United States 
government even felt that it was necessary to increase its military 
defence in the Philippine Islands.
The movement was directed at all foreign powers at whose hands 
China had suffered deprivation of her rights. Japan? whose stake in 
South Manchuria was larger than that of any other powers? was a major 
target of the Chinese movement. It was interesting? therefore? that 
during the early phase of the agitation? Japan was alleged by West­
erners to have instilled anti-foreign ideas into the minds of the Chinese people. 
The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun reported that the London Times had accused 
the Japanese residents in Peking of inciting Chinese trouble-makers 
to break out in anti-American riots; and the British consul in 
Hankow had written to the Japanese government pointing out that Japanese 
were not targets of Chinese anti-foreign hostility and that Chinese 
officials and people alike and in particular? Chinese students recently 
returning from Japan were inclined towards improving relations with 
Japan. Japanese nationals in China were therefore? believed to be 
in a privileged position? economically and politically better than that
(39)of their European and American counterparts.
It would seem that the allegation was unjustified. In fact?
Chinese students who had returned to China were equally? if not more? 
ill-disposed towards Japan. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said that as 
far as recovering their rights from foreigners was concerned? the
(39) "Anti-foreign ideas and Japan"? TAS? 19th March? 1906? p.4? "On 
relations between Japan and China"? TAS? 24th June? 1906? p.2.
According to the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun? most Europeans and Americans 
in China including G.E. Morrison? London Times Correspondent in 
Peking? held the same view.
Chinese made no distinction between the Europeans on the one hand and 
the Japanese on the other. It Maintained,moreover, that as an 
internal unrest in China would have a more adverse effect on Japan 
than any other powers? it was within Japan's "moral responsibility" 
towards the other countries to do her utmost to maintain peace and 
order xn China.
When Japan saw that her own interests alongside those of the 
Western countries were beinC threatened in China? she felt it necessary 
to speak on behalf of the powers as well as for herself. This
sense of "moral responsibility" had become part of Japan's consciousness
of her own power status since the Russo-Japanese war. At the same time? 
in warning the Chinese against extreme anti-foreignism? the Japanese 
believed they were trying to bring harmony to the relations between 
East and West.
On 19th February? 1906? the Japanese minister in China? Uchida?
was ordered by the government to deliver a message to the Chinese
government? advising the latter to exercise strict control over the 
riots:
"... The heat of the Chinese people's anti-foreign 
hostility will soon reach such a high degree that 
it cannot be predicted with certainty that 
disasters will not result. It goes without 
saying that if this were to take place? it would 
have grave repercussions on China. The Japanese
government sincerely advises the Chinese government
to seriously attend to this and make urgent efforts
to prevent any further encouragement to this
fervour"' ^
The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun commented that it was out of a sense of 
duty as China's friendly neighbour that the Japanese government had given this piece.
I W  "Anti-foreign ideas and Japan"? TAS? 19th March? 1906? p.^ f? "The
Japanese government's advice to China"? TAS? 22nd February? 1906? p.2. 
(^1) "China's anti-foreign hostility - admonition from the Japanese 
government"? TNNS, 21st February? 1906? p.3»
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of advice. The movement? it said? was an act of folly which would
lead to disastrous results for China herself. One had only to look
back at the Boxer Rebellion which had been sparked off by nothing more
than some senseless acts of violence. Yet it had ended not only
in the loss of China's sovereignty over Manchuria but the implantation
02)of the seeds of humiliation in the minds of the entire nation.
It was most important that the movement should not turn into
another Boxer incident? said the same paper, There was no evidence to
show that China had acquired the ability to administer the rights which
had been lost to foreigners since the Russo-Japanese war had ended.
The movement was merely an after-effect of the war and the Chinese
had mistaken the achievement of the Japanese victory for proof of
(A3)their own abilities.v
It was in Manchuria that the movement caused the greatest concern 
to the Japanese. As the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun put it? anti-Japanese feeling 
was creating much difficulties* for Japan. Japan had put her
entire nation at risk in fighting Russia. She had not been able
to recover what she had given up in the war except for taking over 
Russia's rights and interests in Manchuria. Not only had China not 
sought to repay Japan's efforts? she actually did not have any appreci­
ation for what Japan had contributed towards the maintenance of peace 
and civilization in the East. Furthermore? she did not have the 
slightest gratitude for Japan's sacrifices. By clamouring for her 
lost rights in southern Manchuria? China was in fact manoeuvring to 
obstruct Japan's claim to the rights which were transferred from
(A2) "China's anti-foreign hostility"? editorial? TNNS? 23rd February?
1906 ? p .2.
(A3 ) "The present situation in China" editorial? TNNS? 1st March?
1906? p.2.
the Russians. Such behaviour on China's part was a drawback to the 
improvement of relations which had hitherto been in progress between the 
two countries. One could not help feeling dismayed at the prospects 
for future relations between Japan and China and it was Japan's 
sincere hope that the Chinese government would wake up to the problem.
Yet the Japanese reacted to the rights recovery movement in 
China with mixed feelings. On the one hand, they were annoyed by the 
fact that Japanese rights and interests were threatened by Chinese 
hostility. On the other hand, they were ready to recognize in 
the movement a sense of awakening on the part of the Chinese people.
Many saw growing nationalism in China as a healthy sign. At last,
China was emerging from her backwardness and making progress to become 
a power in the civilized world. Japan had undergone a similar 
experience in the past and she could sympathize with this development 
in China. Indeed, may Japanese would have liked to think that Japanese 
guidance and leadership were accountable for the emergence of nationalist 
aspirations in the Asian countries. Hence amidst the misgivings and 
frustrations surrounding the element of anti-foreignism in the Chinese 
movement, there were unmistakable signs of optimism and enthusiasm.
An article in the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun commented that the anti- 
Japanese feeling stirred up by Chinese students was no cause for 
concern. It was merely an expression of the spirit of defiance and 
enthusiasm natural to the young generation. China badly needed such 
elements to bring fresh life to her and reform the evil practices of 
her society. If China was to perpetuate her weakness and become as
(AA) "Rights recovery movement and the diplomatic relations between 
Japan and China", TAS, 22nd October, 1906, p.2.
helpless as Korea, then Japan would never be able to extricate herself
from the need to defend herself. The fact that at that moment anti-
Japanese feeling was running high was proof that China was not content
to sucuumb to the same fate as Korea. It was a propitious sign that
(i+5)
both Japan and China were to become strong and independent.
The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun saw it as an angry reaction to 
the past injustice inflicted upon the Chinese people by the foreign 
powers. An editorial of the same paper said that hitherto, the Chinese 
people had been misunderstood not only by the Europeans and Americans 
but also by the Japanese. Chinese from southern provinces who had 
gone abroad as workers were looked upon as typical of the entire 
nation. Their forbearance was often mistaken for a lack of the spirit 
of resistance. Not only were her people subjected to insults in 
other parts of the world but China also lost her sovereignty. But as 
the Japanese minister to China in 1905 had once said, China was a "sleeping 
elephant" which would shock the whole world on its awakening. Indeed, 
the editorial continued, for the past seven or eight years, through 
the Boxer incident, the anti-American trade boycott and the concentration 
of political and economic power in the hands of Chinese living in the 
British colonies of Hong Kong, Singapore and the Malayan Peninsula, 
the Chinese had gradually proved themselves to be a nation which was 
not to be bullied. This had aroused an alarmist reaction from the 
Europeans and Americans. They seemed to have lost sight of the fact 
that had they treated the Chinese with fairness and generosity instead 
of aggressiveness and contempt, the Chinese people would have 
reciprocated politically and socially, in a manner worthy of the most 
peace-loving nation in the world. It was hoped that more and more 
people of the world would gradually come to realize the need to
(A5 ) "Peking at a glance - anti-Japanese hostility," TAS, 2?th April, 
1906, p.5.
understand the real conditions of China; while the Chinese people
themselves would endeavour, in a humble manner, to acquaint themselves
with the international situation and contribute to the strengthening
(46)
of a peaceful foundation in the Far East.
Enthusiasm for China's growing sense of awareness was expressed 
in another editorial article of the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun which 
said that a parallel could be drawn between the situation in China 
at that time and that in Japan in the early Meiji era. The Shanghai 
riot of Decem.ber, 1905 had the underlying objective of recovering 
the jurisdictional autonomy of the Chinese court. One could expect 
similar incidents to take place in other parts of China where the
Chinese would clamour for their rights. The Japanese people had
reasons to be sympathetic towards such show of anti-foreignism. Japan
herself had been swept by a wave of patriotism and enthusiasm for her
national heritage in the 18 8 0's and 1 8 9 0's. But her aspirations were 
thwarted by a fear of the Western countries which successfully 
forced Japan to agree to unequal terms in the treaties. It was only 
with a sense of awakening resulting from an indignation against 
foreign oppression that Japan realized the need to rid herself of the 
humiliating terms particularly that of extraterritoriality. The 
present anti-foreign movement which had swept China was, therefore, 
reminiscent of Japan. As the technological gap between China and 
the Western countries was too big and as China's navy and army were not 
strong enough to command respect from the powers, there was still 
no question of an equal treaty relationship between China and the West. 
Her people were therefore subjected to a sense of national humiliation.
(A6 ) "Europe, America and China", editorial, TNNS, 12th February, 1906,
p . 2 .
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Once this feeling was engendered, it was not easy to wipe it away. 
Japan could not but be concerned about the future of China. Being 
her neighbouring country, Japan was directly affected by both China's 
plight and fortune. On the one hand, Japan could not condone the 
unreasonable behaviour of the Chinese government and people while 
on the other hand, she could enlighten China on the attainment, in 
a civilized manner, of independence for the nation and dignity for 
the individual Chinese people. If Japan would take pains over this 
task, China should be able to see the day when she would rid herself
(47)of all humiliations.
But what policies should a guiding neighbour adopt towards 
China? Again the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun had this to say,
"For at least half a century since the opening 
of the ports, the Chinese people have retained 
their conservative attitudes and have not made 
much progress. This can be attributed to their 
arrogance and refusal to dispel illusions of 
their greatness. However, sone responsibilities 
can also be pinned onto the powers infringing on 
her territories. Since the opening of trade, the 
various countries have adopted a wrong attitude 
towards China. Their goal is to acquire rights 
and privileges from China and not to spread culture 
in that country. They apply pressure and insults 
in their dealings with the Chinese people rather 
than offer guidance and enlightenment.... Are 
these not factors contributing to the anti-foreign 
sentiment?.... Japan's policies towards China have 
remained constant throughout —  maintenance of 
China, adherence to the principle of the 'open 
door' and introduction of methods of development 
into China. The first two are diplomatic policies 
and the last is an act of friendship.... As long 
as the wealthy resources of East Asia are unexplored, 
commercial benefits cannot be reaped. Should 
the powers realize this and concentrate their 
efforts on developing China, Japan has every 
reason to welcome their gesture.... We believe
(A7) "Anti-foreign hostility of the Chinese people", editorial, TNNS, 
Ath January, 1 906, p.2 .
that the spread of education is the fundamental 
step in guiding China towards enlightenment....
The way to befriend her is to induce her to
taste the benefits of Western advancement so as
to gradually remove her antagonism towards 
the foreigners...."(^8)
Still , the Japanese felt cautious as they thought about the 
difficulties of the task they faced. In particular, they were doubtful 
about China’s response to Japanese guidance. As the Toyko Nichi-Nichi 
Shimbun put it, nationalism, if suitably guided, could lead to national 
unification. However, it was no easy task to control China's anti- 
foreign sentiment and direct it to beneficial nationalism. China was 
big and expansive. There were immense differences among the people 
throughout the country and the Peking government did not command alleg­
iance from its subjects. Any mistakes on the part of the government
could lead to a second or third Boxer incident. The other powers 
recognized Japan's natural responsibility to lead China towards develop­
ment on account of the geographical and historical closeness of the
two countries. But this also meant that Japan would inevitably
be the first to encounter disaster if she made any mistakes in the 
venture. One would suppose that it was essential to encourage a 
sense of loyalty to the Emperor and respect for the military in the 
Chinese as prerequisites for the implementation of reforms. Nevertheless, 
one had to bear in mind the danger of growing Chinese arrogance and 
conceit once they had attained the semblance of national unity. They 
would probably repudiate Japan's commitment and close her door to the 
Europeans and Americans. It had often been said that China and Japan 
should never disassociate from one another on am ount of their racial
(48) "The enlightenment of China", editorial, TNNS, Ath July, 1906# p.2.
and cultural affinity. However, China had been extremely contemptuous
of Japan up until the Sino-Japanese war. At the moment,- she was being
cooperative towards Japan. She was sending thousands of students.
This had been motivated by a desire to strengthen herself and need to
learn from Japan. But Chinese students who had returned home were
not professing any good-will towards their host country. China was
treating Japan in the same way as she did the Western countries.
Japan, sadly, had not attained any special position in China's foreign
relations. Hence if she was to worry about the lack of nationalistic
feeling in the Chinese, she should first realize that the Chinese
people also lacked sufficient knowledge of the meaning of nationalism.
If China did not discard her arrogance, acknowledge the equality of
races, respect justice in international relations and accept the need
to be humble in her search for peace and progress, then for Japan to
encourage a spirit of loyalty to the Emperor and respect for the military
(4-9)
would be tantamount to sowing the seeds of future disaster.
But there was also optimism that China would recover in a short 
while from the extremity of her anti-foreign hostility. The Tokyo 
Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, for example, said the result of the Russo-Japanese 
war had led to great changes in international relations in the Far 
East. The conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the 
strengthened position of the United States in East Asia had paved the 
way for the preservation of China's territorial integrity and peace 
in this part of the world. China should make use of this opportune 
moment to reform her internal policies and strengthen herself. If 
she would conduct her policies in the manner of a progressive and
(4 9 ) "The ways to enlighten China", editorial, TNNS, 15th August, 1906,
p.2.
'independent' nation, the recovery of her rights would only be a matter 
of time. On Ath June, 1 906, the same paper said,
"We cannot deny that the Chinese people's potentials
are something to be reckoned with. The
contradictions in their theories and ideas and 
the conflicting policies of the Chinese government 
are but unavoidable mistakes which we must 
overlook. It is the duty of Japan to take up 
the position of a leader offering China supervision
and encouragement and guarding her from lapsing
into the depths of further mistakes...."(51)
Thus, it would appear that the aspirations of the Chinese movement
as expressed by the informed sector of the Chinese public like the
Wai Chiao Pao —  to obtain the sympathy of enlightened foreigners by 
elevating the people's wisdom through political action —  had been
answered. Japan, if not any other power, had come to resize that
this new nationalism could not be treated as blind anti-foreignism.
The realization of what was happening in China also raised serious
problems for Japanese policy. As Iriye puts it, this new sense of
awareness was "pictured by Japan as nationalistic vis-a-vis foreign
rights and potentially anti-government in domestic politics. Japan
was confronted with the alternatives of either pursuing its rights
and interests in China and risking not only the growth of anti-Japanese
sentiment, but possibly also, a dangerous situation for the dynasty,
or coming to terms with Chinese public opinion with a view towards
consolidating essential Japanese interests and solidifying the power
(52)of the Peking government..." ' Hayashi Gonsuke, Japanese minister
in Peking between 1906-1908 wrote in March, 1907 that Chinese nationalism 
was a "natural phenomenon expressing the people's self-awareness". It
(50) "China's anti-foreignism" editorial, TNNS, 23rd February, 1906, p.2.
(5 1) "The Chinese people's self-awakening", editorial, TNNS, Ath June,
1 906, p.2 .
(52) Iriye Akira, "Public Opinion and foreign policy, the case of 
late Ch'ing China", op.cit., p.230.
was impossible to eradicate it by force. Japan should take advantage 
of such a sentiment with the view towards 'supervising and guiding' 
Chinese nationalism. It was particularly urgent to form close ties 
with prominent officials in Peking and the provinces so as to prevent 
political upheaval. Both these objectives necessitated a conciliatory 
attitude and compromising spirit in dealing with less vital areas of 
Japanese rights in China.^ 3 ^
The underlying objective was closer cooperation between the two 
countries in this new phase of relationship. This idea was also 
put forward in Hayashi's speech given at a regular meeting of the Toho 
Kyokai in July the same year,
"...There may have been more frequent negotiations 
on various questions between Japan and China 
since the Russo-Japanese war. But these are 
only matters of little importance which do not 
call for anxiety on our part. Although it is 
not easy to predict the outcome of the Chinese 
government's activities [with regard to the 
rights recovery movement], I am confident that 
henceforth a still more important relationship 
must evolve between Japan and China. It would 
benefit both countries if we would enlighten and 
guide the Chinese people who are in doubts. Japan' 
policies towards China since the Sino-Japanese 
war have been to preserve her territories. China 
may have suspected Japan's intentions and resented 
her help. But Japan must dispel China's doubts 
against all odds and urge her to make progress in 
her development. There are rumours of various 
conflicts arising from Manchuria between the two 
countries but I believe that these are extremely 
immaterial incidents which must not be used as 
excuses for mutual conflicts. Not only are 
present relations between Japan and China in an 
excellent state, future relations are also hopeful. 
It is important that Japan must treat China with 
sincerity and cooperate with her in promoting 
civilization and peace in the East."(5A)
(53) Quoted in Iriye, ibid., Hayashi to Hayashi, 30th April, 1907,
Japanese Foreign Ministry File, "Kakukoku naisei kankei zasshin, 
Shina no bu : Manshu", (Miscellaneous items on domestic policies, 
China : Manchuria).
(5A) "Minister Hayashi's speech", reprinted in TNNS, 12th July, 1907,
p.5? "Regular meeting of the Toho Kyokai", TAS, 1st July, 1907, p.2
Japan to force China to strengthen herself
The agitation to recover China's rights from the foreigners preceded 
a much more fundamental movement for political renovation. Under 
the pressure of rising nationalist sentiment, the Manchu government 
launched a programme of internal reforms following the Japanese model.
The influence which Japan had on the reforms themselves did not, 
however, throw much light on Sino-Japanese relations. What was more 
significant, perhaps, was Japan's attitudes and responses towards this 
attempt on the part of the Peking government to introduce reforms 
throughout the country on an unprecedented scale.
Japan's victory over Russia had strengthened her conviction in leading 
China towards enlightenment. Many believed that Japanese influence in 
East Asia had significantly increased after the war. In October, 190^ , 
Okuma gave a speech entitled "Japanese influence in East Asia" at the 
Shinkan Kyokai in which he introduced th e  idea of Japanese, power in the 
"Asian Monroe Doctrine". He argued that Japan's newly acquired 
influence in the Far East had made her the only country in a position 
to take up the responsibility of dealing with Asian affairs. No 
big power should intervene in any matter in Asia which affected Japanese 
interests. He went on to say that it was urgent for Japan to intro­
duce reform policies in Korea and China. China was like a sick man
and Japan was the only country which could cure her. The time had 
come when Japan's influence in Asia was beginning to be respected by 
the world and it was also time for her to set to work on China's 
illness. ^ 5 )
(55) Okuma, "Japanese influence in East Asia", Gaiko Jiho, Tokyo,No. 8^f (Vol.7, 
No .12). December 190^ -, pp. -^2-T9. Also Okuma-ko Hachi jugonen-shi, 
op.cit.i Vol.2. pp. -^36-^3 8. See also Chapter Four.
One year later in November, 1905> Okuma spoke with more urgency 
about the necessity of reforms in China as the prerequisite to peace 
in the Far East. In his speech "Further discussion on peace in 
East Asia", given at the Toho Kyokai, he said that Japan had to force 
China to carry out reforms. He warned that the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance could net serve to preserve China as the cause of her decline 
came from within. The Chinese ministers were senile with little 
insight into the future of the country and the Chinese government was 
merely trying to prolong its life-span. It had foolishly spurned 
Japan's friendship and jeopardized peace in the Far East. Hence if 
Japan wished to save China, she would have to apply pressure and make 
her influence felt in Peking. Only by making China strengthen herself 
and guiding her in her reforms could Japan hope to ensure peace in the 
East/ 56 ^
While many Japanese would have had misgivings about Okuma's 
argument for Japan taking sole responsibility in managing affairs in 
Asia, they would have had little reservations in supporting his idea 
of forcing China to adopt more enlightened policies both in her 
internal affairs and in her relations with Japan. Japan's mission 
to lead her backward neighbours towards development had derived 
from her success in modernization. Japan's reform was accomplished, 
her institutional structure perfected. The Japanese were now looking 
towards China and Asia where they could make a contribution comparable 
to those made by the West in other undeveloped parts of ihe world.
In attempting to do so, the Japanese adopted the tactics and tone 
of a big power. And when they felt that China had continued to be
(5 6) Okuma, "Further discussion on peace in East Asia", ibid,No.9 (Vol.9? 
N0 .1 O January, 1906, pp. 1-13> See also "Okuma's speech at the 
Toho Kyokai on 5th November, 1905”? TNNS, 6th November, 1905> 
p.2 and TAS, 6th November, 1905i p-3»
steeped in backwardness, Japan would have to compel her to do so.
In a review of Okuma's speech, the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said that
the Chinese should not be surprised that Okuma, who had spent his life
-time espousing the preservation of China, should have uttered those
seemingly harsh words. Okuma’s advice for the Japanese government
was wise. But China needed not be alarmed by it. For in assuming
such an attitude, Japan had no motive other than seeing peace restored
in the Far East. China had to bear in mind that Japan’s policies of
"open door" and preservation of Chinese territories were carried out
to both countries' advantage. China should have nothing to fear if
she would openly negotiate and make compromises with Japan in matters
relating toJapansinterests. However, she had ignored the overall
importance of the situation, turned her back on Japan's friendship
and resorted to "crafty plots and tricks". That was why Japan now
felt it imperative to exercise her power to meet the situation. As
Japan's new position and power had been acknowledged by the other
countries, it was only a matter of course that she should make use of
(57)them to maintain peace in the interests of both Japan and China.
However, the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun believed that Japan should be
sympathetic towards the Chinese reform movement and recognize it as
the manifestation of good intentions to make progress even though
(
it was sneered by the rest of the world. Talking of the
successful training programme for the Chinese provincial armies which 
had taken place in the preceding six or seven years, the same newspaper said 
the Japanese military advisers had done China an invaluable service and it 
hoped that they would continue to be appointed by the Chinese government.
(57) "Okuma's speech", TAS, 8th November, 1905? p.3*
(5 8) "The progress of massive reforms in China", editorial, TAS, 23rd 
September, 1906, p.3»
Foreign advisers, it said, often devoted their best to their host 
countries. During the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese government 
appointed over six hundred foreign experts in various government 
enterprises and those people had truly devoted their services to 
the well-being of Japan. Now Japan would offer China what she had 
received from Europe and America. These were only the obligations of 
the countries of a civilized world. A weak China would not only 
be a disaster to the Chinese people but;also a serious drawback to 
Japan's foreign relations. Japan should therefore do her best to
(59)make China strong. In another article,the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun
said that Japan should fulfil the duty of a good neighbour and with the 
help of England, protect China from foreign incursions by maintaining 
the principle of "open-door''. In this way, China would be able to 
reform her internal politics in peace. Moreover, Japan's conclusions 
of agreements with France and Russia should not hinder her from supporting 
China's reform movement. The Japanese Gaimusho should encourage the 
Chinese government to implement its constitutional programme regardless 
of Japan's new involvement with the powers/^^
But the state of affairs in China was none too promising. The 
decline of the Empire caused by the deterioration in the functioning 
of the central and provincial governments called for governmental 
reforms. This in turn gave rise to occasions in which the century-old 
rivalry between the Manchu and Chinese officials was manifested within 
the central government, leading to the further loss of centralization 
and control over the movement to overthrow the Manchu regime.
(59) "The Chinese army and Japan", editorial, TAS, 24th December, 1906, p.3-
(60) "The Chinese imperial edict for the establishment of a constitution",
TAS, 4th September, 1906, p.5? and "The present situation of 
China's government", TAS, 14th August, 1907, p.3»
Hence it was with a good deal of insight that the Tokyo newspapers 
gave warnings of the difficulties facing China in establishing a 
constitution. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, for example, urged 
China first to sweep away all evil practices notably corruption in 
the government and institutions such as the army. Then she should 
centralize all power in Peking from where she could effectively build 
up her military defence, reorganize the finances, introduce nation­
wide education and set up a police force. But centralization depended 
on a harmonious relationship first between the Manchus and Chinese 
and second, between the new generation represented mainly by returned 
students who were full of new ideas and the older governmental leaders 
who were often steeped in inefficiency and corruption. The traditional 
rivalry between the Manchus and the Chinese was particularly harmful 
as it brought into the open the question of allegiance from the Chinese 
people to their Manchu monarch. This was especially important at a 
time when the Chinese people were beginning to question the ability 
of the Manchu government to protect the country from Western incursions. 
Anti-foreignism tended to aggravate the hostility against the Manchus.
And it would surely create difficulties and embarrassment for the
, ( 6 1 ) government.
One ray of hope seemed to come from the fact that both Yuan Shih- 
k'ai and Chang Chih-tung had been included in the Peking government as a 
result of the reform in the official system in April, 1907. The 
Japanese press was in favour of Japan giving support to these two 
progressive Chinese leaders. It hoped that Yuan and Chang would 
successfully effect centralization, suppress the revolutionary
(6 1) See various articles in the TNNS and TAS. TNNS : "Difficulties 
surrounding the implementation of constitutional policies", 
editorial, 5th September, 1906, p.2, "The present situation of 
Peking political circles", special report from Peking, 19th 
September, 1906, p.1 , "Inside the Chinese army", 19th June 19P7, p.2. 
"The future of Chinese constitutionalism" editorial, 16th September,
1907, p.2. TAS’. "China and the constitutional movement", editorial, 
31st July, 1906, p.3.
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outbreaks of discontented Chinese. The Tokyo newspapers, on the 
one hand, urged the Manchu government to exercise its sense of 
benevolence and responsibility in dealing with the subversive 
elements and on the other hand, asked the Chinese revolutionaries 
to discard their narrow-minded hatred for their non-Chinese rulers.
Both the Nichi-Nichi Shimbun and the Asahi Shimbun reckoned that 
both parties should channel their efforts towards the completion of 
constitutional reforms and build up the framework of a self-strengthening 
society. A revolution in China would only invite foreign intervention, 
endanger the existence of the country and allow the face and honour of 
China to be disgraced. ^
Rapprochement with the West
Japan's claim to guide China towards reform and modernization 
had been strengthened by her victory over Russia in 1905. The 
Japanese believed that they had attained the position to introduce 
Western civilization to the East. But the victory over Russia had other 
implications for the Japanese. It was a major step forward towards 
'civilization' of which the Far East had hitherto been deprived by the 
absence of peace. That peace had not been a reality in this part of 
the world was believed to be as much a result of Russia's violation 
as the inability on the part of the other Asian countries to overcome 
their backwardness. Increasingly in the post-Russo-Japanese-war era, 
the idea of a civilized world had come to be associated by the Japanese 
with the Western powers which were enjoying the fruit of development
(62) "The riots in southern China", TAS, 1st June, 1907, p.3? "The
organization of China's political parties", TNNS, 16th September, 
1907, p.2 .
and modernization.
At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, the Jiji Shimpo had 
said that Japan was "striding along the road to civilization under the 
guidance of England and A m e r i c a . I n d e e d ,  some Japanese would
tlae
have liked to believe that the Western rumour ofA"yellow peril" was 
not directed against Japan but the rest of the Asian countries. When 
Ueda Mannen was talking of the"Principle of enlightenment in literature" 
(Bungaku no kaikoku shugi), he said. "Although Japan belongs to the 
yellow race, she is a civilized nation. One must not generalize 
and view the Japanese people in the same light as the Chinese, Korean 
or other nations of East Asia."^^ Again the Nihohjin said in May,
1904,
"...The so-called yellow people refers to the 
four hundred million Chinese people. If, [with 
their unenlightened state of mind], they were 
as strong as the Japanese, then the European and 
American peoples would surely be in great danger. 
This is how the ’yellow peril', in the main, is 
to be explained.... During the Boxer Rebellion 
in northern China... a lot of suffering was infl­
icted on the Europeans and Americans.... If one 
views the outbreak of harmful unrest as constituting 
the 'yellow peril', then one must say that it has 
been prevented [precisely] by the Japanese... who 
actually carry the principle of guiding China 
towards enlightenment alongside the European and 
American countries. It is Russia which has tried 
to prevent enlightened ideas of the West from 
reaching the Chinese people and peaceful enterprises 
from progressing in China, thus opposing the 
principle of the Japanese people and the hope of 
the civilized countries....The Japanese, by 
fighting the Russians...[only] wish to introduce 
an opening for peaceful enterprisg^^on behalf 
of the Europeans and Americans." v
Undoubtedly, a half century's work had made Japan a far more
(63) "The gcod-will of America", Jiji Shimpo, 14th February, 1904, 
quoted in Oka Yoshitake, op.cit., p.44.
(64) "The views of ten distinquished scholars on the Russo-Japanese 
war" (Ju-taika senji taikan), ibid., p.45.
(6 5) "The yellow peril and Russia", Nihonjin,No.211 , 20th May, 1904, 
quoted in Somura Yasunobu, op.cit., pp.267-268.
developed country than the rest of Asia. The defeat of Russia was 
an achievement unprecedented in Asian history of the early twentieth 
century. As the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said, the victory of 
Japan was not a victory of the Asian peoples. Japan was a unique 
country. Her defeat of Russia was partly a result of Western technol­
ogies and partly Japanese etatisme. The Russian people were a 
mixture of European and Asian races. They were of low calibre and 
owing to her despotic political system, Russia was entirely different 
from Japan and the European countries but resembled most Asian countries.
The victory of Japan was therefore the victory of a Europeanized country
(66)over an Asianized country and not a victory of the Asian people.
Increasingly, the Japanese looked towards the 'civilized countries' 
of the Western world. Japan, now a Westernized Asian nation, should join hands 
with the Western powers to spread civilization in the East. This, 
however, did not necessarily mean a complete break of ties with her 
Asian neighbours. The Kokka Gakkai Zasshi wrote in 1906 about the 
rapprochement of Japan and France,
"...Japan wishes to see white and yellow nations 
united in a common financial policy.... To 
achieve a thorough cooperation between the 
white and yellow nations... capital from the 
former would have to be used to support the 
needs of the latter.... Japan (and the rest 
of Asia ) could not alienate herself from the 
white nations owing to the limitations [especially] 
in her finances...."(67)
Acceptance by the Western powers was important. According to 
the Kokumin Shimbun, Japan's policies of preservation and'bpen-door" in 
China had won the approval and understanding of the West. In fact,
(6 6) "No victory for the Asian people" editorial, TNNS, 11th July, 1906, p.2.
(67) "On the necessity of an agreement between Japan and France",
Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, October, 1 906, translated in Wai Chiao Pao,
No. 1 6 1, 20th November, 1906, pp. 14-15.
it said that Japan's policies had so far run parallel to those of 
the Western powers. It was true that, because of the geographical 
and historical closeness of the two countries, Japan had a special 
duty towards China in introducing her to civilization, peace and 
progress. But this special relationship should not prevent the 
powers from cooperating with Japan in guiding and supporting China.
Japan was the link between China and the powers. Her role was to 
open China to world relations, introduce the Chinese mind to the 
newest technologies and progressive ideas of the West so that China 
would find a place for herself in the civilized world. The recent 
argument of some Japanese that Japan had the sole right to manage affairs 
in East Asia was contrary to Japan's goal which was the attainment of 
peace, progress and civilization in the Far East and general good-will 
in the world. Such narrow-minded ideas as put forward in the East 
Asian Monroe Doctrine could only limit Japan and make enemies for
(68herself and could not justify Japan's claims to be a civilized nation.
In fact, Okuma himself accepted in 1907 that the current trend 
in the relations between the countries of the world was one of 
gradual harmonization of the Eastern and Western civilizations. He 
told a gathering of Chinese students that for centuries, civilization 
in the Eastern hemisphere had spread eastward only as far as Japan and 
civilization in the Western hemisphere had advanced westward no further 
than America. It was only lately that the two civilizations had
begun to meet. After the initial conflicts, exchanges and adaptations,
Western and Eastern cultures gradually blended with one another.
(6 8) "Policies towards China", Kokumin Shimbun, translated in CCJP, 
op.cit., Vol.4, 20th November, 1904, p.1 .
This process had enabled Japan to become a modernized state. If 
this could happen to Japan, it was only logical that it could also 
happen to China. He believed that the likelihood of wars among 
the "civilized countries" of the world was diminishing. But the 
Chinese should still exert and strengthen themselves for a nation's 
weakness would only lead to sacrifice and disasters for the world.
After all, the Russo-Japanese war had been caused by the inability of 
the Chinese to safeguard the three Eastern Provinces in Manchuria.
X X X
Japan entered a new phase in international relations after 
having emerged as a world power from the war of 190^-1905• A new 
element developed in her attitudes towards the Western powers on 
the one hand and China on the other —  a concern with the future of 
East-West relations. The Japanese public and leaders began to talk 
about Japan's task to "harmonize" relations between East and West and her 
right To force Lhina to -adopt Western civilization. This had 
stemmed from a fundamental awareness of Japan being an Asian nation, 
now successfully Westernized and faced with growing aspirations of 
the Eastern nations on the one hand and increasing competitions from 
the Western powers on the other.
The Japanese were never more convinced that if permanent peace 
was to become a reality in the Far East, China had to strengthen 
herself. There was also a continuation of the feeling that Japan
(6 9) "Count Okuma's speech at a gathering of Chinese students" (at
the Chinese Young Men's Christian Association), TAS, 3rd April, 
1907, p.A.
should lead the Asian countries in their awakening. In fact, the 
few years after the Russo-Japanese war saw the concept of Japanese 
guidance actually put into effect on an unprecedented scale. China’s 
attempt to establish a constitution and launch reforms gave Japan the 
opportunity to lead her towards modernization notably in the army 
and educational systems. There was no lack of enthusiasm and optimism 
surrounding China's "awakening", her resolution to strengthen herself 
and at last, her search for the key to civilization and peace in the 
East. Even more fervently, it seems, Japan grasped the long-awaited 
moment to play the role of a friend and leader and, so she believed > 
actually do something which would ensure her own national safety.
The Japanese victory over Russia brought revenge and self- 
confidence. It became imperative that Japan made it clear to the 
world that her stake in Southern Manchuria was vital to her national 
independence, as distinct from the interests of t. e Western powers 
in that area. This necessitated a re-examination of her relations 
with China. The assumption underlying Japan's idea of cooperation 
between the two countries after the war was that China would fully recogn­
ize her rights and interests in southern Manchuria. The Chinese hence 
found themselves no better off after the war. Moreover, growing 
Chinese nationalism meant that cooperation on such a basis could 
hardly materialize. The Japanese, on the other hand, looked upon 
China's resentment of her new position as indicative of her ingratitude 
and her inability to see that cooperation with Japan was for her 
own good.
The Japanese were also frustrated by the Chinese government's 
slowness in strengthening the country. The mission to guide China 
had derived from Japanese success in modernization. It represented 
a heavenly calling which was incumbent upon Japan whether China wished
to be saved from destruction or not. In the post-war era .Japan's 'duty’ 
to lead her Asian neighbours came to be associated, with the responsibilities 
and tactics of a big power. Hence the unexpected remonstrance from 
Okuma in 1905 of the need for Japan to use a strong hand in making the 
Chinese government see Japan's point of view and forcing it to 
carry out reforms. This was in fact a continuation of his declaration 
in the so-called Asian Monroe Doctrine in late 190F that Japan had 
sole responsibility in East Asia. The Japanese public too, was concern­
ed at the government's "inadequate" policies towards China. The 
world, it reckoned, was entering an era of intensive competition. It 
was doubtful whether Japan was strong enough yet to participate in the 
competitive power politics. Japan would have to assert herself 
still further in order to stand up to the challenge. The implantation 
of her influence in East Asia and the exploitation of the advantages 
and prestige which she had won in China as a result of the war seemed 
to be the logical solution.
But Japan had also recognized, at the same time, the emergence of an 
awareness on the part of the Chinese which was nationalistic especially 
in face of foreign rights. This nationalism was also potentially 
anti-government in domestic politics. Rather than risking the growth 
of anti-Japanese sentiment and a dangerous situation for the dynasty, 
Japan opted for conciliation and came to terms with Chinese nationalism 
with a view to consolidating and maintaining the status quo in the  
Far Fhst. The well-being of the Chinese government was as important 
for China's stability as Japan's safety. Japan would do well to 
take positive steps to improve relations with both the Chinese govern­
ment and people. What was most important was that Japan should 
guide the nationalijtaspirations of the Chinese in the right direction 
and prevent them from turning into blind anti-foreign hostility.
222.
However, the realization of the need for restraint as exemplified 
by the decision of the Conference on Manchuria of the genro and cabinet 
ministers in March-April, 1906 did not result solely from the consider­
ation of Chinese hostility. In fact, the Conference was called to 
deal with complaints made by the Western powers that the Japanese 
authorities in Manchuria had engaged in discriminatory activities.
Concern about reactions from the Western powers had come to play an 
important part in Japanese political thinking. It became evident 
that the idea of Japan as a civilized nation would be given meaning 
only by her being accepted by the West. Rather than insisting on 
her right to guide China on grounds of racial and cultural affinity, 
many Japanese believed that they could now fulfil this mission in 
cooperation with the Western powers. Japan was now conscious of the 
need to abide by the rules of the "community of nations" —  rules 
which constituted the criteria of acceptance and civilization.
Japan's diplomatic position after the Russo-Japanese war led her 
to follow a line of policy alongside the Western powers in pursuit of 
of her own interests. But more often than not, one is persuaded to 
feel that for Japan, the question of rapprochement with the West and cooper­
ation with China were not conflicting issues. The underlying 
assumption of the Japanese was that improvement in Japan's relations 
with the Western powers need not entail estrangement with China.
Rather, many believed that one complemented the other. Increasingly,
Japan was convinced that she had an important role to play in her relations 
with the Western countries, but it was a role which was closely related 
to China coming to terms with Japan's growing power and position in 
East Asia.
CHAPTER SIX
CHINESE STUDENTS IN JAPAN AND JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN 
CHINA , 1895-1911
From about 1898 to 1907, Japanese influence in the educational 
development of China rapidly increased. This was followed by a 
rather abrupt decline towards the end of the first decade of the 
twentieth century. By the time the Chinese revolution broke out 
in 1911? Japanese involvement in China's educational affairs had 
ended almost completely. Much has been said of the Japanese and 
Chinese attitudes towards the question of Chinese students in Japan 
which arose as part of the argument for Sino-Japanese cooperation.
This chapter looks at the two channels by which educational influence 
was exercised by Japan on China —  the academic curricula of Chinese 
students in Japan and the educational activities of Japanese organizations 
and individuals in China.
The sending of students to Japan to be educated in the "new learning"
began as part of the educational reform in China which took place
soon after the Sino-Japanese war. There were obvious advantages of
sending students to Japan rather than to the West. Chang Chih-tung
in his essay, "Exhortation to Study", pointed out that it was more
economical both in time and money, it was easier for Chinese students
to learn the Japanese language than to learn Western languages and
it was a short-cut to acquiring Western knowledge as the Japanese had
(1)selected those areas of Western learning essential for modernization.
(1) Excerpt from ChangChih-tung's "Exhortation to Study" in Shu Hsin-ch'eng, 
Chin-tai Chung-kuo Liu-hsiieh-shi (A history of Chinese students 
studying abroad in recent times), Shanghai, 1933s pp.F7-98.
Mention has been made of the favourable attitude of many Japanese
government and military leaders to the idea of Japan training Chinese
students in the post-1895 period. It May, 1 898, the Japanese minister
to China, Yano Fumio, intimated to the Chinese government that the
Japanese government intended to cultivate friendly relations with
China and as China at that time urgently needed people with abilities
and knowledge, it was advisable for her to send people to Japan to
study. Japan would contribute to the funds required for such a project
and the number of students to take part was tentatively fixed at two 
(2)hundred. Yano's offer coincided with the Japanese government's
demand for railway concessions in Fukien. He also believed that new 
men of ability influenced by Japan and distributed over the old empire 
would probably favour the extension of Japan's influence on the Asian 
Continent. ^ ^
Yang Shen-hsiu of the Chinese Ministry of Defence who presented Yano' 
case to the Tsungli Yamen on 1st June was in favour of accepting the 
Japanese offer. He pointed out that organizations with the objective 
of helping the development of East Asian countries had been established 
in Japan and the Chinese government should send students to that country. 
He also proposed that students who were already studying the Japanese 
language in the T'ung Wen Kuan (Interpreters' College) should be 
selected. Furthermore, the governor-generals cf Kwangtung, Kwangsi, 
Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsu and Chekiang should be asked to select young,
(4)intelligent people who had some knowledge of the Japanese language.
(2) Yano's message quoted in Shu Hsin-ch'engfedOhung-kuo chin-tai Chiao- 
yu-shih Tzu-liao (Documents on Chinese education, 1860-1922), 
Peking, 1962, p. l73»
(3) Yano to foreign minister Nisbi, 29th April, 1898, NGB, Vol. 31>
Part 1 , (1954) No. 490, p. 502.
(4) Yang Shen-hsiu to Tsungli Yamen, 1st June, 1898, Yu Pao-hsien (ed.)
Huang-ch'ao Hsii-ai Wen-p'ien (A collection of essays by writers of
the reform movement), Shanghai, 1902, Vo1.15i Section on School II, 
pp. 41-42#
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The first group of thirteen students had been sent by the Chinese
government in 1896 to Kano Jigoro's Higher Teachers Training College
to leam Japanese and literature as well as general subjects under
(5)the supervisor Honda Masujiro and other Japanese teachers. After
Japan had made the offical offer in 18981 steps were taken by the
Japanese educational authorities to cope with the larger number of
students with inadequate knowledge of the Japanese language. In
June, 1898, the Nichika Gakudo (Sino-Japanese School) was set up in
Japan by Takakusu Junjiro. Designed especially for Chinese students,
it gave them preparatory tuition in the Japanese language and other
subjects to enable them to take up specialized studies in higher institutions
such as the university.^ ' In l899i the Nichika Gakudo had twenty-six
(7)students from Chekiang, Kiangsu, Kwangtung, Chihli, Anhwei and Fukien.
Most of the students attended schools and institutions especially
set up for them. Many of the earlier students selected from among
imperial clansmen were sent by the government to study military
science. 3?-he— largest military science. The largest military
preparatory school for Chinese students at that time was the Seijo
Gakko to which the first military students were sent by Chang Chih-tung,
Yuan Shih-k'ai and Liu K'un-i after the visit of the Japanese
emissaries sent by Kawakami Soroku in late 1897. Up to 1902, the
school had been taking in Chinese students sponsored by their government.
In 1902, nine private students wanted to enter the school but the
(8)Chinese minister in Japan refused to endorse their applications. This
was, at that time, an entrance requirement for military students set
(5) "Miscellaneous records of the first lecture in the courses of
general subjects and teachers training of the Kobun Shoin" in 
Shu Hsin-ch'eng, Chin-tai Chung-kuo Liu-hsueh-shi, p.22.
(6) ibid., p.25.
(7) "Prospects of the Nichika Gakudo", collected in Huang-ch'ao Hsii-ai.
Wen-p'ien, op.cit., Vol.1 6, Section on School III, pp.l5U-l6a.
Chang Tsung-hsiang, who was among the twenty-six students, wrote 
an essay "On guide-lines to studying in Japan" in 1901 when he 
returned to China expounding the advantages and necessity of 
sending more students to Japan.
(8) See Chapter Four.
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down by the Chinese government. A dispute ensued between the students 
and the minister. On the intervention by the Toa Dobun Kai, the 
Chinese minister in Tokyo and the Japanese government arrived at an 
agreement whereby a Shimbu Gakko was to be established which would 
take over the entire student body of the Seijo Gakko. From 1903» at 
the request of the Chinese minister and supervisor of students in
(9)Japan, the Seijo Gakko began to offer arts courses to Chinese students.
The Shimbu Gakko was established in July,1903 by the General Staff
of the Japanese army. It became the main military school which gave
Chinese students preparatory training for further military education
at the various training schools for army officers. It would seem
that the nine private students who caused the dispute in 1902 did not
win their case. Entrance to the Shimbu Gakko was still restricted
to government-sponsored student s . ' From April, 1904, one hundred
students were sent annually to the school by the Chinese government
which paid the expenses of the students' education as well as the
(1 1)salaries of the teachers. The number of students at the Shimbu
Gakko exceeded that of the Seijo Gakko in earlier years. By 1907,
there was a total of about eight hundred and fifty Chinese military
graduates from the two schools. The "Students' Register" in the
"Survey of the Shimbu Gakko" in 1907 reveals that ninety percent of
the important officers in the Chinese army at the end of the decade
(12)had received their training at the school.
Many private students were accepted into the Tobu Gakudo* Founded
(9) Saneto Keishu, Chugokujin Nihon Ryugakushi (A history of Chinese 
students in Japan), Tokyo, i960, p.6 8.
(10) ibid., pp.68-6 9.
(11) Yo-chang Ch'eng-an Hui-lan (Collection of documented treaty stipulations), 
Vol. 32, Part 2, cited in Shu Hsin-ch'eng, Chin-tai Chung-kuo 
Liu-hsueh-shi, p.57.
( 1 2 ) Saneto, op.cit., p. 70. Also, "Survey of the Shimbu Gakko, April, 1907", 
cited in Shu Hsin-ch'eng, Chin-tai Chung-kuo Liu-hsueh-shi,
pp. 63-64.
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by Terao Torn in 19031 it was a private school offering military
studies to Chinese students who were refused entrance into the Shimbu
Gakko and came to be known as the private Shimbu Gakko. Many students
bad.
who later became leading revolutionariesAstudied here. According to
Saneto, the Tobu Gakudo might well have been a breeding place of the
(13)active members of the revolutionary movement in Japan.
In 1902, the Toa Dobun Shoin was set up in Tokyo. The school 
admitted Chinese and Korean students wishing to do general studies. It also
(l4)offered crash courses to those who wished to study law and politics.
In 1903i the Chinese minister of education, Chang Po-hsi, in an "Outline
of educational activities",put emphasis on developing the teachers
training colleges in China. He called for a general revision of the
curricula of the existing teachers training colleges and advocated
the setting up of new colleges in more provinces. Students were to be
sent abroad to take up teachers training courses so that they might
(15)fill the places in the newly-established colleges at home. By
1904, most of the teachers in the provinces had studied in Japan.
Many of these students had entered the Kobun Shoin founded in 1902 
by Kano Jigoro who had himself investigated the Chinese educational 
system. Besides teachers training courses, the school also offered 
three-year courses in Japanese, psychology, management, physics and
v, • + (16)chemistry.
The emphasis on the establishment of teachers training colleges in 
various provinces of China in 1903 was part of a major step in the 
reform of China's educational system. On the prompting of Chang Chih-
(13) Saneto, p.7l.
(14) ibid., p.6 8.
(15) "Survey of the Shimbu Gakko, April, 1907", cited in Shu Hsin-ch'eng,
Chin-tai Chung-kuo Liu-hsueh-shi, p.52.
(16) Saneto, p.6 8.
tung, a law was passed that the scholar-gentry in charge of the schools in 
the provinces be sent outside China to investigate the educational 
systems in other countries, especially Japan. Chang also drew up a 
set of regulations encouraging private students to take up studies
(17)in Japan. The result was a rapid increase in the number of
privately- supported students. The adoption in 1903 of the new 
educational system modelled on that in Japan, the abolition of the 
civil service examination system in 1905 and the defeat of Russia 
in the same year explain the continual increase in the number of students 
to over seven thousand by 1906. ^ ^
The Chinese government was concerned at the rapidly growing student
population in Japan. In August, 1906, it ordered the provincial
governments to limit the number of students. .Students wishing to
study in Japan were required to have already reached higher school
standard and to be familiar with the Japanese language. They were
also required to sit a preliminary examination at home before they
took up specialized or higher studies in Japan. Short-term attendance
(19)at schools in Japan was also forbidden.
In late 1907, the number of students who were taking preparatory 
courses in general studies with a view to entering higher educational 
institutions in Japan exceeded two thousand* Seeing that the 
places in such higher institutions were limited, the Chinese minister,
Li Chia-chii, made an agreement with the Japanese Mombusho that for 
fifteen years as from 1908, five higher institutes in Japan, namely, 
the First Higher School (Tokyo), the Higher Teachers Training College
(17) Shu Hsin-ch1 eng(cd.^ Chung-kuo chin-tai Chiao-yii-shih Tzu-liao, p.182.
(18) Excerpt from Japanese Mombusho, Gakusei Gowju^njenwshi (History of 
fifty years of educational system), in Shu Hsin-ch'eng, Chin-tai 
Chung-kuo Liu-hsueh-shi, p.70. There were grave discrepancies
in the statistics of the total number of Chinese students in Japan 
during any one year. The Japan Weekly Mail gave the number of 
13>000 for 1906. But the Mombusho estimate was "over 7000" for the 
same year. This would seem to be more reliable, see Saneto, p.60.
(19 )"Lespatches to provincial governors to limit students going abroad and 
promote the establishment of schools at home", 7th August,19 0 6, Hsfeh-pu 
Tsou-tzii Chi-yao (Curriculum devised by the Board of Education),i9u9.Vol. 1
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(Tokyo), the Higher Technical College (Tokyo), the Higher Commercial 
College (Yamaguchi) and the Chiba Medical School, would take in annually a
total of one hundred and sixty-five Chinese students who would be
five 
(21)
given grants by the home government.^ ^  By 1910, the higher
institutes had taken in four hundred and sixty students.
Whilst attendance at other institutions was high, very few students
entered government universities in Japan. In 1909, only nineteen
Chinese students attended the Tokyo Imperial University and in 1909>
there were no more than sixty. On the other hand, private universities
were more accessible to Chinese students. In 1909> the figures of these
students attending the Meiji and Hosei Universities were seven hundred
and three hundred and eighty respectively, while over eight hundred
were recorded to have graduated from the Chinese students section of
(22)Waseda University. The number of students registered in other
private universities were not recorded. Over 1908-1909> many higher
institutes offering , in particular, law and politics sprang up
requiring very low entrance qualifications and providing poor academic
training. Some of the students attending these universities and
institutes even refused to disclose the number of years they had
studied and the duration of the courses when the Chinese Board of
(23)Education made an investigation into these universities.
The Chinese government began to regard Japan as an increasingly 
undesirable place for Chinese students. There was a gradual decline
(20) "Regulations setting down the number of students to be admitted into
higher institutions and annual budgets of individual provinces for 
financing the students", 3rd January, 1 908, ibid., Vol.3*
(21) Shu Hsin-ch’eng, Chin-tai Chung-kuo Liu-hsueh-shi, p.6 8.
(22) Roger F. Hackett, "Chinese students in Japan, 1900-1911” in Papers 
on China, East AsianResearch Centre, Harvard University, Cambridge, 
Mass., Vol.3 1 19^9> p.1^ 3*
(23) "Regulations concerning entrance requirements of students wishing
to enter Japanese private universities and qualifications to be 
attained by graduates of such universities before they could be 
recommended to sit appointment examinations at home", 29th July, 
1908, Hsiieh-pu Tsou-tzii Chi-yao, Vol.9.
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in the overall standard of education for Chinese students in Japan.
In proportion to their numbers, students returning from Japan fared
worse than their counterparts from Europe and America in special
examinations for government jobs. Moreover, the growing restlessness
of the students themselves became problematic for the Manchu government.
From 1908, the Chinese government began to send larger numbers of students
to America and Germany instead. An imperial decree in early 1908
stressed the importance of sending members of the imperial family to
study military science in Germany, politics and legal studies in
England and America as the "first step towards the revitalization of
(29)
the education of the nation". From 1909> the number of Chinese
students dropped drastically. By 1911> most had returned to China.
Hirakawa Seifu in his "Shina Kyowa-shi" (A history of the Chinese
republic) classified the Chinese students of this period into two
groups - those who came prior to 1909 and those who came after. The
former were, according to him, acquainted with their own history and
culture, and were able to select certain areas of the "new learning"
to add to the knowledge they already had of their own society. These
were generally conservative and tended to advocate gradual changes in
China. Most of them sought only institutional training in Japan to
supplement their Chinese education. These students were usually
carefully selected and they were assured of government jobs on their 
(25)return. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and people who were in favour of a
constitutional monarchy in China had some influence with these students.
Okuma and organizations like the Toa Dobun Kai made sense to them, so
(29) "The Chinese Emperor's decree", TNNS, 2nd February, 1908, p.9.
(25) Quoted in Hackett, "Chinese students in Japan, 1900-1911"> p.193.
much so that a brief period of friendship existed between Liang and the 
"progressive Chinese" on the one hand and Okuma and Inukai on the 
other in the 1898-1899 period.
Later students, according to Hirakawa's classification, knew little
about their own culture. The average age of these students was twenty-
three. They literally swallowed the "new learning", and for a time,
their only ideology was a shallow worship of the Meiji Constitution.
These students often restricted their studies to law, politics and
military science, and tended to advocate radical reforms and changes 
(26)in China. Many of these later comers were privately - supported
students whc. had little to lose when they went home. The student 
movement which centred round them played a central role in undermining 
the government at home. The same movement also affected Japan's hopes 
for influencing the ideology of China's new intelligentsia. The 
successes of Japan at modernization made them aware of the weakness 
of their own government and country. When confronted by Japanese 
power and the general ill-feeling on the part of the Japanese populace, 
they became conscious of their unfriendly environment. These sentiments 
combined to evoke a new sense of patriotism. Anti-Japanese hostility
was but part of this sense of national pride. In seeking outlets 
for their extremely nationalistic feelings* they reacted against any 
kind of authority and foreign pressure. Demonstrations and boycott of 
classes were their usual methods of protest .
By 1907, the thousands of Chinese students who had imbibed nationalism 
and little else from their stay in Japan were keenly suspicious of all 
Japanese. At the outbreak of the revolution in 1911» most students had
(26) ibid., pp. 193-199.
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returned to China. Their distrust and wariness of Japan were heightened 
by the fear of Japanese intervention to put down the revolution.
x x x
The first flush of Japanese educational activities in China began 
soon after the establishment of the Toa Dobun Kai in November, 1898.
As a semi-official organization, the Toa Dobun Kai was partially 
financed by the Gaimusho. Its professed objective was to promote understanding 
and solidarity between Japan, China and Korea at the height of 
Western imperialistic activities in China.
From the outset, the Society was engaged in cultural and journalistic 
activities in the key centres of China. In Shanghai, where the Society 
had its headquarters, the monthly Ya-Tung Shih-Pao (East Asian News) was 
started in 1898. It became an offical journal of the Society and was 
widely read in Chinese intellectual and journalistic circles. This 
journal was complemented by the T*ung Wen Hu Pao (Shanghai Common Culture 
Newspaper) which was published daily. In Hankow, the Han Pao (China 
News) was also published daily. It was taken over from the Chinese by 
a member of the Society, Munakata Kotaro. The publication became the 
only daily newspaper circulated in Hankow, a trading centre with a 
population of six hundred thousand people who, apart from their governor- 
general, Chang Chih-tung, were known to have very strong anti-Japanese 
feelings. In Fukien, where Japanese influence was greatest, the 
Tung-Wen Hsiieh-T'ang (Japanese Language College) was founded with the 
cooperation of the influential gentry class. In the year 1899-1900, 
sixty students, most of them from upper class families, were admitted. 
Japanese was the main language taught as the medium through which 
students could take up general subjects. Some students from this college 
were sent to Japan to further their studies. Branch quarters had
also been set up in Peking and Newchang but the outbreak of the Boxer
(27)Rebellion had prevented these from becoming active centres.
A more important part of the Society’s activities in China, 
it would seem, was for investigational purposes. Japanese students 
were sent to study in Kwangtung, a trading centre with Japan and a 
leading political centre in southern China, commanding the affairs 
of Macao, Hong Kong, Fatshan, Swatow and Chaochow, the last two places 
having Japanese language schools set up by the Society. Japanese 
students were also sent to Hankow. It was hoped that through these 
kinck of activities, the Society would not merely come into contact 
with the influential people among the Chinese but would acquire more 
knowledge of Chinese affairs, thus aiding Japanese political and busine, 
enterprises in China.
The largest school set up by the Society was the Toa Dobun
Shoin for Chinese and Japanese students, first established in Nanking 
in 1900. The objective was to foster friendly relations between 
Japan and China - relations which had been jeopardized in the "1899-1895 
war. It was hoped that through sending Japanese students to the 
school, the true facts about China would be made known to the Japanese 
public. The school had been open for no more than a few months when 
the Boxer Rebellion broke out; student morale was affected. In 
August, 1900, the staff and students were moved to Shanghai. At the 
end of 190'! 1 students were sent from various fu and ken in Japan.
They were taught mainly politics and commerce in order that they might, 
one day, take up responsible positions —  such as company directors —  
in the development of China. Included in the students' curriculum
(27) Toa Dobun Kai Kankei Zassen (Miscellaneous documents relating to 
the Toa Dobun Kai), sections 1 and 2, Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, op.cit., pp. 38-91, 58-6 2.
(2 8) ibid., pp. 9-2-93-
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were investigation tours during the summer vacation. Every year,
about eighty students from the third year would travel i-n "the
eighteen provinces, Manchuria, Mongolia and the border territories,
to investigate in detail the political and economic conditions of
the places visited. About every third year, return trips were made
to the various fu and ken of Japan and during these periods the students
(29)would tell the people at home things about China.
extended, inves tiga tjcn
During 1907-19^3* anfranip/feofChina headed by the president Nabeshima 
was sponsored by the Society with a view to visiting the entire 
country and promoting understanding between the two peoples. In the 
"Proposed plan for the development of China" drawn up at the end of the 
trip, a positive policy of economic penetration was advocated. The 
trip coincided with the reforms and revolution in China. It was 
urged that the Society’s plan for the development of China should not 
be hindered by the unrest in the country. The suggestions included 
the installation of a Japanese consul, a trade commissioner and a 
tourist office at every trading port in China. Their aim would be 
to promote the business relations between the two countries in the hope 
that anti-Japanese feelings as manifested by the trade boycott in 
1908 would be prevented in future. It was also proposed that agricultural 
and engineering studies be included in the curricula of the Japanese 
students studying in the Shanghai Dobun Shoin so that they would be 
well-equipped when they finished studying to take up agricultural and 
industrial activities in various parts of China. Furthermore, more 
frequent reports were to be made and published on the affairs investigated, 
especially in the important areas. More Chinese language newspapers
(29) ibid., pp. 586-590.
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were to be published in Shanghai and Hankow and the prices were to be 
kept low to ensure wide circulation. It was hoped that these would 
be circulated among the members of provincial assemblies, commercial 
organizations and principals of schools. As the Chinese students 
studying in Japan would eventually take up responsibilities in the 
newly established republican government, it was urged that their good­
will towards Japan be cultivated, by improving their welfare and 
academic training in Japan.
In the years following the Sino-Japanese war, large numbers of 
Japanese went to China, not a few of whom became military, le.gal, 
diplomatic, educational and agricultural advisers in the Chinese govern-
(31)ment. In l899i there were 1?25 Japanese in China and in 19051 16,910.
Many of these Japanese took up educational careers and opened schoolsibr Chinese 
students. By 1905* there were no less than fifteen schools other than 
the Shanghai Dobun Shoin and its subsidiary schools run by the Japanese.
These were scattered throughout northern and central China. The more 
notable were the Nihongo Gakudo in Hangchow (1898), the Shoka Gakudo 
in Chuanchow (1899)1 Tobun Gakudo in Tientsin (1899)» Toa Gakuin in
Amoy (1900), Honganji Tobun Gakudo in Nanking (1901), Tobun Gakusha in
-  -  _  -  (B2)Peking (1901), and Ryugaku Koto Yobi Gakudo in Shanghai (1905) All
of these schools were teaching general subjects in addition to the 
Japanese language. General and crash courses were offered in much the 
same way as in most schools set up for Chinese students in Japan.
Probably the most successful of these schools was the Tobun Gakusha 
founded by Nakashima Tatsuyuki in Peking in March,1901. Nakashima
(3 0) ibid., pp. 282-289, 996-997, 500-5 1 2.
(31) Toa Dobun Kai,Shina Nenkan (Annual Report on China), cited in Saneto,
pp. 88-8 9.
(3 2) ibid., p. 8 9.
himself had studied under a Chinese scholar in 1898. The school 
offered special studies in Japanese and translations for more mature 
students with a good background of Chinese learning and general subjects 
plus Japanese for ycunger students, Japanese scholars who were themselves 
studying the Chinese language were employed to take up part of the teaching 
in the school. The school admitted students of all ages from all 
kinds of social backgrounds —  the only entrance requirement was that 
they did not smoke opium. In six years from 1901 to the first half 
of 1906, about 1,867 students had attended the school. Many of them 
eventually took up educational careers in various provinces of China. 
Nakashima was known to have expended his entire energy on keeping up 
the academic standard and the morale of the staff and students. The sources 
finance and assistance came from the intellectual and offical circles 
in China as well as Japan. Supporters included people like Yuan Shih- 
k ’ai, Li Hung-chang, Kawashima Naniwa and Kano Jigoro; help came even
(33)from members of the Japanese army stationed in China. '" In the
latter half of 1905* when Yuan Shih-k’ai was governor-general, the 
school came under the jurisdiction of the ChdhLi Ministry of Education*
Nakashima himself said, "...It is out of a sense of vocation and
(39.)
gratitude that I have embarked on a career of education in China..."
Asked if he thought Japan would be threatened by a China grown strong 
as a result of the introduction of modern education, he replied that 
when China reached the stage of enlightenment and prosperity, the trade 
between the two countries would expand as a result of increased Japanese 
exports. Secondly, in times of crisis, a strong China could possibly
(33) ibid., p.90.
(39) "Brief record of the Tohun Gakusha", cited in Saneto, p.210.
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be the source of a foreign loan. Thirdly, a strong neighbour could 
resist the aggressive designs of other powers, leaving Japan to pursue 
her national destinies in peace. Fourthly, there had never been a 
precedent in history when Japan had suffered destruction because of 
China's physical greatness. Finally, the Chinese people tended to put 
self-interest before everything and a sense of nationalism was lacking
• (^ 5)m  them.
After the establishment of the Tobun Gakusha, other schools modelled 
on the same line were set up by the Japanese in Peking itself after 1901. 
Some of these were the Bummei Gakudo, the Nichi-F.igo Gakudo, the Nihongo 
Sokusei Gakudo, the Nichi-Ei Sokusei Gakko and the Shinka Gakudo, all 
founded by scholars who had formerly taught at Nakashima's Tobun Gakusha. 
Otha? schools included the Toa Zenrin Gakudo and Hakki Chugakudo^^
In this connection, the Japanese who went to China as teachers
deserve mention. Although they had started to go to China before 1900,
it was only after the Boxer Rebellion that it became a common practice
for Japanese teachers to be sent to China. The highest recorded
number in 1906 of these teachers in Nakashima's school was almost six
hundred. According to a Japanese teacher,Nakashima Hanjiro, who had
taught at the Tientsin Peiyang Teachers Training College, the total
number of foreign teachers in China in November, 1909 was 356 and of these,
(37)311 were Japanese, that is, over eighty-four per cent. Over
the decade, these teachers had taught at kindergartens, primary schools, 
secondary schools, higher level institutes, Japanese schools as well 
as schools where other languages were taught, translation institutes,
(3 5) ibid.
(3 6) ibid, p.93.
(37) Figures quoted in Saneto pp. 93-96. Saneto, however, thinks that 
there were at least 960 Japanese teachers in China in 1909, see 
pp. 99^97.
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teachers training colleges, schools of law and politics, technical
colleges, commercial colleges, agricultural institutes, medical schools,
veterinary colleges, schools for studying railways, engineering schools,
police academies and military preparatory schools. With the exception
(38)of Kansu, the schools were distributed over the provinces.^ J
However, towards the end of the decade, the influence of Japanese 
teachers began to decline. As the Chinese Board of Education stepped 
up the establishment of more schools in China,the need for foreign 
education became less felt. Chinese students returned home in increasing 
numbers with the qualifications to teach in Chinese schools. They 
filled many teaching posts which formerly had to be given to recruits 
from Japan. Also, the Chinese public was beginning to talk about 
the recovery of rights including what it called the "right to educate" 
the Chinese youths. Foreign especially Japanese teachers and educationists 
became increasingly unpopular with the Chinese students and scholars.
In 1907, the Wai Chiao Pao condemned the foreign countries for their 
encroachment on China's educational development and called upon the 
Chinese government to speed up the implementation of educational reform
(39)and methods throughout the country.
Moreover, Japan's hitherto predominant position in China's 
education, began to be seriously challenged by Western influences.
American and German universities, medical schools and higher institutes 
were established in Tientsin, Shanghai, Peking, Tsingtao and other
(ZK
Chinese cities, often, with funds from the American and German governments. 
The Americans, in particular, made a decided effort to reduce the
(3 8) When the T'ung Meng Hui was formed in Tokyo in 1903* Kansu was 
also the only province not represented in its membership.
(39) Wai Chiao Pao, No. 1831 "1907, quoted in Shu Hsin-ch'engflecflChung-kuo
Chin-tai Chiao-yu-shih Tzu-liao, op.cit. pp. 1077-1079.
(9-0) Aoyagi Atsutsure, "The education of the Chinese and the international
rivalry between Japan, America and Germany", Gaiko Jiho, op.cit.,
No.122 (Vol.1 1, N0 .1), January, 1908, pp. 71- 7 k .
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Japanese influence. On 2nd June, 1907, an article entitled "Chinese 
don't want Japanese teachers" appeared in the New York Daily Tribune.
It criticized the Japanese teachers employed in Chinese government 
schools as ignorant and inadequate. It also warned the Chinese 
government that Chinese students in Japan were easily led astray and
(VOgiven substandard academic training. Meanwhile, the first batch
of Chinese students were sent in 1907 to Yale, Cornell, Wellesley and
other American universities as a result of an agreement made between
Tuan Fang and the American government during his tour of investigation
(2+2)
of constitutionalism in the West in 1906. In 1908, President
Roosevelt stressed in his inaugural address in Congress that America 
was willing to give financial aid to Chinese educational activities; 
a sum of ten million dollars from the Boxer indemnity was put aside
(43)and channelled into educational development in China.
Over the years, the academic achievement and enthusiasm of the
(44)teaching corps from Japan had declined considerably. It was
partly the result of the gradually decreasing interest of the Japanese
authorities in Japan's involvement in educating the Chinese. There was
a marked lack of attention paid to the welfare of the Japanese teachers
in China. They were often poorly paid, especially when compared to
Western teachers and the authorities at home made no attempt to control
their affairs. Although the Japanese government took no active step
to put an end to Japanese commitment in China's educational affairs*
(45)it took an increasingly lukewarm attitude towards the question. As the
number of Chinese students going to Japan fell rapidly, so the number 
of Japanese teachers in China dwindled quickly towards the end of the 
decade. By 191I1 almost all of them had returned to Japan.
(41) ibid., pp. 70-71
(42) ibid., p.74
(43) ibid., p.75
(44) Hirakawa Seifu, Shina Kyowa-shi, quoted in Saneto, p. 103.
(45) See Chapter Seven.
CHAPTER SEVEN
JAPAN'S RECONSIDERATION OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA: 
CONSOLIDATION OF JAPAN'S SPECIAL POSITION IN CHINA, 1907-1911
While the Chinese believed that Japan's diplomatic successes 
with the Western countries in 1907 had secured for her a place among 
the imperialist powers, many Japanese were beginning to feel uncertain 
about their new relationship with the West. Contrary to what the 
Japanese had expected, Japan's policy of alignment with the powers 
did not entail her acceptance by the latter as their equals. The 
'civilized nations' of the West appeared to be jeolously preserving 
their own interests and superior positions and many in Japan began 
to have doubts about the 'harmony' between East and West.
Japan's awareness of Western hostility
The first blow came with America's legislations against the 
immigration of Japanese (as well as Chinese and Korean) labourers.
The "yellow peril" had taken on a new meaning in America after Japan 
emerged from her triumph over Russia. Japanese immigrants, entering 
in large numbers especially to California aroused fears in the 
American states on the Pacific coast. A gentlemen's agreement was 
made between President Roosevelt and the Japanese government whereby 
the latter would refuse Japanese labourers passports to the mainland 
United States. It was, however, nothing more than a facjade of 
American-Japanese good-will. Anti-Japanese prejudice among the 
populace remained and the West-coast agitators continued to clamour 
for restrictive measures against Japanese labourers and their families
already in America.
The Japanese were bitterly frustrated by this show of racial
predudice. They could not explain the phenomenon as they felt they
(l)had done much to allay the Western fear of a "yellow peril". The
Japanese government, however, was anxious to preserve the confidence 
and understanding of the Western powers. It concluded the Root- 
Takahira agreement with America in 1908 and took pains to ensure that 
the visit of the American fleet to Japan —  part of a round-the-world 
cruise in 1908-1909 demonstrating American naval power in the Pacific
(2)—  was given an extraordinarily cordial reception by the Japanese people.
But the immigration dispute had made the Japanese realize that Western 
prejudices against the East still persisted and that Japan's position 
in the world was as uncertain as before the war. At the end of 1907, 
the year in which Japan had entered into political agreements with 
France and Russia, Ito himself admitted that "Japan’s position in 
the world is most grievous. The situation is such that there is an 
unmistakable trend towards Japanese isolation" . ^ ^
Anti-Japanese feelings in this period were not confined to America. 
Throughout 1908 and well into 1909 > Japan encountered criticism of 
her activities in Manchuria from other powers as well as America.
The most severe allegations came from Morrison, London Times Correspondent 
in Peking,who attacked the Japanese government for subjecting southern 
Manchuria under military rule and going back on its promise to 
observe the "open door" in the area. He also claimed that foreign
(1) No less than twenty editorial articles appeared in the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun 
and the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun over the 1905-1907 period expressing 
concern and amazement at the influence of the "yellow peril" idea in 
America and criticizing the American authorities' legislations against 
Japanese immigrants especially the segregation orders of the American 
Schools Board.
(2) The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun even printed a series of "Guide to conversations 
with the American visitors" in English for its readers.
(5) Quoted by Iriye Akira, Across the Pacific : an inner history of American - 
East Asian relations, New York, 1967, p.11A.
especially British merchants in Manchuria were very dissatisfied with 
the Japanese authorities and that Japanese nationals on the Asian
(4)continent were extremely unpopular. The New York Times likewise
received unfavourable reports of the Japanese from its correspondent
in Peking who urged the American government and the powers to "help
China resist Japanese and Russian invasions of Manchuria and violation
of China's independence... as China's protests are ineffective in face
(5)of Russian and Japanese military presence in the area".
Similar criticism had been made by the Westerners in early 
1906 and Japan had made an effort to mitigate the suspicions of the 
Western powers. In 1 9 0 8, however, the Japanese reacted with bitterness.
They felt they had been done a grave injustice. The Tokyo Asahi 
Shimbun said that as Japan had made great sacrifices of human lives 
and money to preserve the "open door" and Chinese sovereignty in 
Manchuria, she expected to receive prase and approval from the powers 
for her endeavour towards the improvement of world relations in 
East Asia. Trade between China and England, America , Germany, for 
example, had increased rapidly since 1905 as a result of Japanese 
efforts in Manchuria. The accusations by the British and Americans 
were totally unexpected.^^
In a later editorial article, the same newspaper commented that it 
was most grievous for Japan that she should have been accused of being 
an aggressive nation by the Europeans and Americans. Japan's 
economic and political relations with the Western powers would inevitably
(4) "Dr. Morrison and Manchurian policy", TNNS, 1st January, 1 9 0 8, p.5«
For an account of Morrison's relations with Japan from 1905 to 191Ji 
see I.H.Nish, "Dr.G.E. Morrison and Japan" in Journal of the Oriental 
Society of Australia, Vol.II, No.1 (June, 1965)* PP» ^2-97.
(5) The New York Times report is quoted in "Manchuria and the open door',' TNNS, 
20th May, 1908, p.1.
(6 ) "The powers and the truth in Manchuria", editorial, TAS, 10th April,
1908, p.5 .
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suffer as a result of the latters' suspicions and unjust allegations. 
Japan's victory over Russia was the finest yet of her achievements. 
During the war, Japan did not receive a single word of complaint 
against her ways and conduct from the powers. Criticism directed 
against her at this moment of triumph sounded like thunder. The 
Japanese looked upon themselves as a civilized nation in the East and 
believed that their culture and institutions were comparable to those 
of the other countries. Europeans and Americans who had no knowledge 
of the Japanese language and whose customs and habits differed from 
those of Japan could not easily appreciate the excellent quality of the
(7)Japanese culture and customs.
The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun put it more plainly,
the
"As the rumour ofA'yellow peril' gradually 
subsides, Japan-phobia is emerging.... The 
recent groundless accusations against Japan 
have resulted from the world's jealousy of 
Japan's rising status and prestige....The 
Japanese people are looked upon as the leader 
of the awakening of Asia. This arouses a 
sense of danger in the European countries 
especially England. They fear that Japan 
may become a rival and talk of her as a successful 
commercial enemy. They conjure up fears of 
Japan dealing harmful blows to the white race...."
Once again, the question of racial tension and East-West rivalry 
arose in Japanese thinking. The conviction that Japan had an important 
role to play in her relations with the Western countries was shaken 
by seemingly irrational factors in international politics. Hostility 
of the Western powers put Japan on the defensive. Many Japanese 
came to advocate that Japan assert herself as the leader of the 
Eastern nations in opposition to Western civilization.
(7) "Western suspicions of Japan", editorial, TAS, 9th September, 1908,
(8 ) "Japan-phobia", TNNS, 18th May, 1908, p.1.
(8)
P • 3 •
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Renewed emphasis on Sino-Japanese solidarity against the West, 1908
The anti-Japanese boycott of 1908 aroused much concern in Japan 
for the future relations between the two countries. The Gaiko Jiho 
commented that estrangement between Japan and China did not begin with 
the Tatsu Maru incident. Sino-Japanese relations had suffered since 
the conclusion of the Franco-Japanese and Russo-Japanese agreements. 
While the Chinese were to blame for wrongly suspecting Japan's 
intentions, Japan's association with France and Russia, however, opened 
herself to suspicions. For although those two countries pledged them­
selves to respect the principle of preservation of China in their 
agreements with Japan, both had, in fact, disregarded their promises. 
Russia, realizing that she would encounter strong resistance in 
Manchuria, had turned her attention to Mongolia and Tibet, implanting 
her influence by intervening in the internal politics of those areas. 
France, for her part, had used the revolutionary outbreaks in Kwangsi 
in late 1907 as an excuse to send troops to the border between Yunnan 
and Indo-China; whereas the French officers were known to have 
encouraged the revolutionary movement in Kwangsi and Yunnan. Had Japan 
taken the initiative to cooperate with France and Russia in partitioning 
C h i n a s h e  would have obtained willing support from them. Was it 
not, therefore, self-contradiction and hypocrisyon Japan's part to befriend 
these two aggressive powers on the one hand and proclaim to the 
world her intention of preserving China on the other?
Moreover, the Gaiko Jiho went on, there was a tendency for the 
Japanese to look up to Europe and America and dismiss the rest of the 
world as unworthy of her friendship. If the Japanese were really 
to examine themselves, they would find that they held the Chinese in 
contempt. The Chientao question was in fact an example of a policy 
which had been motivated by a desire to bully China. But China in
2^5.
1908 was very different from China at the time of the Sino-Japanese war. 
Her people's knowledge had greatly increased and she had firmly
established herself as a nation. During the Tatsu Maru incident?
there was the rumour that the Chinese government contemplated asking 
the American President to intervene on its behalf. American influence 
in China had greatly increased since Japan and Russia concluded
their agreement in 1907 and more and more? the Chinese regarded
President Roosevelt as the guardian of peace. If this new relationship 
between China and America continued to develop and relations between 
Japan and China were allowed to deteriorate? then Japan would soon find 
herself at a disadvantage. In future? there would be no harmony 
between countries of the East.
In conclusion? the Gaiko Jiho said?
"Asia belongs to the Asiatics? Japan and China 
should strengthen their friendship and cooperate 
to maintain a peaceful situation in the Far
East. For these purposes? both countries must
try to understand one another's national temperament 
Each should be humble and be ready to make
sacrifices.... In the interests of the [general
well-being of the] Far East... both Japan and China 
should conduct their relations with integrity 
and maagnaniarily. We urge the peoples of both 
countries to be forbearing and helpful to one 
another so that no immaterial disputes should be 
allowed to permanently jeopardize the stability 
of the overall situation? leaving much regrets 
to posterity. .. ."w'
The Taiyo said that the Japanese authorities and leaders? through
the
their ignorance of Chinese affairs? were letting^Western powers 
supersede Japan's special position in that country. It commented 
that although Japan had come into contact with Chinese culture and
(9) "On China and Japan should trust one another and harmonize their
relations"? Gaiko Jiho? 1908? translated in Wai Chiao Pao? No.210? 
3rd June? 1 908? pp.l7-l8.
learning for over a thousand years? she compared poorly with the 
Western countries in their knowledge of Chinese affairs. At the 
Same tin© , Japan? far more than the Western powers? looked down 
on the Chinese and resorted to high-handed diplomacy in dealing with 
China. The anti-Japanese boycott had caused considerable damage to 
Japan's trade with China and if this condition deteriorated? Japan's 
diplomatic relations with China would he weakened? giving America 
and the European powers the opportunity to strengthen their 
influences in China.
Furthermore? the Taiyo beljsred that China had come a long way from 
the days when the powers could use threat and coercion to make her give 
way in diplomatic and commercial matters. That was why all the 
countries were stepping up their research of China and making efforts 
to improve their relations with that country. The Japanese had the 
advantage of being China's closest neighbour and sharing the same 
culture and customs with the Chinese. They were in the best 
position to cultivate a mutually beneficial relationship with the 
Chinese. Above all? Japan should assume the role of a mentor in all 
aspects of Chinese affairs? diplomatic? financial and otherwise? in 
order that she would not lag behind the Western countries in such 
matters. ^
The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun urged the Japanese government to get 
rid of the "disease of military policy" (gun sei byo) which had 
"poisoned" its political thinking in relation to Manchuria since the 
Russo-Japanese war. The disease? it said? was the fundamental cause
(10) "The basis of Sino-Japanese relations"? Taiyo ? November? 1908? 
translated in Wai Chiao Pao? No. 231? 27th December? 1908? 
pp.15-1 6? 17-18.
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of conflict between Japan and China and only by eradicating it could
Japan hope to gain the friendship of the Chinese government and people.
The government leaders and ministers had failed to recognize China’s
progress in reforming the country and take account of the rising tide
of Chinese nationalism? thus arousing resentment from the Chinese people.
The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun also believed that this was largely the
( 1 1 )fault of Hayashi? minister to Peking from 1906 to 1908. It
welcomed the impending appointment of Ijuin Hikokichi as it was time? it reckoned
Japan changed her image in the Chinese eye. Ijuin had been able
to make friends with Chinese leaders when he was consul-general of
Tientsin and he could be relied upon to promote better relations
between the two countries. It maintained that the change of the
minister to Peking must be accompanied by the change of attitude towards
China. Japan must be sympathetic towards the Chinese people who
were becoming aware of the need to preserve their own country.
Japanese sympathy and support at this juncture would no doubt be 
appreciated by China.
Such arguments reflected a sense of insecurity in face of the 
possibility of Japanese isolation in the post-1907 period. Confronted 
with Western hostility? many Japanese had misgivings about a cooperative 
policy with the powers. Moreover? they were also aware that Japan's 
rapprochement with the West had aroused doubts and suspicions in her 
Asian neighbours. Rather than risking the danger of a rejection from 
both sides, some Japanese came to advocate the strengthening of ties 
with the Eastern countries. The continuation of steady progress in 
China made them reconsider the possiblity of a special relationship
(1 1) Hayashi? however? was not unaware of the need for Japan to come 
to terms with Chinese nationalism with a view to consolidating 
Japanese interests in China. See Chajfer Five.
(12) "The question of the change of diplomats"? editorial? TAS» 28th 
April? 1908? p.3, "Improvement in Sino-Japanese relations"? 
editorial? TAS? 9th June? 1 9 0 8? p.3.
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the
between the two countries in^face of increasing influence of the 
Western powers in the Far East.
Concern at the government's declining interest in Japanese involvement 
in the education of Chinese students
The question of Japanese leadershipwas seen by many as of 
particular importance at this juncture. The Japanese press and 
individual educationists maintained that Japan should not abandon her 
duty of guiding China at a time when the Western countries were 
trying to undermine Japan's predominant position in Chinese education.
Returning from a trip of investigation to China in early 1908,
Inukai, a leading member of the House of Representatives in the Diet,
commented that most Japanese were inclined to think the Chinese
ungrateful for their anti-Japanese hostility. They expected obeisance
from the Chinese students on account of the latter having received their
education from Japan. This, however, was asking too much. If
the Japanese would find out the causes of the Chinese rights recovery
movement, they would no doubt think it justified. Japan's opposition
to the movement would amount to an acquiescence of the act of
(13)partitioning China by the powers.
Moreover, Inukai believed that the anti-Japanese and rights 
recovery movements in China indicated a development in the mind of 
the Chinese students and a desire to rid China of her dependence on 
the other countries. Such were in fact signs of progress which
(13) "Inukai's talk on his investigation in China',' TNNS, 28th January, 
1908. p.4.
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had resulted from Japanese guidance. However, Japan would have 
to handle the movements with care, she could not abandon her role as 
the guardian of China for the next twenty years. There were recent 
rumours of China planning to send her students to Germany<■ Japan must 
restore her prestige in China and the only way to do so was to offer 
Chinese students better care and education. Japanese teachers in 
China seldom commanded respect from the Chinese because of the inadequacy 
and rivalries among themselves. The Japanese authorities should pay 
more attention to these matters for it was often because of their 
negligence in such matters that the relations between the two countries
(l4)suffered.
Okuma attributed the decline of Japanese influence in the education 
of Chinese students to the "short-sighted" policies of the Gairnusho 
and Mombusho. The '1905 regulations, he said, was a failure for the 
Mombusho and the first major cause of the decreasing number of Chinese 
students going to Japan. Instead of overcoming the inadequacy in 
educational facilities and taking measures to control profiteering 
schools and ill-qualified teachers, the Mombusho unwisely clamped down 
on the Chinese students who had come a long way, "inspired with hopes, 
ambitions and a sense of purpose to serve their own country when they 
return to China". It was also a mistake for the Mombusho to send 
people of inferior calibre and qualifications to teach in China. Many 
of these teachers went to China because they had failed to seek 
employment in Japan. Meanwhile, the Gairnusho,failing to comprehend 
the situation in China, had aggravated the anti-Japanese hostility
(l4) "Talk by Inukai", TAS, 21st January, 9^08, p.2. "Inukai's talk 
on China", TAS, 23th January, 1908, p.4.
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in that country by adopting a high-handed policy towards Manchuria.
For the Chinese? the Russo-Japanese war had made little change to the 
question of their national independence except that it was now Japan? 
instead of Russia? that was threatening her sovereignty in Manchuria.
Okuma also urged the Japanese authorities to take into account the
economic benefits which would result from a special relationship
with China. He pointed out that China's trade with other countries
as well as the Chinese market were both expanding and Japan stood to
gain from strengthening her economic ties with China. America and
Germany were both trying to expand their influence in that country
through educating Chinese students. If the Japanese authorities
persisted in disappointing "Chinese hopes of learning from Japan"»
they would not only drive Chinese students into the arms of America
( 1 5 )and Germany but also abandon all her future interests in China.
Aoyagi was particularly concerned at the increasingly competitive 
character of Western? especially American educational activities in 
China. He believed that America's interest in Chinese education 
was fundamentally political and that the educational activities of the 
powers had become one of the major aspects of international rivalries 
in China. President Roosevelt's speech in Congress was a challenge 
to Japan and Japan must not allow her prestige and influence in China to 
be undermined. Japan had a unique role to play in the education 
of Chinese students who looked to Japan as a model in building up their 
own country. The Meiji Restoration? though a result of much copying
(15) "Decline in the number of Chinese students and Count Okuma"? 
TNNS? 16th February? 1908? p.4.
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of Western technology and. modernization? had been a product of inspirations 
and perseverance indigenous to the East. The new civilization that 
Japan had built up was suited to be adopted by China. Japan alone 
could introduce the education of a nation (kokumin kyoiku) into the 
Chinesemind. In spite of the increasing competition from the Western 
countries? Japan still had a heaven-ordained mission (tenshoku) to 
educate Chinese youths. By carrying outthis mission? Japan would 
strengthen her special position in China. Neglect on the part of 
the Japanese authorities reflected a failure to recognize that this 
was vital to the future relations between the two countries.
There were indeed signs of indifference and a loss of interest in
the Japanese official attitude in connection with this question. In
a "conversation with a friend" in 1908? prime minister Saionji regretted
that Japan's involvement in the education of Chinese students was
causing much trouble in her diplomatic relations with Europe and America.
He hoped the Japanese authorities would soon refrain from further
commitment thus easing Japan's relations with the Western countries.
Moreover? he said that it was a mistake for Chinese students to come
to Japan. The progress in civilization which Japan had attained
compared poorly with that of the advanced countries of the West. The
Western countries would be a more ideal place for Chinese students to
(17)seek the knowledge and methods of strengthening their own country.
In a conversation with Chirol? foreign editor of the London Times, 
in April? 1909i Kato Takaaki? minister to England? actually disclaimed 
Japan's influence over Chinese students. Chirol had commented that
(16) Aoyagi Atsutsure? "The education of Chinese students and international 
rivalries between Japan? America and Germany"? Gaiko Jiho? No.122 
(Vol.1 1? N0 .1)? January? 1908? pp.ll-1 6? 17-18.
(17) Aoyagi Atsutsure? "The danger of the present government's policy 
towards China"? Gaiko Jiho? No. 12^ - (Vol.1 1? No.5)» March? 1908?
pp.37-58.
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Japan had not been using her influence with China to good purposes and 
that Japanese influence had given rise to adverse effects in China 
contrary to the goal of helping the Chinese make progress. Kato 
admitted that Chinese students who had studied in Japan often returned 
to their own country with anti-Japanese ideas and many spoke slanderously 
of their host country. Japan regretted deeply her failure to guide 
these students. But this only indicated that she had little or no 
influence on China? to say nothing of exercising an undesirable influence
(18)on the Chinese.
This change in official attitude was significant. The Japanese 
government? concerned at Japan's uncertain relationship with
the powers? believed that she needed political understanding and economic 
assistance of the Western nations in order to safeguard her rights on 
the Asian continent. Although it was interested in the post-war 
movements and development in China? it was reluctant to involve itself 
deeply for fear of losing the confidence and arousing the suspicions 
of the powers. Further commitment in the education of Chinese students 
would have meant a greater identification than it was prepared to 
make with the awakening of the Asian countries.
Japan's special position in China
The Japanese public? however? was becoming more and more doubtful 
whether Japan was benefiting from her rapprochement with the Western 
powers especially with regard to her position in China after 1907. It 
believed that Japan would have to act independently of the powers
(1 8) Japanese minister to England Kato to Komura? 7th April? 1909» 
NGB, Vol.9-2, Parti, No.252, p.26l.
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to safeguard and extend her position and interests in China. The 
Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun urged the government to be more assertive 
in its diplomatic relations with the West. It said?
"... Although the establishment of peace by the 
various agreements is a happy event for all 
countries concerned? it by no means compensates 
for the damage of Japanese interests and 
honour through the set-backs and losses Japan
suffers on the diplomatic front. As long as the
government leaders fail to cure their fears of the 
Europeans and Americans? one cannot expect to (^ g) 
see a revitalization in Japan’s foreign policy".
In a later editorial article? the same newspaper said that the 
objectives of the agreements concluded between Japan and the powers 
in 1907 and 1908 were not merely to prevent war but also to respect- 
each other's rights and interests and uphold the principle of equal opportunity 
in commerce and industries in the Far East. However? the concord 
and harmony one had expected of such treaty relations were not discernible 
with regard to China. The Americans were making noisy allegations against
Japan's "monopolistic activities". This was because they refused to
respect Japan's rights in Manchuria. One faction in the Peking 
government even advocated the strengthening of friendship between 
America and China in order to obstruct Japan's plans in Manchuria.
Also? the question of the Hsinmintun-Fengtien Railway had remained 
unresolved between Japan and China as a result of the intervention 
of some British capitalists. The Japanese never expected that 
obstructions against the development of their interests would come 
from an ally. It would seem that for every diplomatic issue between 
Japan and China? there was a third party manipulating the Chinese 
mind to the disadvantage of Japan. The agreements between Japan and
(19) "Japan's foreign relations"? editorial? TNNS? 9th February? 1909>
p.1.
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the powers had hardly served Japan's interests. Relations between 
Japan and the powers had remained in the same state as before the 
conclusion of the agreements. It was much to the regret of the 
Japanese that the efforts they made in coming to terms with the powers 
had been in vain.^^
As a matter of fact? the need to safeguard Japan's interests in 
China was appreciated by the government as much as by the public.
For the Japanese government leaders? cooperation with the Western 
powers was not incompatible with Japan's special position in China.
Japan's position in Asia? in particular Manchuria? was a part of the 
new order in East Asia which Japan's rapprocherreit with the West had 
helped to establish. Japan could claim special interests in that 
area as due her status as a power.
Although unetny Japanese professed to favour and sympathize with 
growing nationalism in China? they were not prepared to concede what 
they considered to be their vital interests in Manchuria merely to 
pacify the Chinese. More often than not? Japanese policy in this 
period failed to respond consistently and adequately to the emergence 
of Chinese nationalism. The railway disputes in Manchuria? in 
particular? revealed Japan's disregard for China's growing rights 
recovery movement. The government had the support of the country 
at large in pressing its demands on China and encountered criticism 
from the press only for its lack of firmness in dealing with the 
Chinese government.
(20) "The application of the various agreements - Japan must not 
allow the agreements to become a dead letter"? editorial? 
TNNS? 16th April? 1909i p.2.
a. The Hsinmintun - Fakumen Railway question
In November? 1907? the Chinese government signed a contract with
a British firm for the construction of the railway running from Hsinmintun
to Fakumen. Japan protested against the project on the basis of the
treaty of 1905 hy which China had committed herself not to construct
lines parallel to or in the vicinity of the South Manchuria Railway or
any other line which would compete with it. The Chinese ,
however? denied the competitive character of the proposed line and
requested a definition of the area which Japan regarded as competitive.
On this question opinions altogether differed; the Japanese claiming the
benefit of the doubt for their own contention? and in respect of the
question of area affirmed that each case must be judged on its own
(21)merits? as the question was never purely one of mileage.
The Japanese government’s failure to arrive at a quick agreement
with the Chinese aroused dissatisfaction at home. The opposition in the
Diet attacked the government for being inadequate and allowing Japan's
(2 2)national inteissts be trampled underfoot. The Japanese press?
however? directed its criticisms mainly at China. The Tokyo Asahi 
Shimbun asserted that it was the right of Japan as the owner of the 
South Manchuria Railway to set down regulations controlling the 
construction of competing lines in the area. Such a measure was vital 
to the existence of the South Manchuria Railway and was not motivated 
by selfishness. In so doing? Japan was not contravening the
(21) For documents relating to the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Hsinmintun- 
Fakumen Railway? see NGB? Vol.9l? Part. 1 ? pp. 630ff. vSee in particular 
No. 660? 685 for Japan's case against the construction. It was
in connection with this particular railway dispute that Japan was 
most severely criticized by Morrison and the British contractors 
interested in the construction of the line. See No. 651»669> 6 8 8.
(22) "Oishi Masaji's speech at the general meeting of the Shimpoto"? TAS?
20th January? 1 908? p.2. "The Shimpoto's policy towards the cabinet: 
rebuke of the government's inadequate foreign policies "? TAS?
21st January? 1908? p.2.
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principles of "open door" and equal opportunity in Manchuria.
Moreover, China owed much to Japan for the reconstruction of
Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese war and she was being ungrateful
(23)in trying to undermine Japanese rights in that area.
The question remained unresloved throughout 1 9 0 8. During the 
negotiations, Japan had offered to waive her claim on Chientao, 
provided that all other questions in Manchuria including that of 
jurisdiction over Korean settlers in Chientao were adjusted to her 
satisfaction. The Chinese did not accept the Japanese offer at 
first and in early 1 909i proposed the arbitration of all pending 
questions in Manchuria at the Hague Tribunal. The Japanese government 
rejected the Chinese proposal and insisted on direct negotiations with 
Peking. China's proposal also aroused much opposition in the 
Japanese public. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun said if the matter was 
referred to the Hague Tribunal, it would only reflect on the ignorance 
and inadequacy of both the Japanese and Chinese governments in their 
use of diplomacy and the politicians of the Eastern countries would
(24)become the laughing-stock of the world. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi
Shimbun criticized the Chinese government for its lack of sincerity:
China was greatly indebted to Japan and she had a moral obligation to 
respect Japan's rights as laid down in the Peking treaty of 1903*
It had been the hope of the Japanese people that the Chinese would become 
more friendly towards them for their act of chivalry in the Russo- 
Japanese war. However, the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun said, the 
Japanese were disappointed with China's attitudes and actions in connection
(23) "The question of the parallel line in Manchuria", editorial, TAS,
17th January, 1908, p.3* "The question of the parallel line 
in Manchuria", editorial, TAS, 7th April, 1 9 0 8, p.3»
(24) "The solution of unresolved questions between Japan and China",
editorial, TAS, 30th March, 19095 P*3*
237.
(23)with the Manchurian questions.
The question was not settled until September, 1909- The matter
was never referred to the Hague Tribunal and China discarded her plan
to build the railway. In this and other questions relating to
Manchuria, Japan expected the Chinese to remember that without the
intervention of Japanese arms, Manchuria would have been irretrievably
lost to them. The Japanese found it intolerable that China should
begrudge them protection of what in their view were Japan's legitimate
imperialist interests. As the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun put it, Japan did
not object in principle to the growing enthusiasm in China for the
recovery of her rights but Japanese rights could not be sacrificed in
(26)the interest of this movement.
b. The Antung - Mukden Railway question
During the Russo-Japanese war, Japan had built a light railway 
between Antung and Mukden for military purposes. When the South 
Manchuria Railway passed into the hands of Japan, the Japanese 
government wanted to connect it with the Korean railway system. The 
reconstruction of the Antung-Mukden line was necessary for linking 
Fusan at the southern tip of the Korean peninsula with the South 
Manchuria Railway and, via Harbin, with the Chinese Eastern Railway.
Hence save the 122 miles across the Tsushima Strait, an entire land 
route would be established for intercourse between Japan and Europe 
on the one hand and Japan and the Far East generally, on the other.
(25) "The unresolved issues between Japan and China and friendship
between the two countries", editorial, TNNS, 3th April, 9^09-
p.2.
(26) "The misunderstanding on the part of China", editorial, TAS,
3th June, 1 909, p.3*
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The Japanese viewed the Antung-Mukden Railway as of greater importance 
than any other disputes in Manchuria with China as the railway would 
be of great value for the extension of Japan's economic and strategic 
interests in the Far East.
By the treaty of 1905> it was agreed that Japan had the right 
to maintain the military line for fifteen years at the end of which 
China would redeem the railway. It was also agreed that the line be 
converted from a military into a commercial line, the reconstruction to 
be commenced within two years of the signing of the treaty of 1905 
and carried out as a joint Chinese and Japanese enterprise. However, 
it was not until the spring of 1909 that the Japanese government 
made the proposal to the Chinese. In addition to the reconstruction 
of the Antung-Mukden line, the Japanese requested that a section be 
built between Mukden and Ch'en-hsiang-t'un, twenty miles west of 
Mukden. The Chinese countered that it was not necessary, in the 
interest of trade and commerce, to extend the railway zone. The Chinese 
reply also specified that the work of improvement must be confined to 
the existing track and that no broadening of the gauge would be 
permitted. In addition, the Chinese government emphasized that Japan 
must not extend her military control or patrolling of the railway zone 
when the railway was rebuilt. The Chinese government would furnish 
police for guarding the line. The Japanese government refused to
(27)accept the Chinese terms objecting especially to the last condition.
In early August, 1909i Ijuin, Japanese minister in Peking, 
launched a campaign to improve the relations between Japan and China
(27) See NGB, Vol.42, Part 1 , Nos. 320, 321. For Japan's case, see 
Nos. 323, 324, 339* For Japan's povomitent'e explanation to 
the powers, see No. 340.
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(Nisshin kankei kaizen no undo). With the help of Kawashima Naniwa,
Ijuin tried to persuade the Manchu princes, in particular the Prince
Regent, to come to an understanding with the Japanese government
on the various unsettled questions in Manchuria. The two countries,
Ijuin maintained, should plan their future in concert with one another.
China's "intransigent attitude" towards the Antung-Mukden Railway and
Chientao questions had exhibited her disregard for the future of the
(28)two countries and provoked resentment in Japan. At the same
time, Odagiri tried to impress upon Chang Chih-tung that the Japanese
government and people sincerely wished to "harmonize the relations and
strengthen the friendship between the two countries" and that the
Japanese government had a "genuine desire to settle the disputes in the
interests of Japan and China". The Cpinese leaders must do their part
(29)to respond to Japan's good-will.
While this was going cm, the Japanese government instructed Ijuin 
to deliver an ultimatum to the Waiwupu on 6th August, informing the 
Peking government that Japan had decided to undertake the reconstruction 
work on the line whatever the response of the Chinese government 
would be.^°^ And on the same day, on orders received from Tokyo, 
the reconstruction of the line promptly began.
By delivering the ultimatum, Japan achieved a breakthrough in 
her negotiations with China on the various pending questions in 
Manchuria. In the face of Japan's firm stand, the Chinese government
conceded and an agreement on the reconstruction of the Antung-Mukden
line was signed between Koike, Japanese consul-general in Mukden
(28) Ijuin to foreign minister Komura, 4th August, 1909* NGB, Vol.42, 
part 1, No. 342, pp. 390-392.
(29) ibid.
(30) Komura to Ijuin, 2nd August, 1909» ibid., No. 339i p.386 and
Komura to Ijuin, 4th August, 1909i ibid.. No. 343? pp. 392-393.
and Hsi Liang, governor-general of Manchuria. Komura, Japanese
foreign minister, was satisfied that the Japanese government's
ultimatum had strengthened "the force of the argument for improving
Sino-Japanese relations which has been fermenting within the Chinese
government" and that the Chinese government had "changed its attitude
entirely and shown a sincere desire to come to an agreement with
(31)Japan on the unsettled questions in Manchuria".
The government's decision to take independent action in commencing 
work on the reconstruction of the Antung-Mukden Railway was fully 
supported by the Japanese public. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun 
said China had lately resorted to trickery and exhibited no sign of 
sincerity in dealing with Japan. Not only had she obstructed Japan's 
rightful action in turning her interests to the best economic and 
strategic accounts but she had also inflicted an insult on the Japanese 
nation. By seeking refuge in the people's enthusiasm for the so- 
called recovery of Chinese rights, the Chinese government and leaders 
tried to bypass their obligation to carry out the treaty stipulations. 
In this way, the recovery of rights was none other than an advocacy 
of closing the country (Sakoku Shugi),an unenlightened policy which obstructed, 
the course of normal relations between civilized countries. If Japan 
were to take the movement in China seriously, then the future between 
the two countries would be one of pessimism. But Japan had not lost 
hopes in China. The clamour for the recovery of rights was but a 
passing phase. As long as the Japanese government did not slack in 
seeing that Japan's treaty rights were respected, the Chinese would
(31) Foreign minister Komura to minister to England Kato, 19th August, 
I909i ibid., No.380, p.430.
soon awaken to the futility of anti-Japanese hostility. The Japanese 
people were confident that with the government’s recent action with 
regard to the Antung-Mukden Railway dispute, Sino-Japanese negotiations 
would enter a new era.
The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun warned China that "unreasonableness” and 
"disregard for the law" were the most feeble forms of diplomacy. A 
country put her own safety at risk by defying another which was her 
superior in strength and wealth. The Chinese would be wise to
(3 3)
examine and restrain themselves in their future relations with Japan.
In a later editorial, the same newspaper said,
Thus anti-Japanese sentiment came to be regarded as an unenlightened 
attitude which the Chinese must discard if they wished to see Sino- 
Japanese cooperation materialize in the future. The Japanese stressed 
that a harmonious relationship between the two countries was necessary 
so that Japanese wishes and actions would be ’respected' and accepted 
by China. As the Chinese government increasingly lost ground to the 
Japanese government, a cooperative relationship would inevitably 
result in Japan dictating her terms to China. For the Japanese, 
solidarity with China must not be allowed to interfere with the 
requirements of Japanese security and prestige. It should, rather,
(32) "Reasons for the independent action - the government's determination"
TNNS, 7th August, 1909? p.7 and "The future of unresolved questions 
between Japan and China", editorial, TNNS, 10th August, ^909? p.2.
(33) "The attitude of the Chinese government", editorial, TAS, 11th
August, 1909? p.3*
(3/+) »»T;he announcement of the Sino-Japanese Convention", editorial, TAS, 
9th September, 1909? p.3.
"...There are many among the Chinese who do not 
appreciate and understand as we do the vital 
importance of a sincere and cordial friendship 
between Japan and China, and who are not as 
concerned as we are at the disharmony of the two 
countries. If this is not the time to lead 
them away from their unenlightened^confused 
state of mind, when will it be...?
help to enhance Japan's influence and position in that country*
Japanese economic expansion in China: competition within the framework
of cooperation with the Western powers
The question of Japan's trading relations with China aroused 
serious concern in 1908 when Japanese goods were boycotted in 
southern China as a result of the Tatsu Maru incident. Japanese 
expert of silk and textile goods to China was especially hard-hit 
and trade with southern China did not pick up after the boycott. The 
Japanese public urged the government to strengthen the economic ties 
between the two countries with a view to counteracting the economic 
influence of the Western countries in China. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi 
Shimbun said at the time,
"....As Japan is separated from China by only a 
strip of water, she has better prospects of developing 
trade with China than America and the European 
countries.... The governments and peoples of Japan 
and China must ... strive to promote and respect 
their mutual interests and preserve their 
friendship."(35)
Japanese interests in promoting economic activities in China 
was further aroused in 1909 when a British - French - German syndicate 
proposed to make a loan to the Chinese government for the purpose 
of building two railways out of Hankow, known as the Hukuang loan.
When an American group, known as the Morgan Syndicate consisting of 
four New York banks demanded a one-quarter share in the project, Japanese 
attention was drawn to the expansion of America's economic activities
(35) "The boycott of Japanese goods by Chinese merchants", editorial, 
TNNS, 9th September, ^909> p»3»
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in China. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun remarked that Japan could
not stand aside and watch America pour her investments into China.
Japan must assume an active role in the economic development of the 
Far East. The Japanese government and people must make a concerted
effort to build up enterprises in China. They should use
Japan's historical and geographical closeness with China to their 
best advantage. ^
In June, ^909? a plan was drawn up by a group of Japanese 
industrialists for the organization of a syndicate which would 
promote Japanese economic enterprises especially the building of 
railways in China. The proposed syndicate was in the main a capitalists' 
concern which included big business units like Mitsui, Mitsubishi,
Okura and others, mostly banking groups in Tokyo and Osaka. It was 
also backed by government leaders. The preparatory meetings for its 
establishment were attended by Katsura, prime minister, Komura, 
foreign minister, Ishii, deputy foreign minister and Kurachi, head 
of the Political Affairs Bureau. At one of the meetings held on 
13th July, 1909> Komura had expressed dissatisfaction with the 
lack of support for the government on the part of the private sector 
in developing Japan's economic interests in China. He said that as 
a result of this, Japanese claims in China were not substantiated. The 
secret agreement made with China on the nonalienation of Fukien, for 
example, gained for Japan very little advantages because Japanese 
enterprises had made little headway in the area in the past decade. At the same 
meeting, Katsura promised Japanese capitalists necessary government protection
(3 6) "America's activities in China - competition between the powers 
and Japan's position", editorial, TNNS, 20th June, I909i p.2«
"The difficulties of launching enterprises in China", editorial,
TNNS, 28th July, ^909. p.2.
for their activities in China.
On 20th July? 1909? the Nisshin Kogyo Kaisha (Sino-Japanese 
Development Company) was established by thirty Japanese banking and 
business groups. An initial capital of one hundred million yens 
was to be raised by its members? a quarter of the sum to be invested 
directly in railways? civil engineering? mining? ship-building and 
electrical industries in China. This was to be a departure from
pattern of
the usual^foreign business commitments in China as the European and 
American syndicates had so far invested only in Chinese railways. 
However? the main objective of the Nisshin Kogyo Kaisha was to act 
as an agent for Japanese capitalists? introducing businesses in China 
to potential investors? encouraging development projects and making 
investigations and plans for the purpose of promoting Japanese trade 
and industrial interests in China. Although the Company began with 
a limited capital? it nevertheless marked the beginning of a new phase 
of Japanese economic activities in China.
Joint enterprises with the Chinese was an important part of the 
Japanese business interest at this stage. In May? 1910? a trip 
to China was arranged by six business organizations in Tokyo?
Yokohama? Nagoya? Kyoto? Osaka and Kobe. The main objective of the 
visit was to see the Chinese trade promotion exhibition in Nanking? 
inspect the industries and commerce in the Yangtze region and establish 
contacts with the business circles in China. Although the trip was 
ostensibly a private visit ? it had been organized in early 1909 with 
the help of Komura? Ijuin and seven Japanese consuls in various parts
(3?) "Proceedings at the Conference of the China Development Company 
(Taishin Kigyotan): purpose of its establishment and nature of 
its business"? TAS? 16th July? 1909? p.^ -.
(3 8) "The Sino-Japanese Development Corrlhny (Nisshin Kogyo Kaisha)"? 
editorial? TNNS? 21st July? 1909? p.2.
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of China. Foreign minister Komura's letter to the Japanese consuls 
in China said,
"...It is the objective [of the Japanese trade 
groups] to minimize the friction between the 
Japanese and Chinese peoples....[Sino-Japanese] 
disputes and negotiations in the past few years 
have caused disharmony between the two countries and 
given rise to mutual misunderstandings....
Because of this, the Japanese government has taken 
care to ... settle its differences with China.
However, although diplomats in various parts of 
China have gradually regained the friendship of 
the Chinese officials, Japanese and Chinese businessmen 
have never [been able to] exchange their ideas 
with one another.... [Japanese ministers in China] 
should hence contact influential Chinese business 
groups... and make arrangements for them to meet 
with their Japanese counterparts in the latters1 
forthcoming visit to China...."(39)
Headed by Kondo of the Tokyo Trade Council (Shogyo Kaigisho), the 
sight-seeing business group (Kanko Jitsugyotan) took off on 3rd May,
1910. It was to tour China for two months, visiting various cities 
in northern and southern China. News of the visit, however, did not 
go down well with the Chinese public. Newspapers in Peking, Tientsin, 
Changchun, Hangchow and Shanghai took a hostile attitude and called 
on the people to turn a cold shoulder on the Japanese visitors. They 
warned the Chinese people of Japan's "conspiracy" to expand her economic 
interests in China and used highly inflammatory language to describe 
the visiting Japanese: "the monster's visit to China" (Shanghai
Shenchow Jih Pao), "burning ambition of the Japanese" (Chung Wai Jih 
Pao), "Alas, the unpredictable calculations of the Japanese!"
(Hangchow Kung Min Jih Pao) and "the perilous visiting group to China" 
(Tientsin Chung-kuo Pao).^^
(39) Foreign minister Komura to Japanese minister and seven consuls 
in China, 28th January, 1909? NGB, Vol. 43, Part 2, p. 3 8 6.
(40) Report of the "Nippon Dempo" on the visit to China of the Japanese 
business group and the Chinese press , NGB, Vol.43, Part 2,
pp. 394-395.
The Japanese were, however, warmly welcomed by Chinese officials
and businessmen in all the places they visited. Mutual good-will was
■given
exchanged. To quote the speechAby the Japanese group leader Kondo 
at the reception given by the governor and influential gentry of 
Hangchow,
"Japan and China, being two independent brother 
countries in the East, belong tc the same race 
and share the same culture.... It goes without 
saying that they should strengthen their 
interdependence. However, communications between 
the two countries have not been frequent. This 
has resulted in a lack of understanding of one 
another's natural inclinations and given rise to 
mutual suspicions and bad feelings. As the 
old saying has it, 'brotherly disputes invite 
invasion from the outsider'. In order to 
rectify this regrettable situation, Japan and 
China must make joint efforts to promote business, 
encourage industries and commerce and strive for 
progress with one mind and purpose.... They must 
take up the responsibilities [befitting their 
status in this part of the world] and place 
themselves in the key position [in order to 
fight for survival] in the competitive economic 
world of the twentieth century...."(4l)
The tour was, on the whole , a success. In all the places 
they visited, the Japanese met with large numbers of Chinese businessmen 
and members of the wealthy gentry class. In Nanking, a plan was 
even drawn up for the formation of an "organization for the liaison" of 
Sino-Japanese merchants. A scheme for the opening of a Sino-Japanese 
exhibition was also discussed between the Japanese and a group of
(42)merchants from Shanghai.
News reports on the Japanese visit were received with enthusiasm 
at home. The Japanese press was hopeful that the visit would herald 
a new era of Sino-Japanese cooperation. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun
(41) Japanese charge d'affaires in Hangchow to Komura: report on the 
reception given to the Japanese business group at Hangchow, 27th 
June, 1910, NGB, Vol.43, Part 2, No.1007, pp.425-426.
(42) Japanese consul in Nanking to Komura, 16th June, 1910, NGB, Vol.43? 
Part 2 , No.996, p.4l7.
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said that at a time of Western encroachment, Japan and Chinai being 
the only two independent countries in the Far East? should look upon 
one another as the one friend and ally. Yet this was a far cry 
from reality. Whilst the politicians and people of Japan and China 
never stopped talking of the cultural and racial affinity and the 
need for cooperation between the two countries, so much so that such 
terms had lost their meanings, there was nothing but mutual suspicions 
and insincerity. This was because Japan and China had never openly 
expressed their innermost feelings to one another. In future the two 
peoples must create more opportunities to come into contact with one 
another and try to analyse and understand each other's problems. Those 
were the duties of the organizers and promoters of the Japanese visit
, (43)to China.
In an interview with the reporter of the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun after 
they had returned to Japan, leading members of the Japanese business 
group commented that Japan would no longer have to worry about her 
lagging behind America and the European powers in developing her 
economic interests in China. The Chinese had begun to realize that 
they had to look for support from a country of the same culture and 
race. They were beginning to show signs of willingness to see Japan's 
point of view and appreciate her real intentions. The Japanese 
should seize this opportunity to cultivate joint economic activities
(44)with the Chinese people.
Having arrived at the position of a big power, Japan began to 
take an interest in pursuing her economic inteissts in China alongside
(43) "The way to attain friendship between Japan and China", editorial,
TNNS, 16th May, 19^0, p.2, "The appearance and reality of Sino- 
Japanese friendship", editorial, TNNS, 4th July, 1910, p.2.
(44) "Conversation on the inspection tour of China", TAS, 4th July, 19^0,
p.4.
the other powers. As a relatively new participant in this particular 
power-game, Japan was conscious of the predominant Western influence • 
Throughout the post-Russo-Japanese - war period, the Westemcountries were 
inclined to believe that Japan strove for political and economic 
influences in China which would be detrimental to their own interests.
The Japanese, for their part, were convinced that the Western powers 
were so strong and rich that they would have to establish a stronghold 
in China in order to contain the challenge of Western competition.
This was but part of the argument for securing Japan's special position 
in China in this period. The strengthening of friendly relations with 
China was vital for the expansion of Japan's economic influence at this 
early stage. Once again, the Japanese reminded themselves - and the 
Chinese - of the special relationship which had existed between the 
two countries. The cultural and geographical proximity with China 
would be an advantage for Japan in competing with the Western powers.
Thus in 1911i at the same time that the international loan was 
being negotiated between China on the one hand and America, Germany, 
England and France on the other, an agreement for a loan of ten million 
yens was concluded between Sheng Hsuan-huai, secretary of the Board 
of Posts and Communications and Odagiri of the Yokohama Specie Bank, 
for the purpose of constructing the Canton-Hankow and Szechuan-Hankow
(45)Railways and reforming China's finances. " Although the question of a 
Japanese financial adviser was discussed between the two parties, it was 
not made as a condition of the loan. But the terms and rate of 
interests were the same as those being negotiated between China
(43) Decree relating to the four-power loan and Specie loan as published 
in the Chinese Government Gazette on 4th May, 1911, NGB, Vol.44, 
part 2 , p. 3 0 9.
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and the powers.
The Japanese considered the loan as a great success. It was 
regarded as proof of Japan having risen to the status of a creditor- 
nation alongside the other powers. The Japanese public viewed it as 
the beginning of closer economic cooperation between Japan and China.
The Sino-Japanese loan? like the four-power loan, had aroused bitter 
hostility in the Chinese people especially the Chekiang and Kiangsu 
gentry. Within the government itself, Sheng encountered opposition 
from the Ministry of Defence especially Hsu Shih-ch'ang who was
(46)believed to be extremely anti-Japanese. ' The eventual conclusion
was hailed by the Japanese press as evidence of the far-sighted judgment 
of the Chinese government and economic sector and proof of the "faith
(47)and confidence on the part of the Chinese official circles in Japan". 
Furthermore, the Japanese press optimistically observed, it signified 
the combination of Japanese and Chinese interests which would help 
to remove the Chinese people's needless and uncalled-for fear and 
suspicion of Japan. It was regarded as a sign of strengthening 
economic relations which paved the way for closer friendship between
r u  4- 4- ■the two countries.
Nevertheless, the extension and consolidation of Japan's influence 
and interests in China took place within the diplomatic framework of 
understanding with the Western powers. To safeguard her share of 
imperialist activities in China, Japan needed to coordinate her actions 
with some, if not all, of the Western countries to ensure the powers’ 
recognition of Japan's special position and enable Japan to pursue
(46) Ijuin to Komura, 4th May, d9Jh, NGB, Vol.44, Part 2, No.633> p.308.
(47) "The by-product of the conclusion of the loan", TNNS, 29th March,
1911i p.3.
(48) "The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese loan", editorials in TNNS,
27th March, 1911 , p.1 and TAS, 27th March, '’9 1 1 , p.3*
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further interests in China.
Thus Japan was at the same time interested in participating in 
international financial enterprises in China. When in late 1910,
Willard Straight initiated the four-power banking loan to the Chinese 
government, Baron Takahashi, vice-president of the Bank of Japan, 
wrote to Jacob Schiff, American representative of the consortium,
"...The matter of international financial business 
in China has again come into prominence, and as 
the condition of our money market and the financial 
strength of the country have changed a great deal 
in the meantime, the desire has materialized on 
the part of our leading bankers to participate in 
the international group...."(49)
Japanese interest in joining the international consortium, however, 
received no immediate attention from the powers. In June, 191 1 , an 
agreement for a loan of ten million pounds was signed between China and 
the four powers. Article 16 gave the four powers preferential right 
in loan operations. It also stipulated that nshould the Imperial 
Chinese government decide to invite foreign capitalists to participate 
with Chinese interests in Manchurian business contemplated under this 
loan, or to be undertaken in connection therewith, the [four-power]
Banks should first be invited to so participate." ^0)
Soon after the announcement of this agreement, Komura instructed 
Motono, Japanese minister in Russia, to approach the Russian government 
with a proposal for taking joint action in pressing the powers to either amend 
or expunge Article 1 6. Japan maintained that she possessed in the region of 
s-outhern Manchuria special rights and interests, and while she was fully
(49) Takahashi to Schiff, 29th November, 19^ 0? appendix to Takahashi
to Komura, 3^st January, 19"I'll NGB, Vol.44, Part2_,pp. 276-277.
(50) For full text of the "Currency Reform and Industrial Development
Loan Agreement", see NGB, Vol.44, Part 2, pp.34'1-354, For Article
1 6, see p.3 5 2.
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prepared to respect the rights of others? she was unable to view with 
indifference measures which tended, not only to menace those special 
rights and interests, but to place her subjects and institutions at 
a disadvantage as compared with the subjects and institutions of any 
other country.v^  ^
The Russian government, after consultation with Japan, notified the
consortium governments that Russia maintained special rights in
northern Manchuria under the provisions of treaties and agreements concluded
with China, and that Russia reserved the right to take any essential
measure to protect her interests in the said region. Japan made a
similar declaration that, in view of the Russian pronouncement, she
reserved the right to take the same posture concerning southern 
(52)Manchuria.
This coordinated action led to the conclusion of the third Russo- 
Japanese agreement in July, 19/12, under which the two powers pledged 
to respect the regions of special interests of both countries and 
confirmed the division of Inner Mongolia into eastern and western 
sectors as they had divided Manchuria into northern and southern 
sectors in 1907.
x x x
By entering into a series of agreements and understanding with 
the powers in 1907 and 1908, Japan was able to expand and consolidate 
her power and position in East Asia. But as Japanese interests in
(5 1) Komura to Motono, 14th June, NGB, Vol.49, Part 2, No.682,
PP. 356-557.
(52) See NGB, Vol.44, Part 2, Nos. 6911 7l7, 721 and 722.
southern Manchuria considerably increased after 1907, they came into 
conflict with those of the powers in the area. Thus by cooperating 
with the Western countries, Japan had arrived at a position to 
compete with them. This element of competition in her relationship 
with the powers led Japan to see the need for retaining her special 
relationship with China when acting in concert with the West was not 
obviously advantageous to her own interests.
The Japanese government did not feel it necessary to account to 
the powers for its actions in strengthening Japan's position in 
China. The assumption was that Japan's special position in China, 
secured by coordination of Western and Japanese activity, was a part o 
the new equilibrium being established in the post-Russo-Japanese-war 
era. In matters where Japan's vital intersts were not affected, 
however, the Japanese government was ready to forgo Japan's special 
relationship with China in the interest of coordination with the 
Western countries. In 1908, Japanese government leaders disclaimed 
Japanese influence in the emergence of Chinese nationalism. They 
feared that identification with the "awakening of China" would result 
in embarrassment for the government in its relations with the Western 
countries. The Japanese government leaders were aware that they had 
to tread cautiously in order not to aggravate the insecurity of Japan' 
position among the powers.
The Japanese public, on the other hand, was not bound by the need 
to exercise caution in delicate situations in international politics. 
Bewildered by the racial prejudice and suspicions of the Western 
countries, the Japanese suddenly became aware of their isolation in 
the post-war world. They began to have doubts about the real value 
of international understanding. Many Japanese came to advocate that 
instead of coordinating her actions with the powers, Japan must
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henceforth carry out what she believed to be in her interests whatever 
the attitudes of the Western countries.
Unlike the government leaders, many Japanese had not relinquished 
the hope of guiding China towards development. The Chinese rights 
recovery and reform movements in this period were evidence of China's 
gradual awakening in face of foreign encroachment. Japan was, 
moreover, deeply involved as the Chinese nationalists began resorting 
to the boycotting of Japanese goods to protest against Japan's 
imperialist policy in Manchuria.
However, the concept of guidance had increasingly come to be 
associated with the possibilities and tactics of big power status. 
Nationalism was seen as necessary for making China a strong country 
which would be a worthy ally for Japan in combating predominant Western 
influences, but it must not be allowed to jeopardize Japanese interests.
And in face of the "stubborn" and hostile attitude of the Chinese,
Japan must force or coax China to cooperate with her. It was in this 
connection that the Japanese public threw its weight behind the government’s 
policy in Manchuria. It was also in this connection that the Japanese 
business sector launched a campaign for economic cooperation between 
Japan and China. Having as its objective the expansion of Japanese 
economic interests in China, such unprecedented economic activities 
were in turn fully endorsed and supported by the government.
CONCLUSION
After the Manchus were overthrown? Japan's position in China 
was considerably less secure. The Japanese government now faced an 
overtly hostile government led by Yuan Shih-k'ai. Yuan was ready to 
accept financial and political assistance from the Western powers 
especially Germany to counter Japanese influence in China. The 
Japanese government became more and more convinced that it had to use 
force to ensure Japan's special position in China.
Japan was especially alarmed at the prospect of her leases in 
Manchuria expiring in 1923* Since 1907? she had been making a series 
of agreements with Russia with a view to safeguarding her interests 
in Manchuria. These agreements? however? had not ensured a permanent 
possession of the region while enabling Russia to consolidate her 
interests in North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. In 1913> Kato 
Takaaki? soon to take over the office of foreign minister from prime 
Minister Katsura? told the British foreign secretary? Edward Grey? that 
Manchuria was a tree planted and fertilized in Japanese blood and 
money. In addition to having tangible interests? Japan had a "historical 
and sentimental affinity for the area". She could not give it up 
and was determined to have exclusive possession of Port Arthur? Tbrt Dairen 
and the area contiguous to those places. That was the "immutable 
policy of any Japanese government? based ... upon the will of the 
Japanese people".^1^
Economic rivalry among the powers had also intensified after 
the fall of the Manchus. The Japanese? though eager to lend money
(1 ) Interview between Kato and Grey on 3rd January? 1913i full text in 
Ito Masanori? ed.? Kato Komei Den (Biography of Kato Komei)? Tokyo? 
1929? Vol.2? pp. 133-136. Quoted in Paul S. Dull? "Count Kato Komei 
and the Twenty-one Demands" in Pacific Historical Review? California? 
Vol.19 (1930)? p.132.
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to Chinai found that they were being outstripped by wealthy competitors.
By 191^1 Japan felt that her influence was being frozen out of China 
by foreign capital. Moreover, Yuan Shih-k'ai was planning to nationalize 
the iron ore production and the management of the Hanyehping Company 
which had been supplying Japan with iron ore. This plan, if implemented, 
would have shattered Japan's hope for joint control of the Company 
with China.
The enforced inactivity of the European powers in Asia during the
First World War provided an opportunity for Japan to strengthen her
economic and political influence in China. By capturing the German
installations inShantung in November, 191*H Japan was able to remove
German influence from China as well as enlarge her own sphere of
interest. She feared that once the war was over, the Western powers
would resume and intensify their exploitation of Asia. It was
believed that the time had come for Japan to negotiate with the Yuan
Shih-k'ai government for an all-out agreement which would ensure for
Japan substantial increases in economic, political and military rights
in Manchuria, Shantung, Inner Mongolia, Fukien and central China. The
strengthening of Japan's position vis-a-vis her Western competitors
depended on a Sino-Japanese collaboration which would make further
foreign aggression impossible. Yamagata Aritomo said in August, 191^
that Japan had to settle on a policy towards China, aiming "primarily
at improving Sino-Japanese relations and inspiring in China a feeling
(2)of abiding trust in us". He also warned that Japan needed friendly
Chinese aid in the coming war between the yellow and white races although 
Japai must not raise the question of a league of coloured peoples when
(2) From the memorandum submitted by Yamagata to the government in August, 
191^ + in Tokutomi Iichiro, Kosaku Yamagata Aritomo Den (Biography 
of Prince Yamagata Aritomo), Tokyo, 1933* Vol.3» pp.920-927, translated 
in Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 
1838-1922, Massachusetts, 1971, p.273.
approaching the Chinese government for an agreement as this would "injure
the feelings of other countries and impair their friendship for our
(3)Empire". '
There were others in Japan, however, who were less concerned with 
foreign opinions. Japanese nationalists, in particular, firmly believed 
that Japan should ally herself with China, protect China from the Western 
powers and encourage the inevitable nationalist revolution against Yuan
rp|
Shih-k'ai. envisaged that a Nationalist China under a government
(9-)rid of Yuan would be much less hostile to Japanese aid and intervention.
Sun Yat-sen had said as much in his desperate appeal to the Okuma
(5)
government for support against Yuan Shih-k'ai.
Thus in January, 1915 ’ the Twenty-one Demands, a logical fruition 
of Japanese attitudes and policies towards China since the end of the 
Russo-Japanese war, were presented to the Yuan Shih-k'ai government in five groups. 
The fifth group demanded full cooperation from the Chinese. Arrangements 
were to be made for the employment of Japanese political, financial 
and military advisers in the Chinese governments, joint Sino-Japanese 
police administration in key areas, the purchase by China of Japanese 
munitions and joint operation of certain Chinese arsenals. These demands, though
£xs\ctjuig5were reminiscent of Japan's offer of guidance and assistance 
to which the Chinese responded favourably in the 1898-1909- period.
In 1898, Chang Chih-tung had had little misgivings in employing Japanese 
military advisers to train his Hupeh army. And in the decade 
following the Japanese mission to China led by Kamio Mitsuomi, it 
was not unusual for Japanese advisers and instructors in Chinese 
railway companies, military and police academies to be given the 
Chinese imperial awards.
(3) Hackett, ibid., pp. 279—275. Yamagata specifically pointed out that
Japan was in alliance with England and had agreements with Russia
and France.
(9-) See Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, pp. 180-182.
(5) See ibid., pp. 188-1891 for Sun's letter to Okuma.
Nevertheless, the fifth group of demands raised a storm 
of protest in China. Chinese resistance and opposition were not 
unreasonable or surprising. By 1915* the cooperation theme in Japanese 
policy and attitude towards China had incorporated a powerful element 
of desire for exploitation of imperialist gains. The sweeping demands 
for military and governmental control by Japan, if accepted, would 
have reduced China to the status of a Japanese protectorate. This was
incompatible with the nationalist aspirations of the Chinese. The
last demands aroused much anti-Japanese hostility in China and many 
Chinese including some of tie opponents of Yuan Shih-k'ai rallied 
to his support in an attempt to hold out against Japanese aggression.
An ultimatum delivered to the Chinese government in May secured Chinese 
concessions to the other four groups of demands. But Japan's hope for 
a Sino-Japanese alliance which would strengthen her political ties with 
China did not materialize. The Twenty-one Demands marked a definite 
break in the relations of the two countries.
Japan's rise to power was in part self-assertiveness and in part 
a belief in Japanese leadership in East Asia. When China and Japan 
were forced to enter world politics in the nineteenth century, neither 
country was able to hold her own in face of the Western encroachment in 
the East. Each country, however, went her own way in response to 
the Western challenge. The Japanese attempts to renovate and 
strengthen the country indicated an acute awareness of the foreign 
threat to the independence of the nation. The fact that the Chinese 
whom the Japanese held in traditional respect as a powerful nation had 
failed to keep the Western powers at bay could only have convinced 
Japan that she could not challenge the Western threat single-handedly. 
The idea of Sino-Japanese cooperation was founded on the assumption 
that both countries needed to unite their efforts to ensure their 
survival. The increasing Western imperialistic activities on East 
Asian territory and in particular the Triple Intervention in 1895
followed by the scramble for concessions in China three years later 
heightened Japan's fear for her own security. Many Japanese came to 
view the world in terms of confrontation between the Eastern and 
Western countries. Hence although China's weakness was exposed in the 
war of l899— l895i many Japanese still regarded her as a necessary 
ally in a racial struggle.
The disparity in strength and development between Japan and China 
meant that if the two countries were to join hands in preserving 
themselves from Western engulfment, Japan, rather that China, must 
lead. The concept of Japanese leadership was founded on Japan's 
realization of her superiority of strength in East Asia. This 
realization led the Japanese to identify themselves as the leader of the 
Asian awakening in the early twentieth century, but it also fore shadowed 
an unequal partnership in a cooperative relationship and the eventual 
parting of the way for Japan and China.
The Russo-Japanese war changed the political situation in the 
Far East. Southern Manchuria became a Japanese sphere of influence. 
Japan felt that she needed to protect and exploit her new continental 
position. For many Japanese, the fact that Japan had stronger 
political, historical and geographical ties with China than did the other 
powers was a valid reason for Japan to expand her rights and interests 
in China more extensively than those of other countries. This was 
considered to be Japan's natural right just as it was Japan's natural 
duty to guide and lead China towards modernization. Thus in the 
post-war period, Japanese writers who urged the government to adopt 
a strong policy towards China also emphasized that Japan had stronger 
claims tc help China carry out reforms now that she had become a 
significant force in the Far East. When, however, the extension 
of Japan's vital interests in China met with Chinese opposition, the
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requirements of Japanese prestige and security prevailed against the 
need for coming to terms with Chinese nationalism. Japan's growing 
imperialist opportunities and position led to the submergence, though 
not extinction, of the Nisshin teikei ron. The combination of force 
and guidance in Japan's tactics resulted in even greater suspicion of 
Japanese intentions in the Chinese mind.
At the same time, military domination of China, or parts of China,
would altogether free Japan from dependence on Chinese friendship in 
safeguarding Japanese security from Western aggression in Asia. Thus 
in 1900, Japan tested her opportunity for expansion in scuthern China 
by sending an expedition to Amoy while northern China was preoccupied 
with the Boxer disturbances. After the Russo-Japanese war, Japan's 
defence policy was both defensive and aggressive. Military preparations 
after the war were directed chiefly at Russia in the event of the latter
seeking revenge for her defeat. But one of the main points, in fact,
the main objective of the "Plan of National Defence for the Empire"
(Teikoku Kokubo Hoshin) devised by Tanaka Giichi of the General Staff 
and Yamagata in October, 1906 was that Japan's "efforts to expand our 
national sovereignty and enhance cur interests in China must excel 
o t h e r s " . A n d  the last poipt in the "plan" stated that if action 
against China should be necessary, the army would conquer South China 
and the navy would control the Formosan straits and harass the southern
(7)coastal cities. The extension of Japan's national power on the
(6 ) Text of Yamagata's "National Defence Policy of the Empire" (Teikoku 
Kokubo Hoshin-an) of 1906 is collected in Oyama Azusa, Yamagata 
Aritomo Ikensho, (Reprints of 77 memoranda to the Prime Minister 
and other writings by Yamagata Aritomo), op.cit., pp. 290-301,
see especially pp. 299-3 0 0.
(7) ibid.
Asian continent was seen by some as a logical development of Japanese policy 
now that her own security had been secured by military strength.
Inevitably, as Japan emerged from Asian backwardness, she began 
to have doubts about relying totally on cooperation with China and 
the other Asian countries whose weakness continued to invite Western 
control. By 1900, Japan had created a military and economic strength 
unrivalled by her Asain neighbours. She had also rid herself of the 
humiliating term of extraterritoriality in her treaty relationship 
with some of the Western powers. Her moderation and conscientious 
participation in the allied expedition to Peking during the Boxer Rebellion 
won her not only Chinese admiration but also Western friendship. The 
Japanese realized that their rising status and prestige promised an 
important role in Far Eastern international politics. If the Western 
powers were to be prevented from further expansion in Asia, it would 
require diplomatic rapprochement and cooperative policies.
Hence instead of looking for a general union of Asian nations 
against Western domination, Japanese leaders, in particular, saw a 
more promising future for Japan in coodinating her actions with the 
West. By forming an alliance with England in 1902, Japan arrived at a 
position to partake in the politics of the big powers. Having defeated 
Russia in 1905? she proceeded to reach a diplomatic reconciliation with 
the latter. Subsequent agreements with France, Russia and America 
enabled her to safeguard her spheres of influence in China and increase 
her capacity for international competition.
By 1910, Japan was competing with the powers in tie pursuit of 
imperialist gains in East Asia. China and in particular Manchuria 
was gradually gaining importance as a market and a source of raw 
materials for Japan and there were growing possibilities for the expansion 
of Japanese trade and investment. Japan had to woo or force China to
be cooperative but only with a view to enhancing Japan's bargaining 
power vis-a-vis her Western competitors. The promotion of Japanese 
interests still depended on the recognition of Japan's special position 
in China by the powers. Nothing should be done to jeopardize Japan's 
chances of entering into firmer alliances with the Western countries 
especially England and Russia.
Thus cooperation with China, territorial expansion on the Chinese 
mainland and alliance with one or more Western powers could all usefully 
safeguard Japanese security and contribute to the increase of Japanese 
strength. Indeed, more often than not, Japanese attitudes and policies 
towards China in this period indicated that the adoption of one method 
was not necessarily a barrier to the acceptance of the rest. Nevertheless, 
the use of military force and alignment of policies with the imperialist 
powers to ensure Japan's position of supremacy in China necessarily 
weakened the possiblities of a genuine Sino-Japanese cooperation.
A more fundamental factor working against the realization of a
Sino-Japanese special relationship would seem to be China's slow realization
\ner
of her passing supremacy in the East and^belated rediscovery of Japan.
Before the Sino-Japanese war, the Chinese response to the Nisshin teikei 
ron had been slow and lukewarm. The Japanese assumption that countries 
in the East, being weak in comparison with the Western powers, should 
combine their strength to defend themselves, was not shared by most 
Chinese. The reality of China's old world was founded on an acknowledgment 
of China's superiority by all smaller states in the East. It is not 
unlikely that in the early stage of Western expansion in the Far 
East, China had never entertained the idea that her Asian neighbours 
including Japan might have had the adequate potential for assisting 
her in her encounters with the Western powers. Before the Chinese 
mission was established in Japan in ^877, the Chinese government had
not regarded Japan as a possible force in Asia. And few Chinese at 
that time were ready to view Japan in the light of a possible ally.
It was only in the 1 8 8 0's that China began to consider the possibility 
of enlisting Japanese help in countering the Russian threat. But 
the influential faction in Peking still regarded a policy of appeasing 
Russia as a better alternative in safeguarding Chinese security. 
Nineteenth-century China did not share the Japanese image of East and 
West. Consequently, the Chinese were much more lukewarm about Asian 
solidarity in a racial struggle. They were more concerned with "using 
barbarian to control barbarian".
It was Japan's superior strength demonstrated in the war of 189 +^- 
1895 which convinced the Chinese that they needed Japanese help in 
preserving Asian integrity. In the following decade, China's 
traditional sense of superiority over the Japanese was replaced by an 
acknowledgment of Japanese leadership. Enlightened Chinese leaders 
welcomed Japanese help and advice in improving Chinese military and 
economic affairs. The Chinese government saw the need to reform its 
institutions on the Japanese model and entrusted the Japanese with the 
education of Chinese students. Chinese reformers urged the authorities 
to learn from Japan. Sun Yat-sen and the revolutionaries were anxious 
for guidance proffered by their Japanese sympathisers in fighting
Western imperialism. In fact, at the turn of the century, the Chinese
had hoped for a Sino-Japanese alliance - a hope which was not realized 
as Japan was already contemplating a policy of cooperation with the West*
Up until the eve of the Russo-Japanese war, the need for strengthening 
the country had been seen by comparatively few people in China. As
the literate section of the public gradually acquired a sense of
political consciousness, more Chinese became concerned at the plight of 
the country. Japan's effcrts. in stopping Russian expansion in 
Manchuria were admired by all in China. Her victory over Russia
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inspired the Chinese with hopes for a revival of the Asian nations.
Many Chinese were encouraged to believe that if sucess could happen 
to Japan, it could also happen to China. It was a shameful thing for 
the Chinese that they should have needed Japan to fight the war for 
them.
Chinese aspirations in the post-war era were arbte-r a strong 
country which would resist all foreign aggressions. Identifying the 
Manchu government with the cause of China's weakness, the revolutionaries 
acquired a sense of Chinese pride and Chinese nationalism. They 
began to clamour for the recovery of Chinese national rights and 
sovereignty and an end to her unequal relationship with the powers.
Whilst this national consciousness was necessary for China's strengthening 
which many Japanese professed to favour, it was also ominous of what 
was happening to their hopes for leadership and aggrandizement in 
Asia. The emergence of Chinese nationalism meant that the Chinese would 
only accept cooperation on terms of equality. And as Japan exploited 
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A. In English 
(i) Official
British Parliamentary Papers: Correspondence Respecting
the Affairs of China?
China? No. 1 ? March? l899» 
Inclosure 2 in No. 9-01?
Vol. C1X, 308-310.
(ii) Unofficial
Lensen? G.A. (ed.) The D'Anethan Dispatches
from Japan? 1899—1910 . The 
Observations of Baron Albert 
d'Anethan? Belgian Minister 
Plenipotentiary and Dean of 




Ch'ing-Chi Wai-Chiao Shih-Liao (Documents on the foreign 
relations of the last two reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty)?
Peking? 1932-35*
Chung-
Ch'ing Hsiian-T'ung Ch'ao. Jih Chiao-She Shih-Liao (Documents 
on Sino-Japanese relations in the Hsiian-t'ung period)? Peking 
Palace Museum? 1933.
Ch'ing Kuang-Hsii Ch'ao Chung-Jih Chiao-She Shih-Liao (Documents 
on Sino-Japanese relations in the Kuang-hsii period) ? Peking 
Palace Museum? 1932-3.
These two publications form a basic source of information 
on the formulation of Chinese policies towards Japan from 
1875 to 1912. They are as yet the most comprehensive 
Chinese collections of documents available on Sino-Japanese 
relations in this period.
Hsueh-Pu Tsou-Tzii Chi-Yao (Curriculum devised by the Board 
of Education). This collection of regulations and documents 
relating to schools and educational administration appears 
in published form but has neither page numbers nor indications 
of the place and date of publication.
(ii) Unofficial
Chang Wen-Hsiang Kung Ch'uan-Chi (Collected memorials? 
works and papers by Chang Chih-tung)? Peking? 1937.
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Chung-Kuo Chin-Tai Chiao-Yii Shih Tzu-Liao (Historical 
materials on the history of Chinese education in modern 
times* 1860-1922)» Peking, 1922.
Hsin-Hai Ko-Ming-Ch'ien Shih-Nien-Chien Shih-Lun Hsuan-Chi 
(Selected reviews of current affairs in the decade before 
the revolution of 19hh)1 edited by Chang Nan and Wang 
Jen-chih, Peking, 1960. A collection of writingSby Chinese 
scholars and intellectuals in the 1 9 0 0's.
Hsin-Hai Ko-Ming Lieh-Shih Shih-Wen Hsiian (Selection of 
revolutionary literature of the 1900's), edited by Hsiao 
P'ing, Peking, 1962. A collection of writings by Chinese 
revolutionaries many of whom were active in Japan at the 
time.
Huang-Ch'ao Ching-Shih-Wen San-P'ien (Supplementary collection 
of articles on social themes), edited by Ch'en Chung-i,
Shanghai, 1898.
Huang-Ch'ao Hsii-Ai Wen-P'ien (Collection of essay by writers 
of the reform movement), edited by Yu Pao-hsien and others, 
Shanghai, 1902-3.
K'ang Nan-Hai Tzu-P'ien Nien-Pu (Chronological autobiography 
of K'ang Yu-wei to 1898), series 11 of Chin-tai Chung-kuo 
Shih-liao Ts'ung-k'an. (Documentary collection on the modern 
history of China), Taipeh, 1966.
Liu K'un-I I-Chi (Written works left by Liu K'un-i after 
his death), Chung-kuo Chih-tai-shih Tzu-liao Ts'ung-shu 
(Series of historical materials on modern Chinese history),
Peking, 1939*
Wu-Hsu Pien-Fa (Historical materials on the reform of 1898), 
edited by Chien Po-tsan and others, Series 8 of Chin-tai 
Chung-kuo Shih-liao Ts'ung-k'an, Shanghai, 1953» There 
is a particularly extensive collection of documents and 
private papers relating to the coup d'etat in September,
1898.
Yin-Ping-Shih Wen-Chi (Literary writings in the Ice-drinking 
House) Taipeh, 1959. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's writings on political 
and social reform in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.
Yu-Chai Ts'un-Kao Ch'u-Kan (Collection of memorials, 
telegrammes and letters by the Chinese industrialist 
Sheng Hsiian-huai), edited by Wang Wen-chih, Shanghai, 1939*
(iii) Personal Accounts
Feng Tzu-yu Chung-Hua Min-Kuo K'ai-Kuo-
Ch'ien Ko-Ming Shih (History 
of the revolution before the 
establishment of the republic), 
Shanghai, 1928.
Ko-Ming I-Shih (Reminiscences of 
the 1911 revolution), Shanghai,
1953* Feng Tzu-yu was a participant 
in the revolutionary movement. These
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two works are reminiscences 
of his life and activities 
in Japan.
(iv) Newspapers and Journals:
Ching Chung Jih Pao (Warning Bell Daily)i a facsimile 
reprintj Taipehi 1968. The paper ran for one year (1904-1905) 
as one of the most influential revolutionary newspapers 
in Shanghai.
Ch’ing I Pao (China Discussion)» reprinted* Taipehi 1967.
Liang Ch'i-ch’ao's reform journal of the post-1 8 9 8 periodi 
published in Yokohama! 1898-1901.
Cheng Lun (Political Discussions) 1 Shanghaii 1907. The 
offical publication of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's Cheng Wen She 
(Political Information Club). It was suppressed by Tz’u Hsi 
after seven issues.
Chung Kuo Jih Pao (China Daily News) 1 a facsimile reprint5 
Taipehi 1969. Published in Hong Kong in 1899-1900 as the 
earliest newspaper to propagate revolution.
Chung Wai Jih Pao (Universal Gazette)i Began as a newspaper 
advocating reform in Shanghai in. the late 1890's but became 
reactionary after the coup of 1898. From 19081 it received 
subsidiesfrom the authorities. In the same year it criticized 
the anti-American boycott and became unpopular with industrial, 
commercial and educational circles in Shanghai.
Hong Kong Hua Tzu Jih Pao (Hong Kong Chinese Language Daily 
News). Started in 1864-5 as one of the earliest and longest- 
running Chinese newspapers.
Hsin Min Ts'ung Pao (New People's Miscellany) 1 reprintedi 
Taipehi 1966. A reform journal of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's 
published in Yokohama! 1902-1906.
Kuo Feng Pao (National Custom) 1 a journal of scholarly 
discussions of political theories and problems launched 
by the constitutionalist-reformer supporters of Liang Ch'i- 
ch'ao in Shanghai in 1909 after the death of Tzu Hsi and 
continued up to 1911.
Min Hsu Jih Pao (people's Plight) 1 a facsimile, reprint 1 
Taipehi 1969. A revolutionary newspaper in Shanghai in the 
1909-1910 period.
Min Li Pao (Democrat) 1 a facsimile reprint 1 Taipehi 1969*
The most widely-read and important revolutionary newspaper 
in Shanghai between 1910-1913* It continued to publish 
as a republican paper after the downfall of the Manchus.
Min Pao (People's News), reprinted by the Kuo-hsiieh ch'u-pan- 
shei Pekingi ^957. The official journal of the T’ung Meng 
Hui established in Tokyo* 1905*
0 Shih Ching Wen (Russian Alarm) 1 a facsimile reprinti Taipehi 
1968. One of the earliest anti-Manchu newspapers aiming 
to awaken the Chinese public to the foreign threat* Published 
in Shanghai from 1903-1904.
Tung Fang Tsa Chih (Eastern Miscellany) 5 Began in Shanghai,
1903 as a political journal advocating the establishment of 
a constitution for China.
Yu Hsiieh 1 P'ien (Foreign works translated by Chinese 
scholars studying abroad)1 Tokyo, 1902, reprinted, Taipeh, 1968,
Vvdi Chiaopao (Diplomatic- Review), A conservative, sclnolayly political journal 
founded in Shanghai in 1 became a. semi-official publication in 1906.
In Japanese
(i) Official
Gakusei Hachijunen Shi (History of the Japanese educational 
system during the past eighty years), published by the 
Mombusho(Ministry of Education), Tokyo, 1954.
Nihon Gaiko Bunsho (Japanese diplomatic documents), published 
by the Research Division, Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs), Tokyo, 1933 -• The first 7 volumes (1867-1874) 
appear under the title Dai Nihon Gaiko Bunsho.
Nihon Gaiko Nempyo Narabi Ni Shuyo Bunsho (Chronological 
record of Japanese foreign relations and select documents), 
Gaimusho, Tokyo, 1965-6 .
Taishi Kaiko Roku (Memoirs about China), a publication of 
the T5a Dobun Kai edited by Nakajima Masao, is compiled 
by the "Society for the compilation of writings about men 
who have rendered conspicuous service in regard to China",
Tokyo, 1936. It includes first-hand accounts of commercial 
ventures and political anecdotes of Japanese individuals and 
organizations active in China. Part 2 is given over to 
biographies.
Toa Dobun Kai Kankei Zassen (Miscellaneous documents relating 
to the Toa Dobun Kai), Section 1, 1899-1910, Japanese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. This is one of the selected 
archives of the Japanese Army, Navy and other government 
agencies in the period 1868-1945 microfilmed for the Library 
of Congress , 1949-1951•
Toa Senkaku Shishi Kiden (Stories and biographies of pioneering 
East Asian adventurers), Tokyo, 1933-6. An official history 
of the Kokuryukai, written and compiled by Kuzuu Yoshihisa, 
head of the Kokuryukai in the 1930's. It gives accounts 
of the activities of Japanese continentalists from the late 
Tokugawa period up to 1932.
(ii) Unofficial
"Hayashi Tadasu Gaimudaijin, 'Taishin Seiryaku Kankei Kanken'" 
(Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu's "Personal view of policy 
towards China") in Nihon Gaikoshi Kenkyu : Meiji Jidai (Studies 
in Japanese diplomatic history: the Meiji period), edited 
by Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Tokyo, 1961.
Konoe Atsumaro Nikki (Diary of Konoe Atsumaro), compiled by 
the Atsumaro Nikki Kankokai (Committee for the publication
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of the Diary of Konoe Atsumaro), Tokyo, 1968. The 
first five volumes are Konoe1s day-to-day entries between 
February 1895 to March 1903. These record meetings with 
his colleagues and sometimes proceedings in the diet.
The supplementary volume contains his private letters, 
speeches and short written works.
Kotoku Shusui, Hyron to Zuiso (Kotoku Shusui, Reviews and 
Reflections), Tokyo, 19^9- A collection compiled by Kono 
Hirornichi of Kotoku's essays written between 1899 and 1903-
Okurna-Ko Hachiju-gonen Shi (Biography of Okuma Shigenobu,
1838-1922), edited by Ichijima Kenkichi, Tokyo, 1926. An 
account of Okuma's life as a politician and scholar. A 
large part of Vol. 2,is devoted to his involvement in the 
education of Chinese students and his views on Sino-Japanese 
friendship.
Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho (The written opinions of Yamagata 
Aritomo), a compilation of eighty-two documents with 
accompanying analysis by Oyama Azusa, series 16 of Meiji 
Hyakunen-Shi Sosho, Tokyo, 1966. The documents include 
memorials, policy proposals, public statements and private 
opinions dating from l8?1 to 1919.
(iii) Personal Accounts
Kayano Chochi Chuka Minkoku Kakumei Hykyu
(Private sources for the Chinese 
republican revolution), Tokyo,
19V 1 • A personal account of the 
Chinese revolution by Sun Yat-sen's 
confidant Kayano Chochi.
Miyake Setsurei Dojidai-Shi (History of Japan
during my life time), Tokyo, 19^ +9- 
1933* Miyake Setsure,journalist 
and scholar, was one time editor 
and one of the proprietors of 
Nihon, a nationalist newspaper of 
much influence especially in the 
18 9 0*s. This work is his personal 
record of the year-by-year changes 
in the government and the deaths 
of Japanese parliamentarians and 
politicians during his life time 
(1860-19^3)• There is, however, 
little coverage on Japan's external 
relations.
(iv) Newspapers and Journals
Gaiko Jiho (Diplomatic Journal), Tokyo. This journal 
was started in 1898 and printed reviews of the political 
situation in the Far East. Its articles and discussions 
were written mainly by influential scholars and politicians. 
Microfilmed reproduction of selected articles between 1898-19H  
have been used.
Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo Rising Sun Daily), microfilm 
reproduction by the Tokyo Asahi Shimbunsha. This newspaper
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was started in 1888 by Murayama when he took over the 
proprietorship of the Mezamashi Shimbun in Osaka. This 
was the first example of a newspaper venture launched in 
Tokyo by Osaka journalists using capital raised in Osaka.
It soon became a vigorous newspaper and in the l890's 
expressed views which were sympathetic to the Progressive 
Party led by Okuma. After the turn of the century? it 
became a pro-Kenseihonto paper? openly criticizing the 
government led alternately by the Ito and Yamagata factions 
through the first decade of the twentieth century.
Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun (Tokyo Daily News)? Microfilm 
reproduction by the Mainichi Shimbunsha? Tokyo? 1966. This 
newspaper began in the early l870's as one of the earliest 
newspapers belonging to the Chosu group led by Ito and Inoue. 
After 1882? it attempted to be an independent and non-party 
paper. But in 189I1 it fell into the hands of Ito Miyoji, 
a protege of Ito and again became a major newspaper of the 
Ito faction. In October? 190A-? it was taken over by Kato 
Takaaki who had failed in the election in 1903» Kato hoped 
to use the paper as a platform for his views and a means 
to gain public support especially against the Katsura 
government. But he soon lost interest and gave up his 
editorial work. He sold it in 1908 when he was appointed 
as minister to England. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun then 
became connected with the Mitsubishi and Mitsui business 
groups. In March? its management was transferred to
the proprietors of the Osaka M&inichi Shimbun which reported 
mainly business and commercial news in the Kansai region.
The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun then became the Tokyo edition 
of the Osaka Mainichi Shimbun but retained its own name until 











Chang Chih-tung and Educational 
Reform in China? Harvard East 
Asian Studies? Series 5^ +» Cambridge? 
Mass.? 1971•
The Modern History of Japan?
London? 1963 •
China and the Far East? Clark 
University? Mass.? 191Q»
Recent Events and Present Policies 
in China ? London? 1912.
Japan's Modern Century? New 
York? 1955*
The Chinese Periodical Press?
1800-19 12? Shanghai ?1933•
Nationalism in Japan? Berkeley?
1935.


















The Anglo-Japanese Alliance? 
Beltimore? 1931•
The Far East Unveiled: an Inner 
History of Events in Japan and 
China in 191 6? London? 1918•
The Japanese Seizure of Korea? 
1868-191G> Philadelphia? 1960.
Yuan Shih-k 'ai? 1839-1916 ? Stanford? 
1961.
Party Rivalry and Political Changes 
in Taisho Japan? Harvard East 
Asian Studies (35)? Cambridge ? Mass.? 
1968.
Chinese Intellectuals and the 
Revolution of 1911? University 
of Washington Press? 1969.
The White Peril in the Far East: 
an Interpretation of the Significance 
of the Russo-Japanese War? New 
York? 1905«
Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise 
of Modern Japan? 1838-1922T~ 
Cambridge? Mass.? 1971.
Contemporary Politics in the 
Far East ? New York? London? 1916.
Across the Pacific: an Inner 
History of American-East Asian 
Relations? New York? 1967.
Diplomatic Commentaries 
Baltimore? 1936.
The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen? 
Cambridge? Mass.? 195^ •
Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji 
Restoration? Princeton? 1961.
The Emergence of Japan as a 
World Power? 1895-19^5? Tokyo?
1968.
Press and Politics in Japan?
Chicago? 1921.
The Passing of the Manchus?
London? 1912.
Kosaka Masaaki (ed.) 
(translated and adopted 
by David Abosch)
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Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind 
of Modern China? reissue?
Berkeley and Los Angeles? 1967.
The Political History of China? 
18AO-1928? Princeton? 1956.
A History of the Press and Public 
Opinion in China? Institute of 
Pacific Relations? China Council? 
Honolulu? 1937.
The Economic Development of Japan? 
1868-1938?^ Princeton? 195^*
Great Britain and Japan? 1911-1915? 
London? 1969.
A Political History of Japan?
1868-1912 ? London? 1916.
The New Far East ? New York?
1906.
The International Relations of 
the Chinese Empire? a facsimile 
of the original edition? Taipeh? 
1971.





Japan's Emergence as a Modern 
State ? New York? 19^ +0.
The Japanese Oligarchy and the 
Russo-Japanese War? Columbia 
University Press? 1970.
Japan's Foreign Policies? New 
York? 1920.
The Manchu Abdication and the 
Powers? 1908-1912? Berkely? 1935
Intellectual and Political Currents
















Japan? a Short Cultural History 
London? 1962.
The Western World and Japan? 
London? 1950
Democracy and the Party Movement 
in Pre-war Japan? Berkeley?1953*
War and Diplomacy in the Japanese 
Empire ? New York, 1935*
Wang Ching-wei, a Political 
Biography? Shanghai, 1931.
Affairs of China? London? 1938.
The Coming Struggle in Eastern 
Asia? London? 1908.
The Reshaping of the Far East?
2 Vols., New York, 1905*
The Truth about Japan and China? 
New York, 1909.
China in Revolution: the First 
Phase, 1900-1913? New Haven, 19?1.
"Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Coup d'etat 
of 1898 in China", Pacific 
Historical Review, California?
Vol. Ill (1937).
"Huang Tsun-hsien and Japan"?
Journal of the South Seas Society? 
Singapore, Vol. XVII, Part 1 (1961).
"Chinese Students in Japan"?
Chinese Recorder? American 
Presbyterian Mission Press,
October, 1909.
"Count Kato Komei and the Twenty-one 
Demands"? Pacific Historical 
Review? Vol. XIX (1950).
"Chinese Students in Japan? 1900-1911"i 
Papers on China? East Asian 
Research Centre? Harvard University? 
Cambridge? Mass., Vol. III? 19^9-
"Japan's Role in the Reform Move­
ment of K'ang Yu-wei" in Lo Jung- 
p'ang (ed.)? K'ang Yu-wei? a 
Biography and a Symposium? Associa­
tion for Asian Studies: Monographs 
and Papers, No. XXIII, University 
of Arizona Press, 1967.
Ikei Masaru "Japan's Response to the Chinese 
Revolution of 1911"? Journal of 








"The Ideology of Japanese Imperialism 
Imperial Japan and China" in 
Goodman? G.K.? compiler? Imperial 
Japan and Asia? a Reassessment? 
Occasional Papers of the East 
Asian Institute? Columbia University 
New York? 1967.
"Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: 
the case of Late Ch'ing China" 
in Feuerwerker? A.et al. (eda)? 
Approaches to Modern Chinese 
History? University of California 
Press? 1967.
"Japanese Views of China during the 
Meiji Period"? in Feuerwerker,A. 
et al.Ceds.) Approaches to Modern 
Chinese History? U.C. Press? 1967.
"Modernization and Foreign Policy 
in Meiji Japan" in Ward? R.E. (ed.) 
Political Development in Modern 
Japan? Princeton? 1 968.
"Attitudes towards Asia and the 
Beginning of Japanese Empire" in 
Goodman? G.K. (compiler)? Imperial 
Japan and Asia? a Reassessment? 
Columbia University? New York? 1967.
"A Catechism of Western Diplomacy: 
the Japanese and Hamilton Fish?
1872"? Journal of Asian Studies?
May? 1967.
"The Reform Ideas of Huang Tsun- 
hsien's 'History of Japan' and 
its influence on the Hundred Days' 
Reform"? Journal of the South Seas 
Society? Singapore? Vol. XVII?
Part 2 (1961).
"Dr. G.E. Morrison and Japan"?
Journal of the Oriental Society of 
Australia? Vol. II? No.1 .
(June ? T9 6 3).
"Japan's Indecision during the 
Boxer Disturbances"? Journal of 
Asian Studies? Vol. XX (1961)
"A New Japanese Invasion of China"? 
Chinese Recorder? July? 1901.
"The Chinese Constitutional Mission 
of 1905-1906"? Journal of Modern 
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"Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations? 
1870-189V'? Chinese Social and 
Political Science Review? Vol. XVII 
(1933-^ ).
"Chinese Students in Japan"? East 
of Asia Magazine? Quarterly 
Publication at the North China 
Herald Office? Shanghai? Vol. IV? 
Part 2 (July? 1905).
"Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Japanese"? 
Journal of Asian Studies? Vol. XXIV 
(1965).
Chung-Tung Chan-Chi Pen-Mo (History 
of the Sino-Japanese war over Korea)? 
Shanghai? 1897. An account of the 
political situation in the Far East 
based on Chinese and foreign official 
publications.
Pai-Nien Lai Chung-Jih Kuan-Hsi 
Lun-Wen Chi (Articles on Sino- 
Japanese relations in the last 
hundred years)? Taipeh? 1968.
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao Yu Ch'ing-Chi 
Ko-Ming (Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the 
revolution in late Ch'ing China)? 
Taipeh? 196 -^.
Kuo-Fu Yii Jih-Pen Yu-Jen (Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen and his Japanese friends)? 
Taipeh? 1965*
Chung-Kuo Hsin-Wen Shih-Yeh 
(Chinese newspaper enterprise)? 
Shanghai? 1932.
Chung-Kuo Pao-Hsiieh Shi (A history 
of Chinese Journalism)? Shanghai?
1927.
Chin-Tai Chung-Kuo Liu-Hsiieh Shi 
(A history of Chinese students 
studying abroad in recent times)? 
Shanghai ? 1933•
Wai-Jen Yii Wu-Hsii Pien-Fa (The 
foreigners and the 1898 reform 
movement)? Taipeh? 1965.
Liu-Shih-Nien Lai Chung-Kuo Yu Jih-Per 
(Relations between China and Japan 















(ii) Articles and Essays 
Oka Yoshitake
Sakai Yukichi
Nihon no Chugokukan (Japan's 
image of China)? Tokyo? 1938.
Shina Mondai Jiten (Dictionary of 
Chinese problems)? Tokyo? 19 +^2 .
A collection of sixty-two articles 
on China with maps and biographical 
guides.
Meiji Jidai no Shimbun to Zasshi 
(Newspapers and magazines in the 
Meiji period). Tokyo? 1961.
Nihon Shimbun Hyakunenshi (One 
hundred years of Japanese newspapers) 
Tokyo? 1960.
Meiji Shoki Nichi-Kan-Shin Kankei 
no Kenkyu (Studies of the relations 
between Japan? Korea and China in 
the early Meiji period)? Tokyo? 1969.
Chugokujin Nihon Ryugakushi (A 
history of Chinese students in 
Japan)? Tokyo? 1960.
Chugoku Kyoikushi (History of 
education in China)? Tokyo? 1933*
Nihonjin ni totte no Chugoku-zo 
(China as seen by the Japanese)? 
Tokyo? 1966.
Ajia Shugi (Asianism)? Gendai 
Nihon Shiso Taikei? 9» (Outline 
of contemporary Japanese thoughts)? 
Tokyo? 1963*
Nihon Kinsei Gaiko-shi (A history 
of Japan's foreign relations in 
modern times)? Tokyo? 1938.
"Kokuminteki Dokuritsu to Kokka 
Risei" (National independence and 
raison d'etat) in Sekai no Naka no 
Nihon (Japan in the world)? Kindai 
Nihon Shiso-shi Koza (Lectures on 
modern Japanese intellectual history) 
Vol. VIII? Tokyo? 1961.
"Konoe Atsumaro to Meiji Sanjunendai 
no Taikokopa" (Konoe Atsumaro and 
the 'hard-line party in foreign 
relations' in the 1897-1907 period)? 
in Kokka Gakka Zasshi? Vol. 831 





Konoe's views on Japan's relations 
with Russia, China and Korea with part­
icular reference to the roles played b; 
the Toa Dobun Kai and Kokumin 
Domei Kai in Japanese politics 
and foreign relations . The 
writer has based his assessment 
primarily on the compilation, "Konoe 
Atsumaro Nikki" of which he is one 
of the editors.
"Bojutsu Henpo to Nihon" (The 1898 
reform movement and Japan) in 
Tokyo Toritsu Daigaku Hogakukai 
Zashi (Journal of the Society of 
the Law Faculty of the Tokyo State 
University), Vol. VI, No.2.
"Tairiku Seisaku ni okeru Imeeji no 
Tenkai" (Changing images in contin­
ental 'policy) in Shinohara Hajime and 
Mitani Taichiro (eds.), Kidai 
Nihon no Seiji Shid.o; Sei.jika Kenkyujl 
(Political Leadership in Modern 
Japan: Studies of Politicians, Part. 
II), Tokyo, 1969*
"Bojutsu yori Koshi ni itaru Kakumeipa 
to Henpopa no Kosho" (The negotia­
tions between the revolutionary 
and reformist parties from 1898- 
1900) in Kindai Chugoku Kenkyu 
I-inkai ed., Kindai Chugoku Kenkyu 
(Seminars on Modern China), Vol.7, 
Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha, 1966.
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